Christopher Capozzola: World War I, Ideology, Propaganda, and Politics | Lex Fridman Podcast #320

Christopher Capozzola 0:00 The lesson I would want everyone to take from the story of the First World War, uh, is that human life is not cheap, um, that all of the warring powers thought that just by throwing more men and more material at the front, they would solve their political problems with military force, and at the end of the day in 1918, one side did win that, um, but it didn't actually solve any of those political problems.

Lex Fridman 0:35 You said that World War I gave birth to the surveillance state in the US. Can you explain? The following is a conversation with Christopher Capozzola, a historian at MIT specializing in the history of politics and war in modern American history, especially about the role of World War I in defining the trajectory of the United States and our human civilization in the 20th and 21st centuries. This is the Lex Fridman Podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description, and now, dear friends, here's Christopher Capozzola.

Lex Fridman 1:12 Let's start with a big and difficult question. How did World War I start?

Christopher Capozzola 1:16 On the one hand, World War I started, uh, because of a series of events in the summer of 1914, uh, that brought, uh, sort of the major powers of Europe into conflict with one another, but I actually think it's more useful to say that World War I started at least a generation earlier when rising powers, particularly Germany, started devoting more and more of their resources toward military affairs and naval affairs. This sets off an arms race in Europe. It sets off a rivalry, uh, over the colonial world and who will control the resources in Africa and Asia, and so by the time you get to the summer of 1914, in s- in a lot of ways, I say the war has already begun, and this is just the match that lights the flame.

Lex Fridman 2:03 So, the capacity for war was brewing within, like, the, the leaders and within the populous. They started accepting sort of slowly through the culture propagated this idea that we can go to war, it's a good idea to go to war, it's a good idea to expand and dominate others, that kinda thing. Maybe not put in those clear terms, but just a sense that military action is the way that nations operate at the global scale.

Christopher Capozzola 2:34 Yes, yes and, right? So yes, um, there's a sense that the military can be the solution to political conflict, uh, in Europe itself, and the and is that war and, and military conflict are already happening, right? Uh, that there's war particularly, uh, in Africa, in North Africa, in the Middle East, um, in the Balkans. Conflict is already underway, um, and the European powers haven't faced off against each other. They've usually faced off against an asymmetrical conflict against much less powerful states, um, but, you know, in some ways, that, that war is already underway.

Lex Fridman 3:09 So, do you think it was inevitable? Because World War I is brought up as a case study where it seems like, um, a few accidental leaders and a few accidental events or one accidental event led to the war, and if you change that one little thing, it could've avoided a war. Your sense is the, the, uh, the drums of war have been beating for quite a while and it would've happened almost no matter what, or very likely to have happened.

Christopher Capozzola 3:38 Yes. Historians never like to say things are inevitable, um, and certainly, you know, there were people who could've chosen a different path, um, both in the short term and the long term, um, but fundamentally, um, there were, uh, irreconcilable conflicts in the system of empires in the world in 1914, uh, I can't see, uh, you know, it didn't have to be this war, but it had, it probably had to be a war.

Lex Fridman 4:02 So there was the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There's France and Great Britain, US. Could the US be called an empire at that moment yet? (laughs)

Christopher Capozzola 4:14 Uh, yeah.

Lex Fridman 4:14 When, when do you graduate to empire status? (laughs)

Christopher Capozzola 4:17 Um, well, certainly after, after 1898 with the acquisition of the former territories of the Spanish Empire, you know, the United States has formal colonial possessions, um, and it has sort of mindsets of, of rule and, and military acquisition that would define em- empire in a kinda more informal sense.

Lex Fridman 4:34 So you would say you would put the blame or the responsibility of starting World War I into the hands of the German Empire and Kaiser Wilhelm II?

Christopher Capozzola 4:46 You know, that's a really, uh, tough call to make, um, and you know, that deciding that is going to keep historians in business for the next 200 years, um, uh, I think there are people who would lay all of the blame, um, uh, on the Germans, right? And you know, who'd point toward a generation of, of arms buildup, um, you know, alliances that, that Germany made and promises that they made to, uh, to their allies in the Balkans, um, to the Austro-Hungarians, um, and so yes, there's an awful lot of responsibility there. Um, there has been a trend lately to say, um, no, it's no one's fault, right? That, uh, you know, that all of the various powers literally were sleepwalking into the war, right? They backed into it inadvertently. I think that lets everyone a little too much off the hook, right? And so I think in between is, uh, you know, I would put the blame on the system of empires itself, on the system, uh, but in that system, the actor that sort of carries the most responsibility is definitely imperial Germany.

Lex Fridman 5:52 So, the leader of Austro-Hungarian Empire, Franz Joseph I, his nephew's Archduke Franz Ferdinand, he was assassinated.And so that didn't have to lead to a war. And then, uh, the leader of the German Empire, Kaiser Wilhelm II, pressured sort of, uh, (laughs) sta- started talking trash-

Christopher Capozzola 6:22 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 6:23 ... um, and boiling the water that ultimately resulted in the explosion, um, plus all the other players. So, wh- what, can you describe the dynamics of how that unrolled? What US, what's the role of US, what's the role of France, what's the u- role of Great Britain, Germany, and Austria-Hungarian Empire?

Christopher Capozzola 6:41 Yeah. Over the course of about, uh, four weeks, right, following the assassination of, uh, of the archduke, um, in Sarajevo, um, it sort of triggers a series of, uh, political conflicts and ultimately ultimatums, um, sort of demanding, um, sort of that, that one or other power sort of stand down in response to th- to the demands of either, um, you know, Britain, France, or, or, or in turn, um, Germany or Russia. At the same time that those alliances kind of trigger automatic responses, um, from the other side, and so it escalates. Um, and once that escalation is combined with the call up of military troops, then none of those powers wants to be sort of the last one to kind of get ready for conflict. So even throughout it, they a- they think they are getting ready in a defensive maneuver. Um, and they, if they think if there is conflict, well, it might be a skirmish, it might be, you know, sort of a standoff. Uh, it could be solved with diplomacy later because diplomacy's failing now. Um, that turns out not to be the case. Diplomacy fails, it's not a skirmish, it becomes a massive war. And the Americans are watching all of this from the sidelines. Um, they have very little influence over what happens that summer.

Lex Fridman 7:59 How does it go from a skirmish between a few nations to a global war? Is there a place where there's a phase transition?

Christopher Capozzola 8:09 Yeah. I think the phase transition is in, over the course of the fall of 1914. Um, when the Germans make a, an initial sort of bold move into France, in many ways, they're fighting the last war, the Franco-Prussian War, um, of eight- of 1870. Um, and they really do sort of, um, you know, kind of want to have a quick sort of, uh, lightning strike in some ways against France, um, to kind of bring the war to a speedy conclusion. Uh, France turns out, uh, to be able to fight back, uh, more effectively than the Germans expected, um, and then, uh, the battle lines sort of harden. And then behind that, uh, the, the, the, the French and the Germans as well as the British on, on the, uh, side of the French start digging in literally, right? Um, and digging trenches, trenches that at first are, you know, three feet deep to, you know, to avoid shelling from artillery, then become six feet, 10 feet deep, you know, two miles wide, um, that include telegraph wires, that include whole hospitals in the back. And then at that point, um, you know, the, the front is, is locked in place, and the only way to break that is sort of basically dialing the war up to 11, right? Sort of massive numbers of troops, massive efforts, um, no- uh, none of which work, right? And so the war is stuck in this. But that's the, that's the phase transition right there.

Lex Fridman 9:36 What were the machines of war in that case? You mentioned trenches. What were the guns used? What was the size of guns? What are we talking about? What, what, what did Germany start accumulating that led up to this war?

Christopher Capozzola 9:52 One of the things that we see immediately is the industrial revolution of the previous 30 or 40 years brought, uh, to bear on warfare, right? And so you see sort of machine guns, you see artillery, uh, you know, these are the kind of the, the key weapons of war on both sides, right? The vast majority of battlefield casualties are from artillery shelling, um, from one side to another. Um, not, you know, sort of rifle or, or even sort of, you know, machine gun kind of, uh, attacks. In some ways, the, the weapons of war are, uh, are human beings, right? Um, you know, tens of thousands of them poured over the top, um, in these sort of waves, uh, to kind of try to break through the enemy lines. And it would work for a little while, um, you know, but, but holding the territory that had been gained often proved to be even more demanding than, than gaining it. And so often, um, you know, each side would retreat ba- back into the trenches and, and wait for another day.

Lex Fridman 10:53 And how did Russia, how did Britain, how did France get pulled into the war? I suppose the France one is the easy one, but what, what is the order of events here?

Christopher Capozzola 11:06 Right.

Lex Fridman 11:07 How it becomes a global war.

Christopher Capozzola 11:08 Yeah. So Britain, France, and, and Russia, uh, are at this time, um, in, they're in alliance. Um, and so the, th- the conflicts, you know, in the f- summer of 1914 that lead, uh, sort of to the declarations of war happened sort of one after another, right, um, at the, in August of, in late August of 1914. Um, and all three powers essentially come in at the same time, um, because they have promised to do so, um, through a series of alliances, um, conducted secretly in the years before 1914 that committed them to defend one another. Uh, Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire, um, have their own sort of set of secret al- uh, agreements that also commit them to defend one another. Um, and what this does is it, it sort of brings them all into, into conflict at, at the exact same moment. They're also, for many of these countries, bringing not just their, their national armies, um, but also their empires into the conflict, right? So Britain and France, of course, have, you know, enormous, uh, sort of global empires. They, they're begin mobilizing soldiers as well as raw materials. Germany, uh, has, you know, less of an overseas empire. Russia and the Ottoman Empire, of course, have their own sort of hinterland, um, you know, within the empire. And very soon, you know, sort of all of the warring powers are, are bringing the entire world in, into con- into the conflict.

Lex Fridman 12:28 Did they have a sense of how deadly the war is? I mean, this is another-... scale of death and destruction?

Christopher Capozzola 12:37 At the beginning, no, but very quickly, um, the scale of the devastation of these sort of massive over the top, uh, attacks on the trenches is apparent to the military officers and it very quickly becomes apparent even at home. Uh, you know, there is, of course, censorship of the battlefield and- and, you know, specific details don't reach people, but, you know, for civilians in- in any of the- the warring powers, they know fairly soon how destructive the war is. Uh, and to me, that's always been a real sort of, um, puzzle, right? So that by the time the United States comes to decide whether to join the war in 1917, they know what- exactly what they're getting into, right? They're not backing into the war in the ways that the- the European powers did. Uh, you know, they've seen the devastation, they've seen photographs, they've seen injured soldiers, um, and they make that choice anyway.

Lex Fridman 13:30 When you say "they," do you mean the leaders or the people? Did, uh, m- ma- the- the death and destruction reach the minds of the American people by that time?

Christopher Capozzola 13:42 Uh, yes, absolutely. You know, the- the- we don't, in 1917, have the mass media that we have now but, um, but, you know, there are images in newspapers, there are newsreels, um, that play at the movie theaters, um, and, of course, some of it is sanitized, but, um, but that combined with press accounts, often really quite descriptive press accounts, um, gory accounts, reached, you know, anyone who cared to read them. You know, certainly plenty of people didn't follow the- the news, felt it was far away, but- but most Americans who cared about the news knew how devastating this war was.

Lex Fridman 14:18 Yeah, there's something that happens that I recently visited Ukraine for a few weeks, there's something that happens with the human mind as you get away from the actual front where the bullets are flying. Like, literally one kilometer away, you start to not feel the war. The- you'll hear an explosion, you'll see an explosion and you start to, like, get assimilated to it, or you start to get used to it, and then when you get as far away from, like, currently what is Kiev, you start to, you know the war's going on, everybody around you is fighting in that war, but it's still somehow distant. And I think with the United States, with the ocean between, even if you have the stories everywhere, it still is somehow distant like the way a movie is. Maybe... Yeah, like a- a movie or a video game. It's somewhere else, even if your loved ones are going or you are going to fight.

Christopher Capozzola 15:19 Yeah. That is absolutely the case. And in some ways that's true even for the home fronts in- in Europe, you know, except for the areas where, you know, in Belgium and France, where the- the war is, you know, right there in your backyard, um, for other people, yeah, there's a- there's a distance and soldiers, of course, feel this very strongly when they, uh, European soldiers, when they're able to go home on leave, um, often, you know, deeply resent the, you know, the- what they see as the- the luxury that- that civilians are living entering the war.

Lex Fridman 15:49 So how did US enter the war? Who was the president? What was the dynamics involved? And, um, could it have stayed out?

Christopher Capozzola 16:00 To answer your last question first, yes, right? Um, that the United States could have, uh, could have stayed out of the First World War. Uh, as a military power, um, the United States could not have ignored the war completely, right? It shaped everything, right? It shaped, uh, it shaped trade, it shaped goods and services, agriculture, you know, whether, you know, there was a crop coming, whether there were immigrants coming, um, across the Atlantic to work in American factories, right? So the US can't ignore the war. Uh, but the US makes a choice in 1917 to enter the war, um, by declaring war, right, uh, on- on Germany and Austria. Uh, and in that sense, um, this is a war of choice, um, but it's- it's kicked off by a series of events, right? So President Woodrow Wilson, um, has been president through the- this entire period of time. Uh, he has just run, uh, the- in the 1916 presidential election on a campaign to keep the United States out of war, um, but then in early 1917, the Germans in some ways, um, sort of twist the Americans' arms, right? The- the Germans, uh, sort of high command comes to understand that, you know, that they're stuck, right? Uh, that they, you know, they're stuck in this trench warfare, they need a big breakthrough. Their one big chance is to kind of, is to sort of break the blockade, uh, to push through, uh, that- that the British have imposed on them, to break the, uh, breakthrough against, um, against France. And so they- they do. And along with this, they start sinking ships on the Atlantic, including American ships. The Germans know full well this will draw the United States into war, but the Germans look at the United States at this moment, um, a relatively small army, a relatively small navy, a country that, at least on paper, is deeply divided about whether to join the war, and so they say, "Let's do it." Right? They're not gonna get any American soldiers there in time, right? Uh, you know, it was a gamble, but I think, uh, probably the- their best chance. They took that gamble, they- they lost, right? In part because French resistance was strong, in part because Americans mobilized much faster and in much greater numbers than the Germans thought they would.

Lex Fridman 18:19 So the American people were divided?

Christopher Capozzola 18:21 The American people were absolutely divided about whether to enter this war, right? From 1914 to 1917, there is a searing debate, um, across the political spectrum. It doesn't break down easily on party lines, uh...... um, about whether it was in the US interest to do this, whether American troops should be sent abroad, um, whether, you know, uh, Americans would end up just being cannon fodder for the European empires. Um, eventually, as American s- ships are sunk, um, first in the Lusitania in 1915, then in much greater numbers in 1917, uh, you know, the, the tide starts to turn and Americans feel that, you know, a response is necessary. And the actual declaration of war in Congress is pretty lopsided, um, but it's not unanimous by any means.

Lex Fridman 19:08 Lopsided towards, towards entering the war?

Christopher Capozzola 19:11 Yeah, yeah.

Lex Fridman 19:13 Well, that's really interesting because, um, there's echoes of that in, in later wars where Congress seems to... Nobody wants to be the guy that says no to war for some reason. Once you sense that, uh, in terms of, sorry, in terms of, uh, politicians because then you appear weak. But I w- I wonder if that was always the case. So you make the case that World War I is largely responsible for defining what it means to be an American citizen. So in which way does it define the American citizen?

Christopher Capozzola 19:51 When you think about citizenship, what it means is two things. First of all, what are your rights and obligations? What is sort of the legal citizenship, um, that, that you have, um, as a citizen of the United States or any other state? Uh, and the second is a more amorphous definition of, like, what does it mean to belong, right? To be part of America, right? To feel American, to, uh, you know, to love it or hate it or be willing to die for it, right? Um, and both of those things really are crystal clear, um, in terms of their importance during the war, right? So both of those things are on the table. Um, being, uh, a citizen, who is a citizen, who isn't, um, matters. So people who had never carried passports or, or, you know, any- anything before suddenly have to. Um, but also what it means to be an American, right? Uh, to feel like a... to be part of this project is also kind of being defined and, and enforced during World War I.

Lex Fridman 20:46 So project, you know, is a funny way to put a global war, right? So, uh, can you tell the story, perhaps that's a good example of it, of the James Montgomery Flagg's 1916 poster that reads, "I want you."

Christopher Capozzola 21:03 Right.

Lex Fridman 21:04 A lot of people know this poster, I think, in its original form, in its memefied form, I don't know. But we know this poster and we don't know where it came from, or m- most Americans, I think, uh, me included, didn't know where it came from, and it actually comes from 1916. Does this poster represent the birth of something new in America which is a, um, a commodification or, I don't know, that propaganda machine that says what it means to be an American is somebody that fights for their country?

Christopher Capozzola 21:40 Yeah. So the image, uh, it's, in fact, I think one of the most recognizable images, not only in the United States, but in the entire world, right?

Lex Fridman 21:48 Mm-hmm.

Christopher Capozzola 21:48 Um, and you could br- you can bring it almost anywhere on Earth in 2022 and people will know what it refers to, right? And so this is a, uh, an image that circulated first, um, as a magazine cover, later as a recruitment poster, um, where the figure is Uncle Sam sort of pointing at the viewer, um, with his finger sort of pointing and saying, "I want you." Right? And the "I want you" is a recruitment, uh, tool to, to join the US Army. And this image, you know, really kind of starts as a kind of, like I said, a magazine cover in 1916 by the artist James Montgomery Flagg. It initially appears under the heading, "What are you doing for preparedness?" Meaning to prepare in case war comes to the United States, right? At that point in 1916, we're still neutral. Um, in 1917, um, uh, it's turned into a US Army recruiting poster, um, and then it, it reappears in World War II, reappears generations after. You know, like you said, it's now, uh, gets remixed, memefied, um, it's a- it's all over the place. I think, for me, it's a, it's a turning point, it's a sort of window into American culture at a crucial moment in our history, um, where the federal government is now embarking on a war overseas that's going to make enormous demands, um, on its citizens, and at the same time, where sort of technologies of mass production and mass media and what, uh, we would probably call propaganda, um, are being sort of mobilized, um, for the, for the first time in, in this new kind of way.

Lex Fridman 23:25 Well, in some sense, is it fair to say that th- the empire is born, the expanding empire is born from the Noam Chomsky perspective kind of empire that seeks to have military influence elsewhere in the world?

Christopher Capozzola 23:42 Yes, but I think as historians we need to be at least as interested in what happens to the people who are getting pointed to by Uncle Sam, right? Rather than just the one, you know, whether he's pointing at us. Um, and, you know, so, so yes. He's asking us to do that, but, but how do we respond?

Lex Fridman 23:59 And the people responded. So the people are ultimately the, the machines of history, the mechanisms of history. It's not Uncle Sam. Uncle Sam can only do so much if the people aren't willing to step up.

Christopher Capozzola 24:13 Absolutely. They... And, you know, the American people responded for sure, but they didn't build what Uncle Sam asked them to do, um, in that poster, right? Um, and I think that's, uh, you know, kind of a crucial aspect that, uh, you know, there never would have been sort of u- global US power without the, the response that begins in World War I.

Lex Fridman 24:32 What was the Selective Service Act of 1917?

Christopher Capozzola 24:35 ... so one of the very first things that Uncle Sam wants you to do, right, is to register for Selective Service, for the draft, right? Um, and they... The law is passed very soon after the US enters the war. Um, it's sort of dem- you know, uh, demanding that all men, uh, first between eight, uh, 21 and 30, then between 18 and 45 register for the draft. Um, and they'll be selected, uh, by a government agency, by a volunteer organization.

Lex Fridman 25:00 So it's a requirement to sign up?

Christopher Capozzola 25:02 It, it is a legal requirement to register. Um, not, of course not everyone who registers is selected. Um, uh, uh, but over the course of the war, 24 million men register. Almost four million, uh, serve in some fashion.

Lex Fridman 25:14 What was the response? What was the feeling amongst American people to have to sign up to the Selective Service Act?

Christopher Capozzola 25:21 Well-

Lex Fridman 25:22 Have to register.

Christopher Capozzola 25:23 Yeah. This is, uh, this is a bigger turning point than, than we might think, right? In some ways, this is a tougher, uh, demand of the American public than entering the war. It's one thing to declare war on Germany, right? It's another thing to go down to your local post office, uh, and fill out the forms that, that allow your own government to send you there to fight. Um, and this is especially important at a time when the federal government doesn't really have any other way to find you unless you actually go and register yourself, right? Um, and so, you know, ordinary people are participating, um, in the building of this war machine, but at least a half a million of them don't, right? And simply never fill out the forms, move from one town to another-

Lex Fridman 26:08 But you said 20 million did? 20-something?

Christopher Capozzola 26:10 Uh, yeah, about 24 million register, at least 500,000 die.

Lex Fridman 26:14 Is it surprising to you that that many registered?

Christopher Capozzola 26:18 Uh-

Lex Fridman 26:18 Since the country was divided?

Christopher Capozzola 26:19 It, it is, and that's what I've, I've, you know, sort of tried to dig in to figure out how did, how did you get 24 million people to, to register for the draft, and, uh, it's certainly not coming from the top down, right? Um, you know, there may be 100, uh, sort of agents in what's now called the FBI. Um, you know, it's certainly not being enforced from Washington. It's being enforced in, you know, through the, the eyes of everyday neighbors, um, you know, through community, uh, surveillance, all kinds of ways.

Lex Fridman 26:47 Oh, so there was like a pressure?

Christopher Capozzola 26:50 There was a lot of pressure.

Lex Fridman 26:51 Interesting. So there was not a significant like, uh, anti-war movement as you would see maybe later with Vietnam and things like this?

Christopher Capozzola 27:01 There was a significant movement before 1917, but, um, but it becomes very hard to keep up an organized anti-war movement after that, particularly when the government starts shutting down protests.

Lex Fridman 27:13 So as the Selective Service Act of 1917 runs up against some of the freedoms, some of the rights that are, uh, defined in our founding documents, what was that clash like? What was sacrificed? What freedoms and rights were sacrificed in this process?

Christopher Capozzola 27:35 I mean, I think on some level the fundamental right, right, uh, is liberty, right? Um, that conscription sort of demands, um, you know, uh, sacrifice, um, on the behalf of some for the, for, notionally for the protection of all.

Lex Fridman 27:50 So even if you're against the war, you're forced to fight?

Christopher Capozzola 27:53 Right. Yes. Um, you know, and there, there were small, uh, provisions for conscientious objectors, um, solely those who had religious objections to all war, right? Not political objections to this war.

Lex Fridman 28:05 Mm.

Christopher Capozzola 28:06 Um, and some, you know, several thousand were able to, to take those provisions. But even then, um, they faced, uh, social sanction, they faced ridicule. Uh, some of them faced, uh, intimidation, um, you know, so those liberty interests, um, both individual freedom, religious freedom, you know, those are some of the first things to go.

Lex Fridman 28:25 So what about freedom of speech?

Christopher Capozzola 28:29 Uh-

Lex Fridman 28:29 Was there silencing of the press, of the voices of the different people that would object?

Christopher Capozzola 28:34 Uh, yes, absolutely, right? And so very soon after the Selective Service Act is passed, then you get the Espionage Act, um, which of course is back in the news, um, in 2022.

Lex Fridman 28:44 What's the Espionage Act?

Christopher Capozzola 28:45 The Espionage Act is a sort of omnibus bill that contains about 10 or, different provisions, very few of which have to do with espionage. Um, but one key provision, um, basically makes it illegal to say or do anything that would interfere with military recruitment, right? Um, and that, that provision is used to shut down, uh, radical publications, to shut down German language publications, um, and you know, this is really has a chilling impact on speech during the war.

Lex Fridman 29:14 Could you put into words what it means to be an American citizen that is in part sparked by World War I? What does, what does that, what does that mean? Somebody that's... should be willing to sacrifice certain freedoms to fight for their country? Um, somebody that's willing to fight to spread freedom elsewhere in the world? Sp- spread the American ideals? Like what, what, what, um... Does that begin to tell the story of what it means to be an American?

Christopher Capozzola 29:49 Uh, I think what we see is a change, right? So citizenship during World War I now includes, um, uh, the obligation to defend the country, right? To serve, right? And to, if asked, to die for it, right? Um, and we certainly see that, and I think we see the, the close linkage of military service and US citizenship coming out of this time period. Um, but, um, you know, when you start making lots of demands on people to fulfill obligations, in turn they're gonna start demanding rights. Um, and we start to see, not necessarily during the war but after, more demands for free speech, uh, protections, more demands for, for equality for marginalized groups. Um, and so, you know, obligations and rights are sort of developing in a dynamic relationship.

Lex Fridman 30:38 Oh, it's almost like an overreach of power sparked-... a, a sense like, "Oh, crap. We can't trust centralized power to abu- like, to drag us into a war. We need, we need to be able to..." So there's that, the birth of that tension between the government and the people?

Christopher Capozzola 30:56 It's a, a rebirth of it, you know. Of course-

Lex Fridman 30:58 Right.

Christopher Capozzola 30:58 ... that, you know, that tension's always there, but, but, uh, in its modern form, I think it comes from this point.

Lex Fridman 31:02 Re-intensification of it.

Christopher Capozzola 31:04 Yeah.

Lex Fridman 31:04 So what about, uh, you said that World War I gave birth to the surveillance state in the US. Can you explain?

Christopher Capozzola 31:11 Yeah, so the Espionage Act, um, you know, sort of empowers, uh, federal organizations to watch other Americans. Um, they are particularly interested in anyone who is obstructing the draft, um, anyone who is trying to kind of, uh, organize labor, or strikes, or radical movements, um, and anyone who might have sympathy for, for Germany, which basically means, you know, all German Americans come under surveillance. Initially, um, you know, this is very small scale, um, but, um, but soon every government agency gets involved from the, the Treasury Department Secret Service to the Post Office, which is, uh, sort of reading mail, to the Justice Department, which mobilizes 200,000 volunteers.

Lex Fridman 31:54 Yeah.

Christopher Capozzola 31:55 Um, you know, it's a, it's a really significant enterprise. Much of it goes away after the war, but of all the things that go away, this core of the surveillance state is the thing that persists, um, most com- most fully.

Lex Fridman 32:08 Is this also a place where government, the size of government starts to grow in these different organizations, or maybe creates a momentum for growth of government?

Christopher Capozzola 32:19 Oh, it's, uh, it's ex- exponential growth, right? That, um, you know, that over the course of the war, um, by almost any metric you use, right, the, the size of the federal budget, the number of federal employees, the number of soldiers in the standing army, all of those things skyrocket during the war. They go down after the war, but they never go down to what they were before.

Lex Fridman 32:41 And probably gave a momentum for growth over time.

Christopher Capozzola 32:44 Uh, yes, absolutely.

Lex Fridman 32:47 Did World War I give birth to the military-industrial complex in the United States? So, war profiteering, expanding of the war machine in order to financially benefit a lot of parties involved.

Christopher Capozzola 33:05 So I guess, I, I would maybe break that into two parts, right? That, um, uh, on the one hand, yes, um, the, there is war profiteering. Um, there are investigations of it, um, in the years after the war. There's a widespread concern that the profit motive had played a, uh, you know, too much of a part, um-

Lex Fridman 33:27 Yeah.

Christopher Capozzola 33:28 ... in the war, and that's definitely the case. Um, but I think when you try to think of this term military-industrial complex, um, it's best, you know, to think of it as, you know, at what point does the one side lock in the other, right? That military choices are shaped by industry, uh, sta- you know, objectives and, and vice versa! Uh, and I don't think that that was fully locked into place during World War I. I think that's really a Cold War phenomenon when the United States is on this intense kind of footing for, for two generations in a row.

Lex Fridman 34:00 So industrial is really important there. There is companies. So before then, weapons of war were created, were, uh, funded directly by the government. What... Were like, um, like who was manufacturing the weapons of war?

Christopher Capozzola 34:15 They were generally manufactured by private industry. Um, uh, there were, of course, ar- well, arsenals, sort of 19th century, um, iterations where the government would produce its own weapons, um, partly to make sure that they got what they wanted, um, but, but most of the weapons of war for all of the European powers, um, inclu- and the United States, are produced by private industry.

Lex Fridman 34:37 So why do you say that the mi- military-industrial complex didn't start then? What was the, what was the important thing that happened in the Cold War?

Christopher Capozzola 34:45 I think, uh, one way to think about it is that it's the Cold War is a point at which it, uh, switches from being a dial to a ratchet, right? So during World War I, um, you know, the relationship between the military and industry dials up, um, you know, fast and high and stays, you know, stays that way, and it dials back down.

Lex Fridman 35:05 Mm-hmm.

Christopher Capozzola 35:06 Whereas during, uh, the Cold War, um, sort of the relationship between the two often looks more like a ratchet. It goes up-

Lex Fridman 35:12 Yes, it becomes unstoppable.

Christopher Capozzola 35:13 ... and goes up again, uh-

Lex Fridman 35:15 And, in the way that you start, I think the way the military-industrial complex is often invol- uh, um, discussed is as a system that is unstoppable.

Christopher Capozzola 35:28 Right, and-

Lex Fridman 35:29 Like it expands. It almost, I mean, if you take a very cynical view, it creates war so that it can make money. It doesn't just find places where it can help through military conflict. It creates tensions that directly or indirectly lead to military conflict that it can then fuel and make money from.

Christopher Capozzola 35:56 That is certainly one of the concerns, um, bo- uh, both people, um, you know, who are critical of the First World War and then also of Dwight Eisenhower, right, when he's, um, president and, and sort of in his, uh, farewell address where he sort of introduces the term military-industrial complex. And some of it is about the profit motive, but some of it is, uh, uh, a fear that, that Eisenhower had that no one had an interest in stopping this, right? And that no one had a voice in stopping it, and that the ordinary American could, could really do nothing, um, to sort of, uh, you know, to kind of, to dial it, to dial things down.

Lex Fridman 36:33 Is it strange to you that we don't often hear that kind of speech today with like I- Eisenhower speaking about the military-industrial c- uh, c- complex? So for example, we'll have people criticizing the spending on the w- on war efforts, but they're not discussing the-... yeah, the machinery of the military industrial complex, like the- the basic way that human nature works, th- whe- that we get- get ourselves trapped in this thing. They're saying like, "There's better things to spend money on," versus describing a very seemingly natural process of when you build weapons of war, that's gonna lead to more war. Like, it pulls you in somehow.

Christopher Capozzola 37:20 Yeah. I would say throughout the Cold War, um, and even after the end of it, uh, there has not been a sustained conversation, um, in the United States, um, about- uh, about our defense establishment, right, what we, you know, what we really need, um, and, um, you know, what- what serves our interest, um, and- uh, and to what extent, um, sort of other things like market forces, profit motives, um, you know, belong in that- in that conversation. Uh, what's interesting is that in the generation after the First World War, that wa- that conversation was on the table, right, um, through a series of- of investigations in the US, the Nye Committee, um, in Britain, a royal commission, journalistic exposes. You know, this would have been just talked about constantly, um, in the years between about 1930 and 1936, uh, as people were starting to worry, right, that storm clouds were gathering in Europe again.

Lex Fridman 38:19 Yeah. But it always seems like those folks get pushed to the fringes. You're- you're made an activist ve-versus a intel- like a versus a thinking leader.

Christopher Capozzola 38:33 Those discussions are often marginalized, um, framed as conspiracy theory, um, et cetera, um, and, um, you know, I think it's- it's important to realize that, you know, uh, in the generation after World War I, this was a serious civic conversation. It led to, you know, sort of investigations of defense, uh, sort of finance. It led to experiments, um, in Britain and France, in public finance of- of war material. Um, and I think those conversations need to be reconvened, um, uh, now in the 21st century.

Lex Fridman 39:05 Is there any parallels between World War I and the war in Ukraine? The reason I bring it up is because you mentioned sort of there was a hunger for war, a capacity for war that was already established, and the different parties were just boiling the, uh, the tensions. So there's a case made that America had a role to play, NATO had a role to play in the current war in Ukraine. Is there some truth to that, um, uh, y- when you think about it in the context of World War I, or is it purely about the specific parties involved, which is Russia and Ukraine?

Christopher Capozzola 39:52 I think it's very easy to draw parallels between World War I, uh, and the war in Ukraine, um, but I don't think they really work, um, that, you know, the first World War, uh, in some ways is generated by a, you know, fundamental conflict, uh, in the Euro- European system of empires, right, in the global system of empires. Um, so in many ways, if there's a parallel, the war in Ukraine is the parallel to some of the conflicts in, um, you know, in the Mediterranean and the Balkans in 1911 to 1913, um, that, um, you know, that then later there was a much greater conflict, right? And so I think if there's any lessons to be learned, um, for how not to t- you know, let, uh, World War III look like World War I, um, it would be to make sure that, um, you know, that systems aren't locked into place, um, that escalate wars out of- out of people's expectations.

Lex Fridman 40:59 Well, that- that's I s- I suppose what I was, uh, implying, that this is the early stages of a World War III, that in the same way that several wolves are licking their chops or whatever the expression is, they're- they're creating tension, they're creating military c- uh, conflict with a kind of unstoppable imperative for a global war. That's, I mean, uh, many kind of people that are looking at this are really worried about that. Now the- the stopping, the forcing function to stop this war is that there's se- several nuclear powers involved-

Christopher Capozzola 41:40 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 41:40 ... which has, at least for now, worked to stop full-on global war. But I'm not sure that's going to be the case. In fact, what is one of the surprising things to me in Ukraine is that still in the 21st century, we can go to something that involves nuclear powers, not directly yet but awfully close to directly, go to a hot war. And so do you worry about that, that there's a kind of descent into a World War I type of scenario?

Christopher Capozzola 42:17 Yes. I mean, that- that keeps me up at night and I think it should keep, uh, you know, the citizens of both the United States and Russia u- uh- uh- up at night. Um, and I think, uh, again it gets back to what I was saying in- that the- in the summer of 1914, um, even then, um, things that looked, um, like, uh, a march toward war could have been different, right? Um, and so I think it's important for leaders to, um, of both countries and of all of the sort of related countr- you know, of Ukraine, of the various NATO powers, um, to really, um, sort of imagine off-ramps and to imagine alternatives, um, and to make them possible, um, you know, whether it's through diplomacy, whether it's through other formats, um, you know, I think that, uh...... you know, that, that's the only way to prevent sort of greater escalation.

Lex Fridman 43:15 What's the difference between World War I and the Civil War in terms of how they defined what it means to be an American, but also, uh, the American citize- citizen's relationship with the war, um, what, what the leaders were doing then? Is there interesting differences and similarities? Besides the fact that-

Christopher Capozzola 43:35 Yeah.

Lex Fridman 43:35 ... everybody seems to have forgot about World War I in the United States and everyone still remembers Civil War?

Christopher Capozzola 43:41 I mean, it, it's true. Um, and, uh, you know, uh, the, the American Civil War defines American identity, um, uh, in some ways, along with the Revolution and the Second World War, um, more so than any other conflict. Um, and, you know, it's, it's a fundamentally different war, right? It's won, uh, because it is a civil war, right? Because, um, you know, because of secession, because of the Confederacy, um, you know, this is a, a conflict happening on the territory of the United States between Americans and so the dynamics are, are, are really quite different, right? So, you know, the d- the, the leaders, particularly Lincoln, have a different relationship to the home front, to civilians, um, than, than they, than, say, Wilson or Roosevelt had in the... in World War I and II.

Lex Fridman 44:30 Also, the way you would tell the story of the Civil War, perhaps similar to the way we tell the story of World War II, there's, like, a reason to actually fight the war. The way we tell the story is we're fighting for this ideal that all men are created equal, that the, the, the war is over slavery, in part. Perhaps that's a radi- drastic oversimplification of what the war was actually about in the moment, like how do you get pulled into an actual war versus a d- (laughs) a, uh, hot discussion.

Christopher Capozzola 45:03 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 45:04 And the same with World War II, people kind of framed the narrative that it was against evil.

Christopher Capozzola 45:10 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 45:11 Hitler being evil. I think the key part of that is probably the Holocaust-

Christopher Capozzola 45:17 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 45:18 ... is how you can formulate Hitler as being evil. If there's no Holocaust, perhaps there's a case to be made that we wouldn't see World War II as such a, quote-unquote, "good war," uh, that there's an atrocity that had to happen to make it really, uh... to be able to tell a clear narrative of why we get into this war. Perhaps such a narrative doesn't exist for World War I and so that doesn't stay in the American mind. We try to, uh, sweep it under the rug, even though, uh, overall 16 million people died. So, so to, to you, the difference is in the fact that you're fighting for s- for ideas and fighting on, on, on the homeland, but in terms of people's participation, you know, um, fighting for your country, was there similarities there?

Christopher Capozzola 46:11 Yeah. I mean, I think, uh, I mean, the Civil War in, in both the North and the South, uh, troops are raised overwhelmingly, um, through volunteer recruitment. Uh, there is a draft in, in both the North and the South, but, um, uh, you know, it's, uh, it's not significant. Um, only 8% of, of, uh, of Confederate soldiers came in through conscription. Um, and so, in fact, you know, the, the mobilization for volunteers often organized locally around individual communities or states, um, create sort of multiple identities and, and levels of loyalty, um, where people both in the North and the South have loyalty both to their state regiments, um, to their, their sort of community militias and, as well, to, to the country. They are fighting over the country, right? Over the United States, right? Right? And so the... And the Union and the Confederacy have conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable visions of that, um, but, but, you know, that sort of nationalism that comes out of, uh, ou- out of the Union, um, after the victory in the war is a kind of crucial force shaping America, uh, ever since.

Lex Fridman 47:21 So what was the neutrality period? Why did US stay out of the war for so long? Like, what was going on in that interesting, like, what made Woodrow Wilson change his mind? What, what, uh, what was the int- interesting dynamic there?

Christopher Capozzola 47:38 I always say that the United States entered the war in April of 1917, but Americans entered it right away, right? Um, they entered it, um... You know, some of them actually went and volunteered and fought, um, almost exclusively on the side, um, of Britain and France. Um, uh, at least 50,000 joined the Canadian Army or the British Army, um, and serve. Um, millions volunteer. They sent humanitarian aid. I think, in many ways, modern war creates modern humanitarianism, um, and we can see that in the neutrality period. Um, and even if they wanted the, the United States to stay out of the war, a lot of Americans get involved in it by thinking about it, caring about it, you know, arguing about it, um, and, you know, at the same time, they're worried that British propaganda is shaping their news system. They are worried, um, uh, that German espionage is undermining them. Um, they're worried that both Britain and Germany are trying to interfere in American elections and American news cycles. Uh, you know, they're... And at the same time, uh, a revolution is breaking out in Mexico, right? So there are sort of, you know, concerns about, uh, what's happening in the Western hemisphere as well as what's happening in Europe.

Lex Fridman 48:54 So World War I was supposed to be the war to end all wars, and it didn't. How did l- how did World War I pave the way to World War II? Every nation probably has their own story in this trajectory towards World War II. How did Europe...... allow World War II to happen? How did the Soviet Union, Russia allow World War II to happen, and how did America allow World War II to happen? And Japan?

Christopher Capozzola 49:24 Yeah, you're right. The answer is different for each country, right? Uh, that in some ways, in Germany, um, the culture of defeat, uh, and the experience of defeat at the end of World War I leads to a culture of resentment, recrimination, uh, finger-pointing, blame that, um, makes German politics very ugly. Um, as one person puts it, brutalizes, uh, German politics. Um-

Lex Fridman 49:51 It places resentment at the core-

Christopher Capozzola 49:53 Yes.

Lex Fridman 49:54 ... of the populous and its politics.

Christopher Capozzola 49:56 Yeah. And, you know, so in some ways that lays the groundwork for the kind of politics of, of resentment and hate that, that comes from the, from the Nazis. Um, you know, for the United States, in some ways the failure to win the peace, um, uh, you know, uh, sets up the, the possibility for, for the next war, right? That, um, that the United States, uh, you know, through Wilson as sort of crafting a new international order in, in order that th- this will be the war to end all wars. But because the United States failed to join the League of Nations, um, you see that the United States really sort of on the hook for another generation. Uh, in Asia, the story is more complicated, right? Um, and I think it's worth bearing that in mind that, that World War II is a two-front war. Um, it's, it starts in Asia for its own reasons. Um, World War I is transformative for Japan, right? Um, it is a time of massive economic expansion. Um, a lot of that, uh, sort of economic wealth is poured into sort of greater industrialization and militarization. And so when the military wing, um, uh, in Japanese politics takes over in the 1930s, they are in some ways, uh, flexing muscles that come out of the First World War.

Lex Fridman 51:09 Can you talk about the end of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles? Um, how's, uh, what's interesting about that dynamics there, of the parties involved of, um, how it could've been done differently to avoid the resentment? Is there, or, again, is it inevitable? (laughs)

Christopher Capozzola 51:30 So the war ends, and very soon, even before the war is over, um, the, the United States in particular is trying to shape the peace, right? And the United States is the central actor, um, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Woodrow Wilson is there. He's presiding. Um, and he knows that he calls the shots. This is like-

Lex Fridman 51:51 So he was respected.

Christopher Capozzola 51:53 He was respected, but, uh, but resentfully in some ways by, by the, the European powers, Britain and France and, and Italy to a lesser extent, who, you know, felt that they had sacrificed more. Um, they had two goals, right? They wanted to shape, um, the, the imperial system in order to make sure that their, you know, kind of fundamental economic structures wouldn't change, and they also wanted to, um, sort of weaken Germany as much as possible, right? So that Germany couldn't rise again. What this leads to is a, a peace treaty that, um, you know, maintains some of the fundamental conflicts of the imperial system and, um, makes, uh, bankrupts Germany, uh, starves Germany, and kind of feeds this politics of, of resentment, um, that make it i- um, impossible for Germany to kind of participate in a European order.

Lex Fridman 52:46 So, uh, people like historian Neil Ferguson, for example, make the case that if Britain stayed out of World War I, we would've avoided this whole mess and we would potentially even avoid World War II. There's kind of counterfactual history. Do you think it's possible to make the case for that? That there was a, uh, a moment, especially in that case, staying out of the war for Britain, that the escalation to a global war could've been avoided, and one that ultimately ends i- in a deep, global resentment? So where Germany is resentful not just of France or particular nations, but is resentful of the entire, um, I don't know how you would define it, the West or something like this, the entire global world?

Christopher Capozzola 53:36 I wish it were that easy. (laughs) Um, and, you know, I think, um, it's useful to think in counterfactuals, um, you know, what if. Um, and if you believe, as historians do, in causation, um, then if that one thing causes another, then you also have to believe in counterfactuals, right? That if something hadn't happened, then maybe that wouldn't, you know, that would've worked differently. Um, but, uh, I think all the things that led to World War I, um, are multi-causal and nuanced, and this is what historians do. We make things more complicated. Um, and so, you know, there was no one thing that could've, you know, uh, that, that could've turned the, the tide of history. Um, you know, and, you know, oh, if only Hitler had gotten into art school or oh, if only Fidel Castro had gotten into the major leagues, you know? Uh, uh, those are interesting thought experiments, but few, few events in history, I think, are that contingent.

Lex Fridman 54:39 Well, Hitler's an example of somebody who's a charismatic leader that seems to have a really disproportionate amount of influence on the tide of history. So, you know, if you look at Stalin, you could imagine that many other people could've stepped into that role. And, uh, the same goes for many of the, the other presidents through... or even Mao.

Christopher Capozzola 55:07 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 55:08 It seems that there's a singular nature to Hitler, that you could play the counterfactual-... that if there was no Hitler, you may have not had World War II. He, better than many, uh, leaders in history, was able to channel the resentment of the populous into a very aggressive expansion of the military. And, um, I would say, skillful deceit of the entire world, in terms of his plans, and was able to effectively start the war. So, is it, is it possible that, um... I mean, could Hitler have been stopped? Could we have avoided if he just got into art school?

Christopher Capozzola 55:49 Right. Uh-

Lex Fridman 55:51 Or again-

Christopher Capozzola 55:51 Yeah.

Lex Fridman 55:51 ... do you feel like there's a current of events that was unstoppable?

Christopher Capozzola 55:55 I mean, part of what you're talking about is, uh, is Hitler the individual, as a sort of charismatic leader who's able to mobilize, um, you know, the, the nation. Um, and part of it is Hitlerism, right? Um, his own sort of individual ability to play, for example, play off his subordinates against one another-

Lex Fridman 56:15 Yeah.

Christopher Capozzola 56:15 ... to set up a system and, you know, of that, of that nature that, that in some ways escalates violence, including, uh, you know, the violence that leads to the Holocaust. Um, and some of it is also Hitlerism, um, as a, as a, a leader cult. And we see this in many other sort of, uh, ind- you know, things where, where a political movement, um, surrounds one particular individual who may or may not be replaceable. Um, so, so yes, um, the World War II we got, um, would have been completely different, um, if a different, um, sort of, uh, faction had risen to power in Germany. Um, but, uh, but Europe, you know, Depression-era Europe was so unstable, um, and democracies collapsed throughout Western Europe over the course of the 1930s, uh, you know, whether they had charismatic, uh, uh, totalitarian leaders or not.

Lex Fridman 57:05 Have you actually read, uh, one, one book I just recently, um, finished? I'd love to get your opinion from a historian perspective. There's a book called Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich by Norman Ohler. It makes a case that drugs played a very large r- um, meth essentially, played a very large role in World War II. There's a lot of criticism of this book, saying that it's, it's, it's, um, kind of to what you're saying, it takes this one little variable and makes it like, this explains everything. So everything about Hitler, everything about the, uh, blitzkrieg, everything about the military, the, the way, the strategy, the decisions could be explained through drugs, or at least implies that kind of thing. Um, and the interesting thing about this book, because Hitler and Nazi Germany is one of the most sort of written about periods of human history, and this was not... Drugs were almost entirely not written about-

Christopher Capozzola 58:05 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 58:06 ... in, in this context. So here, here come, uh, along this semi-historian, 'cause I don't think he's even a historian. He's a f- um, a lot of his work is fiction. Um, uh, hopefully I'm saying that correctly. So he tells a really c- that's one of the criticisms, is he tells a very compelling story that drugs were at the center of, um, of this period, and also of the man of Hitler. What are your sort of feelings and thoughts about, um, if you've g- gotten a chance to read this book, but I'm sure there's books like it-

Christopher Capozzola 58:39 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 58:39 ... that tell a interesting perspective, singular perspective on a war?

Christopher Capozzola 58:43 Yeah. I mean, I, I have read it, and I, I also had this sort of eye-opening experience that a lot of, uh, uh, historians did, and they're like, "Why didn't, why didn't we think about this?"

Lex Fridman 58:52 Yeah.

Christopher Capozzola 58:52 Right? Um, and, uh, you know, I think, uh, whether he's... You know, the, the, the author Ohler is, um, you know, sort of not a trained academic historian, but the joy of history is, like, you don't have to be one to write-

Lex Fridman 59:04 Yeah.

Christopher Capozzola 59:04 ... good history. Um, and I don't think anyone, uh, you know, sort of criticizes him for, for that. Um, I like the book as a, as a window into the Third Reich. You know, of course drugs don't e- explain all of it, uh, but it helps us see, um, you know, uh, it see, helps us see the people who supported Hitler, um, uh, the ways in which, um, you know, uh, it was that mind-altering and performance-altering drugs were used to kind of keep soldiers on the battlefield. Um, the ways in which, um... You know, I think that we take, we don't fully understand the extent to which the Third Reich is held together with, like, duct tape, um, from, um, you know, from a pretty early phase, by like 1940 or '41 even. You know, it's all smoke and mirrors. And I think that wartime propaganda, both Germans trying to say, you know, "E- we're winning everything," and America trying to mobilize, uh, and the other allies, you know, to mobilize against Germany, uh, described a more formid- formidable enemy than it really was by 1941 and '42.

Lex Fridman 1:00:13 Yeah. I mean, I could see both cases. Uh, one is that duct tape doesn't make the man.

Christopher Capozzola 1:00:18 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 1:00:19 But also, as an engineer, I'm a huge fan of duct tape.

Christopher Capozzola 1:00:22 (laughs) Yeah.

Lex Fridman 1:00:23 'Cause it does seem to solve a lot of problems. And, uh, I do worry that this perspective that that book presents about drugs is somehow, to the mind, really compelling. Because I, it's almost like the mind, or at least my mind, searches for an answer. How could this have happened? And it's nice to have a clean explanation. And drugs is one popular one. When people talk about steroids and sports, the moment you introduce the topic of steroids, somehow the mind wants to explain all success in the context was because this person was on steroids. Lance Armstrong.

Christopher Capozzola 1:01:01 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 1:01:02 Well, it's, it, it, like, it's a very sticky idea. Certain ideas, certain explanations are very sticky, and I think that's really dangerous, because then you lose the full context. And also, in the case of drugs, it removes the responsibility from the person, both for the military genius and the evil.

Christopher Capozzola 1:01:21 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 1:01:22 ... and I think you c- I mean, it's a very dangerous thing to do. Because so- something about the mind, maybe it's just mine, that's sticky to this, "Well, drugs explain it." If the drugs didn't happen, uh, then it would be very different. Yeah, it's, it worries me-

Christopher Capozzola 1:01:36 Yeah.

Lex Fridman 1:01:37 ... how compelling it is of an explanation, you know?

Christopher Capozzola 1:01:40 Yeah. So that, that's why it's maybe better to think of it as a, a window into the Third Reich-

Lex Fridman 1:01:44 Yes.

Christopher Capozzola 1:01:44 ... than an ex- explanation of it.

Lex Fridman 1:01:46 But it's also a nice exploration of Hitler the man. Y- fo- for some reason, discussing his habits, especially later in the war, um, his practices with drugs, gives you a, a window into the person, and reminds you that as a human, this is a human being.

Christopher Capozzola 1:02:02 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 1:02:04 Like a human being get, that gets emotional in the morning, gets thoughtful in the morning, hopeful, sad, depressed, angry, like a story of emotions of the human being is, uh, uh, that somehow we construct, um, which is a pretty dangerous thing to do, to construct an evil monster out of Hitler, when in reality, he's a human being like all of us. I think the lesson there is the Solzhenitsyn lesson, which is all of us, to some degree, are capable of evil. That, um, or maybe if you want to make it less powerful a statement, many of our leaders are capable of evil, that this Hitler is not truly singular in history, that, uh, yeah, when the, the resentment of the populous matches the right charismatic leader, it's, it's easy to make the kind of... Not easy, but it, it's possible to frequently make the kind of, uh, initiation of military conflict that happened in World War, World War II. By the way, because you said not a trained historian, one of the, one of the most compelling, and, I don't know, entertaining and fascinating exploration of World War I comes from Dan Carlin. I don't know if you've gotten a chance to listen to his sort of podcast form telling of the Blueprint for Ar- Armageddon, which is a telling of World War I. What do you think about Dan Carlin? You yourself, as a historian who has studied, who's written about World War I, do you, do you enjoy that kind of telling of history?

Christopher Capozzola 1:03:40 Absolutely. And I think, uh, again, you know, uh, you don't need a PhD in history to, to be a historian, right? Um, you know-

Lex Fridman 1:03:46 Does every historian agree with that?

Christopher Capozzola 1:03:48 Uh, no.

Lex Fridman 1:03:48 (laughs) He gets quite a bit of criticism from historians.

Christopher Capozzola 1:03:51 Uh, you know, I mean, uh, we, you know, we like to argue with each other and nitpick with each other, but, um, but, uh, the one thing I have no patience for is when we, like, pull rank on each other. Um, you know, I think, um, we depend on, uh, you know, if you're, you know, a historian in a university with degrees and research materials, you know, you depend on the work of people in some local community, like recording oral histories, saving documents. And history is a, it's a social science, but it's also a storytelling art. Um, and, you know, uh, history books are the ones you find on the shelves in bookstores that people read for, for fun, and, and then, and you can appreciate both the, the knowledge production, um, as well as the storytelling. Um, and when you get a good oral storyteller, like Dan Carlin, and there's a reason that thousands and hundreds of thousands of people tune in.

Lex Fridman 1:04:44 Yeah, but he definitely suffers from anxiety about getting things correct, and it's very, it's very difficult.

Christopher Capozzola 1:04:50 Well, our first job is to get the facts cr- uh, the facts correct-

Lex Fridman 1:04:53 Yeah.

Christopher Capozzola 1:04:53 ... and then, and then to tell the story off of those.

Lex Fridman 1:04:56 But the, the, the facts are so fuzzy. So it's, uh, I mean, you have the, probably my favorite telling of W- World War II is W- William Shirer's Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, and, uh, or at least not telling of Nazi Germany, and that goes to primary sources a lot, which is n- like, I suppose that's the honest way to do it. (laughs) But it's tough. It's really tough to write that way, to really go to primary sources, um, always. And I think the, one of the things that Dan tries to do, which is also really tough to do, perhaps easier in, in oral history, is, uh, try to make you feel what it was like to be there, s- which, uh, I think he does by trying to tell the story of, like, individual soldiers, and, um... D- do you find that telling, like individual citizens, do you find that kind of telling of history compelling?

Christopher Capozzola 1:05:59 Yeah, I mean, I think we need, uh, historical imagination, um, and I think historical imagination teaches something very valuable, which is humility, um, to realize that there are other people, um, who've lived on this planet, and they organized their lives differently, and, you know, they made it through just fine, too. Um, and, um, you know, I think that that, uh, that kind of, of, of meeting other people from the past can be actually a very useful skill for meeting people unlike you in the present.

Lex Fridman 1:06:38 Unlike you, but also like you.

Christopher Capozzola 1:06:40 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 1:06:40 I think both are, uh, both are humbling, one, realizing that they d- lived in a different space and time, but, two, realizing that if you w- if you were placed in that space and time, you might have done a- all the same things, whether it's the brave good thing or the evil thing.

Christopher Capozzola 1:06:57 Yeah, absolutely. Um, and you get a, also a sense of, um, uh, of possibility. You know, there's this famous line, right, that, um, you know, those who do not learn history are condemned to repeat it. Um, but I think the other half is true, uh, as well, which is those who do not learn history don't get the chance to repeat it. Right? Uh, you know, that we're not the first people on this planet to face, you know, any certain kinds of problems. Um, you know, other people have, have lived through worlds like this one before.

Lex Fridman 1:07:26 Yeah, it's like when you fall in love as a teenager for the first time. There's... And then there's a breakup-... you think it, it's the greatest stradegy- tragedy that has ever happened in the world. You're the first person, uh, even though, like, Romeo and Juliet and so on had, had this issue, you're the first person that truly feels the catastrophic heartbreak of that experience. It's good to be reminded that no, the human condition is what it is, we have lived through it at the individual and the societal scale.

Lex Fridman 1:08:01 Let me ask you about nationalism, which I think is at the core of I Want You poster. Is nationalism destructive or empowering to a nation? And we can use different words like patriotism-

Christopher Capozzola 1:08:14 Hmm.

Lex Fridman 1:08:14 ... which is, in many ways, synonymous to nationalism. But, uh, in recent history, perhaps because of the Nazis, has, has, um, slowly parted ways, that somehow nationalism is when patriotism- patriotism gone bad or something like this.

Christopher Capozzola 1:08:30 Yeah. They're, they're different, right? Um, patriotism, um, you know, patriotism is in some ways best thought of as an emotion, right? Uh, and a feeling of, of love of country, right? Um, you know, uh, literally. Um, uh, and in some ways, that's a necessary condition to participate in nationalism. Um, you know, whether... To me, I think nationalism is crucial, um, in a world organized around nation states, um, and you have to sort of believe that you are engaged in a common project together, right? Um, and so, you know, in the contemporary United States, um, you know, uh, in some ways that, that question is actually on the table in ways that it hasn't been in the past. But, you know, you have to believe that you're engaged in a common project, that you have something in common with the person with whom you share this nation, um, and, um, and that you would sacrifice for them, whether it's by paying taxes for them or, um, you know, or going to war to defend them. Um, that's a vision of, you know, what we might call civic nationalism, um, uh, that's, that's the good version. The question is whether you could have that, um, without having, um, exclusionary nationalism, you know, hating the other, right? Fearing the other. Saying, uh, "Yeah. Be, you're part of this nation, uh, against all others." Um, and I think there's a long tradition in America of a very inclusive, uh, nationalism, um, that is open, uh, inclusive, welcoming, um, and, you know, new people to this shared project. Um, that's something to be defended. Exclusionary nationalisms based on, you know, um, uh, uh, ethnic hatreds and, and others that we see throughout the world, um, those are things to be afraid of.

Lex Fridman 1:10:24 But there is a kind of narrative in the United States that a nationalism that includes the big umbrella of democratic nations, nations that strive for freedom, and everybody else is against, is against freedom and against human nature, and it just so happens that it's a half and half split across the world. So that's imperialism, that feels like it beats the drum of war.

Christopher Capozzola 1:10:52 Yeah. And I, I mean, I don't want to paint too rosy a picture, and certainly, you know, the United States, um, as a nation has often found it easier to define ourselves against something, um, than to clarify exactly what we're for.

Lex Fridman 1:11:06 Yeah. Yeah. The Cold War, China today. Not- that's not only United States, I suppose, as, as human nature. It's we need a competitor. It's almost like maybe the success of human civilization requires figuring out how to construct competitors that don't result in global war.

Christopher Capozzola 1:11:33 Yes. Or figuring out, um, how to turn enemies into rivals and competitors.

Lex Fridman 1:11:40 Sure. Right.

Christopher Capozzola 1:11:40 There's a real difference. (laughs)

Lex Fridman 1:11:41 Right.

Christopher Capozzola 1:11:41 Uh, you know, you can, you, you know, you compete with competitors, you, you fight with enemies.

Lex Fridman 1:11:47 Yeah. With competitors, there's a respect, may- maybe even a love, uh, underlying the competition. What lessons, what are the biggest lessons you take away from World War I? Maybe, we, we talked about several, but, you know, you look back at the 20th century, what... As a historian, what do you learn about human nature, about human civilization, about history from looking at this war?

Christopher Capozzola 1:12:18 Hmm. I think the, the lesson I would want everyone to take from the story of the First World War, uh, is that human life is not cheap, um, that all of the warring powers thought that just by throwing more men and more material at the front, they would solve their political problems with military force. And, at the end of the day in 1918, one side did win that, um, but it didn't actually solve any of those political problems. Uh-

Lex Fridman 1:12:59 And in the end, the regular people paid the price with their lives.

Christopher Capozzola 1:13:06 They did, and people who, people who had been told that their lives were cheap, uh, remembered that, right? Um, and it sort of, you know, reshapes mass politics for the rest of the 20th century, both in Europe and around the world.

Lex Fridman 1:13:21 Yeah, the, yeah, the cost of a death of a single soldier is not just, or a single civilian, is not just the cost of that single life, it's the resentment that... The anger, the hate that r- reverberates throughout. One of the things I, I saw in Ukraine-... is the birth of, at scale, of generational hate.

Christopher Capozzola 1:13:44 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 1:13:44 Not towards administrations or leaders, but towards entire peoples. And that hate, I mean, overnight that hate is created and it takes perhaps decades for that hate to dissipate.

Christopher Capozzola 1:13:58 It takes decades and it takes, uh, it takes collective effort to build institutions that divert that, that hate into, into other places.

Lex Fridman 1:14:10 One of the biggest things I thought was not part of the calculus in when, uh, the United States invaded A- Afghanistan and Iraq is the creation of hate. When you, when you drop a bomb, um, even if it hits military targets, even if it kills soldiers, which in that case it didn't, there's a very large amount of civilians, what does that do to the... yeah, like, what, um, how many years, minutes, hours, months, and years of hate do you create with a single bomb you, you drop?

Christopher Capozzola 1:14:49 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 1:14:49 And, like, calculate that. Like, literally can the Pentagon have a chart, how many people wi- will hate us? Uh, how many people does it take... do some science here. How many people does it take, uh, when you have a million people that hate you, how many of them will become terrorists? Uh, how many of them, uh, will do something to the nation you love and care about, which is the United States, will do something that will be very costly? I feel like there was not a pl- plot in the chart. It was more about short term effects.

Christopher Capozzola 1:15:25 Uh, yes. It's, again, it's the idea of using, uh, military force to solve political problems. Um, and I think there's a, a squandering of, of good will that people have around the world towards the United States. Um, you know, that's respect for, uh, you know, for its economy, for its consumer products and so forth, and I think that's, um, uh, that's been lost, a lot of that.

Lex Fridman 1:15:46 Do you think leaders can stop war? I have a, perhaps a romantic notion, perhaps 'cause I do these podcasts in person and so on, that leaders that get in a room together and can talk, they can stop war. I mean, that's the power of a leader, especially one with a, uh, in an authoritarian regime, that they can through comradery alleviate some of the, uh, emotions associated with the ego.

Christopher Capozzola 1:16:17 Yes. Leaders can stop war if they get into the room when they understand, um, from the masses in their countries that war is something that they want stopped.

Lex Fridman 1:16:31 So the people-

Christopher Capozzola 1:16:32 So-

Lex Fridman 1:16:32 ... ultimately have a really big say.

Christopher Capozzola 1:16:34 They do. You know, that it was the, it was mass movements by, um, people in the United States for the nuclear freeze, um, in Russia pushing for, for openness that brought, for example, um, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev to Reykjavik to sort of debate, uh, you know, uh, and eventually sort of put caps on, on nuclear weapons. Um, you know, those two people did, you know, made choices in the room that made that possible. Um, but they were both being pushed, um, uh, and knew they were being pushed by, by their people.

Lex Fridman 1:17:08 Boy, that's a tough one. It puts a lot of responsibility on the German people, for example, in both wars. We fans of history tend to conceive of history as a, a meeting of leaders. We think of Chamberlain, we think of Churchill and the importance of them in the Second World War, we think about Hitler and Stalin and think that if certain conversations happened they could've, the war could've been avoided. You tell the story of how many times Hitler and, uh, Nazi Germany's military might was not sufficient, they could've been easily stopped, and, uh, the pacifists, the people th- who, uh, believed Hitler, were foolish enough to believe Hitler, uh, didn't act properly, and if the leaders just woke up to that idea. And in fact, um, Churchill is a kind of representation of that. But in your conception here, it's possible that Churchill was also a representation of the British people, even though seemingly unpopular he, that force was, um, that gave birth to somebody like Churchill who said, "We'll never surrender." Right?

Christopher Capozzola 1:18:20 Yes. Uh-

Lex Fridman 1:18:20 She'll fight on the beaches.

Christopher Capozzola 1:18:22 Yeah. And it, you know, it's a, I think, uh, World War II Britain is a good example of that. You know, it's um, it, it is clearly a, you know, a, a dynamic leader who has his pulse on what the people are, want and demand and are willing to do, um, and you know, it's a, it's a dynamic art of, of leading that, uh, and shaping those wants at the same time as, as knowing that you're, you're bound by them.

Lex Fridman 1:18:47 Well then if we conceive of history in this way,

Lex Fridman 1:18:49 let me ask you about our presidents. You a- are taking on the, um, impossibly difficult task of teaching a course in, in, uh, in a couple of years here, or in one year, called the History of American Presidential Elections. So if the people are in part responsible for leaders, how can we explain, um, what is going on in America that we have the leaders that we do today? So the, if we think about the elections of the past several cycles, m- I guess I, let me ask, are we a divided nation? Are we more of a divided nation than we were in the past? What do you understand about the American citizen at the beginning of this century, uh, from the leaders we have elected?

Christopher Capozzola 1:19:42 Yes. Obviously, we are a divided country. In our rhetoric, um, in our day-to-day politics, um, uh, but we are nowhere near as divided as we have been in other periods in our history, right? The most obvious, of course, being in the American Civil War, right, 150 years ago. Um, and the distinction is not just that, you know, we haven't come to blows, um, but that we are fundamentally one society, one economy, um, and sort of, you know, deeply integrated, um, as a nation, um, both, um, domestically, and on the world stage in ways that, um, you know, look nothing like the United States, uh, in 1861. Um, you know, will there be, um, you know, will political rhetoric, um, continue to be extreme? Of course. Um, but, uh, but, but we're, we're not as divided as people think we are.

Lex Fridman 1:20:47 (sighs) Well, um, then if you actually look throughout human history, does it, does it always get so outside of the people that do the elections get as contentious as they've recently been? Um, so there's a kind of perception has been very close and there's a lot of accusations and a lot of tensions. It's very heated. It's almost fueling the machine of division.

Christopher Capozzola 1:21:11 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 1:21:11 Has that often been the case?

Christopher Capozzola 1:21:14 It has. We are, um, it has and it hasn't. I mean, I do think right now is, is different. Um, and there it's worth distinguishing, you know, are there deep social or economic divisions, which I don't actually think that there are, versus partisanship in particular, sort of the rivalry between the two parties. And it's very clear, um, that we are in an era of what we, what political scientists call hyper-partisanship, right? And that the two parties have taken, um, sort of, um, fundamentally different positions, um, and moved further, um, you know, apart from one another. Um, and, um, you know, and, and that is, um, what I think people talk about when they say our country is divided. So the country may not be divided even if our politics are highly partisan. That is, uh, you know, a divergence from, from other time periods in, in our history.

Lex Fridman 1:22:05 So I wonder if this kind of political partisanship is actually, uh, an illusion of division. I, I sometimes feel like we mostly all agree on some basic fundamentals (laughs) and, and the things that people allegedly disagree on are really blown outta proportion, and there's like a media machine and the politicians really want you to pick a, a blue side and a red side, and because of that, somehow, I mean, families break up over Thanksgiving dinner about who they voted for. There's a really strong pressure to be either red or blue, and I wonder if that's a feature or a bug, whether this is just part of the mechanism of democracy that we want to, even if there's not a real thing to be divided over, we need to construct it such that you can always have a tension of ide- a tension of ideas in order to make progress-

Christopher Capozzola 1:23:05 Mm-hmm.

Lex Fridman 1:23:05 ... to figure out how to progress as a nation.

Christopher Capozzola 1:23:08 I think we're figuring that out in real time, right? On the one hand, it's, uh, it's easy to say that it's a feature of, uh, of a political system that has two parties, right? Um, and the United States is in some ways unique, right? In, um, in not being a parliamentary democracy, and so in some ways it, you would think that would be the feature that is causing, uh, partisanship and to reach these heights. That said, um, you know, we can even see in parliamentary systems and, you know, all around the world, uh, that the same kinds of, um, rhetorics of, of irreconcilable division, uh, kind of politics of emotion, um, are proliferating around the world. Um, some of that, um, as you say, I think is, is not as real as, as it appears on, on television, on social media and other formats. Uh, so, you know, I don't, I don't know that other countries are, um, you know, that are experiencing sort of political conflict, uh, I'm not sure that they're deeply divided either.

Lex Fridman 1:24:12 So I've, uh, had the fortune of being intellectually active through the George Bush versus Al Gore election, then the Obama, and it's just every election since, right? And it seems like a large percentage of those elections, there's been a claim that the elections were rigged, that there is some conspiracy, corruption, malevolence on the oth- on the other side. I distinctly remember when Donald Trump won in 2016, a lot of people I know said that election was rigged, and there's different explanations including Russian, um, influence. And then in 2020, I was just running in, in Austin along the river and somebody said like, "Oh, huge fan o- of the podcast." And they said like, "What do you think of it? This is just not right what's happening in this country." That, um, the 2020 election was obviously rigged, uh, from their perspective, uh, in e- uh, electing Joe Biden versus, uh, Donald Trump. Do you think there's a case to be made for and against each claim in the full context of history of our elections being rigged?

Christopher Capozzola 1:25:34 I think the American election system is fundamentally sound, um, and reliable.And I think that the evidence, um, you know, is, is clear for that, um, you know, regardless of which, uh, election you're looking at. In some ways whether even, you know, you look at a presidential election or even a local, you know, county election for dogcatcher or something, right? That the, um, you know, the amount of sort of time, and resources, and precision that go into, uh, voter registration, vote counting, um, certification processes are crucial to democratic institutions. I think when someone says rigged, regardless of which side of the political spectrum they're coming from, um, they're looking for an answer, um, that i- you know, they're looking for that one answer for what is in fact a complex system, right? So, you know, on the left, um, when they say rigged, they may be pointing to a wide range of, um, of ways in which they think that the system, um, is, is tilted, um, through, you know, gerrymandering, um, uh, you know sort of misrepresentation, uh-

Lex Fridman 1:27:02 Yes.

Christopher Capozzola 1:27:02 ... through the electoral college. Um, on the right when people say rigged, they may be concerned, uh, you know, about, about, um, you know sort of voter security. About ways in which the media pre- may, you know, mainstream media may control, um, messages, um, and in which, you know, in both cases the feeling is, um, my, it's articulated as, "My vote didn't get counted right." Um, but th- the deeper concern is, "My, my vote doesn't count." You know? "My voice isn't being heard." Um, so, so no, I don't think, I don't think the elections are rigged.

Lex Fridman 1:27:43 So let me sort of push back, right? There's a comfort to the story that they're not rigged and a lot of us like to live in comfort. So people who articulate conspiracy theories say, "Sure, it's nice to be comfortable," but here's the reality. And the thing they articulate is there's incentives in close elections, wh- which we seem to have non-stop close elections. There's so many financial interests, there's so many powerful people, surely you can construct, not just with the media, uh, in all the ways you described both on the left and the right that elections could be rigged. But literally actually in a fully illegal way, uh, manipulate the results of w- votes. Surely there's incentive to do that, and I don't think that's, uh, that's a totally ridiculous argument. 'Cause it's like, all right well, um, I mean it actually lands to the question, uh, which is a hard question for me to ask as a ultimate- as an optimist, of how many malevolent people are out there and how many malevolent people are required to rig an election? So h- how many, what is the phase transition for a system to become from like, uh, corruption-lite to corruption, uh, to high level of corruption such that you could do things like rig elections? Which is what happens quite a lot in many nations in, um, in the world even today.

Christopher Capozzola 1:29:20 So yes, there is interference in elections and there has been in American history, right? And we can go all the way back into the, the, you know, into the 18th century. Um, you don't have to go back to, you know, uh, Texas in the 1960s, uh, or LBJ to, to find examples of, of direct interference in the outcome of elections. And there are incentives to do that. Those incentives will only feel more, um, existential as hyper-partisanship, uh, makes people think that the outcome of the elections are, um, you know, are, aren't, are a matter of black and white or life and death. Um, and, um, you will see people sort of organizing sort of, um, uh, every way they can to shape elections, right? We saw this in the 1850s, right? When settlers, you know, pro- and anti-slavery sort of flooded into Kansas, um, to try to sort of, uh, you know, uh, determine the outcome of an election. Um, we see this in the reconstruction period, right? When the Ku Klux Klan shows up to kind of, um, you know, to block the doors for, for black voters in the south. Um, you know that th- this history is not new, it's, it's there. Um, I think what, um, what the reason why I think that the system is sound is, um, is not, or the reason... When I say I believe that the election system is fundamentally sound, um, it's not, um, I'm not trying to be reassuring (laughs) um, or encourage complacency, right? I'm saying like, you know, this is something that we need to, to do and to, and to work on.

Lex Fridman 1:30:58 So the, the current electoral mechanisms are, are sufficiently robust even if there is corruption, even if there is rigging, they're robu- like, uh, the force that corrects its- self-corrects and ensures that nobody gets out of line is much stronger than the other incentives which are like, the corrupting incentives. And that's the thing I, um, talked about corrup- you know, visiting Ukraine, talking about corruption. Where a lot of people talk about corruption as being a symptom, not if the system allows, creates the incentives for there to be corruption, humans will always go for corruption. That's just, you have to assume that. The power of the United States is that it constructed systems that prevent you from being corrupt at scale. At least, I mean it depends what you believe, but most of us, if you believe in this