Peter Singlehurst: The Most Powerful Investor You've Never Heard of | 20VC #907

1. 0:00 – 0:22

   Intro

   1. PSPeter Singlehurst0:00

      Three, two, one, zero. You have now arrived at your destination.

   2. HSHarry Stebbings0:09

      Peter, I'm so excited for this. I've been looking forward to this one for a very long time, actually. So I'm s- thrilled that we could do it. And thank you so much for joining me today.

   3. PSPeter Singlehurst0:17

      Thank you for having me, Harry. It's a pleasure to be here.

   4. HSHarry Stebbings0:19

      Well, listen, I'm super excited for the discussion, but I

2. 0:22 – 3:06

   How did you get into the investing world?

   1. HSHarry Stebbings0:22

      do you want to start on you 'cause Baillie Gifford's a really fascinating organization. So I want to hear how did you make your way into the world of investing and come to be at Baillie Gifford and in the investing world?

   2. PSPeter Singlehurst0:33

      Uh, in short, somewhat by accident. Um, uh, my ac- academic background was in philosophy. Uh, I did a master's in philosophy looking mainly at 20th century European philosophers. Finished my master's, didn't really know what to do, but heard about this thing called investment management, this firm called Baillie Gifford, and I quite liked the idea of, of living in Edinburgh. So I applied for the, uh, graduate training scheme, which is how pretty much all of our investors at Baillie Gifford start. Um, a lot of people go on to spend their entire careers here, and it's a partnership, uh, owned by people who started their careers on the, the, uh, the graduate training scheme. Um, so when I first joined, Baillie Gifford was really just a public markets, um, investment firm. Um, I spent time on various, uh, public teams, um, and then ended up on a team called the Long Term Global Growth Team within Baillie Gifford, which sort of does exactly what it says, um, on the tin. And it was roundabout this time that we started seeing more, uh, more of the businesses that we sort of always invested in, high growth companies, staying private longer. Um, and we sort of thought that, you know, maybe this was a structural change that was happening. We thought that maybe actually the process of analyzing these companies might be pretty similar to the process of analyzing a lot of the public companies that we'd always invested in, and that maybe we might be able to access some of these companies because, well, these were really the businesses we'd always invested in, these kind of pretty substantial high growth companies. Um, and so we, we start- we set off doing that from within, uh, a permanent pool of capital that we've managed for the last 114 years, uh, called the Scottish Mortgage Fund. It's confusingly named. It's got nothing to do with mortgages. Uh, it's a, it's a 100-year-plus permanent pool of capital. And we set about trying to do things a bit differently, so being very long term within this evergreen fund, being very low cost in terms of the, the fees that we charged our clients for investing in these companies, and doing it in such a way that was really joined up between our private and public company investing activities. And so that's how we started, uh, doing this, and we, we created a dedicated team in 2017, um, which has continued to grow. We've continued to deploy more of our client's capital into high growth private companies, and I think increasingly, we're cognizant that it's strategically important for how we invest for all of our clients, public and private. Um, and I think that sort of joined up approach is sort of integral, really, to how we operate.

3. 3:06 – 4:42

   Why don’t you consider yourself a VC?

   1. PSPeter Singlehurst3:06

   2. HSHarry Stebbings3:06

      There is so much for me to unpack there. I mean, I, I want to start with actually something, though, that you said before we started this recording, which was, "I don't consider myself a, a venture capitalist." That's pretty interesting to say, and it's, um, novel for me to hear on 20VC. Um, why don't you consider yourself a VC, Peter?

   3. PSPeter Singlehurst3:26

      In my mind, venture capital means very early stage investing. It means, you know, backing the sort of proverbial two people and a dog and an idea in a garage. And that's not what we do. Um, we invest in, I guess, kind of mid- and late-stage high growth private companies, companies where you can have a real conversation about what the business model looks like and a company's competitive advantage. Um, to me, that's, that's sort of more growth investing. That's fundamental company analysis. And we're not operationally involved with companies either. Um, and so that's why I don't call it, what we do, venture capital. We're not sort of pretending or aspiring to do or be what those early stage investors do and, you know, and some of whom are very good at it. We're trying to be a bit different, and we're trying to be a long term partner for our, for our companies, transcending the private and into the public markets, um, over time frames that I think are, uh, unfamiliar to most investors but they are very familiar to us given the longevity of our organization and, and the philosophy that we've always pursued.

   4. HSHarry Stebbings4:31

      Yeah, I mean that 114-year timeframe really does trump most people-

   5. PSPeter Singlehurst4:35

      (laughs)

   6. HSHarry Stebbings4:36

      ... actually. (laughs) Um, before we dive into the public versus private kind of merging, um, I do want to touch on the background,

4. 4:42 – 5:56

   Do you need a finance background to be an investor?

   1. HSHarry Stebbings4:42

      though, 'cause, you know, you said about your background there in kind of studying philosophy. And then when we spoke before, you said very few people at Baillie Gifford have financial backgrounds. Why is that, and what do you think are the benefits of this mindset coming into investing?

   2. PSPeter Singlehurst4:57

      The, the belief that we have is that there are some basic tools that you need to do investing. You know, what set of accounts look like, how to do some sort of fairly basic valuation techniques. And we can teach those pretty quickly when people join. Then there's a whole load of stuff that you can only learn through experience and doing the job. But what you can't teach is cognitive diversity. And so the reason we hire from a range of academic backgrounds is because we bring in people with lots of different perspectives on the world, um, rather than hiring people who grew up dreaming of being fund managers, where you might well end up with a fairly narrow, uh, perspectives on the world.

   3. HSHarry Stebbings5:39

      That's why Baillie Gifford never offered me a job. (laughs)

   4. PSPeter Singlehurst5:43

      (laughs)

   5. HSHarry Stebbings5:43

      Um, I, I, I do want to dive into the public versus private there, because to me, uh, we joked before, but, you know, everything that I buy, you should short. I'm the world's worst public markets investor. And that's so paradoxical in my mind.

5. 5:56 – 8:50

   Is there a divide between public and private markets?

   1. HSHarry Stebbings5:56

      So, tell me, why do you think that actually the framing shouldn't be so different for public versus private? Why do you not believe in segregating the two like this?

   2. PSPeter Singlehurst6:08

      I, I really think that the public-private divide is an artifact of the financial universe rather than anything that you would come up with if you were thinking about investment or company formation from first principles. Um, when you think about what matters for a good business, uh, you know, a big addressable market, great management team, robust competitive advantage, a fantastic business model, well, these things are true whether you're talking about private or public companies. And the only thing that changes when a business goes from being private to being public is that its shares start trading in a slightly different way. I don't think there's really much information in that that tells you that you should delineate investing on those terms. And so we just try to look for great companies and own them for a really long time, um, and try to break down what we believe is this artificial divide between public and, and private businesses.

   3. HSHarry Stebbings7:02

      Can I ask, what are the benefits of being able to invest in both public and private to you and not having this quite blinkered mindset of public versus private?

   4. PSPeter Singlehurst7:12

      I think it's really a question of the, the, the whole being greater than the sum of its parts. There are enormous benefits that we get as private investors by working alongside our public market colleagues (clears throat) every day. We get an incredible sourcing advantage because we source through the, you know, hundreds of public companies and executives and founders that we work with. Um, we get to benefit from the analytical insights of 120 public market investors, and we can draw them into our private, uh, or analysis of private businesses. And then we get to bring the benefits of the scale of being a, you know, fairly large public market organization in supporting companies over, over their journey, not just privately, but potentially with greater sums of capital into the public markets as well. So it's enormously beneficial for us as private investors. For our public teams, they basically get a window into the future. They get to see the businesses that will be in the public markets over the next five or ten years, and just get insight and understanding and relationships with those companies that you could never get if you weren't an active participant in the private markets. I think it's also beneficial for the companies we back because we can be this long-term provider of capital over their journey. And it's beneficial for our clients because we give them continuity of ownership and access to these companies at low fees, rather than maybe them being in a private market manager's mandate, disappearing out of that mandate when a company becomes public, and then reappearing in a public market manager's portfolio. I think really all this kind of boils down to better alignment, better alignment between ourselves and the companies we back, but also with the clients whose capital

6. 8:50 – 10:40

   Are venture funds aligned to their LPs?

   1. PSPeter Singlehurst8:50

      we're responsible for.

   2. HSHarry Stebbings8:51

      Do you think traditional venture funds are aligned to their LPs?

   3. PSPeter Singlehurst8:56

      I think they start off aligned, but I think that when you get into the tail years of limited-life funds, I worry that you start to get misalignments of interests. I also worry that traditional carried interest structures can drive misalignments of interest because of the value that can flow to individual investors from crystallizing an exit, even if actually what you should really be doing is continuing to own that business for much, much longer, because it's a company that can continue to compound for, for years and years and years. Um-

   4. HSHarry Stebbings9:28

      Why is there misalignment in the later ends of a fund's life? Sorry. I should probably know this. (laughs)

   5. PSPeter Singlehurst9:34

      Uh, uh, I think it's partly because you have these set of incentives around fundraising cycles.

   6. HSHarry Stebbings9:40

      Yeah.

   7. PSPeter Singlehurst9:40

      So you want a, a, a, you know, a traditionally structured venture capital or private equity manager who's incentivized to distribute capital. In distributing capital, they collect carried interest, so they, you know, take quite a lot of the returns, and then they go back to those LPs and they say, "Hey, we distributed that capital. We're raising a new fund. Can you put it into our new fund?" Um, and it's this sort of, uh, cycle of fundraising, distribution, collection of carried interest, which doesn't necessarily align with the sort of logic of investment returns of finding great businesses and owning them for a really long time.

   8. HSHarry Stebbings10:16

      And I, I, I totally agree with you in terms of those misalignments. I also see managers keeping businesses alive artificially to allow them to raise new funds, new funds are raised, and then allow companies to die. I think there's many more misalignments than people actually see and think about. Um, so I totally agree with you there. I want to touch on a couple of things that you mentioned before. You mentioned kind of fundamentals and, you know, first principles thinking. You mentioned market size.

7. 10:40 – 12:00

   Outcome scenario planning

   1. HSHarry Stebbings10:40

      I'm always troubled by this. Should one do outcome scenario planning, thinking about how big this could be, knowing that actually in your winners, you always underestimate how big it could be. So, is it worth doing at all?

   2. PSPeter Singlehurst10:56

      I think it's worth doing within the context of probabilities, and this is how we think about valuation upside. We, we (clears throat) create scenarios in which, you know, are deliberately contrived where a company can be a very high returning business and a high returning investment for our clients. We think about the probabilities or the, the, the things that would have to come to pass for that to be the case, and then we look and test the probabilities that you would have to ascribe to that. But whenever you do that, there are many different things that go into it. It's the size of the market, but it's, it's the financial characteristics of the company. It's the robustness of the competitive advantage, which will be a di- direct input into the returns the business can make, the amount of capital it will require, the returns on equity it can make.Um, and so I think it's trying to understand these things holistically and in the round, imagining that you will be an owner of this company for a really, really long time, rather than saying, "Well, this thing will go public and, you know, somebody will pay a multiple of X, Y, Z, which is higher than the multiple that I paid, then that's how I'll make money."

   3. HSHarry Stebbings11:58

      Okay. So, uh, I've learned, you know,

8. 12:00 – 13:30

   How can you anticipate competitive advantage?

   1. HSHarry Stebbings12:00

      over time to actually, um, say what I think in shows, um, 'cause I used to just agree all the time. Um, I- I don't, I don't really get it. Um, and what I don't really get is the competitive advantage element, 'cause I think defensibility is built over time and in ways that you just can't anticipate. It could be data defensibility. It could be network effects that were unanticipated. And so I look at businesses and I'm just like, (laughs) "Is the founder a fucking machine?"

   2. PSPeter Singlehurst12:29

      (laughs)

   3. HSHarry Stebbings12:29

      Yes or no? And, you know, that's k- k- it's kind of it, because you just don't know what form of moat network will be built. So how, how do you think about the accuracy with which you can actually anticipate competitive advantage?

   4. PSPeter Singlehurst12:46

      So I, I would actually completely agree with that. We are not trying to accurately nail down what a company's competitive advantage is or will be. Actually, if you look at the, the reports we write, the analysis that we do on competitive advantage, it looks more like a meditative, meditative essay than a set of assertions. And we try to think about these things dynamically as well. It's not interesting to us what the company's competitive advantage is today. It's the set of hypotheses and the conviction you can have in that, in how that competitive advantage can evolve as the company grows and how it can get better as it gets bigger.

   5. HSHarry Stebbings13:23

      So, totally agree with you there, and I'm glad that I'm not completely nuts. Um, the other thing is, like, the long-term financial partner. I

9. 13:30 – 15:45

   What happens if you lose faith in the company?

   1. HSHarry Stebbings13:30

      love that. (laughs) What if you lose faith in the company and the founder? Like, it, it can happen, and it's sad, and sometimes you can gain faith and gain more confidence. But what happens if you lose faith? Like, are, are you on the hook for it? Like, how do you think about that? (laughs)

   2. PSPeter Singlehurst13:48

      I mean, I suppose it slightly depends whether the company is still private or public. And if it's still private, we would not put more money into that capital. And if it's public, we would probably, we would probably look to sell it. That, that sort of long-term hold is not unconditional. It's conditional upon execution and performance and the delivery of returns for our clients. In a way, though, those aren't the difficult ones. Where you've lost faith, like, those are quite straightforward decisions. It's where you don't quite know why something isn't working out, whether it's not clear whether it's the team or set of external factors which will right themself for whatever reason. Those are the really agonizing decisions. It's where it's not quite clear why something isn't working, and you're faced with the question of whether to put more capital, uh, to work into those businesses.

   3. HSHarry Stebbings14:36

      Cliffhanger. What do you do then? (laughs)

   4. PSPeter Singlehurst14:39

      (laughs) You, you, you agonize. Uh, I mean-

   5. HSHarry Stebbings14:43

      Um, and, and which side do you tend to fall on more often? Concentrate capital knowing that actually you backed it for a reason, continue to support, or be cautious?

   6. PSPeter Singlehurst14:53

      I think we probably fall more often on the side of continuing to back businesses. Um, and sometimes those are the best decisions we ever make. And sometimes they're the worst decisions we ever make. Um, but founders and companies will more often find us leaning on the side of supporting, though that's not unconditional, and there are plenty of examples where we don't support in those, those difficult circumstances if we believe that the situation cannot be changed.

   7. HSHarry Stebbings15:25

      One of the reasons I was so excited for this show is, you've got to remember, I've done, like, you know, 3,000 shows with VCs. (laughs) Um, and, and so this is, like, a very different one for me, um, given Baillie Gifford being such a different entity. One thing that I was just thinking about last night, um, in bed, which clearly shows I need to get out more, um, is- (laughs) this sounds much weirder than I, I thought it did.

10. 15:45 – 17:50

    How does Baillie Gifford look at portfolio construction?

    1. HSHarry Stebbings15:45

       Um, w- what does portfolio construction (laughs) mean to Baillie Gifford today?

    2. PSPeter Singlehurst15:51

       So when we take holdings in companies, w- we tend to take pretty standard position sizes. Um, and those positions are ones that we intend to build on if there is, um, continued, uh, deepening of our conviction in those companies. And I think that's a little bit different from a lot of other investment models where it's sort of, you know, put your capital in upfront at a given price and then effectively minimizing dilution thereafter. W- we size positions with the intention and desire to continue to build on those as conviction builds and deepens. I think ultimately, you only really ever understand a business by being a shareholder. And so we feed that into our, uh, to our portfolio construction. And of course, then we don't add to those companies where we're not building that conviction.

    3. HSHarry Stebbings16:36

       I totally get you on buying up. How do you think about, though, that a company will never be cheaper than it is today? Grab all your ownership on first check.

    4. PSPeter Singlehurst16:45

       So I disagree with that because I think that com- the probability-adjusted upside of companies can often grow as they become larger. Um, and so even though ostensibly the price, yes, might be lower in a previous round, as I said, I think sometimes the probability of outsized returns can grow as companies actually become more valuable because they are executing and delivering. And the likelihood of even further upside can go up in line with that as a sort of path dependency.

    5. HSHarry Stebbings17:16

       Walk me through that, sorry. When you say the probability, you're saying they've de-risked enough elements to make it more probable to be an outsized returner, in which case you should concentrate capital? Is, is... Sorry. Am I getting it right?

    6. PSPeter Singlehurst17:29

       Yeah, I think that's broadly right. But it also goes back to our question, uh, discussion about competitive advantage. And if you're seeing competitive advantage deepen and compound, well, then that can also be something which I guess, yes, you could call it de-risking. But I think that we would, we would sort of look at very closely in, in thinking about how the potential upside returns for a company are evolving and changing,

11. 17:50 – 19:48

    How do you think about diversification?

    1. PSPeter Singlehurst17:50

       um, as they grow.

    2. HSHarry Stebbings17:52

       How do you, uh, uh, how do you think about diversification given that structure and model, then?

    3. PSPeter Singlehurst17:58

       Yeah, so diversification is normally thought of in terms of downside risk mitigation.

    4. HSHarry Stebbings18:04

       Yep.

    5. PSPeter Singlehurst18:04

       Um, we would think about it much more in terms of diversifying to maximize the probability of capturing outliers. Uh, we also don't think about diversification in terms of traditional sectors. Um, we try to think about it much more in terms of the underlying commonalities of businesses, and we sort of group our companies accordingly. So, you end up with companies in our sort of, um, uh, categorizations, which are ostensibly very, very different companies. So, for instance, we would put two businesses like Tanium and SpaceX in the same category, uh, within our diversification thinking, because we would view both of those companies as providing the underlying infrastructure for the continued evolution of communication technologies, either through endpoint security or through the, you know, provision of, of global broadband, satellite broadband.

    6. HSHarry Stebbings18:56

       Totally get you. But what does that look like then? 'Cause you know, uh, w- traditional funds have like, you know, 25 to 30 lines is what, you know, the majority say. They, they often have no idea why 25 to 30, which always makes me laugh slightly. Um, (laughs) but, but how do you think about that? When you sit down w- you know, with your team-

    7. PSPeter Singlehurst19:13

       (laughs)

    8. HSHarry Stebbings19:13

       ... do you go, "Guys, we..." and girls, um, "We are, um, in eight companies, and we don't have enough diversification on a per-company basis. We need to put in 20." Is that how it... uh, walk me, walk me through the diversification thinking on a per-company basis.

    9. PSPeter Singlehurst19:30

       Yeah, so I mean, if you look at our funds, you're probably more, uh, more like sort of 40, 45 companies within a portfolio. Um, but you'll often see quite a lot of concentration within the top 10 holdings.

    10. HSHarry Stebbings19:41

        Yeah.

    11. PSPeter Singlehurst19:41

        Um, you know, as we, as, you know, putting it's, sort of, concentrated capital in those companies where conviction is building.

12. 19:48 – 23:59

    How much do you concentrate your capital?

    1. PSPeter Singlehurst19:48

    2. HSHarry Stebbings19:49

       Uh, how, how... Sorry, um, how much concentration? I remember when like, Bryan Singerman sa- from Founders Fund said, um, "The biggest enemy of great venture returns is capital concentration limits on a per-company basis," and that Founders Fund actually have done so well because they have exceeded 40, 50% on a per-company basis. Does it look like two or three having 70% of the capital? How does that spread in terms of capital distributions look?

    3. PSPeter Singlehurst20:16

       Um, so it's not quite that concentrated. Um, you know, I think at times we've had sort of upwards of sort of 50% of, uh, an even fund in the top 10 companies. Um, now those will often be companies that we've invested in privately that have gone public and, you know, have gone up a lot. Now, of course, some of that concentration has flattened off, uh, in the last few months as you would expect. Um, and so that kind of level of concentration, you know, can be a bit movable given that we continue to own these companies into the public markets and those, you know, the market prices of those businesses, uh, in recent times, in particular can be rather volatile.

    4. HSHarry Stebbings20:51

       (laughs) We're gonna get into the volatility, don't worry. Uh, I do wanna ask you, speaking of kind of the, the diversification, one thing that I thought was super interesting as well is given your entry point, you know, it's very different to mine. How do you think about loss ratio?

    5. PSPeter Singlehurst21:06

       So, I think when we first started this, we thought that we would have a much higher loss ratio than we, we have done. Um, over the last 10 years, we've deployed something like $10 billion into about 100 private companies. Um, we've had one bankruptcy of a company, um, which is nothing to be proud of for sure, but I think we thought it was gonna be much higher than it was. Um, now, in a way, when you think about it, it's kind of quite logical that we should have those kind of low loss ratios because we're not doing super early-stage investments. We're investing, you know, mostly in revenue-generating businesses, real companies with real products. Um, and so it's completely different downside risk that we face compared to early-stage, uh, investing. But nevertheless, we've been able to find a lot of companies that can deliver the sorts of returns and have the kind of growth that you would expect at the early stage.

    6. HSHarry Stebbings21:58

       Okay, so I'm a precocious young member on your team who's just joined, uh, and I say, "Peter, does that mean that, um, we're not taking enough risk? 10 years, one bankruptcy, are we really taking enough risk going after Alpha if we've got one bankruptcy? I know, I know they're revenue-generating, but really?"

    7. PSPeter Singlehurst22:18

       I think that's a completely fair question, and we ask ourselves that all the time. Um, I think ultimately it sort of comes down to looking at the companies that we, that we have backed and, you know, are those companies growing, uh, uh, in the way that we would have hoped and growing very, very quickly? And they are, you know, we... Um, I think that if we had a sort of stagnant portfolio of companies that were, you know, chugging away at, you know, 10% year over year, then we would be really worried. Um, but, you know, we're fortunate to have found companies that, uh, are able to grow very, very quickly, um, often over quite long periods of time.

    8. HSHarry Stebbings22:56

       How many companies have actually... I, I've had quite a few now, whereas, like, they've had acquisitions and have got like 50 cents on the dollar back. And so it's like, it's not a bankruptcy, but when you look at that cohort, is there many in that cohort?

    9. PSPeter Singlehurst23:09

       Very few of our investments get acquired. Um, and that's partly because we, we steer away from any company where we get a whiff of, um, them potentially being bought. Um, I think it kind of comes back to what we're trying to achieve. You know, we're not trying to find a company that can be bought for, you know, 1 or 2X in a year or two. We're trying to find companies that over a 5, 10, 15-year view can go on to become 5, 10, 20 times their, their current size. And so, that kind of skews us towards companies that we, you know, that we believe have the potential, but also where you have a management team who has a level of ambition to keep it private, so keep, keep the business independent, um, and grow it independently rather than looking for an M&A exit.

    10. HSHarry Stebbings23:55

        Speaking of kind of seeing that value, that 10, 20, 30X from

13. 23:59 – 26:32

    How do cross-over funds affect what you do?

    1. HSHarry Stebbings23:59

       here-... I, I'm fascinated. Given that as an entry point, how did the crossover funds (laughs) invading growth, how did that impact your investing, your price discipline, your entry point? How did it change what you do?

    2. PSPeter Singlehurst24:14

       I mean, I, I think the way it really s- changed things, particularly last year, was it changed the time frames that rounds were happening in. So, we were seeing rounds happening last year at speeds that certainly wouldn't have enabled us to do our necessarily diligence, and I don't think it was enabling anybody to do any diligence. And so we were walking away from rounds that, you know, companies we thought were really interesting but where that kind of pace of capital last year, we just didn't think was enabling enough work to be done. Uh, I, I, I think the, the sad thing about that is that the, the people that will suffer from that is, is the companies themselves, because they will have ended up with shareholders who don't fully understand what it is they've invested in. And that's kinda fine when everything's going great. But it's in difficult times, you know, difficult times like we are in today, where I think that will end up being difficult for the companies who have shareholders who haven't really understood, uh, what it is they've invested in.

    3. HSHarry Stebbings25:12

       Difficult times. Difficult times. Peter, I should have a bottle of tequila beside my desk.

    4. PSPeter Singlehurst25:17

       (laughs)

    5. HSHarry Stebbings25:17

       Fuck. Uh, uh, I do want to ask, you know, uh, we- we've seen some of the crossover funds, not naming names, but post some, you know, "I think I'm having difficult times," pretty horrific numbers. Um, Doug Leone from Sequoia said on the show, I love this, "We've seen them come. We've seen them go. They are tourists." Um, and, uh, I wanted to hear your thoughts on how do you expect them to respond? Will they retrench and retreat from this high-priced growth investing market? Will they double down? How do you expect them to respond in the face of the volatility in public markets and their numbers being flattened?

    6. PSPeter Singlehurst25:56

       I think it's a really interesting question, and I think in many ways the people that will decide the answer to that will be their clients, their limited partners. It'll be, you know, whether or not s- they can go on to raise successive funds that will determine how they, you know, conduct themselves in this market going forward. Um, I wouldn't try to sort of second-guess what the answer to that will be, but I think in many ways it might not be in the hands of the investors themselves. The... It'll be in the hands of their end clients and the people to whom, uh, they have the responsibility of, of managing that capital.

    7. HSHarry Stebbings26:29

       Yeah. I, I, I get you totally. Can I ask you now, when we look

14. 26:32 – 28:41

    Do VCs really add value?

    1. HSHarry Stebbings26:32

       at a lot of new venture models today, a lot of it is pretty service-heavy, especially for the big firms, and they use those fees to pay for the operational intense businesses that they run providing these services. When we spoke before, you said, "Don't come to us if you need help. We're a financial partner." Uh, so talk to me. In a world of, like, services and value-add and, you know, heavy operational models, how do you think about n- not adding this operational value? And I guess do you think VCs really add value?

    2. PSPeter Singlehurst27:01

       I d- I think there are definitely some VCs that had an incredible amount of value. Um, I would also say, though, that, uh, there's a sort of industry of using that as kind of air cover to carry out quite a lot of window dressing around sort of so-called value creation in order to justify very high fees. But that doesn't take anything away from, you know, those folks that are actually genuinely very good at it. Um, I, I think we've always tried to be very clear about what we are and what we're not good at. Um, and as I said, we're not sort of aspiring or pretending to be venture capitalists, and so we don't pretend or aspire to be able to help a very, very early-stage company, you know, advise on their sales and marketing strategy. It's not to say, however, that there aren't things that we can't be helpful with. And I guess if you look at our heritage, you know, it comes from the public markets, and I think what we can be helpful with is helping companies transition into the public markets, um, in some cases with capital, um, but also with advice and guidance around what the public markets will be like and what they should expect. Um, normally the way in which it manif- that manifests itself is that we are the voice around the table telling our pub- our private companies, "Look, are you really sure you want to go public? Like, you do realize that's a sort of one-way valve, and it's really hard being a public company. You'll get people owning your shares for all sorts of reasons that can be potentially completely misaligned with what you're trying to do. You'll have sell-side analysts jumping up and down on you quarter to quarter. It is going to be brutal." Um, and so ironically, given that, you know, we, we manage a fair amount in the public markets, normally we're the people telling our private companies to just be patient and

15. 28:41 – 31:30

    What advice do you give about going public?

    1. PSPeter Singlehurst28:41

       don't rush off and go public."

    2. HSHarry Stebbings28:43

       What do you think are the biggest misnomers or mis- uh, mistakes that people make in terms of their thinking around going public? When you're advising founders-

    3. PSPeter Singlehurst28:53

       Mm-hmm.

    4. HSHarry Stebbings28:53

       ... what naivetes do you most often find that they have, and what's the reality?

    5. PSPeter Singlehurst28:58

       I think it's that they view the process of going public as, uh, trying to appeal to everybody. They want to sort of, you know, convince every investor they meet that they're a great company and that, um, they should invest in them. The thing that I normally say to, uh, the, the founders of the companies that we back that are going to public, going public is that they should actually treat the process of going public, uh, as much as an exercise of trying to put off the wrong kind of investors. Um, I really believe that a company's shareholder base can be a significant competitive advantage or a s- significant competitive disadvantage depending on whether they get it wrong or right. And a successful IPO is really about trying to find a relatively small number of aligned shareholders in the public markets who can be partners and stewards of that business. And if you look at a business over the years like Amazon, I think one of the things that has given them license to continue to invest and grow is the fact that they've been owned by a relatively small group of fairly long-term investors. Um, and that's enabled a degree of focus that you wouldn't be able to have as a public company if you were trying to please everybody in the public markets. You have to displease, frankly, most public market participants if you're going to remain true to what it is you're trying to build.

    6. HSHarry Stebbings30:20

       I mean this naively, probably. Why would you ever go public, in many ways? If you can have a great concentrated investor base without prying eyes, without the need to disclose information, and build a great business with significant capital and private markets, why, why go public?

    7. PSPeter Singlehurst30:37

       I mean, I think that's a great question, and there are companies in our portfolios that, I think is, they've been private for a long time, and I think they'll probably stay private for a really long time. You know, a business like Epic Games, you know, has been private since 1992, and I don't think Tim Sweeney's about to rush off and take that business public. I, I think there are, however, good reasons and bad reasons. I think a good and honorable reason is to give employees liquidity. Um, you know, if you remunerate your employee base through options, you know, these people put the best years of their lives into these companies, and it's only right that they should be able to get a bit of liquidity, you know, pay off their mortgage, you know, pay their kids' college fees, and all of that sort of stuff. I think that's really honorable. I think a really bad reason for going public is because you've got early-stage investors who have funds coming to the end of their life, and they want to distribute capital to their limited partners and collect carried interest and all of that whole,

16. 31:30 – 33:00

    How do you think about secondaries?

    1. PSPeter Singlehurst31:30

       uh, circus. Um, so yeah, I, I, h- I, I think that there can be good reasons, but I think, unfortunately, there are often a lot of bad reasons as to why companies go public.

    2. HSHarry Stebbings31:41

       How do you and Baillie Gifford think of providing secondaries to funds? I think about, like, being an early-stage manager and having to provide, you know, DPI and cashback to my LPs. We mentioned misalignment in terms of fundraising. You know, cashback helps fundraisers. Um, if you're willing to give me cash for my 10% and I don't have to wait another four years for this to go public, and then they'll lock up and all, everything in between, how do you think about providing secondaries for funds? Is that something that you engage with often?

    3. PSPeter Singlehurst32:07

       Uh, so no, we wouldn't ever do, do sort of secondaries within funds. I mean, we will do secondary transactions within our, for our portfolio companies, so, you know, we'll help provide a bit of liquidity for, um, employees. And in some cases, early-stage investors, um, it can just be a bit of a pressure release valve for companies to enable them to then decide when they go public on their terms.

    4. HSHarry Stebbings32:29

       Yeah.

    5. PSPeter Singlehurst32:29

       So there are places for these kinds of secondary transactions, but w- what we would never do, there's this whole sort of brokered market for private companies that's very gray and very shady and that we steer quite clear of. Where we do do secondaries, it's only ever in conjunction with the company, and it's normally only ever in companies where we've put primary capital in, um, and where we have a sort of preexisting, um, relationship with the company.

    6. HSHarry Stebbings32:56

       I wanna double down. Before we do a quick-fire, I wanna double down on actually your

17. 33:00 – 34:30

    How has your style of investing changed?

    1. HSHarry Stebbings33:00

       style of investing itself. People change a lot as investors over the years. You know, you've been with Baillie Gifford now for 12 years. When you think about how your style's changed, what have been the most significant developments, and are there moments or events that have caused these eva- like, developments? Let's be reflective.

    2. PSPeter Singlehurst33:18

       Yeah, I, I think that's a very interesting question. Um, I suppose that there's quite a narrow way to look at it, which is, I started off my career looking at, um, uh, public companies, and then I started looking at private companies. But fundamentally, I think what I've always been doing is looking at, uh, great growth businesses. Um, I, I guess in a way, the sort of more recent iteration or development is that it's no longer just about the companies that I research and the companies that, that I find. It's about, you know, being an investor now is really also actually about building a team that's able to invest, and I think that's a whole new skillset that, you know, I've had to learn over the course of the last five or six years, because it is a different skillset. Um, but ultimately, we can only be exceptional as a group of investors if it's more than just one person that's exceptional. You have to be able to, uh, build a team, uh, that is comprised of great investors, where you have a safe environment where people can learn, develop, be vulnerable, make mistakes. Um, and I very much think of, you know, the last five years of sort of building the private companies team within Baillie Gifford as actually quite an important

18. 34:30 – 37:14

    Lessons for team building

    1. PSPeter Singlehurst34:30

       part of my own growth as an investor.

    2. HSHarry Stebbings34:33

       All right, let's double down on this. This is good. So, I, I have the same prob- not problem, but, you know, uh, experience building teams investing. Two big lessons for me is, number one, I often, like, shoot shit down pretty quickly.

    3. PSPeter Singlehurst34:46

       (laughs)

    4. HSHarry Stebbings34:46

       You know, if I just know that I've seen the space before, and, and you know when you just know it's not one for you?

    5. PSPeter Singlehurst34:51

       (laughs)

    6. HSHarry Stebbings34:51

       I shut it down. I cr- Like, that done. Don't do that. You've got to give them the oxygen to come to it on their own. Y- you can't shut things down and create an environment where they're nervous to bring it to you because you're too cynical, is one for me. And then number two, you know, sometimes, Peter, you're, you know, you're the boss of your team, I'm the boss of mine. You're going through the world of shit, and then they come to you with some random little thing, and you, in your head, you're thinking, "Are you serious? Do you know what I've got on my plate?" And actually, you have to go, "Peter, I'll be back in an hour. Really important that we have that chat that you wanted to have. Let me just deal with this." I've learned to not pass over my tension onto them in any way. Um, those are lessons for me. What are lessons for you?

    7. PSPeter Singlehurst35:38

       Um, I think that point around sort of giving people oxygen is a really important one. Um, I, I, I think, however, that's something that we've always... I think that's kind of wrought through our organization at Baillie Gifford, though. So, you know, if you come up within a culture that enables and facilitates freedom to, you know, look at whatever it is that interests you from quite an early stage, it's kind of relatively straightforward to kind of pass that on, um, within, within the, within the team. Um, (sighs) you know, the, the question of, um-... of, I think, sort of how you can facilitate and kind of build... I suppose, in a way, it's about sort of building resilience within a team. And sort of when you have those difficult times, you know, making sure that it's not something which kind of leads to a kind of internal stress within the team. I think it just comes back to having really good communications within teams, having people that are friends as much as peers and colleagues. And again, I think this kind of partly comes back to the way in which we've been built over a very long time as an organization, which is the fact that if I look around this office, um, I've worked with pretty much all of these people my entire career. Um, I've worked with them for a decade or more. And so, uh, th- I think that just gives rise to a kind of level of trust and a level of working together that we couldn't have if this was the sort of organization where kind of people came in for a couple of years and then left, and, um, if it was more of a kind of high turnover sort of model. I think that kind of trust really stems from the longevity that,

19. 37:14 – 39:07

    Advice for young investors

    1. PSPeter Singlehurst37:14

       with which people sort of stay at this organization.

    2. HSHarry Stebbings37:16

       You mentioned kind of the morale there in different times. You know, I, I want to ask, it's a tough time right now for everyone, but especially for younger investors who are really questioning-

    3. PSPeter Singlehurst37:25

       Yeah.

    4. HSHarry Stebbings37:25

       ... whether they're actually any good at this. What do you advise younger people who are really feeling insecure about whether they're any good and whether the last few years have just been an inflated period for them and it wasn't real?

    5. PSPeter Singlehurst37:39

       I think in times like this, it's really important to focus on the inputs. Uh, so that means focusing on investment philosophy. It means focusing on investment process. And I think you do need to sort of, you know, continuously test and evaluate as to whether those, you know, philosophies and processes are appropriate. But if they are, then now is the time to really be focusing on, on those and making sure you're absolutely nailing the inputs into the process. Because share prices are outputs, and particularly in the public markets, they are pretty uncontrollable. And if you were to be focusing on share prices, you would drive yourself insane. And so again-

    6. HSHarry Stebbings38:20

       (laughs)

    7. PSPeter Singlehurst38:20

       ... you know, whilst, you know, most of the teams here are public market teams, you won't see a single Bloomberg terminal on the desks of investment teams. And that's because we're not sitting here looking at share prices. We're trying to understand the fundamentals of companies, understand what's signal and what's noise, and really try to focus on the long-term evolution and development of these companies, rather than obsessing what's, you know, what is happening with sort of the share price bouncing around from day to day. Because that will be a fairly fast route to insanity.

    8. HSHarry Stebbings38:49

       (laughs) I agree with that. Poor crypto investors.

    9. PSPeter Singlehurst38:53

       (laughs)

    10. HSHarry Stebbings38:53

        Um, uh, t- tell me, sometimes inputs are wrong, and we make the wrong decision. Um, I, I, I mean, I've been doing it this long, and I, I have, you know, a couple, um, that have gone bust. I think I've got more bankruptcies than Baillie Gifford, which is

20. 39:07 – 42:33

    Lessons learned from a bad investment

    1. HSHarry Stebbings39:07

       a great advertisement. Um, (laughs) but, uh, my, my question to you is, you learn a lot when things don't work out. Can you take me to a time when an investment hasn't worked out? And what were your biggest takeaways from that experience?

    2. PSPeter Singlehurst39:22

       Yeah, so, so that company that, that I mentioned, the one that went bankrupt, was a business called Intarcia. It was a company that was developing a therapy for type 2 diabetes. And when we invested in it, it was, it was a very, it was late stage in the s- in the sense of being in phase three trials, it was close to commercializa- or close to regulatory approval, and then close to commercialization. Um, now, in my analysis, I placed a very high probability on that working, and it didn't work. Uh, they didn't get regulatory approval, and the company ran out of money, and it went bankrupt. Um, the, the lesson that I took from that was how to deal with probabilities at the extreme ends of the spectrum. I, I, there was something which was, you know, based on the clinical trial data, based on the base probabilities of success for similar therapies in that, in that disease area, um, it looked pretty high probability. Um, and I placed a very high probability on it. Um, what I learnt was that I should be very wary of anything that I believe to be high probability. What I also have learnt over the years is that when you're operating in the, uh, the other end of the spectrum, in low probabilities, the behavioral biases to, is to, is to sort of aim again too low. And that the things which appear to be a low probability actually often have a much higher probability than you might think. And the things which you think have a very high probability sometimes actually have a much lower probability than you might think.

    3. HSHarry Stebbings40:56

       So, I totally agree with you. How do you then fact check your probabilistic analysis when, as you said there, be wary when it's super probable, I can see this happening? How do you fact check it internally? Like, is it consensus-driven investment decision-making? Is it individuals? Walk me through that.

    4. PSPeter Singlehurst41:14

       Yeah, I mean, the fact-checking thing is really interesting, isn't it? Because there aren't any facts about the future in all of these. You know, history only plays itself out once, so you can't sort of replay these scenarios and, and actually say what the probability was because only have, only one course of events happened. Um, but sorry, that's somewhat tangential. Coming back to your question about, um, decision-making processes, uh, we, we keep it pretty, um, pretty lean. Um, the people who we make, or who are the decision makers on the various pot, pools of capital that we invest in, um, speak to each other most days. Uh, when we need to make a decision, we sit down and we decide together. And again, I think this point that we've, you know, many of us have spent really, a really long time working together, um, enables us to have, I think, quite, um, open conversations. They're very high trust conversations. They're conversations where we can be quite vulnerable with each other. Um, and we try to keep it at, at that sort of personal and informal level-... rather than having sort of, you know, large investment committees where everybody kind of sits around a table and, um, opines on Company XYZ. We, we really try to sort of keep it quite small and nimble.

    5. HSHarry Stebbings42:27

       Oh, I, I, I love VC pontification. Utterly brilliant.

    6. PSPeter Singlehurst42:31

       (laughs)

    7. HSHarry Stebbings42:31

       It's how we justify the fees, Peter.

21. 42:33 – 45:50

    What was your biggest winner?

    1. HSHarry Stebbings42:33

       You should get into our game. Um, now I... (laughs) What, what I want to ask is, you know, we spoke about the loss there. Winners also inform your perspective. Um, how do you think... You know, a, like, how do you think about your biggest win and how do you think that changed your view of investing?

    2. PSPeter Singlehurst42:49

       I mean, my biggest win as of date, uh, is still of a public company actually. Um, I was working on Tesla in 2000 and, uh, 12, and we went on to buy that for various strategies. Um, and so far that one's done all right. Um, I think what I really learned there was not just intellectually, but behaviorally, what, what asymmetry really looks like. Um, but I think also I really learned that, and this is actually to, uh, uh, something that one of my, my colleagues said the other day. He said that if you are sufficiently long term, uh, even in your most successful investments, there will always be a time when you look and feel really stupid. And I think Tesla is an example of a company (laughs) where there have been multiple periods over the course of that investment where we as an organization have looked and felt really stupid. Um-

    3. HSHarry Stebbings43:41

       Is that, is that really hard in public markets though? Because I can look and feel stupid in private and guess what? You're stuck with it. So no choice. But you, I mean, and this is why I have so much respect for you, you, when you look and feel stupid, can sell anytime you want, pretty much. Um, is that tough having that freedom to sell?

    4. PSPeter Singlehurst44:05

       I think it would be tougher if, um, if the sort of long-term mode of investing wasn't so ingrained in how we think and operate as an organization. Um, and, and I think in many ways this is kind of what made private investing quite natural for us. We, we sort of think of many of our public holdings as really as illiquid as many of our private holdings because if we're investing in a company with a 10-year view, you probably shouldn't be doing anything two or three years into that investment journey. You should really be thinking of it as being pretty much as illiquid as, as any private holding.

    5. HSHarry Stebbings44:47

       I, I mean, I totally agree with you in terms of that mindset. I think it's still tough to have when you know the truth. (laughs) Um, but I-

    6. PSPeter Singlehurst44:53

       I think also being based outside of a lot of financial ecosystems really helps us. You know, we're based in Edinburgh, in Scotland. You know, when we walk out of the door, uh, we're, you know, there aren't a load of other fund managers or investment bankers or venture capitalists kind of walking down the streets. And that enables us to, um, I think in some ways be a little bit isolationist from the rest of the financial world. Um, and I, there are good sides and bad sides to that, but there's, one of the good sides is that it enables us to focus on what we're doing and what we believe rather than being too peer aware.

    7. HSHarry Stebbings45:33

       I, I totally get you. Um, I've never been north of Cambridge, so I have no idea-

    8. PSPeter Singlehurst45:37

       (laughs)

    9. HSHarry Stebbings45:37

       ... really where Edinburgh or Scotland is, but, uh (laughs) -

    10. PSPeter Singlehurst45:41

        (laughs) .

    11. HSHarry Stebbings45:41

        ... I totally agree with you in terms of the benefits of isolationism. Um, I, I don't know if that's even a word, isolationism. Jesus.

    12. PSPeter Singlehurst45:47

        (laughs) It is.

    13. HSHarry Stebbings45:47

        Anyway. Uh, yeah, we'll roll with that.

22. 45:50 – 47:15

    What was your biggest miss?

    1. HSHarry Stebbings45:50

    2. PSPeter Singlehurst45:50

       (laughs)

    3. HSHarry Stebbings45:50

       Um, final one for you. Um, we, we've touched on like the biggest win, we've touched on, you know, a loss, um, and I want to touch on like one that you didn't do, a miss, and how that changed your mindset, and then we'll do the quick fire.

    4. PSPeter Singlehurst46:04

       I mean, one of the ones we really missed was DoorDash. Um, we had a few opportunities to invest in that privately. Um, and I think one of the problems was that we were looking at Postmates at the same time. Um, and, you know, I remember looking at both and thinking, "Gosh, I just kind of can't draw a line between these two." I was getting too obsessed. You know, in many ways, I was getting too obsessed with competitive advantage. And the thing that I should have placed a much greater weight on, um, was the founder of DoorDash and, you know, why he'd started the business and the level of, of commitment that he had to these small businesses that he was wanting to help and kind of bring online and help reach a wider audience. Um, and I think it was that kind of zeal that he had which ultimately was the thing that I should have placed much greater weight on rather than probably trying to be too, too clever about c- the competitive advantage between Postmates and DoorDash.

    5. HSHarry Stebbings47:00

       Yeah. Tony's special. Um, but yeah, I, I totally understand that one. But, um, listen, I, I really appreciate that. That's awesome. I've loved this. This has been so much fun. Uh, listen, I want to do a quick fire round. So I say a short statement, you give me your immediate thoughts.

23. 47:15 – 48:07

    Favorite book

    1. HSHarry Stebbings47:15

       Does that sound okay?

    2. PSPeter Singlehurst47:16

       Sounds brilliant.

    3. HSHarry Stebbings47:17

       So what's your favorite book and why, Peter?

    4. PSPeter Singlehurst47:20

       Oh, I mean, this is kind of like asking somebody who their favorite child is. Um, but I'll try and answer it. Um, one of the books that's influenced me the most is The Myth of Sisyphus by Albert Camus. And given the, you know, told you already that I'm a sort of reformed philosopher, that maybe that doesn't come as too much of a surprise. Uh, I think the thing that just resonates with me there is that life is fundamentally absurd, but that you can create your own meaning in life and that that can be just as motivating as if there was some intrinsic meaning to life woven into the fabric of the universe.

    5. HSHarry Stebbings47:56

       The Myth of Sisyphus. My favorite book is Venture Deals by Brad Felt. (laughs) But I love it. This is great. Listen, that's... And it's also the first time I've heard that on the show. Most people

24. 48:07 – 48:48

    What have you changed your mind on?

    1. HSHarry Stebbings48:07

       say Sapiens, so this is great. Um, what have you recently changed your mind on?

    2. PSPeter Singlehurst48:12

       And I don't think this is a particularly recent change, but quite a profound sort of change and realization for me was a few years ago around the gaming industry. Um, I had a fairly lazy and traditional view that it was a hit-driven business, and as I came to really understand the ways in which digital distribution and in-game purchases in video games completely changed the set of incentives for game developers and players and the potential longevity that could come from those businesses, it sort of opened up a, a new kind of world of investing for me as my beliefs about, um, the gaming industry changed.

25. 48:48 – 49:55

    How has becoming a father changed you as an investor?

    1. PSPeter Singlehurst48:48

    2. HSHarry Stebbings48:48

       This one I'm adding, but I like it. How did becoming a father impact your investing and operating mindset?

    3. PSPeter Singlehurst48:58

       Oh, that's a tough question. Um...

    4. HSHarry Stebbings49:01

       (laughs) I love how British you are. This is great.

    5. PSPeter Singlehurst49:04

       (laughs)

    6. HSHarry Stebbings49:04

       I, I'm so used to Americans, it's like, "Oof, tough one." (laughs)

    7. PSPeter Singlehurst49:10

       (laughs) Um, I think that becoming a father makes you more empathetic, um, that, yeah, and a mother for that matter. Um, I think that I'm... Uh, the way in which I sort of relate to people has, I think, changed after becoming a father, um, and I hope my colleagues find me, uh, yeah, a more empathetic person to work with, uh, on this side of being a father.

    8. HSHarry Stebbings49:36

       What do you believe that many others don't believe?

    9. PSPeter Singlehurst49:40

       I mean, I think we've touched on it already, that, you know, the, the dividing the world between private and public company investing is just meaningless, um, and that the world of company formation, uh, and investing would be a lot better if everybody stops pretending that

26. 49:55 – 50:30

    Biggest insecurity as an investor

    1. PSPeter Singlehurst49:55

       there was a meaningful divide between private and public businesses.

    2. HSHarry Stebbings49:58

       What's your biggest insecurity as an investor today?

    3. PSPeter Singlehurst50:02

       I guess the way that we operate as a firm is, by design, we're sort of slight outsiders, um, you know, both in terms of location, uh, as already, you know, we already talked about, you know, we don't go around calling ourselves venture capitalists. And I think when you have that outsider, that mindset of being outsiders, it can lead to strength. I think there can be strength in difference. But that also comes along with insecurity from being, you know, outsiders

27. 50:30 – 51:15

    Memorable first founder meeting

    1. PSPeter Singlehurst50:30

       within the industry that we operate in every day.

    2. HSHarry Stebbings50:33

       What's the most memorable first founder meeting you've had?

    3. PSPeter Singlehurst50:37

       I mean, I think the memorable ones are the ones where you're sitting there listening to a founder, and as you hear them speaking, your view of what is possible for this business or your view of, of the world is changing. Um, I would say the first time I spoke to Tim Sweeney at Epic Games, that was a real sort of aha moment as to what that business could become and what it was building. Or a business like, uh, Sologent based down in Houston, um, meeting, uh, Gaurav and, and Sean for the first time and understanding how the, what they had could really change the chemicals industry in a way that was really scalable. Um, you know, those would be some of the meetings

28. 51:15 – 52:25

    Most recent publicly announced investment

    1. PSPeter Singlehurst51:15

       that, you know, really stood out for me.

    2. HSHarry Stebbings51:18

       Final one. What's the most recent publicly announced investment, and why did you say yes and get so excited?

    3. PSPeter Singlehurst51:24

       I somewhat lose track of what's publicly announced and what's not. So I'll err on the side of one that I know is definitely publicly announced. Uh, we led a round in Grammarly, uh, last year. Um, it's a business that's, you know, known for being a spellchecking tool really, but actually what they're doing is helping people communicate more effectively. Um, it's a low profile company, a very high profile product, but a very low profile company, a very thoughtful leadership team. Uh, they're very long term. They're obsessed with the culture of their organization, um, and it's a fantastic product that just keeps getting better and better.

    4. HSHarry Stebbings51:59

       Listen, it saves me every day. Uh, I adore Grammarly as a product, and I mean, what a business it is. So, uh, thrilled to hear that. Peter, I've loved this. Thank you so much for being so open. Thank you so much for bluntly, like, being so reflective as well. It's really lovely to be able to have such a, such an honest discussion. So you've been a star, and I've loved doing it.

    5. PSPeter Singlehurst52:18

       Thanks, Hari. It's been great to talk to you.

    6. HSHarry Stebbings52:21

       You are a hero, my friend.

Episode duration: 52:25