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Index Ventures Partner, Martin Mignot: Figma, Scale, Wiz: Inside Index’s Decacorn Factory

Martin Mignot is a Partner at Index Ventures, the best-performing fund in the world right now. In the last three months, they have sold Wiz for $ 32 billion, sold Scale for $14.9 billion, and IPO'd Figma as the largest investor. In addition to this, they are the largest or second-largest shareholders in Roblox, Revolut, Adyen and Datadog. ---------------------------------------------- Agenda for Today: 00:00 – Intro 01:47 – Why Most People Shouldn’t Become VCs 10:18– The Founder Trait That Trumps Market Size Every Time 18:45 – How Spotify Still Haunts Index Ventures & What They Learn From It? 26:11 – The Brutal Truth About European vs. U.S. Founders 34:20 – The Case for a European AI Giant (and Who Might Build It) 42:40 – The Return of the 7-Day Founder Work Week 47:11 – Biggest Lessons from Leading Revolut’s Series A 54:04 – Betting Against Nick Storonsky? Don’t. 1:05:51 – Quick-Fire Round ----------------------------------------------- Subscribe on Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3j2KMcZ... Subscribe on Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast... Follow Harry Stebbings on X: / harrystebbings Follow Martin Mignot on X: / martinmignot Follow 20VC on Instagram: / 20vchq Follow 20VC on TikTok: / 20vc_tok Visit our Website: https://www.20vc.com Subscribe to our Newsletter: https://www.thetwentyminutevc.com/con... ----------------------------------------------- #20vc #harrystebbings #MartinMignot #Indexventures #generalpartner #vc #lp #ai #samaltman #openai

Martin MignotguestHarry Stebbingshost
Aug 11, 20251h 22mWatch on YouTube ↗

EVERY SPOKEN WORD

  1. 0:00 – 1:47

    Intro

    1. MM

      (instrumental music) ... beware of gross margin in the early days. That's a mistake we made a couple of time. You know, you have a lot of businesses that, in the early days, have really bad gross margin. All the LLM providers were very clear examples of that. I think if that's the only thing that's holding you up, in most cases, I would totally ignore it. We never lose a deal or pass on a deal because of price in the early stage. So, we've been around for 30 years. We invested $11.5 billion. We've returned close to 30, and we still have 20-plus in holdings. Most of that is concentrated in eight, nine companies. We invested in probably 300 to close to 400 companies over the years.

    2. HS

      Ready to go? (instrumental music) Martin, it's been eight years since our last show. We last did it on Skype. A lot's changed, man. (laughs) You still look just as young. But thank you-

    3. MM

      You too.

    4. HS

      ... so much for joining me, dude.

    5. MM

      Thanks for having me.

    6. HS

      Dude, I wanna start with a statement that you said before, and you said it actually in a Kauffman Fellows, um, event. You said, "Venture is about playing the right game." And I love this statement, and I wanted to turn it back on you and say, what is the right game then for you?

    7. MM

      The, I think the, the way I put it, uh, for this particular statement was, um, uh, you know, very much, uh, playing the long game. You know, it was very much playing the long game, um, the fact that if you are to get into this industry and this job, you've got to commit for, you know, 10, 15 years at least. And, um, and focus on, not on the, uh, outside reward, or not on the external, uh, you know, just progressing as a career, um, but very much more on the internal and, and doing it for the right reasons, which is investing in great companies, supporting great founders. That was what I

  2. 1:47 – 10:18

    Why Most People Shouldn’t Become VCs

    1. MM

      really meant by that.

    2. HS

      I think in the last cycle we added a wave of tourist VCs who like the events, who like the idea of being a VC. Do you agree that we have this wave of tourist VCs, and has it cleared?

    3. MM

      I don't know if I would say tourist VC, but I would say it's, uh, the asset class has, has institutionalized. You know, it's become, uh, you know, funds have become larger. There's, there's more people in, in general, by and large. And so, you bring people who, um, may sometimes wanna, wanna have a career, choose it as a, as a career, more than as a calling. And I think, you know, me personally, I think us at Index see this job as a calling.

    4. HS

      Doug Leonie said on the show that we've moved from a, uh, high margin boutique community to a low margin commoditized industry. Do you agree with that statement?

    5. MM

      Not entirely, no. Um, I, I know there is a, there is a, a meme which is the industry is gonna, is diverging into two camps. You have e- either have the, the mega funds, the asset gatherers, or you have the tiny boutique shops. And, and I don't truly believe in that. I think there is a, there's a third way, and you know, Index is in that third way, where you need enough scale to help support the founders. And we think always from the founder's point of view, what is, how can we best serve them? And you need a m- I think a minimum size to really help them, to kind of invest across stages, support them from inception to, to IPO. You need a minimum size, but I also don't think you m- you need a, a giga size to really support them. I think this push towards larger asset gathering is very, is very good for, for, for VCs who do it. You know, it can make a lot of sense financially. It can make a lot of sense for them. I'm not sure it makes so much sense for the entrepreneurs themselves, so I do believe there is a, there is a third way.

    6. HS

      What do you think that minimum size is, then?

    7. MM

      Exactly where we are.

    8. HS

      How big are the latest funds?

    9. MM

      Uh, we have a $300 million, uh, seed fund, uh, $800 million venture fund, and $1.5 billion growth fund. That's the latest.

    10. HS

      And that is the minimum for what you need. Perfect.

    11. MM

      I, I, I wouldn't say that's, that's the minimum. I, I, we see it as the right size to both support entrepreneurs, uh, with the right amount of capital, and then, you know, have enough to, uh, pay for the infrastructure that we have.

    12. HS

      So my mind has changed on this. I thought that the mega AUM gatherers would see d- denigration of returns and actually were bluntly just fee accumulators. And actually now, when you see the expansion of outcome sizes and more trillion dollar companies now than ever, and a very few number of people being able to write a billion-dollar check, I think actually they will do incredibly well investing in your OpenAIs at $300 million and your Anthropics at $60 billion and see venture-like returns at scale, in a way that I've really changed my mind on. Do you think I'm wrong to have changed my mind in that way?

    13. MM

      No, I think ... I'm not sure you can have venture-like returns at $300 billion. I think you can have amazing returns. You know, can you have 50, 70 X?

    14. HS

      But you could 5 X-

    15. MM

      Yeah. You can do, you can absolutely 5 X.

    16. HS

      You could 5 X a billion-dollar check.

    17. MM

      Yeah. Yeah, no, absolutely. No, I think the math, I think the max- the, the math makes sense. Do you need dedicated, uh, funds to do that, or can you do it in more, in a more ad hoc way? You know, I think that's, that's a question. But, um, I, I, I think that's, that is on the later, uh, stage si- side of things, obviously. We, you know, on the, on the early stage, uh, you know, eh, you know, the seed or early venture or early growth, I, I don't think you need, you know, tho- those, those mega assets, and I think they, they distract you and they tend to f- to pull you towards the later stage. And you know, if, if you have so much capital to deploy, obviously, you will tend to focus more on the later stage, on the very big checks. And I think if you wanna help and support at the earlier stage, you, you know, ha- it can be an impediment.

    18. HS

      For the AUM gatherers, is seed simply an entry ticket to the real product which is moving $100 to $500 million at the C, D?

    19. MM

      That is not our model, so I don't want to comment on their strategy.

    20. HS

      (laughs) That is such a cop-out. I mean, I, I totally think it is. I think I would admit it if I was them as well. I always, I, I walk around London with my mother, and I always say the same thing, which is like, I have to give analogies, and I'm like, "You know when you went clubbing and you have to pay the entry fee at the door? That's like seed for the AUM gatherers."

    21. MM

      Yeah.

    22. HS

      "And the table is the C and the D." Uh ... (laughs)

    23. MM

      This is not how we see seed at all. You know, we, uh, every check is high conviction. We don't make as many as, as a result, but, you know, we m- we have high conviction checks and we work closely with these founders even at the seed stage. We, it's the same as if you, you are Series A. Our goal is very simple. You know, we wanna be, as early as possible, be- become the largest shareholder and become the, the most valued and most referenced investors in those companies.

    24. HS

      I chatted to Danny before the show, and he said that Martin didn't always have this perspective on where funds would win and this kind of third path being the middle and being-

    25. MM

      Yeah.

    26. HS

      ... your path today.What did you believe and what caused you to change your mind?

    27. MM

      What I've changed my mind on is if you start from the founder and, and if you really think through, uh, how can you best help them. You know, what is the most, you know, the most helpful way that you can interact with them at the early stage especially. How does that help them that you have 10 different products, you know, that you do LBO, you do credit deal, how is that helpful to an early stage founder? It's not. And so, if you really think from that first principle of okay, h- what are the resources you need to be really helpful in those early stages? And again, in, in the service for us of building, uh, both the biggest ownership and the best reference from those founders, it's not this super large scale multi-product. It's a, you know, you need enough, again, to support them, but you also need to be small enough to kind of keep that interpersonal relationship and that close support where they know they can call 10 people at Index and, you know, get help on anything that, that, that may happen to them. And you don't necessarily have that in such a personal and trusted way in a much larger company where people move around a lot more. You know, a lot of our people have been around for 10 year plus, you know, even in our strategist team. And that creates a, a, a level of trust and, and competency that it's really hard to replicate in much larger, on, on much larger organizations.

    28. HS

      It's hard when I ... I love you, but like, dude, team turnover's been high. Like, there's a lot of team turnover. Like, I d- I ... Surely it's not that. Like, we don't have much consistency in the Index team, do you? You've got Shardul, you, Yann.

    29. MM

      Yeah, and, and, and, uh, if you look at the principal rank, you know, we have a lot of people who've been around for a long time. If you look at the strategist rank, we have a lot of people who've been here for a long time. So there has been turnover in the industry, you know, at, at large, but-

    30. HS

      Interesting question. Do you think consistency of team correlates to venture returns?

  3. 10:18 – 18:45

    The Founder Trait That Trumps Market Size Every Time

    1. MM

      that way.

    2. HS

      Okay. So when we think about like, bluntly new deals, yeah, there's two types of founders. There's ones that come to an industry fresh and with the joys of naivety and open eyes, and then there's ones that come to it as an industry insider. How do you think about which founder type you prefer and lessons from them?

    3. MM

      I don't prefer any of those types. The way I think about it is slightly different. You know, the, the, what I love in founders is unique insights. And that unique insight can come ... So the unique insight can come from two places, is one, experience and knowledge of, of an industry. The other one is just sheer intelligence and, and ability to break down complex problem into very simple ones. And, you know, if you think about, uh, all the best founders that are, you know, I've worked with and that, you know, you have worked with, I think they, they tend to have this one similarity, which is they can come up with a, a very simple insight, something that sounds very simple, but actually incredibly deep, and profound, and defensible. And they typically come at it, um, from first principle thinking. I mean, and I think first principle thinking gets thrown out a lot, but the very best founders they have that. And so if you take, you know, Nick at Revolut, you know, as, as, as an example of that, a lot of his decisions and a lot of his core insights were just linked to that first principle thinking. So he thought about, okay, FX, for example. FX for large corridor where you have a lot of volume of, of transfer, costs nothing. So it should be given, you know, given, uh, for free, you know, to the market. And then once you have that, that's a really good hook and then you can build something else. And so, and, and if you think about most of the, the great companies, they have one simple insight, but that is, uh, very deeply original. And to me, that's, that's the core of what I look for in founders is, you know, I wanna sit there and then they will teach me something that they have come up with, either thanks to their experience and, but more, you know, usually, uh-... from that, that deep thinking that they've done and where they've solved this problem. Look at, you know, Will at Deliveroo, for example. His insight was very much, the product is the delivery. Which sounds obvious, but it's not the digital experience that... It's the qu- it's the speed and quality of the del- the delivery and it, it has to come below 20 minutes. That's the... If you can get that consistently, that is the product. Everything else is a, is a distraction. That's the core product and that's what we should entirely focus on.

    4. HS

      It's funny, I had Mischa, the founder of Fiverr, on the show recently and he said a fascinating thing, which is like, "The most important thing that's changed is time to copy." How long it takes for someone else to copy your product.

    5. MM

      Yeah.

    6. HS

      When you see a dramatically reduced time to copy, does the value of unique insight go down? You could have a great idea, but I see it and bluntly, with tools that we have available, I can copy it super fast and I'm better at branding and marketing than you, so I'm gonna crush you. Does the value of unique insight go down?

    7. MM

      I think it, it goes down (laughs) without great execution that comes with it. I think that, on its own, is not enough. I still think it gives you, uh, it gives you an advantage. But then, I agree, I think it's all about execution.

    8. HS

      Can I ask, when you think about, like, market timing risk, it's something where I've got burnt before, how willing are you to take market timing risk when you think about unique insights?

    9. MM

      What, what do you mean by market timing?

    10. HS

      "Hey, I believe this. I don't know how long it's gonna take for the market to see what I believe," versus, "Hey, I have a product that's super fucking great right now and it's gonna fly off the shelf."

    11. MM

      You know, tha- that's a very common (laughs) way of, of making mistakes and, and, and making investments.

    12. HS

      So, like, you could look at, like, Cowboy and say, like, "Hey, actually, in a world today, everyone appreciates the importance of, like, innovation on transportation-"

    13. MM

      Yeah.

    14. HS

      "... uh, the benefits of cycling in cities."

    15. MM

      Yeah.

    16. HS

      It would... ve- very different five or six years ago.

    17. MM

      So, I think, look, market timing i- is a real thing. You know, you, you can be right, but it can be that... Again, if you look at food delivery, it's in- interesting, people tried to do Deliveroo five or six years... There was a French company, I forgot the name, that was, it was doing Deliveroo, but what did- what they didn't have was they didn't have smartphone penetration. So, they had to call peop- I mean, they had to call drivers to tell them where to go and where to deliver. Anyw- anyway, and obviously that didn't scale. And, and, you know, there, there was no ef- ef- efficiency and they would take f- 50 minutes, it would be very expensive. And so you needed to have not only the invention of the smartphone, but you need to have everyone, including drivers, having s- smartphones for the, something like Deliveroo to exist. So, you know, clearly here it's a true, you know, the concept was there, but the technology just d- didn't follow. I think in the case of, of, of Cowboy and micromobility in general, (clears throat) I think the timing was, was absolutely correct. The challenge here in this industry is that it's, um... If you are selling the hardware, it's a ha- you know, it's mostly a hardware product and hardware is, is really hard if you don't sell software on top, because, you know, you, you rely on, on a very complex supply chain, it's been... I mean, which has suffered a lot over the past years, obviously. Um, it's a volume game, you need to have distribution, you need to have relationships. So, so, it... re- you need to raise a lot of money to build all of those assets, and the return on that capital is not as good as on pure software businesses. If you're selling a service, so, you know, Lime and Bird and those, then I think you can have a, a large scale, but it is so operationally complex and you're also competing with a lot of subsidized transportation. So, you are charging full price for a service that is, you know, offered at a discount by a lot of, you know, uh, uh, municipal, uh, services and, and you're fighting against a lot of regulation and a lot of, you know, challenges. I still think that some companies will do well, actually, in that space. I think Lime is, is doing well, I think Dot is doing pretty well. So, I think they will, they will be okay at the end, but it's clearly... You know, it's been a, a really, really difficult space.

    18. HS

      Dude, I had the CEO of Lime on, uh, and he said that at one point they had a 33% break rate every month. One in three break-

    19. MM

      Yeah.

    20. HS

      ... like, every month. Like, destroyed. I mean, (blows raspberry) a hard fucking business. We mentioned Cowboy, it's, it's a hard deal, being direct.

    21. MM

      Yeah.

    22. HS

      How do you prevent hard deals or losses impact future decision making? So many deals... I've met so many great FinTech investors who never did Stripe 'cause they're like, "I thought it would be commoditized, I thought it was a race to the bottom." They let the past dictate the future.

    23. MM

      Yeah.

    24. HS

      How do you not do that?

    25. MM

      Yeah, that's, that's probably the hardest, uh, the hardest one. And actually, you know, it's funny, it doesn't only... It's not only the, the, the bad investments or the mediocre or... So, any investment gives you some form of bias. Uh, you know, if it's a great investment, then everything else may look, you know, not so great in comparison. And, y- you know, I've suffered certainly from that, you know, on the FinTech side, for example, where, you know, I was lucky enough to be early in Revolut, and then I looked at a lot of other FinTech investments and went like, "Well, Revolut can't do this, or Revolut does it better." Or, you know... So, so I think it goes, it goes both ways.

    26. HS

      And you've missed out because of that.

    27. MM

      Yeah, exactly. And I think it-

    28. HS

      What did you miss out on because you thought Revolut was great?

    29. MM

      We could have invested in any... You know, in a lot of other neobanks, um... You know, I think, I... I mean, Qonto would be a really good example of that. Uh, a lot of, you know, remittance and certain corridors. And then, so there's a lot of play on the-

    30. HS

      In the nicest way, do you actually regret... I, I didn't mean this horribly or to single out any players, I'm not a dick journalist. But it's just like, I just think so much that value accrues to the number one-

  4. 18:45 – 26:11

    How Spotify Still Haunts Index Ventures & What They Learn From It?

    1. HS

      It was- it was not too late. (laughs) I'm sorry.

    2. MM

      Yeah, yeah, exactly. Yeah. 100 billion plus, yeah.

    3. HS

      I love Danny, I love Danny, and I love Daniel.

    4. MM

      Yeah.

    5. HS

      And Daniel wanted Danny every freaking round. (laughs)

    6. MM

      I know. Exactly. But you know, so- so, I think the learning here is when you have... again, it goes back to the funder. When you have... and we knew because, you know, Daniel was working at- at one of our companies, so we- we knew the guy was- was incredible. And, um, and so when you have such a unique founder that, again, does have a unique insight about- about their industry and has the ability to execute on it, and also in this case you see real signs of execution, don't overthink it. I think that's a, that's a problem that we have, and I- I'm, uh, chat with a lot of VC who say, you know, it's, kind of, pretty widespread in the industry. Like, you think you are, you know, you wanna be very smart, you wanna be very diligent, you wanna- you... and so there is a tendency to overthink, and you know, when something has a fantastic founder and has real movement, then sometimes you just need... even if it's an industry where like, "Oh my God, I've been burnt in the past," uh, I think don't overthink it.

    7. HS

      I'm early stage, like, seed and A. If I have a world-class founder, I don't give a shit what they're doing.

    8. MM

      Yeah.

    9. HS

      I genuinely do not. I- there's this, like, brilliant, um, curve, I don't know if you've seen it, right? You start your career-

    10. MM

      Yeah, yeah, exactly.

    11. HS

      ... and you think it's all about team. You then go, uh, th- three, five years in-

    12. MM

      Yeah.

    13. HS

      ... where you're like, "Oh, I'm smart, I should analyze markets."

    14. MM

      Yeah.

    15. HS

      And then 10 years in, you're like, just team again.

    16. MM

      Yeah. I remember, uh, I think Matt- Matt Turek shared that, that meme at some point.

    17. HS

      (laughs)

    18. MM

      And I- I'm getting there, too. I'm- I'm ba- I'm back on the- on the other side of the curve.

    19. HS

      Okay. You have team, you have traction, you have market.

    20. MM

      Yeah.

    21. HS

      One through three, most important.

    22. MM

      I mean, team, team, team, and team. I would say that's- that's- that's, you know, I- I'm back to that as- as the number one. But you know, I would say, you know, I u- I probably used to think, you know, market, team, and traction. Now, I'm kind of probably the other way around, so kind of team, traction, and market.

    23. HS

      Given revenue scalings being so unparalleled today for so many companies, does revenue mean less? Does traction mean less? Given zero to 10 million there kind of commoditized now, as- as awful and trite as that sounds. Does it mean less?

    24. MM

      I don't think it means less. Um, I, you know, as you know, finding product-market fit is the hardest thing in- in any business, and- and tons of founders walk around in this route for years without ever finding it. So, I think we shouldn't minimize or trivialize, you know, finding real traction and having real revenue traction. I think this is- this is remarkable and it should be celebrated. Obviously, y- if you are talking about AI, auditing the quality of that revenue is critical. Um, and so that's what people, you know, that's what we spend a lot of our time doing, is, you know, how... is that- is that revenue long-lasting? Is- is it sticky? And- and sometime, obviously if you have... the- the more cohorts you have, the more you can see the numbers. If you don't have that, then it's gonna be, you know, talking to customers and also really trying to understand their use case. If it's- it's something that's more like project-based and- and they wanna use it once and then, you know, they will switch to something else potentially, or it's something that, especially if it's inserted inside their workflow, you know, Cursor is a good example, you know, the- we- we've made a- a bunch of those type of investments, then in all likelihood, even if the number doesn't show it yet, in all likelihood, the stickiness of that product is gonna be a lot higher.

    25. HS

      Totally agree with you there. Can I ask you, we said about kind of keeping that pure mindset. Partnerships can help in terms of preventing mistakes on, "Oh, I've done it before and it's lost money," which is a very dangerous heuristic, obviously. When you think about decision-making internally, how does decision-making look on at New Deals and how does that differ on size of check?

    26. MM

      We have a s- a- a different size of quorum depending on the size of the check, so who needs to be there. Uh, always folks from each office, that's very important, you know, because we work as- as one team across offices, and then we- we vote. We vote, uh, one to 10. You can't vote, uh, five and six. So you have to be, you know, four against, and then it's kind of a qu- so it's a qualified majority, essentially. So if- if the average is above six, you know, the- the deal is- the deal is approved. Um, and so that- that mechanism, you know, i- is the same, and then there's also, uh, some la- latitude if you- if you have, you know, very high conviction on deal, um, at the early stage, I think we have a bias for, you know, to action. And again, going back to having a beginner's mindset, the person who spend a lot more time with a certain team is obviously better placed to make a judgment call on that team, and so there is, you know, there's kind of a collective trust into, uh, the partner's judgment.

    27. HS

      But if you wanna write a $5 million check on the spot, you can do it?

    28. MM

      Not exactly on the spot, but, uh, but you can definitely, you know, make the deal happen.

    29. HS

      What was the most controversial deal-

    30. MM

      (laughs)

  5. 26:11 – 34:20

    The Brutal Truth About European vs. U.S. Founders

    1. MM

      and great investments.

    2. HS

      And honestly, that was my take on lovable's gross margin, which is like-

    3. MM

      Yeah.

    4. HS

      ... what it is today is not what it will be in the future.

    5. MM

      Yeah.

    6. HS

      So I totally agree with you there. European stack rank was what I wrote down here, which is like if I was in the Europe team, I would honestly be a little bit perturbed by the dual structure of having US people on my decision-making because I'm stack ranked against the growth of Silicon Valley companies. I'm never gonna get a deal done. I'm not saying they're worse, but they grow slower. Their execution speeds are often slower. Like I- I just think it's like if you stack rank them, it makes it harder for European teams to get deals done.

    7. MM

      It may, it's not really what we see. You know, we- we- we consistently invest about half in Europe and half in the US, and we have a global one, global bar, and I think that's the way we see the world. And we- we don't, we're not fighting for local, uh, uh, maximum, we're- we're fighting for a global maximum. You know, we wanna be in the very best businesses globally and be the, you know, the reference investors in- in those.

    8. HS

      Is there a culture challenge in presentation? And what I mean by that is like Americans are brilliant at marketing and storytelling, and I mean that nicely-

    9. MM

      Yeah, yeah.

    10. HS

      ... not badly, but respectfully to your fellow countrymen, French people, you know, I- I'll meet them and I'm like, you know, they're like, "Yeah, we're doing 50 million in ARR." And I'm like, "Wow, that's amazing." "Yeah, it's okay."

    11. MM

      (laughs)

    12. HS

      And I'm like-

    13. MM

      Yeah.

    14. HS

      ... "If this was American, it'd be great."

    15. MM

      Sure. Yeah.

    16. HS

      And so my question is, is there a culture chasm that doesn't carry with European founders to your American partners?

    17. MM

      Yes. I think the answer- the answer i- is yes, b- by and large. So k- we know, you know, well, i- if there's one team that is aware of those differences, it- I would say it's- it's Index. And so, um, we are very well aware of it and we take it into account when- when we vote on deals and that's also why we leave a lot of latitude, especially in the... When you have data and it- it's different because obviously, you know, data can- can speaks, you know, can- can- can speak for itself. But I think when, uh, at the earlier stage to your point, the presentation matters a lot more. And that's where leaving more latitude to the partner or the investor who is closer to the founder and spend more time with them, you know, is- is super important because yeah, I mean, we've had that i- in the past, for sure.

    18. HS

      Peter Fenton said on the show that price is a mental trap. Interesting statement.

    19. MM

      Yeah.

    20. HS

      How do you think about your own price sensitivity today?

    21. MM

      Yeah, I- I think is- is absolutely right. You shouldn't lose- you shouldn't lose a deal o- on price, especially, I think it's especially true in the early stage. Um, and so we never, you know, we never pass and we never lose a deal o- o- or pass on a deal because of price in the early stage. I think that is absolutely correct. I think it can be a little b- you know, where does it stop though? I mean, i- it-

    22. HS

      Is that not a price that's too high?

    23. MM

      Yeah.

    24. HS

      I- I will ask, are we being paid for the risk that we're taking?

    25. MM

      That's not really how we think, to be honest. Um, you know, this kind of risk reward profile, y- you know, you don't know, right? Because you don't really have a good sense for the size of the reward. And I think in general, by and large, we've been, you know, the industry has even kind of, you know, underestimated the size of the outcome. I mean, you mentioned the s- the scale of the revenue growth, the scale of the- of the market caps of these businesses. We didn't think that that would be the case, you know, even, you know, 10 years ago. And so- so, you know, at the early stage, if you had known at the time that the outcomes could be so large, well then maybe, you know, with very fair reward for the risk you were taking. So- so I think in the early stage, it's- it's, um, y-... i, I think he's, I think he's absolutely right. The only question is how far does it extend, you know, in valuation? You know, when you are at, you know, you mentioned, you know, Panera at 200 billion. Like, is that, you know, is there a s- m- i- is, is, uh, one trillion still, you know, a mental trap or is it... I, I don't know. So there, there must be some moment where you get into a slightly different realm and where, you know, the, the, the, the, the distribution of outcomes becomes narrower and the likelihood of, you know... And you- so you have a better understanding of where the company will a- you know, the closer you get to IPO, the closer you should have a sense for what is the valuation and so you have a better sense for that risk-reward profile that you, that you're mentioning. In the early stage, this is so far out, you don't really know. So I think y- again, if you go back to the first principle of if you have this extraordinary funder and there's real traction, then, you know, don't overthink it.

    26. HS

      Have you done deals, though, at high prices that in hindsight they were too high price and it negatively impacted the company?

    27. MM

      Oh, yeah. For sure.

    28. HS

      (laughs)

    29. MM

      (laughs) Definitely. Yeah, I mean, yeah.

    30. HS

      And so there is a too high price.

  6. 34:20 – 42:40

    The Case for a European AI Giant (and Who Might Build It)

    1. MM

      really think about it that way. You know, I think in the early stage, whether, you know... And first of all, the label on stage is, you know, is as good as, as, as you want to make it. You know, you know, is it seeds, it's series A, is it pre-seeds, it's s- y- th- there is, I think there is kind of, there's a pre-product market fit business, there is a post product market fit business, and then there is a scale business. And I think, so you have, you know, you have those kind of three, uh, uh, for me there are kind of three stages and we have, you know, our funds are seed venture and growth that can represent those three stages, but, you know, they're not really, really a label. And then for us at the early stage, we don't... You know, the goal, again, the goal for us is to be double digit owner reference shareholder as early as possible. And so we don't try to think, okay, is it now a good time, is it now a bad time? Great companies are created at any time, you know, in, in the cycle. And so if you can get in early enough and have enough ownership, we don't overthink, oh, is it series A, is it series C? How much do we own? But again, I think having, you know, being a multi-stage fund helps with that, with that flexibility.

    2. HS

      Do you have investments in any of the LLM providers?

    3. MM

      We do.

    4. HS

      Which one?

    5. MM

      Uh, we're in, uh, Cohere and in, uh, and we have a seed investments in Mistral.

    6. HS

      Okay. Got it. Do you think about dilution sensitivity down the road? You know, we mentioned delivery, that's kind of V1 of dilution-

    7. MM

      Yeah.

    8. HS

      ... sensitivity if you want, and LLMs is, I guess, the latest version where like there's a fundamental question of like, is it actually a good venture product because the dilutive nature of the business is so high?

    9. MM

      Well, we'll-- we'll see at the end of the-- we'll see at the end of the journey. I think it's, um ... As a-- the pure venture multiple will likely be lower than some of the other categories in the past. I think that is, that is clear. The difference is that the size of the outcome and the speed, very importantly, the speed at which the size is gonna get reached, means that you can have, especially if you can deploy a lot of capital, you will still be able to generate a lot of absolute returns, so ... I mean, I think this, in terms of performance will still be very high in terms of pure multiple and early stage investments. It may be, may be slightly lower because of evolution.

    10. HS

      Do you worry about the distribution of value in the LLM market when you think about, you know, the two tower waves obviously being OpenAI and Anthropic, and what we said ear- earlier about the importance of being number one, how much value accrual actually goes to the long tail with other providers, I really question. Do you worry about that?

    11. MM

      Yeah, of course. Of course I worry about that. Um, I-

    12. HS

      Like, does Europe need an LLM provider?

    13. MM

      Yeah, I think it does. I think it does. Um-

    14. HS

      Can you paint that case for me? I- I- I'm not asking you this as a journalist.

    15. MM

      Yeah.

    16. HS

      I'm asking you as a student. Why?

    17. MM

      Yeah. Well, (clears throat) I think the- the notion of sovereignty and tech sovereignty is- is a real notion. I think it's important. You have to recognize that there's a big part of the economy that has to think that way where, you know, you have geopolitical realities that matter, and so if you're a government entity, if you are a quasi-government company, you may want and or even have to use, you know, local providers eventually, you know, at some point. So, I do think there is a large part of the market that needs and wants local, uh, providers, especially, you know, assuming that they are close to the frontier or at the frontier. And so, so I think there is a real, there is a real market case for that. There's also a lot of, I think, um, uh, you know, localization, customization that can and- and need to happen, and so I think there's gonna be a- a great enterprise market for- for those- those providers. So yeah, I think there is a market. You know, is it gonna be smaller than OpenAI?

    18. HS

      Do you think we need to-

    19. MM

      Yes. For sure. (laughs)

    20. HS

      (laughs) Fair enough. Uh, I don't (laughs) disagree with you. Do you think we need government intervention in AI? I- I- I spoke to Danny obviously before the show, he said ... He was the only one who says actually, he said, "You should ask him about China." Do you think we need government intervention in AI? Pushing you to use one model over another? Shutting off access to certain providers?

    21. MM

      (clears throat) I do believe that having, you know, government entities or quasi-government entities support local innovation is in that, in that critical field is- is important. I- I think the way to do it is not necessarily to, um ... I think they should be customers. I think they- they should buy those products and- and- and- and they should, you know, they should help them as- as customer, rather than, you know, as investor necessarily. Um-

    22. HS

      Do you think TikTok should be allowed though, for example?

    23. MM

      I think it should be allowed, but there should be a- a bigger conversation about social networks and about the openness of algorithms, which doesn't only apply to- to TikTok, but, you know, applies to X, applies to Facebook. I think those algorithms should be, um, should be public, should be able to be audited by, you know, by anyone, um, but also including independent, uh, uh, auditors. I think that's ... You know, they have-- they are not regular companies. I think they- they are utilities. They are critical infrastructure for the economy and for our political systems, and as such I think they require a- a level of- of-- a cert- a treatment that is different from, you know, any, uh, random, uh, random startup.

    24. HS

      When we look at the different players today, we're seeing this kind of real concentration of value, almost like never before. You mentioned like, "Oh, OpenAI are gonna be bigger," but your OpenAIs, your Anthropics, your Cursors, and there's probably, you know, five to ten in this kind of ilk. The concentration of value within startups seems to be more prescient or dominant than ever before. Do you worry about this concentration of value and, bluntly, the platform play that comes from that? Meaning, it is just much more concentrated and makes it more difficult for us investing in smaller players.

    25. MM

      I don't think it's that different from before.

    26. HS

      Really?

    27. MM

      Uh, yeah. You know, if you- if I look at Index, you know, I was, I was looking at the, at the numbers. You know, I think we've- we've invested ... So we've been around for 30 years. We've invested, I think, 11 and a half billion dollars. We've returned, I think about close to 30, and we still have, you know, 20 plus in, you know, in- in holdings. Most of that is basically concentrated in eight, nine companies, uh, and we've invested in probably 300 f- close to 400 companies over the years. So, (laughs) you know, it's like ... S- so the concentr- the power low and the concentration of returns in a small number of names, I mean, we've experienced it ourselves at- at, you know, at our level. And so I don't think it's that different than- than it was before. I mean, I don't, there- I don't see anything that- that indicates that it's going to be that different. And that's why making sure you are in those category leaders early enough to have, you know, big enough ownership and also, you know, earning the reference from the founder, being the reference investor is the most powerful. It's the only thing that really matters.

    28. HS

      What did you miss at the early stage that you were like, "Oh, fuck it, we just have to be in this," and then came in later?

    29. MM

      That was just before I started, but we did that with Zendesk, for example, where, you know, we passed on- on- on the seed and on DA especially. Um, you know, if you look at the memo and the valuation at the time, (laughs) it's- it's quite funny and ............................ I don't remember exactly what it was, but very different from wha- where it is today as you can imagine. Uh, and we came in later at the, uh, you know, with our growth fund.

    30. HS

      Do you worry for your companies about the concentration of talent? You know, we are in a war for talent today like we've never seen before.

  7. 42:40 – 47:11

    The Return of the 7-Day Founder Work Week

    1. HS

      Talking of kind of European founders competing, um, (laughs) I- I obviously posted about the importance of working seven days a week in an increased intensity world where we are competing against China and the US, and that being the new normal. Um, y- you, you know, I think very rightly, uh, said the same, um, and then I got all the blowback. (laughs)

    2. MM

      (laughs)

    3. HS

      And you avoided it all. Um, my question to you is, why do you think that we are in a new world of work intensity and that a new caliber of work is required to build a $10 billion business?

    4. MM

      Again, I- I- I'm not sure it's changed so much. Uh, if you look at the- the most incredible companies in the past, you know, you look at Revolut, you look at Deliveroo, like all of these companies, the amount of work that these founders and these early teams put in was- was tremendous. I mean, it- it was seven days a week, you know, it was nights and weekends. I mean, th- that's what it was. And, um, and so- so I- I think that's what it takes when you are going into those- those hyper growth mode and you have, you know, and you go for the venture backed route, that is, you know, that is part of the journey that is kind of, you know, in many ways what you're saying for. You need to have two things. One is you need to make a- a- a lot of experimentation, iteration. And so that typically means, you know, the longer you work, the more things you can try. And then you need to have a very high kind of growth curve and- and be able to learn very quickly from those experimentations. I think the main change to me is how open people are. And I think it's good because then there is no mismatch of expectation. You're not joining a company and then, "Well, shit, they're working so hard at this, I can't do it. This is not for me." There at least there's- there's real alignment between, you know, what you're saying and what you're doing. And I think that's- that's actually positive.

    5. HS

      When you think about the word liquidity, what are your biggest lessons on when's the right time to sell?

    6. MM

      You know, you talked about, um, market timing and we don't try to time the market at entry and we don't try to time it at exit either. Um, we have... We're not public market investors. We tend to have a very standard liquidity program when a company goes public where we sell, you know, every quarter over three years in a very, you know, recurring regular preset way in- in many ways. We obviously have, you know, we have... We set up exit committee with a... where you have, um, four people on, including the partner who led the deal and a- another partner who didn't lead the deal and is not as close. So, we always have kind of healthy debates and we can ad- we can adjust at the margin, but by and large, our view is don't try to be too smart. And then, so, you know, it's always the same, then when things go really well and you've sold too early, "Oh, shit." But then you also have the, you know, the opposite where if you hadn't done that very systematic approach, you would, you wouldn't have realized a lot of liquidity. So all in all-

    7. HS

      What- what- what did you sell too early and you're most oh-shit about?

    8. MM

      I mean, you know, we were a very large investor in, uh, in Robinhood, um, and we sold, uh, you know, uh, we sold quite a bit at a lower price than where it is today. You know, we still have a large stake, but, um, you know, there's always- there's always gonna be counter examples. Um, and so yeah, I think that's one of... that's the clear one given the- I think you talked about their- their recent, uh, price- price action. And so-

    9. HS

      Do you think it is the right strategy to do that, to sell in these quarterly increments when they go public? Given- given all the information that you have, are you not in a place of asymmetric information where you are better placed and actually look at like a Shopify of the world-

    10. MM

      Yeah.

    11. HS

      ...where, shit, you would have lost 98% of the value?

    12. MM

      Yeah. Um, again, you know, they are, you know, there are counter examples for sure. When we ran the analysis and we did run the analysis, obviously, we didn't, you know, come up with it, you know, randomly.

    13. HS

      (laughs)

    14. MM

      It- it- it came out that-

    15. HS

      For billions of dollars decision, we did, "Oh, fuck it, it works." (laughs)

    16. MM

      And obviously, you know, it's hard to do the counterfactual because, you know, you can never sell only at the top. I mean, that- that, you know, I wish we could, but that- that's just not gonna happen. So, um, but if we... if we looked at if we had taken different schedules, we would have been worse off. And so we felt that overall, if you look across a basket or portfolio, and again, it's a portfolio approach, so you may be wrong on one or two, but if you take a portfolio approach and you do it for long enough and consistently enough, then we, you know, we realized that that was- that was the best outcome.

  8. 47:11 – 54:04

    Biggest Lessons from Leading Revolut’s Series A

    1. MM

    2. HS

      Does the extension of private markets change that perspective? You know, when you look at say, a Revolut of the world now, I think it's like $75 billion in private markets, whatever it is. Um, but it's just an example.

    3. MM

      Yeah.

    4. HS

      The extension means that actually secondaries are so much more real, you have the chance to sell much earlier, and actually that public profile is delayed a lot longer. Do you engage in proactive selling in secondary markets?

    5. MM

      We- we may, again, you know, we may over time, um, in certain situations, you know, like Revolut, we've been in for- for 10 years. So you're kind of getting to the end of- of a fund cycle. So, um, yeah, we're- we're not anti that. I mean, by- by and large-

    6. HS

      Would you... did you sell secondary in Revolut?

    7. MM

      Uh, we- we didn't share that. But we're definitely not opposed to it in general. I think in-

    8. HS

      I wish I could abort it. (laughs)

    9. MM

      By- by and large, we tend to hold, um, pretty much everything until IPO.We, again-

    10. HS

      Do you think that will change?

    11. MM

      It may. You know, I, we, we don't have any, we don't have any taboo. I think, um, we may have funds that are just, you know, at the end of their lives- lifecycle and we wanna realize some level of liquidity. I don't think we'll ever sell a lot. You know, I, I, we ... And again, it goes back to my first point about the, uh, returns being so concentrated in a, in a small number of names. When you're fortunate enough to be a big owner in one of those names, you wanna, you know, then you wanna ride it to, to, you know, for as long as, as you can and, and also g- you know, get ... The best price discovery is on the public market and so you wanna get access to that, that price discovery. And, and so yeah, I, I think-

    12. HS

      Yeah.

    13. MM

      By, you know, by and large we will, we will keep until, until IPO and, and after.

    14. HS

      When we think about like ownership accumulation across round, the thing that I find hard is, Figma is a great example of an incredible business that wasn't maybe obvious for quite a few years actually. It took a while for Dylan to actually come out with any product.

    15. MM

      Yeah.

    16. HS

      And it just wasn't as, it wasn't up and to the right from day one, let's put it that way. Okay?

    17. MM

      But it was nowhere for many years because he was just building the product.

    18. HS

      O- Okay, so there we go.

    19. MM

      Yeah.

    20. HS

      But my point being, I do not believe your winners are instantly obvious.

    21. MM

      No.

    22. HS

      Which means that I think you will often misallocate your reserves and your ownership concentration desires. Do you agree?

    23. MM

      Yes. I think it's, uh, it's, it's, it's, it's inevitable. Yes.

    24. HS

      So, we are not able to accurately predict our winners?

    25. MM

      No, definitely not.

    26. HS

      So then, we should just do the same and-

    27. MM

      It's funny, you know, like Figma is a, is a (laughs) r- is a, is a great example of that. I mean, I think y- you picked a, a really good one where, you know, Dylan, I wanna (laughs) still his anecdote where he would, you know, we have this CEO retreat every year. And he would come on and he would keep on coming back, you know, year one, year two, year three, year four, and he would still not launch, so like, "Why are we still inviting him?" Like, what, what if, you know?

    28. HS

      (laughs)

    29. MM

      And Danny, you know, to, you know, to this, his absolute credit, was always so, the level of, you know, we'd always talk about conviction in this business. Danny's level of conviction behind Dylan at Figma is unparalleled. I don't think there are many examples in the business of, of an investor that has had that level of conviction for so long. We're talking years where it was like, "No, I really believe in, you know, I think this, this funder is really special." I think the product, the, the fact that actually he's not launching that he's, wants to build all those, you know, the right fe- for the good reasons, not that he doesn't want to launch, that he can't launch, it's that he knows that he needs to have that minimum level of, of feature set to be competitive and, and, and for it to work. And, and Danny was, you know, was always a, a massive supporter, even in that long period where there was just, you know, not even a, a product out there.

    30. HS

      With respect then, why let Greylock lead the A?

  9. 54:04 – 1:05:51

    Betting Against Nick Storonsky? Don’t.

    1. MM

      number crunching.

    2. HS

      We've mentioned Revolut quite a few times.

    3. MM

      Yeah.

    4. HS

      I, I do have to ask about, just the story, I didn't actually know this story. How did you first meet Nick? Can you just take me to the site? Who introduced you? Where did you meet him? Just tell me the story.

    5. MM

      It was a while back. I think it was, it was, well, it was more than 10 y- it was 10 years ago now. So, uh, I, I think I'm, I saw them pitch at Seedcamp, at the, you know, one of the demo day. I, you know, I think that's one interesting thing is, typically, when you have exceptional companies, one of the indicator is that you will have multiple touchpoints about that company over a very short amount of time. So, you will ... I will see them at Seedcamp, but someone will, you know, I will see an ad or I will download the app and someone will mention it to me, a friend, and then another. So, in general, you, you have three or four touchpoint. And, and, and for me that's a big signal. "Oh, there is something happening here if I hear a lot about something in a very short amount of time." Like they've, they've got, you know, they're on the side, guys. They've, they've, they've really hit a nerve. I think that's what happened with Revolut where I saw them at Seedcamp but somebody else mentioned them to me, and I was using the app, and one of my partners had ... You know? So, I think it was a multiple, uh, um, it, it was a, it was a multiple signals. But I think the, the Seedcamp one was the, was the first one.

    6. HS

      And so, then you ping Nick and asked for a meeting?

    7. MM

      Yeah. Th- I think I, uh, I, I don't exactly (laughs) remember how, how I got introduced. M- you know, I think I may just have gone to him after, after the pitch. Um, and also, I think we were also, uh, we had been introduced through a, a, another source. Um, and I think one of my partners had also been introduced. And again, I think typically there are multiple touchpoints when, uh, some of these companies. Um, but I ... The, the, the reasons why I had a lot of conviction was, I came in with a prepared mind, meaning that I had been looking at the space for a little while. I had looked at the company in the US called Simple, um, you probably were not born then, but, uh, you know, they were the first real neobank.

    8. HS

      It sold to BBVA, no?

    9. MM

      Yeah, exactly. Yeah.

    10. HS

      Dude.

    11. MM

      Ah. There you go.

    12. HS

      I'm a student of this business.

    13. MM

      Yeah. I know. I know. I know. I know.

    14. HS

      Don't underestimate- (laughs)

    15. MM

      Um, but, yeah, so, so, you know, Simple had been around. And, you know, again, interestingly, going back to beginner's mindset, a lot of people who had backed Simple were like, "Well, this is, it doesn't work, right? It can't work. Look at this, you know, the, uh, you know, you get bought. At best case scenario, you get bought by an incumbent and, you know, it, it will never work because people don't ..." And the main reasons was people don't wanna switch bank accounts. It's a pain. Like why would you switch bank accounts, you know? And it's like, "Oh, you, it's gonna be on, you know, on mobile." But, like, well, my bank has a mobile app, why do I care? And so, I had met, you know, I looked at Simple, uh, I had met Monzo as well actually, and, and I, I'm, I, I was looking for a trigger. Like what would convince people to switch bank accounts, which is such a pain? And what I really love with Revolut was the simple trigger with effects. You know, like, you don't, you, and they, they didn't sell people, "Oh, you're gonna switch bank accounts." They sold, "Oh, you'll trav- you're Brit traveling to Portugal for, uh, a stag weekend, it w- you know, you're gonna get fleeced by your bank. Why don't you get a Revolut card?" And, and I thought that was such a clever, uh, insertion point. And then from that point, Nick's view was, from the beginning, was that he wanted to be the global money app for every product. But the insertion point was, I thought was really effective, and that's how they managed to grow so, so quickly and, and organically for the longest time. That because they have this very clear value proposition that was a lot easier than saying, "Oh, you need to sign up with a new bank." Which no one wants to do.

    16. HS

      I remember chatting to Antoine Lenela and he was like, "You know, we, we won in many respects because we, we offer snacks to start." He's like, "Don't try and convince you for the main meal, just have a little snack."

    17. MM

      Yeah. Exactly.

    18. HS

      "And you come back for some more and more, and then suddenly you want the main meal."

    19. MM

      Yeah.

    20. HS

      Totally agree with you there.

    21. MM

      Mm-hmm.

    22. HS

      Okay. And so, you saw that. Do you think Revolut won in large part because of the lack of banking license that allowed them to move so much quicker?

    23. MM

      It's, you know, i- if you ask Nick, I think he will say the op- he will say the opposite, which is, if you were to do it again, he would probably go for banking license earlier.

    24. HS

      No.

    25. MM

      Yeah.

    26. HS

      A la Poubelle.

    27. MM

      Big ... (laughs) Yeah.

    28. HS

      No. Seriously?

    29. MM

      Beca- Yeah. Um, I think he would, you know... I mean, I heard it said at, uh, a, a, a c- a couple of times because y- and you see it today, it's a lot easier to get a banking license when you, uh, before you have scale than, than after you have scale. And especially in UK.

    30. HS

      But he would've been prohibited from most of his product expansions.

  10. 1:05:51 – 1:09:57

    Quick-Fire Round

    1. HS

      Uh, listen, I wanna do a quick fire round so I say a short statement and you give me your immediate thoughts.

    2. MM

      Sure.

    3. HS

      Does that sound okay?

    4. MM

      Let's do it.

    5. HS

      So what one thing do you believe about venture that other people will think is crazy or strange?

    6. MM

      It's not a career. It goes back to, uh, one of the early point which is I, I don't think people should want to have a career in venture. I think that's the wrong motivation. I don't think it is like an investment bank or like a consulting firm where you join and you can move up the ranks and that's kind of a well-established thing. I think there's a part of passion-

    7. HS

      Do you think I was wrong then? And I don't mean that badly but like, you know, it's ... I watched The Social Network when I was 13, saw this intersection of finance and technology that I loved and thought that is something that I have to be a part of.

    8. MM

      No, uh, th- I think that's exactly the right reason to do it. What I'm saying is not that. What I'm saying is people shouldn't join venture for the status that it brings.And that's, that's what I, that's what I mean by that. Like you didn't do it for the status, you did it because you thought this, you were ex- extremely excited by the technology, by working with, with founders, and just to your point, being part of it. And whether the, which title and which fund and which, didn't matter to you. What mattered to you was working with, with, with the founders and being part of that movement because you couldn't think of anything else to do in your life. That's the right motivation to do it.

    9. HS

      Dude, 11 years ago

    10. NA

      (laughs)

    11. MM

      in Europe, it was not like a status game being in venture.

    12. HS

      Exactly. (laughs)

    13. MM

      Exactly. Exactly. You know.

    14. HS

      Um-

    15. MM

      It was the same for me 15 years ago.

    16. HS

      I totally agree. Okay, you can, uh, choose one partner who is the best picking partner in Index. Who is it?

    17. MM

      I'd say Yann is probably the, the strongest. Yeah. I mean if you look at, if you look at his track record, you know, the consistency, um, and some of the incredible winners that he has, um, I think he's a, I think he's a great picker.

    18. HS

      Which competitor do you most respect?

    19. MM

      Sorry?

    20. HS

      Which competitor do you most respect and why them?

    21. MM

      (inhales deeply) Um-

    22. HS

      So like for me it would be 0.9 with Christophe. I think the, the discipline, the focus, how incredibly articulate they are around what is and isn't their type of deal.

    23. MM

      Yeah. I, you know, historically I've always, um, I've always admired USB. You know, I, Fred Wilson's blog is the reason why I joined Venture, to be honest. You know, I think what he did there in terms of, uh, educating people, explaining how venture works, explaining how entrepreneurship works, his level of sophistication in understanding and explaining business models, in picking the right themes early. So I think historically I would say Fred and USB are, are, they were huge inspirations and when you, you know, I spent time with them, now that I'm in New York, and ev- the way they operate, um, this very unique way, very collegial, the way that they've decided to stay small against the grain and of the industry, um, always being against the current, I, I really, you know, I really, I really admire them. Um, yeah.

    24. HS

      You can invest in one seed fund. Which seed fund do you invest in?

    25. MM

      (laughs) Um, I like, uh, I like Nico at Adjacent a lot. I invested personally and I think he's a, I think he's a very unique, um, I think he's a very unique investor.

    26. HS

      Well, I totally agree. I love Nico. What's the single most memorable first founder meeting and why?

    27. MM

      I still remember meeting, uh, Hanno at Personio, um, that first meeting where it was, and I think it's, it's actually the case with most investments, where it's, it's a yes immediately. Like you meet the person, you hear them talk for five minutes, you're like yeah, that's, you know-

    28. HS

      (laughs)

    29. MM

      ... we should do the deal. You know, if I had done that with every investment, I would probably, you know, done a lot better than I have, um, and not overthink it. But yeah, you know, like the, the clarity of-

    30. HS

      Dude, you know, you, you-

Episode duration: 1:22:50

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