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Andrew & Jihi Bustamante: How CIA spies run a mole hunt

How a married CIA team built a cell-style network to expose a mole; ran espionage operations into hostile Falcon territory while shielded from leadership.

Andrew BustamanteguestSteven BartletthostJihi (Jihee) Bustamanteguest
Aug 28, 20252h 32mWatch on YouTube ↗

EVERY SPOKEN WORD

  1. 0:00 – 1:48

    Intro

    1. AB

      When this story hits the airwaves, it's going to transform people's opinion about the CIA and the depths to which CIA will dive to collect intelligence that protects Americans. So, one of its own officers became a spy, reporting our secrets to a foreign adversary. My wife and I were included in an operation to bait the mole to make a mistake so that the mole could be found and disclosed.

    2. SB

      Your wife is here today and you've never told this story before, have you?

    3. AB

      No. And your curiosity right now is a major issue with CIA, because they don't want the world to know who those people are. It's a dangerous game.

    4. SB

      Well, obviously my research team tried to figure out who it was. (laughs)

    5. AB

      (laughs)

    6. NA

      (laughs)

    7. SB

      So, was this the mole?

    8. NA

      Married CIA spies Andrew and Jihee Bustamante were tasked with unraveling one of the greatest intelligence operations in modern history.

    9. SB

      Their untold story shows you how to build trust, manipulate, and thrive under pressure. What actually happened?

    10. AB

      A foreign ally contacted CIA and said, "You have somebody inside your organization sharing information on operations, officers, assets to an enemy country." They deployed us to the country and crafted new identities, new aliases so that we could build new sources of intelligence and try to find the mole.

    11. JB

      And we were really successful in doing that.

    12. AB

      Nobody felt like they were in imminent danger. But then that changed. My presence in the enemy country became known. I called Jihee and said, "I'm coming home early."

    13. JB

      And from that, I knew that something was wrong, because it is very real that you can be disappeared by a foreign adversary.

    14. AB

      Or worse, being captured. And the president can plausibly deny that you're CIA. So, I had to try to escape the country, but everything went wrong.

    15. SB

      And what happens next?

    16. AB

      A horrible story. So-

    17. SB

      This is the first time I'm setting you at home

  2. 1:48 – 3:19

    A Challenge for DOAC Followers

    1. SB

      a challenge when you listen to this episode. Can you figure out which country Andrew and Jihee were undercover in as spies from what they say? But also, our team here figured out that the mole in the CIA was one of these three people. Can you figure out from what they say which person was the mole? It might make sense for you at this moment to screenshot these three faces and the details below so you can remember their profiles. And by the end of the conversation, I want you to comment below which country you thought Andrew was undercover in as a spy and which one of these people was the mole within the CIA. Let's do this. Listen, to my regular listeners, I know you don't like it when I ask you to subscribe at the start of these conversations. I don't like saying it, I don't like it being in there. None of us like it. It's frustrating. Do you know what's also frustrating? It's also frustrating when I go into the backend of the YouTube channel and I see that 56% of you that listen frequently to this podcast haven't yet subscribed, and so many of you don't even know that you haven't subscribed because I'll see in the comments section, you say to me, you go, "I didn't even realize I didn't subscribe." And that actually fuels the show. It's basically like you're making a donation to the show. So, that's why I ask all the time, because it enables us to build and build and build and build, and we're going for the long term here. So, all I'd ask you is if you've seen this show before and you like it, help me, help my team here. Hit the subscribe button and we'll continue to build this show for you. That's my promise. Thank you to all of you guys that do subscribe. It means the world to me. Let's get on with the show.

  3. 3:19 – 5:24

    The CIA Has Declassified My Undercover Story

    1. SB

      Andrew, you've never told this story before, have you?

    2. AB

      No. I have never told the story of my own operational background. It's been, uh, it's been something that CIA has forbidden for a long time.

    3. SB

      And what's written in this book has taken you a long time to get approved by the CIA.

    4. AB

      Correct. So, uh, all CIA officers sign a lifetime secrecy agreement, and that secrecy agreement gives CIA the right to, to approve or disapprove any operational elements of our background that are still classified and that fit under this very kind of narrow rubric of sources and methods, sources and methods of active intelligence collection. Because of my time at CIA, my work at CIA, and the sensitivity of that work, I just kinda assumed I would never be able to talk about it, and then all that changed with the first Trump administration.

    5. SB

      What was the CIA's response when you said that you wanted to talk about what you're gonna talk about today?

    6. AB

      Well, that's what's interesting. They had two different responses. When I first submitted the request in 2019 to CIA to write about my operational background, we went through kind of some normal bureaucratic back and forth, and they ultimately said, "Yes, you can write about it in, in detail." And then in 2021, when we submitted the manuscript and it was complete, the world started to change. In 2022, uh, multiple major issues, uh, erupted between major adversaries of the United States and CIA came back and, and removed their previous permission. Uh, they basically said that in light of current geopolitics, everything in the book was now reclassified.

    7. SB

      How did you get the CIA to change their mind so that you could release this book and talk about what you're gonna talk about today?

    8. AB

      We engaged with an attorney, one of the top attorneys in the space of classified information and publishing information. So, the attorney believed that because of the effort that my wife and I had put into the book, CIA would back off, and ultimately, that is what they did. When we threatened them with a First Amendment lawsuit, they came back and said, "We don't wanna go down that road. We think we can collaborate on this. We'll approve your book, uh, and you can move forward."

  4. 5:24 – 6:42

    Why Didn't the CIA Want Your Story Public?

    1. AB

    2. SB

      Why do you think they didn't want you to publish this book and this story to get out?

    3. AB

      When this story hits the airwaves, it's going to transform people's opinion about CIA in two big ways. First, they'll understand that CIA is not what the movies portray it to be. It's not superhuman spies who go out there like James Bond or Jason Bourne, who are one man against the world. That's not how espionage works. Espionage is a team sport. You have wins, you have losses. The second thing is they'll actually, they'll start to understand the depths to which CIA will dive to collect intelligence that protects Americans. Inside this book, we talk about a mole that actually penetrated CIA that CIA has never acknowledged.... inside this book, we talk about new tactics that CIA learned from terrorism and then used against our own most strategic adversaries. I don't think people recognize that CIA is morally ambivalent to how it executes espionage operations. The goal is to keep Americans safe.

    4. SB

      When you say in this book you disclosed that there was a mole within the CIA, what does that mean for someone that doesn't know what a mole in the CIA is?

    5. AB

      One of the worst things that can happen to an intelligence service is that one of its own officers becomes a spy for a foreign adversary. That is what I'm referring to when I talk about a mole.

  5. 6:42 – 7:01

    What the Book Reveals About the CIA

    1. AB

    2. SB

      And you were involved in the operation to find the mole within the CIA?

    3. AB

      Correct. More specifically, my wife and I were included in, in an operation to kind of ferret out the mole, to bait and, and tempt the mole to make a mistake so that the mole could be found and disclosed.

  6. 7:01 – 8:03

    How I Became a CIA Spy

    1. AB

    2. SB

      And your wife is here today?

    3. AB

      Correct.

    4. SB

      And we're gonna bring her in and talk to her as well. But for the, for anyone that doesn't know your backstory, which would be pretty remarkable seeing as you've been on this channel now a few times-

    5. AB

      (laughs)

    6. SB

      ... um, could you give me a, a whistle-stop tour of your professional background up until the point that you met Jihye?

    7. AB

      Yeah. Absolutely. So I'm from a rural place in Pennsylvania. Uh, was, like, the only brown kid in a white high school. But I ended up going to an air, a military academy. I went to the Air Force Academy. From the Air Force Academy, I go into the Air Force. The Air Force teaches me how to fly, they teach me a, a foreign language, and then they teach me about nuclear weapons and nuclear missiles, and I serve as a nuclear missile officer in the Air Force. So CIA picked me up, uh, and in my first, my first day on the job in CIA is the day that I met my wife. Um, she was sitting at the back of the classroom. I, of course, worked my way to the front of the classroom, and, uh, and from there our training just kind of overlapped and we, we became close.

    8. SB

      Well, Jihye is here, so I'd like to hear her version of events. Was there any inconsistency in the story

  7. 8:03 – 10:33

    Does the CIA Allow Relationships Between Spies?

    1. SB

      he told? What was your perspective? There's always another perspective. And are you allowed to date in the CIA?

    2. JB

      Oh, yeah. It's encouraged, um, because it's really hard when you're keeping so many secrets to date somebody outside of the CIA and not be able to tell the... 'Cause we had friends who did that, who did that. You have to keep your whole life secret. So you're lying to them about where you're going and what you do-

    3. AB

      Mm-hmm. Day to day.

    4. JB

      ... and... Day to day, every single day. So you're building a relationship and lying-

    5. AB

      Mm-hmm.

    6. JB

      ... all the time. And it's really difficult. So if you date within the CIA, you know, if you're in different divisions or whatever, like, maybe you can't talk about everything in detail, but you at least know what's going on. You know why somebody's going TDY or where they're going for a training, um, session or-

    7. AB

      We can explain to each other, like, "Hey, I'm gonna go work with the Spanish. I'm gonna go work with the, with the Canadians."

    8. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    9. AB

      But when you're dating somebody on the outside, you can't say those things.

    10. SB

      Mm-hmm.

    11. AB

      So it becomes, "I'm going on a business meeting. I'm going on a trip."

    12. SB

      Crazy.

    13. AB

      And we've had many friends who have had relationships explode or melt down because the, the partner starts to ask very logical questions. We had one good friend of ours-

    14. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    15. AB

      ... who was an outsider who was dating one of our good friends who was an insider, and she pulled me aside one day and she was like, "You know, he goes on all these business trips, but he never takes any suits." She's like, "I think he's cheating on me." And I was like, "No, he's actually going to a tactical training course where you don't need to wear anything except BDUs, but I can see your concerns." So you have to walk your, like-

    16. SB

      Mm-hmm.

    17. AB

      ... there's a lot of walking people off a cliff because they start to come to the wrong conclusion-

    18. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    19. SB

      Mm-hmm.

    20. AB

      ... about what their actual, uh, partner is doing.

    21. SB

      Jihye, what's your journey into the CIA?

    22. JB

      Mine was kind of an unexpected journey because I went into social work working with, um, survivors of torture from other countries, with refugees, with asylees. But before (laughs) I got that job, I'd actually, I had spent my entire last year of grad school going to job fairs, and I wanted, what I really wanted was to work for the federal government, for, like, the larger mission for the United States, for, like, the people of the United States. But then nobody was calling me back and I was like, "Okay." I was like, "I'll just submit an application," like an online application to CIA, which I thought was funny. And then a few months later, I got a call back. She was like, "Come to the information session." So I went, in, like, a random hotel with these, like, nondescript signs outside and you walk in and you're like, "I don't know if I'm in the s-, in the right place." And then they close the door and they're like, "Welcome to the CIA recruiting session." And you're like, "This is so bizarre."

    23. SB

      Mm-hmm.

    24. JB

      And, um-

  8. 10:33 – 12:10

    Your Job Was to Identify People to Capture or Kill

    1. JB

    2. SB

      Did they tell you what your role is? 'Cause I know there's several different roles in, in the CIA.

    3. JB

      Mm-hmm. Targeters began, uh, during the war on terror. And because... What they initially did was target individuals for capture or kill for the military.

    4. SB

      Okay. So what, what does that mean? They targeted people for capture or kill-

    5. JB

      So-

    6. SB

      ... for the military. So you would-

    7. JB

      Yeah.

    8. SB

      ... find the person to capture or kill-

    9. JB

      Yes.

    10. SB

      ... in a foreign country?

    11. JB

      Yes. And so because, you know, everybody else is doing their job of, you know, logistics, or weapons, or fighting, or strategy, so the targeter position was really important because it takes time to s-, to go through all this data, to piece together this puzzle of who is important, who is important to capture, who's important to kill, and how do you get to them? The how do you get to them is the piece that, like, everybody else wants to know, but they don't really have time to do that and their other jobs. So they carved out this targeter role so one person can do all this research and identifying the... You know, terrorists were really fascinating because they had, how their organizations were structured, and so you really needed somebody who could look... I mean, it's like a, like targeting the mafia, right? Like, everybody has a role. Like, there's a big organization. Everybody has a role. It is in your favor if you're tar-, if you're going after them, to find out who, who's who. Who's who, who's connected to who, how can you get to different people? 'Cause you're never gonna be able to just get the top person right away. So how do you get there, right?

  9. 12:10 – 13:52

    How Did They Work as a Tandem Couple?

    1. JB

    2. SB

      And you became a targeter?

    3. JB

      Yes.

    4. SB

      So your job was to figure out who to capture and kill?

    5. AB

      Or. Capture or.

    6. JB

      Or kill. (laughs)

    7. SB

      (laughs) And what was your role in the CIA? How was your role different? Can you explain it for a layman?

    8. AB

      Yeah. So, where Jihye was trying to find the individuals that were of interest, my job was to learn what to do after a targeter identified those individuals. How do you actually meet the person? How do you befriend the person? How do you win their trust? How do you collect their secrets? What's known as a, a field officer, an operations officer, a case officer. Those are the different terminologies that we use internally. But you essentially have... Every case is kind of handed over from person to person. So, raw information, sometimes open source information, is handed to a targeter who creates a profile, a dossier, a targeting package, who hands it to an operations officer, who goes out and actually makes that first contact. And then when first contact is made, we pass all the information back, and it goes back to all the same people to build the next package for the next target.

    9. SB

      So, Jihye would identify the individual, and then your job was to fly overseas, go undercover, and make first contact with that individual to extract intelligence from them?

    10. AB

      Eh, not at first. By the time that CIA started utilizing us as a tandem couple... A tandem couple is a term that means a married, truly married, CIA-trained couple. When we started becoming a tandem couple, that's how we were a one-two punch in, for operations. Prior to that, we were in separate offices, in separate divisions, doing separate work. So w- we got along, uh, and we were complementary because I understood the challenges of her job and she understood the challenges of my job, which made both of us better working with our counterparts in our different offices.

  10. 13:52 – 15:57

    Where Does the Story Begin?

    1. AB

    2. SB

      So where, where does this story begin, Andy? You know, you, you wrote this book to tell a story, so I'm asking you the question. Usually, I'd, I'd, I'd hazard a guess where to start, but where does this story begin?

    3. AB

      From my perspective, the story really starts on, uh, on... I think it was a winter day when we were both called in to a counterintelligence office that was a massive oak table... It was a, it was a senior executive leadership type of room. But there were only three people there. It was she, it was me, and it was the leader of what's known as Falcon House, which is this group of specialists inside of CIA focused on one particular adversary, an adversary that we've had to code name Falcon to maintain confidentiality with CIA.

    4. SB

      And so Falcon is a country, basically.

    5. AB

      Mm-hmm. Falcon is a country, correct. And that leader revealed to us that they believed there was a penetration, a mole that was inside of Falcon House, inside of CIA, and that they needed us to agree to do an operation so that the mole will make a mistake here. 'Cause if the mole makes a mistake here, we'll find him, but we can't have you be here, 'cause if you're here, the mole will find you. And then we don't know what happens if the mole finds you. So we're gonna send you across the world to go f- work in this other country, Falcon being the country, while we here, as the experts in Washington DC, try to find the mole. And that was privileged information that neither of us, as junior officers, ever thought we would hear. And I think that... I know for me, I was kind of giddy with excitement, and Jihye was a little bit more apprehensive with, "This can't be real." But that was, for me, that's where the story starts, is when these two people, her and... With her anxiety disorder and, and me with my kind of lackluster CIA career (laughs) , when we got pulled into this office that was clearly outside of our league and invited to do this operation, um, without that first meeting, Shadow Cell would have never happened.

  11. 15:57 – 24:20

    The Mission to Find the Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA

    1. AB

    2. SB

      So from that moment onwards, how long was it before you flew to the foreign country in question? And what was your objective when you got to that for- foreign country? Be, so... I guess it's like a sub-objective to find the mole-

    3. AB

      Mm-hmm.

    4. SB

      ... and there was another main objective, which was going to help find the mole?

    5. AB

      You gotta... Yeah. I mean, you're using great terminology. There were primary objectives and secondary objectives, and the primary objective was to build a new set of reporting assets, a new source of intelligence, several new sources of intelligence, in Falcon, the actual country. And to, to help you frame what Falcon is, there's only a handful of countries that are true stark adversaries to the United States. Every one of those countries has limited to no diplomatic relationship with the United States. That's how hostile they are. Any one of those countries could be Falcon. The reason that we have to code name the country is because CIA, in today's geopolitical world, has, has demanded we don't disclose the name of the country. So we call it Falcon.

    6. SB

      What are United States' adversaries where we don't have any relationship with them? Uh, there's also, like, North Korea.

    7. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    8. SB

      There's Russia.

    9. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    10. SB

      There's Iran we know of. Are there any others?

    11. JB

      Cuba.

    12. AB

      Cuba.

    13. SB

      Cuba.

    14. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    15. AB

      Yeah. There's... And those are, uh, um... There's a mix there of countries that we do have a relationship with, but it's not a warm relationship, versus countries we have no relationship with. So we have no relationship with North Korea.

    16. SB

      Mm-hmm.

    17. AB

      We have a cold relationship with Russia.

    18. SB

      Mm-hmm.

    19. AB

      Right? We have a cold relationship with China. We have no relationship with Iran.

    20. SB

      Mm-hmm.

    21. AB

      So they're all considered hard targets, but of various levels.

    22. SB

      Okay. So this, the objective is, the primary objective is to build a new team in this country-

    23. AB

      Mm-hmm.

    24. SB

      ... but the sub-objective is, in building the team, you're gonna find out, hopefully, who the mole is because the mole is gonna make a mistake.

    25. AB

      The mole's gonna try to find us, because the mole's job is to prevent CIA from collecting secrets about Falcon, 'cause the mole is working for Falcon Intelligence.

    26. SB

      The mole is working for that country?

    27. JB

      Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

    28. AB

      Right.

    29. SB

      The mole is part of the CIA, but working for the adversarial country.

    30. JB

      Mm-hmm.

  12. 24:20 – 32:05

    We Were Risking Our Lives Taking This Job

    1. JB

      that-

    2. SB

      What was the risk that you were thinking about?

    3. JB

      It is very real that you can be disappeared by a foreign adversary, that you can be, you know, killed by them with no explanation, that you can be just...... put in jail and then you never get out, because the government's not necessarily going to come to your aid. And if they do, it might be, still might be 20 years before you're out of their prison. So-

    4. AB

      Every sworn officer has plausible deniability-

    5. JB

      (laughs)

    6. AB

      ... meaning the president can plausibly deny that you don't belong to-

    7. JB

      Yeah.

    8. AB

      ... whatever organization you are claiming to belong to. So a CIA officer arrested in a Russian prison can, can avoid all questioning and say, "Hold on, guys. I'm actually CIA. You caught me. Good job. Now, please send me home. Don't have a diplomatic incident." The president has the right to say, "That person is not CIA."

    9. JB

      Yeah.

    10. AB

      "That person has never worked for me. I don't know who that person is. Uh, that, their American passport might be verified, but, but they are legally in your possession of-"

    11. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    12. AB

      "... of, uh, you know, legal requirements. So we, we don't really know who they are."

    13. SB

      So, so just to clarify then, you were being told you were gonna be flown, both of you, to a foreign country-

    14. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    15. SB

      ... an adversarial foreign country, and you were told that there was a mole amongst your ra- your ranks that was feeding information to the foreign country that you were being flown to.

    16. JB

      So we, they actually stationed us in a neighboring country that was friendly. But we knew that Andy, and anybody we worked with, would have to go into FALCON. So they flew us to a country-

    17. SB

      FALCON being the adversarial country.

    18. JB

      The adver- the adversarial country. So we actually lived in a third country called WOLF, but we were operating in both WOLF and in FALCON. So the danger was still there.

    19. AB

      And then that's when Jihye's targeter mindset in, and that's when she started thinking through, "Well, how could our operation be reverse engineered by FALCON and actually find us? And if we can think like the enemy, we can stay one step ahead of the enemy." So the whole idea of going to WOLF and building our team, from the very beginning, Jihye started to architect how we could do that in a way that would foil the, foil our, uh, aggressors from being able to even discover our existence.

    20. SB

      And what was the objective when you... So you've got this subobjective-

    21. JB

      Yeah.

    22. SB

      ... which I understand, which is to find the mole. But the main objective is just to spy as usual and collect information on this adversarial country.

    23. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    24. AB

      Yes and no. The main objective was to collect information. But the spying as usual is the part that was a no. S- CIA specifically told us they didn't want us to do the standard spy MO.

    25. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    26. AB

      Spying has really been the same since the days of Egypt, the ancient Egypt, right? You find somebody who gives you information about something that they have access to and that's it, and that's spying. Then you turn it into a report and you pass it up to somebody who reads it and they make a decision. They wanted a new, a new kind of mouse track. They w- they wanted a new way of doing espionage. A- and when they deployed us to the friendly country, that was their only request, was, "Whatever you do there, coordinate it with the local leadership and then don't tell us, because we have to make sure that the mole doesn't learn what you're doing. That's going to be how we tempt the mole to start probing around and asking questions that are outside of the norm. That's how we're gonna reverse engineer this and find the mole. So we need you to go do something new and we need it not to be standard."

    27. SB

      "And don't tell us."

    28. AB

      "And don't tell us, but tell your leadership in the friendly country."

    29. SB

      Your CA- CIA leadership in the friendsh- friendly country?

    30. AB

      Correct.

  13. 32:05 – 32:58

    Did You Have to Change Your Identity?

    1. AB

      back.

    2. SB

      So you land in this friendly country next to the enemy country, and do you have to adopt new aliases, new names, new- new stories? Do you have to pretend that you're normal people living a normal life?

    3. AB

      You do. Um, there's different ways that you can craft it. So, um, Jihye's job as the targeter was to find our targets in FALCON. A big part of what we had to do when we got to Wolf, w- our friendly country, was do whatever the leadership there told us to do. So CIA crafted everything for us to land in the friendly country. Once we were in the friendly country, then we had to start crafting new identities, new aliases, so that we could travel out of the friendly country and into FALCON.

    4. SB

      Into the enemy country?

    5. JB

      Mm-hmm. But while living in FALCON, we were, you know, Jihye and Andrew Bustamante, newlywed couple. Where we worked was covered. You know-

    6. SB

      Where did you work?

  14. 32:58 – 36:23

    What Was Your Undercover Job?

    1. SB

    2. AB

      It's undercover. We- we still can't disclose it.

    3. JB

      Yeah. Yeah. (laughs)

    4. SB

      Like, as far as this enemy, did you, like, run a ... When you were in the enemy country-

    5. AB

      Mm-hmm.

    6. SB

      ... working, were you, like, running, like, a, like, a coffee shop? Or is it-

    7. JB

      Yeah, when going into FALCON, there were different ... Um, you had to have a- a different cover and a different cutout.

    8. AB

      And we would use what's, what you're referring to is called commercial-

    9. JB

      Yeah.

    10. AB

      ... cover or commercial activity, meaning we would act as if we were part of commercial business going into and out of the country.

    11. SB

      But you'd use your normal names?

    12. AB

      No. No. We, this is one of the other things that's really fascinating about the book and one of the reasons that CIA pushed back, is we get to disclose whole new levels of tradecraft that have never been talked about in previous books. So the tradecraft that we used here is- is something that the Brits actually call, um, dry cleaning. And what that means is we would clear our path before we would go into FALCON. So we're in a friendly country and we need to go into a hostile country. In order to go from the friendly country to the hostile country, you can't go directly. Because if you go directly, the hostile country can track you back to your friendly country, and then they can send a team to- to hurt you, if they need to, in the friendly country. So instead, what you do is you create a cleansing route. So you travel from the friendly country to a neutral country, and in that neutral country, you'll change identities and then travel into your target country. So now, if the hostile country tracks you, they track you back to a neutral country and they have no idea that you originated from a friendly country.

    13. SB

      But if you go from a friendly country to a neutral country, when you get to the neutral country, do you need, like, a new passport and stuff? Because that neutral country, presumably they- they don't know that you're spies.

    14. AB

      Correct.

    15. SB

      So do you have to have a new passport to then get on a plane to fly into the...

    16. AB

      Yes. And it's what we would call a passport swap, and there's different ways of doing a swap. You can carry your own swap. You can have somebody meet you to do a swap. You can have a cache, where you hide a swap. But that's the benefit of always using a consistent cleansing route, because you can always go back to the same neutral country. And from the hostile country's point of view, every time they track you, you always go back to the same place. So they start to build a pattern of life, what we call a pattern of life, where they believe you're originating from this country, when in fact you're not.

    17. SB

      So you- you- you land in this friendly country. You're making your way into the hostile country. What was your objective? What were you trying to do in that hostile country?

    18. AB

      The first thing we were trying to do was find targets.

    19. SB

      Okay.

    20. AB

      And then f- we knew that as we found targets and built targets, we would also need to support the operations against those targets. And there's a logistical element to espionage where you need to have encrypted phones, you need to have satellite, uh, satellite phones or SIM cards. You need to have money. You need to have specialized gifts. Like, there's- there's a, there's a logistical supply chain that needs to be built.

    21. SB

      Specialized gifts?

    22. AB

      So, um, things that are appealing to a target that they may not be able to get themselves: gold bullion, high-end liquors, child pornography, uh, foreign currency. Whatever they need, your job is to make sure they have a way of getting it.

    23. SB

      Child pornography?

    24. AB

      Some, some targets, especially in the, in the world of drugs and, uh, and terrorism and weapons, they- they feed off of the strangest things.

    25. JB

      Mm-hmm.

  15. 36:23 – 37:31

    CIA Involvement in Illegal Activities

    1. JB

    2. SB

      So the CIA- CIA would supply that pornography?

    3. AB

      In a way. Um, we would more, like, facilitate the transfer. Some other friendly country might actually be who acquires it. So for example, Germany-

    4. NA

      ... (whispers) porn.

    5. AB

      ... might actually, uh, have a raid where they, where they carry out a raid against a pornographer and they have terabytes of porn, right? And then, the UK might have a case where they need porn to pay an Iranian, so now they can trade with BND so that BND can use this cache of porn and they can give it to the Brits who give it to the Iranians and that can be a currency of types. (smacks lips) So again-

    6. SB

      It's crazy.

    7. AB

      ... morally ambivalent. The goal is to protect your people at the end of the day. Right? So when it comes down to it, that's the same way CIA works. If we're giving gold, if we're giving minted American gold coins to an evil person in North Korea, do we really care if it's keeping Americans safe? There are some people who would say yes and there are other people who would say, "Whatever the price is, let's keep Americans safe."

    8. SB

      So

  16. 37:31 – 41:48

    Using Terrorist Tactics

    1. SB

      tell me about what you did then. So you- what was your- what did you accomplish while you were there and what was the ... You talk in the book about using terrorist tactics to build your operation there. Can you, you run me through what is- what it is you accomplished there and the role that both of you played?

    2. AB

      So I'll start it and I'll let you take it over. But the, uh, the- the book's title, Shadow Sell, is really about the sell model and the terrorist sell model that we recreated in our friendly country so that we could execute operations against our hostile country that mirrored tactics and techniques the terrorists had used to foil Americans for the last 20 years in the global war on terror. So, what Jihye and I learned is that CIA was not very good at beating terrorists. America was not very good at beating terrorists. That's why after 20 years of fighting in Afghanistan, we left and we gave it back to the same terrorist group that we went in there to fight. (smacks lips) We had learned a lot from fighting that adversary, but we were the only country in the world fighting the global war on terror. The Russians, the Iranians, the Chinese, the Cubans, the North Koreans, none of them engaged in the war on terror. So everything we had learned from Al-Qaeda, we were the only ones that learned it. So, we found that to be kind of a competitive advantage, so we started building our operations, modeling our operations off of the way the terrorists structured their cells. And we called our cell in Wolf the Shadow Cell. And we had to find the people, recruit the people, and train the people inside our cell. Our actual CIA peers, we had to get them to learn how to run the same model. That's really what the book explains is how we built that and what those people did. Because espionage is not about one superhero overseas. It's about a team of people doing incredible things.

    3. SB

      And were those people on the ground in the friendly country next to the hostile country?

    4. AB

      Yes.

    5. SB

      And so did you- when you recruited these people to build this team, d- did you recruit them from America or were you recruiting them withinside that friendly country?

    6. JB

      Inside of Wolf. Everybody who was in the cell was already wol- working in Wolf.

    7. SB

      And the word cell basically means team?

    8. AB

      Team.

    9. JB

      Right, team.

    10. SB

      So you built this team-

    11. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    12. SB

      ... i- in the friendly country next door to the enemy country and this team consisted of how many people?

    13. AB

      Right. So James was our senior-most case officer. Tasha, Luke, and Beverly were our second-tour case officers, so they were more junior, that's why they were hungry, but-

    14. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    15. AB

      ... but still kind of, uh, flexible. Whereas James was in- James was at a place in his career where if this didn't work, his career would be tanked.

    16. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    17. AB

      And then Jihye and I were not case officers, we were kind of the ... I was the- the mission planner, if you will, and Jihye was the targeter. And then, uh, Diana was our linguist, Will was our tech support, and we had ... that was our- that was our cell. That was our little group of people that would sit in the bullpen. Now, it's important to note that n- none of them ... and this was their primary mission. It was our primary mission. For all of them, helping us was just something they were doing because they believed that if we were successful, it would be good for them. They had primary missions to do all sorts of other things.

    18. JB

      Yeah.

    19. SB

      Oh, okay. And were these people locals?

    20. AB

      They're all Americans, and they're all Americans assigned to Wolf. So they're all American CIA officers, all sworn officers, that are assigned to our friendly country in various different covers to do various different primary missions.

    21. SB

      Okay. And how did you guys, like, communicate? Did you, like, meet up for, like, dinner? Like, what's the-

    22. AB

      (laughs)

    23. SB

      How does it work?

    24. JB

      Yeah, I mean, all of our communication and hangouts were in the office because we couldn't really be seen outside together-

    25. AB

      We had a s-

    26. JB

      ... 'cause they would connect us.

    27. AB

      ... we had what's known as a SCIF, a Specialized Compartmented, uh, Information Facility. So it was a- it was a hardened, soundproof office that we could have meetings in.

    28. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    29. SB

      C- couldn't the adversarial country, like, watch you walking in there in the morning?

    30. AB

      The adversarial country arguably didn't even know we were in Wolf.

  17. 41:48 – 44:30

    What Was Your First Mission?

    1. JB

    2. SB

      So what was your- what was your first mission together as a- as a team? Like, what were you- what were you doing in the enemy country? What was your objective to ... You were finding- you w- working as a targeter to find interesting individuals and then, Andrew, you were pr- predominantly trying to make contact with those individuals?

    3. AB

      Sort of. W- my ... Because I couldn't ... As the node of the- of the cell ... The node is a term that we're using to say I was the piece that was exposed to CIA. So the mole- if the mole went hunting, the mole would find me. I was the one that was exposed.

    4. SB

      Okay.

    5. AB

      So for me, it was important that I actually didn't meet with any of the targets that we had in Falcon. My job was to go to Falcon to start sourcing the information that she would use to identify those individuals.

    6. SB

      L- like, what does that mean?

    7. AB

      So, uh, f- whether it's something stupid like a phone book or a thumb drive, uh, whether you're picking up a dead drop from somebody else, so consider ... In Falcon, we would've already had other case officers carrying out operations.

    8. SB

      Yeah.

    9. AB

      So, we might have a case officer who was able to extract information from a military database. And that military database has all the weapons engineers for Falcon's air force. That case officer-

    10. SB

      That spy.

    11. AB

      ... that spy, that spy can collect the thumb drive.

    12. SB

      Yeah.

    13. AB

      And then they can put that thumb drive in what's known as a dead drop. A dead drop would be something that you hide anywhere in the c- in the country, in a city, wherever else.

    14. SB

      Like in a bush?

    15. AB

      Yeah, like in a bush.

    16. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    17. AB

      I would then go into Falcon and I would go to that dead drop site, the bush.

    18. SB

      So you'd go into the enemy country?

    19. AB

      Right.

    20. SB

      You'd go to th- the bush.

    21. AB

      And take the thumb drive and bring it back by our cleansing route to Wolf, where I could give it to Jihye. Jihye could then extract the information from the thumb drive, and now she has a list of all the engineers who are part of the enemy country's air force. And then from there, she has a starting point for her information to start finding targets. Now, as she finds targets, that's when we tap on our case officers, James, Tasha, Luke, Beverly, and we say, "Here's somebody that we think would be susceptible to you because you're a middle-aged woman, you're an older man, you're a younger man, you're a younger woman." Right? "We think that these people might be susceptible to your interests, your backgrounds, your voice, who knows what, and we need you to target them." And then we would send those, those spies into Falcon to meet the targets that Jihye found.

    22. SB

      Okay. Ah, okay, gotcha.

    23. AB

      The game of espionage is not an easy game. It's a fun game, but it's a m- it's a chess game, not a checkers game. So there's a lot of moving pieces and a lot of moving parts. And, um, for me, it was always very exciting, but I also understand that it can be very difficult to, to express it well.

    24. SB

      Was

  18. 44:30 – 46:07

    When Did You Feel Most at Risk?

    1. SB

      there ever a time when you felt most at risk when you were in that hostile country?

    2. AB

      At some point, it, m- my presence in Falcon, in the enemy country, became known to the local government in the enemy country, and they dep- dispatched a surveillance team to track me. It was a major turning point in our operation. We kinda went from a place where we felt like we were winning to a place where we wondered if we were losing. We went from a place where I felt very safe to a place where I felt like I could immediately be apprehended, and then all the worst thoughts start to creep in. Not necessarily about being shot. Oftentimes, a CIA officer being shot in a foreign country is a welcome experience because being shot at least means everything ends. The worst is being captured and being interrogated and being used for diplomatic leverage and being used for policy leverage and being, being forced to do, uh, you know, into brainwashing and propaganda videos. Like, that's a much worse experience than, than a clean death.

    3. SB

      You said earlier that it would have been the mole that was exposed to your presence and that knew that you were in this enemy country. So was it the mole that told the enemy country?

    4. AB

      That's what we believe. We don't have the evidence to prove it. Um, but what's CIA's conclusion, as well as the conclusion inside of our own shadow cell, is that our operations had reached the place where they were significant enough that the mole took a risk to find out that I was d- the exposed member of the cell, and then the mole reported my name to the hostile country's police force.

  19. 46:07 – 1:00:36

    How Did They Find Out You Were a CIA Spy?

    1. SB

      So you're now inside that hostile c- country, the enemy country, and they know that you're a US spy. Was there a day when you realized that they knew that you were a spy?

    2. AB

      Yes. Uh, well, there wasn't a day that I realized that they were, that they knew I was CIA. There was a day that I realized they were surveilling me as if I was a threat. When you travel, when any businessperson travels to a hostile country, they're almost always surveilled. Their hotel rooms can be rifled through. There's f- there's people called bumbling surveillance or watchers who will usually follow you. Um, I'm not sure what your travel looks like, but I can almost assure you that if you've traveled to Russia or if you've traveled to China, if you've traveled to Cuba, you had a watcher, you had a surveillance team-

    3. SB

      Really?

    4. AB

      ... that was watching you.

    5. SB

      Me?

    6. AB

      Yeah.

    7. SB

      Why?

    8. AB

      Because you're wealthy, you're successful, you're an influencer, you're of significance. At the very least, they wanna make sure some petty criminal doesn't hurt you in their country, 'cause that could be a big deal.

    9. SB

      Thank you.

    10. AB

      But, um-

    11. JB

      (laughs)

    12. SB

      Please continue to surveil me.

    13. AB

      But at worst, they could also be scraping your cellphone to pull all of your contacts off the cellphone so that they could then reach out to any of the contacts that you have on your cellphone. They could scan and duplicate your hard drive as you go through, uh, secondary or go through immigration in a foreign country.

    14. SB

      They can scan my hard drive as I go through immigration?

    15. AB

      Absolutely. We can do that here in the United States too.

    16. SB

      What? So if I land in the United States, they c- they, how do they, how would they do that?

    17. AB

      So there's, uh, there's, there's different authorities that exist for different agencies. So, here inside the United States, one of the authorities that we give to our border patrol is the authority to essentially scrape data off of all of your electronic devices. So if you're, uh, deemed a target of interest and if you're moved into what's known as a secondary screening, they will separate you from your bags. They'll actually open your, your bags. They might even tell you to unlock your cellphone or unlock your laptop. And then from there, with, with technology that's proprietary and technology that's also c- commercially available, they can scrape and scan your hard drive.

    18. SB

      'Cause I've been through security before in various countries. And sometimes when I get to the other end, there's a letter in my suitcase and the letter in my suitcase says, "Hey, we had to go through your bags-"

    19. AB

      Correct.

    20. SB

      "... for some reason."

    21. AB

      If you had a technical, if you had a technical device in your bag along with that letter, there's a good chance that it was cloned.

    22. SB

      But I didn't give them my password.

    23. AB

      Sometimes they don't need your password.

    24. JB

      (laughs)

    25. SB

      Really?

    26. JB

      Oh, yeah.

    27. AB

      (laughs)

    28. SB

      (laughs)

    29. JB

      (laughs)

    30. SB

      How are they gonna get into my, my laptop without my password?

  20. 1:00:36 – 1:10:34

    Planning My Escape

    1. JB

      point.

    2. SB

      So, you're, you f- discover that you've been discovered by this adversarial country. You call Jihye, you let her know that you're coming home early. Then what do you do?

    3. AB

      Then I have to plan my escape. So, another thing that people... that movies don't show you is that when an... the first effort to escape is always self-rescue. It's always on the part of the field officer alone.... to try to escape. There's no Navy SEAL team, there's no evacuation helicopter, there's no high-speed j- boat or, or classy yacht just waiting for you. You have to get yourself across the country's border yourself before you can hope for any kind of evac from there, or what we call an exfil. So I knew that it was on me to come up with some evacuation plan, and I had to come up with an evacuation plan that wasn't going to let the surveillance team know that I knew I was under surveillance. And I had come up w-

    4. SB

      So you're still in the car at this point?

    5. AB

      I'm, I'm in between the car and on foot, uh, dep- depending on where I am in the surveillance detection route, right? It was... Surveillance detection routes generally break into three phases. It's in the first phase that you suspect that you're under surveillance. It's in the second phase that you confirm it. So it's in this second phase when I confirm, "I am absolutely under surveillance," that's when I contact Jihi and that's when I start coming up with my own self-rescue plan.

    6. SB

      And then the third phase?

    7. AB

      The third phase is a collection phase. You know what y- you know that you're under surveillance, you know that you've communicated to somebody that you're under surveillance, and now the mission becomes collect as much information as you can about the surveillance team before they realize that they're being collected against.

    8. SB

      So you, you see this car behind you, multiple cars behind you, and the same people following you on foot. Are you writing this down or are you just trying to memorize it?

    9. AB

      At first, it's all memory. Um, and we have a methodology for trying to memorize this stuff. We actually talk about this in the book as well. You start to come up with short codes to describe the people. Um, and the codes that you come up with mean something to you, but they wouldn't mean anything if they were, if they came out in an interrogation or if they came out in writing. So, like, for you, I might call you Black T-shirt. A black T-shirt means something to me. So if I see Black T-shirt behind me three times in the next 45 minutes in three different parts of the city, I know that I have an image for what Black T-shirt means. But when I write down Black T-shirt, nobody else knows what that means. When I see a woman... It was cold, uh, the, the season that I was carrying out these operations, um, I saw a woman in earmuffs, so I would call her Earmuffs. I saw a guy in a bomber jacket, so I called him Bomber Jacket. And you just recall these people. You recr- You, you... Blue Sedan, Yellow SUV, right? White Taxicab. You, you start to come up with these nicknames that mean something to you, but don't mean anything to anybody else. And then when you get back to a place where you can document your notes in detail, you have a reference point to document in detail. So I start by memorizing. When I got towards the end of my third phase of surveillance detection, I actually wrote down my notes. In the book, it explains, I w- I went into a, like a clothing store, and then I started making notes in the clothing store. Presumably, if somebody came in and arrested me at that moment, what they would see is a bunch of notes about clothing, earmuffs and black T-shirts, inside of a clothing store. That's not espionage. But then when I was able to actually get back to, uh, to Wolf with my cell, then I was able to deconstruct what Black T-shirt meant. Black T-shirt meant, uh, Black male with a goatee, uh, approximately 165 pounds, uh, 5'11", 38 years old.

    10. SB

      So how'd you get from phase two of your process of figuring out if you're being followed to the arcade? Like, what was the... Why did you go to the arcade?

    11. AB

      So I went to the arcade because I was trying... In a surveillance detection route, one of the things that you're actually trying to do is called bore or lull your surveillance. You never want to... In movies, it makes it look like you're trying to, to ditch your surveillance team, you're trying to lose your tail. That's not what professionals do. What professionals do is we drag the tail. We keep the tail with us for as long as possible. And one of the things you do is you make yourself very predictable, you move very slowly, you hang out in public places, which makes it very easy for them to observe you. I was actually going to the arcade to try to collect more information about my surveillance team, but I was trying to give them time and space so they could observe me in a public setting. It c- it backfired, because what actually ended up happening is that when I went into the arcade, they lost me. They lost sight of me, which put them into a position where they started panicking to try to find me, even though I was just sitting inside the arcade.

    12. SB

      I mean, it doesn't sound like it backfired if they lost you.

    13. AB

      It's a terrible thing when they lose you, because when they lose you, they start to panic and they start to assume either they made a mistake or you're a trained officer. If you're a trained officer, if that's the conclusion that they make, they can come in and arrest you. If they lose you, then they start to make mistakes. And when a surveillance team starts to make mistakes, it means that they might stumble across you. They might have two different surveillance people find you at the same time. And for, for them, that's a scary thing, because for them, they're trying not to be identified. They're trying to be discreet, they're trying to not be seen. So when they, uh, in this case, in, in the story that, that we share in Shadow Cell, when the surveillance team broke into a starburst... A starburst means they went, they broke ranks to try to find me in the arcade. When they broke ranks to try to find me, they presented themselves to me in the arcade, face-to-face. And it was in that moment that I realized, "They know that I see them and I know that they see me, and this is bad."

    14. SB

      You locked eyes with them?

    15. AB

      Which you're never supposed to do.

    16. SB

      You're never supposed to do?

    17. AB

      You're never supposed to lock eyes with your surveillance. You're never supposed to lock eyes with anybody who's a threat, ever, because that's threatening behavior, right? That's one of the reasons that people sh- share strong eye contact with peers, is to sh- it's a show of trust. Well, whenever you're locking eyes with somebody who's a threat, it's a s- it's a sign of aggression or dominance. So whenever you're being surveilled, you never want to make eye contact with your surveillance team, because your surveillance team will see that eye contact as a threat.

    18. SB

      When you say y- you sort of bumped into them in that arcade, what's the distance?

    19. AB

      Three feet.

    20. SB

      Three feet? And, and how long did you lock eyes with each other?

    21. AB

      It felt like an eternity. In reality, it was probably two and a half seconds.

    22. SB

      I mean, two and a half seconds is a long time.

    23. AB

      Especially when you're trying not to be seen.

    24. SB

      So recreate that moment for me. You're in the arcade, pretending you're playing with games. You turn a corner.

    25. AB

      It's horrible, man. It's a horrible, it's a horrible story. I'm, I'm in the arcade. I, I'm, I, again, I think I'm doing everything right. I'm like, "Oh, I'm in the arcade." They watched me come in. This gives, they're probably taking a smoke break outside. They've got nothing to worry about. And I'm kinda going from game to game and spending whatever credits that I bought in the arcade. And then I go to this d- dinosaur-hunting shooting game, right? Almost like Big Buck Hunter or, like, Jurassic Park. And I pick up a rifle, and I'm shooting at dinosaurs, and I'm just killing time. And then the fucking surveillant comes around the back of the machine, looking for me. He comes around the back of the machine, and he sees me, and I'm holding a fucking gun-

    26. SB

      (laughs)

    27. AB

      ... and I look at him, and he looks at me. And that's, that's when our two and a half seconds happened. And I'm sitting there, and I'm like, "What just happened? Why is, why did I just see Bomber Jacket come around my video game console and stare at me in the face?" And that's when I kind of realized, "Oh my gosh, like, the team is in panic. I can see multiple people on the team. They lost me. They're trying to find me. Bomber Jacket just found me."

    28. SB

      What did Bomber Jacket do when he looked at you?

    29. AB

      His jaw dropped. He went slack. Like, he looked at me, and he knew that he had fucked up too. And I looked at him, and in my mind's eye, I was just hoping that I didn't look as stupid as he looked.

    30. SB

      In that moment, i- is it true to say that you should've just looked back at the dinosaur game as fast as you possibly could?

  21. 1:10:34 – 1:12:08

    The CIA and Military Black Budget

    1. SB

      that's public though, right?

    2. AB

      Correct.

    3. SB

      But the, the ones that aren't public. So the CIA will create a company, and then they will use that company to pretend to be doing something in a foreign, foreign land basically.

    4. AB

      But the primary mission is intelligence. This is one of the most fascinating things, not only about CIA, but about all of your first world intelligence organizations. You've heard of what's known as the black budget. The black budget is the budget of, of, um, discretionary money that can be spent on military and intelligence operations that isn't tied to the taxpayer. So it's a giant pot of money that isn't p- tied to tax money. So where does that money come from? Part of that money comes from anytime law enforcement or intelligence agencies seize assets.

    5. SB

      Oh.

    6. AB

      We seize cryptocurrency. We seize drugs. We seize child pornography, right? When we seize that money, and we use it for other operations, that's part of the black budget. The other part of the black budget is when an intelligence organization creates a business and that business turns a profit. When that business turns a profit, where does the profit go?

    7. SB

      (laughs)

    8. AB

      It can't go to the case officer. That person's being paid on the US payroll.

    9. SB

      Hmm.

    10. AB

      So all that profit goes into the black budget.

    11. SB

      Do you think the CIA has some big profitable businesses that are set up as fronts that just, like, went really, really well?

    12. AB

      I know it does.

    13. SB

      Really?

    14. AB

      I know it does. The, the, the CIA has businesses that it's set up that have gone wildly profitable. CIA also has officers that built these businesses that then were like, "Why the fuck am I at CIA?"

    15. JB

      (laughs)

    16. AB

      And then they leave CIA, and they go on to run businesses instead.

    17. SB

      I mean, a c- a couple of

  22. 1:12:08 – 1:16:33

    Was TikTok Started as a Spy Platform?

    1. SB

      things popped into my head as you said that. The first was, there's obviously a huge conversation at the moment around TikTok because TikTok was started in China-

    2. AB

      Yep.

    3. SB

      ... has become this massive sort of global success, and I can't think of a better company to have started than a platform like TikTok where everybody's putting their information and data in, and it's tracking your location. So w- what is your perspective on something like TikTok? Do you think TikTok was started as a tool to spy?

    4. AB

      I don't believe TikTok individually was started as a tool to spy. I believe that what happened is TikTok became widely popular, and the government in China realized, "Hey, everything in China belongs to the government anyways."

    5. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    6. AB

      "We can step in and take advantage of this." That is also a way that CIA and MI6 do business as well. When a company does very well and there's an intelligence benefit, they will approach the company. In a democracy, they can't force the company to cooperate. But in a country like China, they can.

    7. SB

      So do you think the social networks, a lot of the big social networks have been approached by the CIA or the MI6 and asked to give...... i- information to them?

    8. AB

      I would go a step further and say that they've all been approached-

    9. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    10. AB

      ... and that the vast majority of them cooperate.

    11. SB

      I- is that a concern for the average person?

    12. JB

      No.

    13. AB

      Not for the- for the average person, that's a benefit.

    14. JB

      The average person is not being targeted. I promise you. Like, there's zero interest in... For the federal government and for the intelligence community, there's absolutely zero interest in the average person.

    15. AB

      The person who's cheating on their spouse-

    16. JB

      Yeah.

    17. AB

      ... or avoiding $5,000 in taxes-

    18. JB

      Mm-hmm.

    19. AB

      ... or who isn't paying their parking bills-

    20. JB

      Yeah.

    21. AB

      ... nobody cares. The, the federal government doesn't care about them.

    22. SB

      Well, you were doing some of that targeting, right?

    23. JB

      Right.

    24. SB

      So did you ever work with any existing company to give you information?

    25. JB

      So, all of my data, depending on what country I was working on, had different sources. And some, some countries had more sources than others, but they're all sources I can't disclose. But there's tons and tons of data that would come into me and then I had... I worked on a number of cases where I had to get FISA requests.

    26. SB

      What's a FISA request?

    27. JB

      A FISA request is when you want to, um, collect information or take information from somebody who is an American citizen. And I just want to remind people, that American citizen, most people who complain about, "Oh, they're targeting American citizens," are thinking about themselves.

    28. SB

      Yeah.

    29. JB

      They're looking at themself in the mirror and thinking, "Oh, they're targeting American citizens." They're not thinking about the Chinese person who just came over and naturalized. They're not thinking about the, you know, Iranian who's been here for a long time and naturalized, right? Like, all of those, they're not thinking about, you know, the...

    30. AB

      The Al-Qaeda member-

Episode duration: 2:32:29

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