Mark Carney: First Republic Bank Fails; Will Interest Rates Rise? Global Warming's Net Zero | E1008

1. 0:00 – 3:09

   Introducing Mark Carney

   1. MCMark Carney0:00

      ... the longer higher rates go on, and the more deposits move to perceived safer places, we're gonna see more consolidation in that sector.

   2. HSHarry Stebbings0:09

      (techno music) Mark, I am so excited for this. We had so much to discuss in our first episode that we couldn't, simply couldn't fit it into one. And so, first, thank you so much for joining me for a second time today.

   3. MCMark Carney0:20

      Uh, well, Harry, thanks for having me back. I wasn't sure you would ask me back. But yeah, there's lots to, uh, lots to cover.

   4. HSHarry Stebbings0:25

      I, I think this is the perfect time to have you back, bluntly. I have so many open questions. Before we dive into the core of the show though, I just wanna do a CliffsNotes, which is really unfair, especially given your career. But what is the CliffsNotes on your career and the cool highlights you'd dive into?

   5. MCMark Carney0:42

      Okay. Uh, well, quick CliffsNotes, I mean, I guess I'd say I've worked pretty much at the intersection of private markets and public policy most of my career. So, I started in the city, uh, just before the fall of the Berlin Wall, so p- probably before you were born. I kinda rode the globalization boom from there, uh, in, in Asia and New York, uh, a bit in Canada with Goldman. Uh, then I, uh, became a central bank governor in search of a quiet life. Um, I figured, you know, eight interest rate meetings a year, and I could spend time with my family and, uh, my timing was a bit off because I started, uh, a few weeks before Bear Stearns, uh, uh, failed. Uh, and then obviously, that cascaded into the subprime crisis, and, uh, Lehman, et cetera. And so, I got involved with, um, the financial reforms after that, uh, picked up from where Mario Draghi left off on leading the financial reforms. Uh, went to the Bank of England, uh, y- you know, during the euro crisis, uh, Brexit, uh, referendum, uh, focused a bit on climate when I was there, given the responsibilities. And now, I'm back more on the private side, so I, that was a long period on the public side, but a public side where, uh, working a lot, obviously, you know, trying to fix and reform private markets. And now, I'm back on the private side, focusing in a couple areas, most of which relate to climate. So, I work with Brookfield, uh, we have Big Transition Fund, we, you know, focus on going to where the emissions are and, and funding companies to get 'em down. I'm on the board of Stripe, a great fintech, uh, company, and, and more. I work with companies like Watershed, which help with the mechanics, the ERP, if you will, of climate to help companies get down. Uh, and I do spend, uh, just back on the public spi- side, I spend about half of my time, uh, as a special envoy, uh, for the United Nations. Sounds great. Uh, yeah, it's-

   6. HSHarry Stebbings2:29

      (laughs)

   7. MCMark Carney2:29

      ... and, uh, for which, uh, they owe me th- I get a dollar a year, and they owe me $3. So, uh, uh, they're in the bad debt, um, uh, category-

   8. HSHarry Stebbings2:36

      (laughs)

   9. MCMark Carney2:36

      ... I've been doing it for three years. Um, and I, in that regard, I work to kind of organize the private financial sector to address climate change, but in a way, and last point, which is, I, I guess, the theme of my career, in a way that gets the power of markets to deliver, uh, the things that people want.

   10. HSHarry Stebbings2:55

       I mean, first off, maybe I wouldn't be single if I had the title of special envoy. This could be the secret-

   11. MCMark Carney3:00

       (laughs)

   12. HSHarry Stebbings3:00

       ... unlock to my love. Uh, I'm very envious of that. The second is, well done for surmising an incredible career in about 150 seconds. But I

2. 3:09 – 7:33

   Current Health of Our Financial System

   1. HSHarry Stebbings3:09

      wanna start today on a core, which is, in the last show, I said, "You know, Mark, I haven't seen a boom, and I haven't seen a bust, and I haven't worked-"

   2. MCMark Carney3:17

      (laughs)

   3. HSHarry Stebbings3:17

      ... "through that cycle." I feel like that is changing. And so, help me, Mark, where are we now? And what follows a bust?

   4. MCMark Carney3:25

      Yeah, exactly. (laughs) So, w- I guess, in the last time, we were in the middle of a boom, or probably towards the end of a boom. And, uh, uh, for students of, uh, economic and financial history, uh, they'd be familiar with something called the Minsky Cycles. And, uh, you know, what you have in those cycles is, uh, it starts with something fundamentally good, you know, the, some big innovation, uh, it could've been the productivity, uh, miracle in the US at the start of the 2000, uh, the first, uh, bits of, uh, financial innovation that helped, uh, develop subprime lending, as an example, uh, blockchain, um, and DeFi, a- as another example. Um, and so, these are fundamentally good innovations. But ultimately, the, the, uh, the, uh, the growth turns to boom, turns to euphoria, and then turns to the phase that we were pretty close to, I think we were just on the cusp of last time we spoke, which is, uh, what this guy, Minsky, uh, uh, the, the, the, uh, economic historian called the Ponzi phase, uh, which is a phase that you recognize is a phase where you're lending against the asset that's at the center of the boom on the assumption that the asset's gonna continue to rise. So, it's asset-based lending with price appreciation absolutely built in. Um, and of course, at some point, uh, there's the so-called Minsky moment. You turn to panic because the assumptions are removed, uh, and we lead into despair. So, we're at, we're at that phase, certainly, I think, in the DeFi, crypto universe. And what's interesting about that phase is provided you'd avoided getting over leveraged in the Ponzi phase, what it brings is tremendous opportunity because the underlying innovation was real, it's still there, you've seen what works and what works less well, there are some assets that can be picked up, and there's much, much less capital in- available to, you, you know, uh, that's competing with you. And so, this is the time after the boom, we've had the bust, and this is where opportunity comes really into play.

   5. HSHarry Stebbings5:29

      Can I ask, can you provide me with an example of an innovation that went through this cycle, experienced this Ponzi realization moment, but had underlying value to the innovation that then was kind of reborn efficiently? Because i- in my mind, it's just like, people realize that it's a Ponzi scheme and never come back.

   6. MCMark Carney5:49

      I'll give you an example of a financial innovation where that's the case. So, you know, the collateralized loan market, uh, CMBS, uh, collateralized mortgage-backed securities, got taken to the assumptions underlying them, but taken to ridiculous extremes, Ponzi extremes. So, the price appreciation built into those structures in 2006, 2007 brought-... the whole, literally, the house, uh, you know, the house of cards crashing down. But the core innovation there lives on and, I think, has served the market quite well, the, the financial system as a whole quite well. And we've ended up, actually, with a much more robust, it's not totally robust to be clear, but a much more robust, what some would call shadow banking system, I would call non-bank finance, uh, that providing a different channel of credit. And actually, given what's going on in the banking sector, a very welcome example of credit. I think you're also asking, though, about a fundamental innovation that, you know, has gone up and down through the boom-bust cycle. And I think the example a little closer to home for me would be in hydrogen, where we've had a couple of those, uh, euphoric cycles. The last one was early 2000s. Uh, we're entering another, and I think a much more solidly, uh, grounded one. Time will tell, though. I can't actually give you the example of hydrogen fully deployed in a way that's, uh, you know, mainstream commercial. I think it's coming. I think it's coming in the next few years. So maybe if you have me back in a few years, I'll be able to nail that question.

   7. HSHarry Stebbings7:23

      (laughs) And I will have a special envoy as a title by then-

   8. MCMark Carney7:26

      (laughs)

   9. HSHarry Stebbings7:26

      ... so we'll both have won.

   10. MCMark Carney7:27

       Exactly.

   11. HSHarry Stebbings7:27

       Um, I- (laughs) I wonder one more thing. You mentioned, uh, you touched on the banking, uh, situation,

3. 7:33 – 10:31

   Is the banking crisis over?

   1. HSHarry Stebbings7:33

      let's put it that way. Uh, we were talking before about FRB being in turmoil. I just want to understand kind of where we are there, Mark. Is the banking crisis over?

   2. MCMark Carney7:42

      Well, I- so you were- you're always careful with your words, uh, and you started with situation, you ended with crisis. Well, I'd put it more in turmoil. So, uh, I- the- the- I guess, the quick answer to your question is no, this turmoil isn't over. We see it as we're talking today, you know, FRB is under, uh, great strain. It is the case that almost one in ten US regional banks would fall below their minimum capital levels if all of their assets were mark to market. So, I think it's, uh, increasingly well-understood that one of the challenges that a number of the regional banks, the extreme being Silicon Valley Bank, one of the challenges they have is they have a lot of actually quite high quality assets, but very low yielding assets. And they have, in some cases, massive franchise problems because of that, because they're just, you know, uh, unless we go back to a low for long world, which I think is extremely unlikely, uh, unless we go back to that world, they're just gonna have very large earnings headwinds, uh, going forward. So, there are a large number of regional institutions in the US that have varying degrees of this problem. And the longer higher rates go on and the more deposits move to perceived safer places, we're gonna see more, uh, at a minimum, I'll put it politely, we're gonna see more consolidation in that sector. But, and here's the big but, this is a very different situation than what we went through 10 years ago, a little more than 10 years ago. I mean, the system as a whole has more than six times the loss absorbency it had then. It has much li- higher liquidity across the system. Central banks are providing, uh, you know, much faster, uh, support as needed for those who are impaired. And there's much- there are many fewer, I should say, many fewer interconnections between the institutions. I mean, in 2008, everybody was connected to everybody else and nobody knew who was gonna fall down next, but everybody was convinced that if somebody failed, it would bring others down. And, you know, those were reasonable assumptions, certainly during the panic. That's just not the case now. Um, we're seeing individual problems that do- the contagion in the system is because of similar business models as opposed to interconnections that, uh, cascade through, uh, through the system. So, the turmoil, I would say it's turmoil, not crisis. No, it's not over because we're in a higher rate environment, uh, we're gonna have a tougher credit environment, uh, coming as the economy slows, but it's in an absolutely different order of magnitude of- of what we experienced in the past.

   3. HSHarry Stebbings10:23

      I'm kind of pleased to hear that, because for someone who hasn't experienced it through a professional sense, it kind of feels like the world is over in some respects. So that is, uh, that's quite refreshing

4. 10:31 – 17:53

   Should The Fed guarantee all deposits?

   1. HSHarry Stebbings10:31

      in some ways. Um, my question to you is, I had Bill Ackman on the show, and he-

   2. MCMark Carney10:35

      Yeah.

   3. HSHarry Stebbings10:35

      ... presented the view that essentially we need to guarantee all deposits in banks, and once you do that, you'll reinsert consumer confidence and turmoil will really be quashed in many ways. Do we need to guarantee all deposits in banks, Mark?

   4. MCMark Carney10:52

      Um, I think it's- well, I'll say a couple of things. One is that what we're seeing is that the current commitment, the current structure, which does not guarantee all deposits in banks, is proving time-inconsistent. So under pressure, authorities are coming in and on a case-by-case basis, effectively guaranteeing all deposits in banks. So, after you have a few of those, you ask the question, it's a fair question, whether, well, shouldn't you just jump to the end state, which is g- guaranteeing all deposits in banks? That's the first point. Second point, there is a bit of an issue, uh, which is somebody has to take that decision, it has to be duly authorized, and in the US, that requires, uh, an act of Congress. So, the effective way to guarantee all those deposits is not gonna happen quickly. That's second. Third, there is a bigger argument, and maybe we'll get into this, but I'll just put it on the table, which is, uh, something, uh, Andrew Bailey, uh, the current governor of the Bank of England, uh, a point he made, a seemingly esoteric point, but quite an important point around the nature of money. And his point was, in effect, most people don't realize that there's a difference between money that's created by a bank, a private bank, so-called inside money...... uh, versus the money that, you know, when people used to use cash that, uh, they would see the manifestation of money created by the central bank, the core, so-called outside money. Most people think they're absolutely interchangeable, which they are in transactions, but they assume they are in deposits, or implicitly assume. And shouldn't we, uh, the authorities make that clear? Okay. Um, last point I'd make is whether, let's say, we take the Ackman Plan, I'll call it the Ackman Plan, um, and, uh, you know, in the UK, in the US, elsewhere, we say, "You know what? It's just not realistic that, you know, Harry VC, um, and people like you, or somebody running the corner shop who has their deposit in a bank is going to sit, take time out to monitor the health of the bank and move that deposit when it- when you start to get concerned about the creditworthiness." I think that is actually a realistic assumption. It's certainly totally unrealistic that individuals do that. Um, now, what we would have to do if we change the system so that all deposits were backstop is to make sure that there is substantial capital at risk in the system so somebody, other than the supervisors in the central banks, are monitoring those institutions. Um, and that's why you need to have senior debt that is non-deposit debt, not recharacterized as deposit and backstop, and so-called contingent capital or AT1, uh, capital, different words for roughly the same thing, which is capital that is subordinated and would be bailed in once the, um, equity holders are wiped out. And it's those pools of capital and the institutions behind them that's gonna discipline the system, uh, or help discipline the system on top of what the boards and the management are supposed to be doing. So you need all of those components.

   5. HSHarry Stebbings14:08

      So help me out here. In terms of that contingent group that's external to, like, the core, uh, savior, which would obviously be, kind of, um, you know, government led, is that, like, a contingent of JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, the biggest institutions who collectively come to rescue the banking system together with this guarantee? What does that look like? I'm sorry if it gets naive.

   6. MCMark Carney14:29

      Yeah, no, what, what it... No, no, no. It's, well, it's something we put in place, um, after the financial crisis. So I said, uh, a few moments ago that, look, the system as a whole has six times as much loss absorbency as it had going into the financial crisis, and though, that's a big multiple. Part of that, um, a little less than half of that, is contingent debt. So it's actually, I mean, there's various structures for this, but in effect, it's subordinate- subordinated debt, which is owned by institutions, not other banks actually. You don't want other banks to own it because that brings contagion. Let's say, uh, I'll take an extreme, uh, example, JPMorgan fails and Goldman Sachs owned a bunch of their contingent debt. Well, then Goldman Sachs is gonna be called into question because they'll take part of the loss on that. So what you want is a different source of capital for it, um, and that tends to be, uh, an insurance company. It's, it's pension funds. They're the big buyers, uh, and straight asset managers as well. They're the big buyers of, I'll call them AT1 securities, which is, uh, a number of people on the, on the pod will recognize. They're the big owners of that and they are very sophisticated, and they do recognize that there are scenarios where they're gonna end up owning equity in a stricken institution because it's failed. And in one extreme, uh, which we saw with Credit Suisse, they, uh, discovered that they owned nothing, uh, at least on the current version of what the Swiss authorities have done. So, that's the way you have discipline in the system and you have additional, an additional level of protection before you get back to the state because you don't want the taxpayer to be, you know, second in line after the equity holder, uh, to prop up these institutions. That was the case, by the way, the taxpayer being second in line, uh, back in 2008.

   7. HSHarry Stebbings16:18

      Marc, I've seen all of my friends, many, many managers centralize their funds to the top four. Um, the biggest names, the too bigs to fail. Why is it bad to have a centralization of wealth to the top four? And why is that not a world that we wanna live in?

   8. MCMark Carney16:36

      Well, I think, you know, as we all believe in competition and, uh, there is value in, uh, having a broader range of, uh, institutions that are competing for that business. Um, so they're providing better service for the business and they're... and mo- most importantly, I guess, they're competing to provide credit to companies and, and entrepreneurs. And, uh, you know, the more you move into a banking oligopoly, uh, the softer the competition comes on, on both sides. So that's one reason. And then the second reason is that the more you have concentration, the more those who benefit from that concentration are too big to fail. Um, they're, they're essential for the system and then that brings, uh, m- moral hazard into the system. All that said, look, entrepreneurs like yourself, people who are listening, uh, should be focused not on whether or not their bank's gonna go down. They should be focused on whether their investments are gonna work out. So, you know, we've gotta design a system that... or have a system that gives that peace of mind and it's, it's part, uh, you know, the first line of defense is, do you have a well-run bank? And, you know, in, in the broad scheme of things, those larger institutions are well run and they're, and they're solid, so it's understandable that money's going

5. 17:53 – 23:00

   The Future of Regional Banks

   1. MCMark Carney17:53

      there.

   2. HSHarry Stebbings17:54

      Marc, can I ask you? You mentioned regional banks earlier. What's the future of regional banks in the US?

   3. MCMark Carney18:00

      I would say, uh, go small or go home. I mean, it's, uh, it's, you know, it was always the US banking system relatively, uh, you know, a very large number of institutions by, by number in the US, you know, kind of barbell strategy. It was, it was dangerous to be in that awkward middle where you're a large regional and therefore you have a lot of corporate deposits, deposits above the minimum, they turn out to be much more flighty. What we saw with Silicon Valley, what we're seeing with First Republic, that's an awkward place to be if you're-If you're a narrow regional, you know, small, literally close to your customers, uh, largely insured deposits, more stable funding base, you're okay. It's an okay business. You don't have a lot of growth opportunities. Or you're gonna get consolidated up into, uh, some of those, uh, very large institutions. So, I think there's going to be really a wave of consolidation, another wave. This- this has happened over time, but will accelerate and, you- you know, in part, it's accelerating because the competition, not just f- uh, well, not just for the regionals, uh, but also for the large institutions, is very much coming from fintech and as a bigger picture point, the system is moving towards a form of narrow banking as a- as- as a c- core competitor to, uh, fractional, uh, fractional reserve banks. In other words, banks that create their own money, uh, and leverage up. And it's able to do that, the system's able to do that, because of, uh, technological changes which make things very easy to take customer money and back-to-back it quite efficiently, uh, into the money markets and, um, and- and provide better, better returns.

   4. HSHarry Stebbings19:38

      Okay, so we see consolidation now within regional banking in the US. You mentioned Credit Suisse earlier. I do have to ask, and I have to thank Mark for this one, but he asked, "How do you assess the balance of regulatory and bank management responsibility in the case of SVB and Credit Suisse?"

   5. MCMark Carney19:54

      Yeah, I think it's- it's a great question. I think, you know, you start with management responsibility in both. Management and boards are the first, uh, lines of defense. Um, I would say in the case of SVB, it, uh, pains me to say this as a former regulator and supervisor, but, uh, much higher regulatory and supervisory responsibility in the case of Silicon Valley Bank because of a couple of things. One is, uh, they changed the rules in the US in 2018, um, and did away with some very basic protections that we apply everywhere else in the world. Um, you know, so, uh, stress tests, uh, uh, we... In the- in the Bank of England when I was there and- and subsequently, we stress test the banks to a four percent, uh, increase within 12 months of interest rates all the way across the curve. Now, it seemed quite extreme at the time. It's more or less what has happened, uh, because of this inflation. But we stress tested everybody. In the US, they said, "Well, no, uh, people under tw- 250 billion," which is a very large number, "uh, don't have to, uh, do things as severe as that." So, that's the first thing. So they weren't doing that. Then they also, uh, lessened responsibilities around, uh, what are called, uh, liquidity rules or liquidity standards and buffers. Um, and some of those actually protect against having the extreme mismatches that places like Silicon Valley had. And then thirdly, in the actual practice of, uh, supervision, uh, so even if you don't have those rules, even if you don't do the stress tests, you just have to look at the books and the mismatches of- of that bank and say, "This is, you know, irresponsible." It clearly was. Um, and, you know, that was noticed but not acted on. So I would say in that case, uh, it's much, you know, apart from management, um, it's more supervisory. I would say in- in the case of Credit Suisse, the challenge, uh, you know, it's been a stricken institution for a number of years. It's had cultural issues, it's, uh, had real risk management issues, and the authorities there have been spending time, and, uh, when I was at the Bank of England, we spent time on this as well, is putting in place, as best as possible, ways to minimize the risk to everybody else of Credit Suisse and then maximize the ability that if Credit Suisse couldn't make it, so to speak, um, that it could be wound down in a- in a relatively orderly fashion. And it wasn't perfect, but the fact is that when, uh, it hit the wall, the Swiss authorities, the international authorities had many more options than they would have had even a few years before to manage that situation. And so, you know, it wasn't a great day for Credit Suisse shareholders or the contingent capital holders who absorbed the losses, but it meant that the depositors, the debt holders, and, you know, the franchise as a whole could be, uh, th- the first two, uh, could be protected and the franchise could be folded into UBS, uh, which, you know, would not have been the case, as I say, uh, just ev- even

6. 23:00 – 25:25

   First Republic Bank: Who’s to blame?

   1. MCMark Carney23:00

      a few years prior to that.

   2. HSHarry Stebbings23:01

      Incredibly unfair question. Is FRB a stricken asset with a damaged business book or is it a consequence of a wider macro banking turmoil situation where really it's being pulled into something that it doesn't deserve to be?

   3. MCMark Carney23:18

      I- I think it, on the balance, it bears more responsibility for the situation it is than the- than the macro. And let me make a macro point, which is that, you know, if we go back to where we were whenever it was we spoke, uh, last time, you know, uh, 12, 15 months ago, uh, you know, we're just rolling into this period where the world's moving out of low f- low for long, uh, interest rate environment, low volatility environment, which some had interpreted as low forever, uh, including low vol forever, and had built up books of business, and in the case of FRB and SVB, very large books of business that were low yielding, assumed low volatility for a very long period of time. And, you know, that was not, it wasn't prudent risk management. Uh, you should've been able to see that at the time. And now that we've moved into a different regime, it- it is a huge headwind on the franchise. Uh, you can't just, you know, reprice these. Uh, nobody has an incentive to, uh, reprice their own loan (laughs) . I mean, they might- might as well keep the, uh, keep the terms that they have. They're certainly not gonna get them again. So, uh, it's more a victim of, um, its own situation. You could say...... I guess, that the macro situation has changed quite dramatically. But one of the things you're supposed to do as a risk manager, you're certainly supposed to do it, uh, do this as a, as a central banker, as a regulator, is think about the tail risks that others are not thinking about, and what is possible, not what's most likely. And it was always the case that one of the very likely possibilities, one of the fat tails, was we would eventually get out of, uh, the liquidity trap this low-for-long interest rate world. And to assume otherwise is irresponsible. Just like now, to assume that we're going back to that world after we get through this bout of inflation, uh, is also, uh, in my view, an unrealistic assumption. You're just gambling for redemption on that one.

   4. HSHarry Stebbings25:21

      Well, I mean, that's what I wanted to ask you, which is, like, when you think about kind of what's to

7. 25:25 – 29:19

   Will interest rates go higher?

   1. HSHarry Stebbings25:25

      come and the consequences, when you think about the consequences of the banking crisis on, like, monetary policy-

   2. MCMark Carney25:31

      Yeah.

   3. HSHarry Stebbings25:31

      ... how do you think that will look in the next 12 months? Let's start there.

   4. MCMark Carney25:36

      So I distinguish between a crisis and turmoil, so I'm still gonna cling to that turmoil term. Uh-

   5. HSHarry Stebbings25:43

      (laughs)

   6. MCMark Carney25:43

      ... but it's nonetheless serious. Like, it's serious enough that, you know, it's going to, uh, let's say in the US, it'll probably slow growth by, you know, half to three-quarters of a percentage point. It's probably enough if people felt that the US economy was on the cusp of, uh, you know, this narrow path, uh, between avoiding recession and having a recession, it's probably enough of a headwind that, uh, there will be a recession in the US. So that's material. Uh, in terms of monetary policy, uh, I think what, what the central banks have done is, uh, is to try to, uh, differentiate between what they need to do to keep the financial system functioning reasonably well and what they need to do to, uh, address inflation. So they provide liquidity to, uh, the banks, particularly in the United States, and that keeps, you know, those who have healthy, healthy enough business models to keep going. But they continue to raise interest rates. But the next point is that the, the degree to which they raise interest rates has changed. And, uh, you know, if we had been talking, uh, at the end of February, early March, before Silicon Valley Bank, I would have said something to the effect of, "I think the Fed may have to go to 6% fed funds." Now, I think, uh, they'll probably stop at five, five and a quarter. So you know, that's 75 basis points at a minimum of, of, of shift, uh, in the stance of monetary policy. And of course, the reason for that is that there is a headwind from what's happening in the regional banking system. It is, you know, half of consumer lending, plus, um, it's three-quarters of the lending into commercial real estate. It's material for, uh, commercial and industrial lending as well. And, you know, the price of that lending is changing, but actually, the availability of, the very availability of that lending is, in many cases, coming to a stop, and the Fed has to react to that.

   7. HSHarry Stebbings27:41

      Marc, I am a, I'm a technologist. I'm a startup investor, so I'm naive, which means I'm allowed to ask questions like this. Was the speed of rate hike, was it irresponsible? It was unparalleled to any other rate hike, supposedly, you know, in the recent times. Was it an irresponsible speed of rate hike?

   8. MCMark Carney28:00

      I think it was necessary. It has consequences. I think that one of the assumptions that, uh, economists, uh, not always financiers, but economists often make is that things move in a linear fashion. Whereas, uh, well, certainly technologists knows that things, uh, things get disruptive, uh, there's, there's quantum moves. And in finance, there are situations where it isn't the case that when you move from, uh, well, certainly in this case, when you move from zero interest rates to 5% interest rates in a short period of time, it doesn't mean the cost of credit moves up lockstep with each of those moves. You get to positions where the availability of credit just stops from certain channels. We're starting, you know, we're seeing that in the regional banking sector. We'll see that in other part, uh, leverage parts of, uh, of the system. I guess we saw it at the very s- at the very start of this move, uh, we saw it in leverage crypto, which wasn't macro significant, but it was for some individuals. So I think the responsibility, uh, uh, dancing around this a bit, as you can tell, but as a responsibility of the authorities is, is to recognize that the faster things go, the more likely there are to be these, uh, to put it politely, non-linearities or sudden stops,

8. 29:19 – 34:11

   Mark Carney as Head of The Fed

   1. MCMark Carney29:19

      and that needs to be taken into account. Yeah.

   2. HSHarry Stebbings29:21

      Marc, if I put you in charge of the Fed, what would you have done differently?

   3. MCMark Carney29:25

      Well, I, the main thing I would have done differently is that the original... So what the Fed did is, when we're in the depths of the pandemic, uh, just in the run-up to the depths of the pandemic and in the depths of the pandemic, it effectively tied its hands, uh, and it said that, um, "We are going to, we, the Fed, are gonna target average inflation, um, and we will make, we will not raise interest rates until we, uh, have the prospect of getting unemployment back to the level it was prior to the pandemic, including in various socioeconomic groups." So it also had an inflation condition as well. So it, it, it, instead of anticipating where inflation was going, it was, uh, it changed its rule, changed its decision rule to a backward-looking decision rule. And, and that meant that, you know, they lost six to nine months, probably, of tightening, uh, time that could have been spent initiating a more, uh, gradual tightening, squeezing out some of the excess which built up, you know, in these late stages of a, of a cycle. You get the excess building up. So there would have been less of that. Now-... the big forces on inflation, the big global forces that help drive inflation to the high single digits, uh, they still would have been acting. So, I, you know, we wouldn't have seen an appreciably different level in the short term of inflation. It would have been lower, but not, you know, it wouldn't have stayed at 2%. We probably would have had fewer of these strains, uh, appearing in the financial sector. We'll never know, though.

   4. HSHarry Stebbings31:01

      Marc, before we move to climate, which I do have to discuss, is there anything that you think is very important that you don't think enough people are spending enough time on, are aware of, are concerned by, when you look at the banking crisis in the last six months, six to 12 months?

   5. MCMark Carney31:18

      I'll answer that with a little farther perspective. I think there's two consequences which might seem slightly, uh, inconsistent, but I'll, I'll say them anyways. And one, maybe a little controversial, which is, I think this probably puts a, you know, a silver bullet into stable coins, um, uh, even though this is a banking crisis. Because the, you know, that model, and there's a lot of value in the link, obviously, between the core of the central bank balance sheet and the, and the DeFi world, or the NFT world and all that. I totally get that. But that model relies on absolutely flawless asset liability matching, you know, not just 24/7, 365, but for decades. And what we see is that deviations from that over time get caught out, uh, and can lead to a panic. Uh, we also see that the authorities, you know, have not been able to oversee money market funds, which is a version of this, uh, twice in the last, you know, 15 years. We've had huge money market fund ch- uh, crises in the US. Haven't been o- able to oversee relatively simple banks like SVB and FRB. And it just, when you put those realities together, the likelihood that there would be an accident over time with a stable coin is pretty high, and the risk of that is unacceptable because it would be at the center of the payment system. So, it wouldn't just be a question of who had a deposit. It would be everybody would be affected by it. And of course, the only way that you can, you can protect against that is to, in effect, staple the stable coin to the central bank balance sheet, uh, which is, in other words, you know, the, it- its, its whole asset side is, uh, is, is matched, uh, one for one. Uh, in that case, that's really a central bank digital currency by another name. So, so that's one consequence of it. I think the other consequence, and the reason why I s- try to say it's, it's a bit inconsistent, is that I do think what this does lead to, though, is the system moving more towards wholesale finance, narrow banking in different pockets, and that the funding of banks will, over time, become more wholesale, less retail, more volatile, more credit differentiation. Monetary policy will end up having more traction, uh, for what it's worth, and the consumer, whether it's, you know, your fund, your, your companies, or you as an individual, you're gonna see actually better rates, uh, as a consequence, better service as a consequence with that. But it's a pretty big, it's a pretty big change that will come from it.

   6. HSHarry Stebbings34:06

      That is a pretty big change, and (laughs) -

   7. MCMark Carney34:08

      (laughs)

   8. HSHarry Stebbings34:08

      ... I was like, yeah, just leave me on a, like, massive cliffhanger

9. 34:11 – 39:11

   Net Zero Emissions: Status Update

   1. HSHarry Stebbings34:11

      there. Thanks for that, Marc. Um-

   2. MCMark Carney34:12

      (laughs) I'm sorry.

   3. HSHarry Stebbings34:13

      ... I, I do want to make sure, though, that we cover climate because, you know, you spent a lot of time on it, and there's a lot of questions I just want to touch on, which is, first, what is new in net zero? Will we ever get on track, Marc?

   4. MCMark Carney34:25

      You know what's new in net zero is that we're getting on track, actually, and that's not something I've ever, I didn't think I would be saying this early. I'll give you some headline numbers, which is, you know, seven years ago when they had the Paris Accord, the world was headed to three and a half degrees. When we had the Glasgow Summit just under, uh, I don't know, whatever it is, 16 months ago, 18 months ago, it was less than two and a half degrees. Now, with the country commitments that are in place since then, it's 1.8 degrees. But what we have with the US IRA, with the European response, the Canadian response to the European and the American (laughs) response, what's happening in Japan, Korea, on and on, is that a number of countries are now, uh, have put in place the policies to get on track to the key way station between now and 2050 net zero, which is the end of this decade, 2030. And, you know, these are orders of magnitude of 40% to 50% reductions in emissions. To back that up, I'll just give you two data points. One is that the level of clean energy investment, so renewables and other investment, has tripled over the course of the last five years. It's on course to quadruple again b- uh, over the course of, uh, you know, between now and the end of the decade. And then if you look at what's happened, uh, in the auto sector and the rise of EVs, three, four years ago, about 4% of new auto sales were EVs. This year, it's looking like it's gonna be closer to 20% worldwide. That i- those are huge, huge numbers, uh, and in most advanced economies, it's likely to be more- one in two by the end of this decade. So, the new thing is that the inflection points that we need, we're living through them right now. And, uh, and, and so, uh, you know, I'm not blase, I'm not Panglossian about it, but it is, it is pretty significant what's going on.

   5. HSHarry Stebbings36:14

      So, I'm gonna play devil's advocate here, Marc-

   6. MCMark Carney36:16

      It's good.

   7. HSHarry Stebbings36:16

      ... which is incredibly bold of me considering the size of your brain-

   8. MCMark Carney36:20

      (laughs)

   9. HSHarry Stebbings36:20

      ... and considering the size of mine, but I'm gonna do it anyway. Number one, y- (laughs) you know, when we look at kind of size of impact, Xi Jinping, uh, and China play a pivotal role. The man has spent his entire life climbing the greasy pole of Chinese politics, which is a challenging pole to ascend.He needs to focus on growth, what China does not have, where we are seeing millions of Chinese people being sent back to rural communities in a bid to them to find work, um, uh, China is in trouble. He doesn't give a shit about climate, he needs growth. Do you agree? And can we make headway with China not really being interested?

   10. MCMark Carney37:05

       Uh, well, I, I disagree with the, I, I'm gonna disagree with the premise. Uh, maybe I won't disagree with what he cares more about as a leader, he cares more about growth than, uh, than short-term climate, but he and the country have made a very big bet on future growth relating to, uh, decarbonization. That that's, you know, it's growth for China, and I'll come back to why it's growth for China, but it absolutely central to the competitiveness of the Chinese economy over the course of the next 25 years, you know? Decarbonization and AI, the two big drivers of competitiveness for China, and I'm gonna back this up in a second, but I'll just make the core point, which is one of the pennies that has dropped for other major economies is that he's right. Xi is right about those drivers of competitiveness and what's motivating, you know, the IRA in the US, which is the big, for those who haven't followed it, the big climate bill, which is enormous in its impact, what motivated that, what's motivated responses in places like Canada and others, yes, it's climate, but really it's about jobs and growth. It's about these, these industries, you know, if you just hearken back to what's happened in the auto sector and what is happening in the auto sector, if you're not building out an EV supply chain and you're an auto manufacturer, you're dead, right? Like, you know, that train is leaving the station, to mix my metaphor, and you need to be there so climate goes there. So, in t- in terms of, you know, is that really manifest? China accounted for half of clean energy investment last year, about 550 billion US of the 1.1 trillion. So half, in effect. Renewable investment's grown at 50% a year, they have more than 50% of the EV market, uh, in terms of the flow there. They are one of the biggest, in fact, the biggest source of, uh, clean tech finance is in China. They're the dominant player in solar and wind, uh, the supply chains for that. So, uh, you know, he's getting growth out of that, to personalize it. The country's get- uh, China's getting growth out of that, and that's why he cares, and that is having a spillover effect on other countries

10. 39:11 – 43:18

    USA vs China on Fighting Global Warming

    1. MCMark Carney39:11

       who are realizing they need to care about it as well.

    2. HSHarry Stebbings39:13

       Okay. So I asked this question of Mr. Mark Evans, and he gave me a fascinating... And this was this week, so I'm gonna compare your statements here. And I know, I said to him, "You can long, you can invest in the future of one, the US or China, over a 10-year period. Which do you invest in?"

    3. MCMark Carney39:30

       I'd invest in the US.

    4. HSHarry Stebbings39:32

       Why?

    5. MCMark Carney39:33

       Okay. Why would I do that? I mean, you know, partly that the, okay, we've got a track record and past performance isn't, you know, an indicator of future, but the main components of what has driven American exceptionalism over, uh, uh, over decades, uh, more than a century, still are there. I mean, still, uh, partly because of immigration, but, uh, it's still the case that, uh, you know, the quality of, uh, skills is amazing. Uh, the financial ecosystem, yes, it has SVB and FRB, but it also has, you know, the whole VC complex. I won't, uh, taint myself by only naming one or two of them. Uh, of course, your, by extension, my host here, uh, is part of that. It has still the best mechanism of creative destruction in the world, uh, I think. Uh, there's some who argue Euro- European competition policy is now stronger. I'm not totally convinced. Notice that US, uh, competition policy has just been reinforced. You know, it has a huge market and has ability to get market access. So it has all of that. And, you know, they've just pivoted. You know, America, when it moves, moves big. And so in this space, in climate, which is one of the big drivers of growth going forward, they have, uh, the US in the, in the space of the time since we last spoke, has gone from well behind Europe, uh, the UK, amongst the major industrialized, uh, countries in addressing climate change to putting in place, you know, the measures now driving with the investment that they're def- you know, that they will overtake, uh, in, in, in the course of a few years. So I would do all of that with, uh, do all of that for the US. And then with respect to China, I mean, yes, massive market. Yes, they've got all these components. Yes, they're gonna do well in this. But what comes with that is, you know, issues around property rights, consistency of, of government policy in some cases. I probably am better off leaving it in the why the US is, uh, is so positive than, you know, enumerating a bunch of issues in China. I think it's a simple choice. And what did Mr. Evans say of interest?

    6. HSHarry Stebbings41:33

       Mr. Ev- Mr. Evans agreed with you. Um, and he-

    7. MCMark Carney41:37

       Oh, li- (laughs)

    8. HSHarry Stebbings41:37

       ... agreed with you, citing s- several problems with, with China and also several posi- positives of the US, uh-

    9. MCMark Carney41:45

       Yeah.

    10. HSHarry Stebbings41:45

        ... which for his sake I'll probably leave, uh, for him to tell you over dinner.

    11. MCMark Carney41:49

        Yeah, yeah. (laughs)

    12. HSHarry Stebbings41:50

        Uh, can I, can I ask you for, for Europe, is Europe weaker than ever, Mark?

    13. MCMark Carney41:55

        No, I don't think it is, actually. On the face of it, it's, obviously there's a massive shock with the war and the energy, uh, hit that comes with that. And so, there's reason to think that it might be, but, uh, I'm, I'm gonna take the other side of this. First is that, uh, the financial system, this is unusual. I, I don't think I've ever been in a position in my career where I've been able to say, uh, the European banking system is in better shape (laughs) than in most other countries, and certainly the US in this case. Uh, but that is the case, so their financial system is, uh, is, is solid. Uh, I know Credit Suisse failed, but, you know, it had relatively unique circumstances. And the core of the system is strong. The second is to say that they're using...... most of the levers of policy now, so fiscal policy is not a permanent headwind to growth there. Thirdly, they've got a pretty good framework in place for the climate, you know, the net zero transition, so the US is gonna catch up and, I think, uh, pull ahead, but Europe's been doing pretty well there and that's driving investment. So, I don't think they're weaker and, at least initially, and it's, it's more than initial because it's been longer than a year, I think the European response to the crisis, the crisis being the war, has actually has made them stronger. It will make them stronger in the medium term, it's accelerated some things that they needed to do.

    14. HSHarry Stebbings43:16

        Can I ask, Mark, a really unfair one? And

11. 43:18 – 44:45

    Which companies and countries act more than they talk?

    1. HSHarry Stebbings43:18

       again, I'll blame Mr. Evans for this one 'cause I can do... Um, which governments and big corporations are acting more than they're talking about climate initiatives?

    2. MCMark Carney43:28

       Uh, I would say acting more than they're talking, uh, look, I would say a company like, uh, and they talk about it, but, you know, a company like Walmart, um, in terms of, you know, Walmart's got... I've, I- I'm not gonna do them justice, but it's certainly well over a million SKUs, uh, in their, in their various stores. And, you know, if, if you... As a retailer you ultimately take responsibility for what are called Scope 3 emissions, so the emissions all the way through the value chain which means you need to know what the emissions are of all those products, uh, that you're putting on the shelves at Walmart. And they are rigorously going through that and then working with their suppliers to, you know, optimize those and get them down. And I, I don't, I don't know that given the complexity and scale of that business you could talk enough about it and still, uh, you know... Given what they're doing, I, they're saying less about it than, uh, than, than what they're putting into place. Uh, in terms of governments, yeah, this is recency bias. I was in Australia a few weeks ago and, uh, I'd say that the shift, uh, at all levels of government in Australia is, is underappreciated and, you know, that's a pretty can-do country, so when you have a decisive shift, uh, what we're seeing is pretty big, uh, shift in,

12. 44:45 – 50:11

    Which talk more than they act?

    1. MCMark Carney44:45

       uh, activity there and, and, and we'll, we'll hear a lot more about it.

    2. HSHarry Stebbings44:48

       Which are talking more than they're acting?

    3. MCMark Carney44:51

       Ah, that was the unfair qu- I thought it was a very fair question to ask me these. Which are talking more than they're acting?

    4. HSHarry Stebbings44:57

       (laughs) .

    5. MCMark Carney44:57

       On the company side, ugh, ugh, I think, um, I think big, uh, big oil is talking more than they're acting. I, I don't think that the scale of, um, the sc- in m- in most cases, the scale of, of investment in the energy of the future, you know, the relative investment there which is, is relatively small percentage of overall cashflow, and a smaller percentage relative to conventional investment, is consistent with where the energy sector is going. So, they all have a lot of talk but, in most cases, um, where the money is actually being put is, is not consistent with that. I'm gonna give an example which is that, um, the reason I was in, um, the reason I was in Australia is that Brookfield, a company I work with, uh, is, is, is leading a bid on a a, a company called Origin, uh, in Australia and it, it does a couple of things but one of the core things it is, is the biggest, uh, generator and retailer of electricity in Australia. So it's got about four and a half million customers. But most of its generation is coal and then they buy on a merchant basis in a bunch of gas generation so, as a whole, it's a meaningful proportion of Australia's emissions, you know, 7% of Australia's emissions as a whole. And Origin basically had a shareholder base that liked the dividends that came from that core steady business but, in effect, it's a transition trap because what they need to do for where Australia's going is to invest about 20 billion plus, uh, Australian, in building up clean power, shutting down the coal and operating for another 50 years, not another 10, 15 years. So, we've been able to come in, we've made a bid at a substantial premium to, you know, the undisturbed share price, a 50%, uh, premium, and, uh, we're gonna, you know, not have a dividend, we're not gonna take a dividend, uh, out of it and we're gonna, uh, invest in that transition, the 20 billion plus, shut down the coal, move forward and give the, give the thing a future and make a good return for, uh, for our investors accordingly. I bring that out, in part because it's an example of the value of going to where the emissions are and the scale of what that... But also, to try to illustrate the broader point that there are a number of companies that, and in the energy sector this is one of the challenges, that aren't moving fast enough for where the world's going and have shareholder bases, and part of the reason is they have shareholder bases that have a different horizon and could get to the point where the terminal value of the, of the enterprise has been affected. And so what appears to be a good yield in the short term is actually quite a poor yield over the medium and long term.

    6. HSHarry Stebbings47:40

       The subsequent question is very much the same as in technology then, is will those incumbents embrace innovation and move fast enough or will we see innovators embrace, you know, bluntly distribution and engage with distribution fast enough to challenge the incumbents? Where does the value accrue there in your mind?

    7. MCMark Carney47:59

       I think, yeah, yeah, I think that's the, you know, the history would say that it's the, it's more likely to be the latter, right? Uh, we see that, you know, time and time again in, uh, in technology. We saw it in the steel sector, a classic example. It's, you know, it has a fancy name, uh, The Innovator's Dilemma, uh, Cl- Clayton Christensen's work on that. So, it's almost the default and the challenge... Now, there are exceptions to this, you know, Netflix is an exception to this, Amazon was, uh, early days Amazon was an exception. Microsoft, I guess, in technology would be a, a, a, an exception so it, it's not destiny but you really have to fight against it and you have to, you do have to-... not cannibalize your business, but you've got to b- well, i- in effect, you do have to cannibalize your business. You ultimately have to take-

    8. HSHarry Stebbings48:50

       Yep.

    9. MCMark Carney48:50

       ... the cash flows from a very nice business and, uh, and invest on something that's not a, not a sure thing, uh, and that's hard to do.

    10. HSHarry Stebbings48:58

        Final part of that question, whi- whi- which governments are talking more than they're acting? And then we'll do a quick fire.

    11. MCMark Carney49:04

        Uh, yeah. I think the, you know, I am the United Nations special envoy, so I would have said the US, but I can't say that anymore. I think it's a relative game, so I'd now say that, you know, the time has come for the next phase of what the UK is going to do, maybe that's the best way to put it, all right? So, it's like anything, you can be out in front, you can be leading, but then others, others cap- catch up to you, start to lap you. So, uh, uh, I think the UK has had a good track record. But I'll quote the, I'll quote the Climate Change Commission, which is, you know, this independent body that does an assessment of the government, and it says that, uh, uh, more than half ... it, it, it, it does not yet have everything in place, uh, in order to, uh, reach its medium-term targets, uh, and has given 300 different recommendations of what's necessary to do it. So, I guess that would fall into the, into the talk more than act.

    12. HSHarry Stebbings50:03

        Well, that's good. I'll ask Rishi on the show when he, uh-

    13. MCMark Carney50:06

        (laughs)

    14. HSHarry Stebbings50:06

        ... when he does come on, ask him about ... 300 different recommendations, that must

13. 50:11 – 55:03

    Quick-Fire Round

    1. HSHarry Stebbings50:11

       be fun. Uh, I want to move into-

    2. MCMark Carney50:12

       Well, he's-

    3. HSHarry Stebbings50:13

       ... a quick fire round, Mark.

    4. MCMark Carney50:13

       Yeah.

    5. HSHarry Stebbings50:13

       So, I say a short statement, you give me your immediate thoughts. We're gonna start with one that I love to ... I can't wait to hear this. What do you miss about not being a Central Bank Governor?

    6. MCMark Carney50:24

       Hm. Uh, I miss, uh, I guess I'd put it, I miss being at the center. Um, in other words, when there's things like what we've been talking about, the banking turmoil and other things, you know, being in the room, being able to influence it more directly for good or ill. And certainly, you know, uh, during the time I was a Central Bank Governor, I would say was at the center, and, uh, I, I, I like being there if I can be.

    7. HSHarry Stebbings50:48

       I'm gonna be cheeky, but I feel like we have a rapport where I can be. Um, why are you not in politics, Mark? You seem like a gifted political advisor, politician. It's your home. Wh- why are you not in politics?

    8. MCMark Carney51:04

       Why would I bu- ... I, look, I, the, the big thing I, I'm trying to help break the back on climate, and I'll do that by whatever means possible. And I've got seats at the moment where I can influence it, so I'd say, uh, you know, politics if necessary, but not necessarily politics.

    9. HSHarry Stebbings51:22

       What do you not miss about being a Central Bank Governor?

    10. MCMark Carney51:25

        (laughs) What, what? If I go back to being at the center, uh, I don't miss when the center doesn't hold, uh, you know, the center not holding. So, I don't (laughs) miss when things are, uh, are spiraling out of control and you're not, you're not on top of it.

    11. HSHarry Stebbings51:39

        What do you know to be true that others do not agree with?

    12. MCMark Carney51:43

        There's no net zero without nuclear power. Um, a lot of people d- don't like to think about nuclear and, and think that there's an easy route to shut it down. But, in fact, we have to grow it by another 50% between now and 2050 worldwide.

    13. HSHarry Stebbings51:57

        What have you changed your mind on in the last 12 months, Mark?

    14. MCMark Carney52:00

        That fusion, uh, fusion power will be commercialized.

    15. HSHarry Stebbings52:03

        Who's your mentor?

    16. MCMark Carney52:05

        I'll give you three, b- but it's a common, uh, thing. Uh, there's a guy I worked with, uh, when I was at Goldman Sachs named Craig Broderick, uh, who was the head of the credit department. When I was a central banker, I would say Mario Draghi. Now that, uh, as an investor, uh, Bruce Flatt is the CEO of Brookfield. And, uh, I think the common thing of all three of those individuals is that you have to both sweat the details and see the big picture. So, you know, the challenge in, whether it's managing risk or conducting policy, uh, or investing, it's not enough just to get the tectonic forces right, uh, and the direction right. You actually have to, uh, have to do the work.

    17. HSHarry Stebbings52:44

        Penultimate one, if you could change one thing in climate, what would it be?

    18. MCMark Carney52:48

        If I could change one thing, uh (laughs) , it would be that we started, uh, we started taking it seriously when you were born. And so, uh, but given we can't go back in time, I would say, we need a big pool of capital, concessionary capital, to shoulder particularly foreign exchange risk in emerging economies. And let me explain that quickly, which is that two thirds of the emissions in the world now come from the emerging world. Now, that includes China, China's about 30% of global emissions. So ... but you've got 35% plus of emissions coming from countries that most private investors never visit, don't have exposure to, don't want to know about, and would be taking quite large, uh, currency risks, uh, and, you know, it's unhedgedable, and that means that a lot of the capital is uneconomic to get there. Now, there's other risks and there's other issues, but we need to have a big pool of capital that will, that will hedge that out. Uh, it's not gonna come from the private sector, um, and given the time horizons, uh, so we need, we, we need to, uh, we need to design that, and, you know, it's one of the things I work on on the, uh, on the side.

    19. HSHarry Stebbings53:55

        Final one, we do this again in, uh, 2028, so five years out. Where's Mark then?

    20. MCMark Carney54:01

        I would like to think that I have ... I'm no longer a special envoy, um, uh, because, uh, what the objective is, so I'm gonna define it in the negative. I'm no longer a special envoy, uh, because I'm, you know, tired of not being paid by the UN, um, but more seriously, because the kind of things I'm working on are just so run-of-the-mill, they're mainstream, that everybody does it, and that's when you have successes that, you know, this is just, you know, carbon competitiveness is just part of the value equation, it's part of the way things are a- analyzed and capital flows naturally. And so, then at that point, what am I doing? I'm an intern at Harry VC-

    21. HSHarry Stebbings54:43

        (laughs)

    22. MCMark Carney54:43

        ... by that point.

    23. HSHarry Stebbings54:44

        Mark, listen, I've loved this.

    24. MCMark Carney54:45

        That'd be fantastic.

    25. HSHarry Stebbings54:47

        I, I ... And, and sadly, you will not be able to be an intern, because I'm actually special envoy in five years' time.

    26. MCMark Carney54:52

        (laughs) Okay.

    27. HSHarry Stebbings54:52

        So, alas, your job has gone, and, uh-

    28. MCMark Carney54:55

        (laughs)

    29. HSHarry Stebbings54:55

        ... I have a new one. Uh, Mark, I love this. Thank you so much for doing it with me. I've learned immensely, and you've been a star, my friend.

    30. MCMark Carney55:02

        It's been great. My pleasure.

Episode duration: 55:03