Lex Fridman PodcastChristopher Capozzola: World War I, Ideology, Propaganda, and Politics | Lex Fridman Podcast #320
EVERY SPOKEN WORD
150 min read · 30,079 words- 0:00 – 1:12
Introduction
- CCChristopher Capozzola
The lesson I would want everyone to take from the story of the First World War, uh, is that human life is not cheap, um, that all of the warring powers thought that just by throwing more men and more material at the front, they would solve their political problems with military force, and at the end of the day in 1918, one side did win that, um, but it didn't actually solve any of those political problems.
- LFLex Fridman
You said that World War I gave birth to the surveillance state in the US. Can you explain? The following is a conversation with Christopher Capozzola, a historian at MIT specializing in the history of politics and war in modern American history, especially about the role of World War I in defining the trajectory of the United States and our human civilization in the 20th and 21st centuries. This is the Lex Fridman Podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description, and now, dear friends, here's Christopher Capozzola.
- 1:12 – 15:49
How World War I started
- LFLex Fridman
Let's start with a big and difficult question. How did World War I start?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
On the one hand, World War I started, uh, because of a series of events in the summer of 1914, uh, that brought, uh, sort of the major powers of Europe into conflict with one another, but I actually think it's more useful to say that World War I started at least a generation earlier when rising powers, particularly Germany, started devoting more and more of their resources toward military affairs and naval affairs. This sets off an arms race in Europe. It sets off a rivalry, uh, over the colonial world and who will control the resources in Africa and Asia, and so by the time you get to the summer of 1914, in s- in a lot of ways, I say the war has already begun, and this is just the match that lights the flame.
- LFLex Fridman
So, the capacity for war was brewing within, like, the, the leaders and within the populous. They started accepting sort of slowly through the culture propagated this idea that we can go to war, it's a good idea to go to war, it's a good idea to expand and dominate others, that kinda thing. Maybe not put in those clear terms, but just a sense that military action is the way that nations operate at the global scale.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yes, yes and, right? So yes, um, there's a sense that the military can be the solution to political conflict, uh, in Europe itself, and the and is that war and, and military conflict are already happening, right? Uh, that there's war particularly, uh, in Africa, in North Africa, in the Middle East, um, in the Balkans. Conflict is already underway, um, and the European powers haven't faced off against each other. They've usually faced off against an asymmetrical conflict against much less powerful states, um, but, you know, in some ways, that, that war is already underway.
- LFLex Fridman
So, do you think it was inevitable? Because World War I is brought up as a case study where it seems like, um, a few accidental leaders and a few accidental events or one accidental event led to the war, and if you change that one little thing, it could've avoided a war. Your sense is the, the, uh, the drums of war have been beating for quite a while and it would've happened almost no matter what, or very likely to have happened.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yes. Historians never like to say things are inevitable, um, and certainly, you know, there were people who could've chosen a different path, um, both in the short term and the long term, um, but fundamentally, um, there were, uh, irreconcilable conflicts in the system of empires in the world in 1914, uh, I can't see, uh, you know, it didn't have to be this war, but it had, it probably had to be a war.
- LFLex Fridman
So there was the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There's France and Great Britain, US. Could the US be called an empire at that moment yet? (laughs)
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Uh, yeah.
- LFLex Fridman
When, when do you graduate to empire status? (laughs)
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Um, well, certainly after, after 1898 with the acquisition of the former territories of the Spanish Empire, you know, the United States has formal colonial possessions, um, and it has sort of mindsets of, of rule and, and military acquisition that would define em- empire in a kinda more informal sense.
- LFLex Fridman
So you would say you would put the blame or the responsibility of starting World War I into the hands of the German Empire and Kaiser Wilhelm II?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
You know, that's a really, uh, tough call to make, um, and you know, that deciding that is going to keep historians in business for the next 200 years, um, uh, I think there are people who would lay all of the blame, um, uh, on the Germans, right? And you know, who'd point toward a generation of, of arms buildup, um, you know, alliances that, that Germany made and promises that they made to, uh, to their allies in the Balkans, um, to the Austro-Hungarians, um, and so yes, there's an awful lot of responsibility there. Um, there has been a trend lately to say, um, no, it's no one's fault, right? That, uh, you know, that all of the various powers literally were sleepwalking into the war, right? They backed into it inadvertently. I think that lets everyone a little too much off the hook, right? And so I think in between is, uh, you know, I would put the blame on the system of empires itself, on the system, uh, but in that system, the actor that sort of carries the most responsibility is definitely imperial Germany.
- LFLex Fridman
So, the leader of Austro-Hungarian Empire, Franz Joseph I, his nephew's Archduke Franz Ferdinand, he was assassinated.And so that didn't have to lead to a war. And then, uh, the leader of the German Empire, Kaiser Wilhelm II, pressured sort of, uh, (laughs) sta- started talking trash-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
... um, and boiling the water that ultimately resulted in the explosion, um, plus all the other players. So, wh- what, can you describe the dynamics of how that unrolled? What US, what's the role of US, what's the role of France, what's the u- role of Great Britain, Germany, and Austria-Hungarian Empire?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. Over the course of about, uh, four weeks, right, following the assassination of, uh, of the archduke, um, in Sarajevo, um, it sort of triggers a series of, uh, political conflicts and ultimately ultimatums, um, sort of demanding, um, sort of that, that one or other power sort of stand down in response to th- to the demands of either, um, you know, Britain, France, or, or, or in turn, um, Germany or Russia. At the same time that those alliances kind of trigger automatic responses, um, from the other side, and so it escalates. Um, and once that escalation is combined with the call up of military troops, then none of those powers wants to be sort of the last one to kind of get ready for conflict. So even throughout it, they a- they think they are getting ready in a defensive maneuver. Um, and they, if they think if there is conflict, well, it might be a skirmish, it might be, you know, sort of a standoff. Uh, it could be solved with diplomacy later because diplomacy's failing now. Um, that turns out not to be the case. Diplomacy fails, it's not a skirmish, it becomes a massive war. And the Americans are watching all of this from the sidelines. Um, they have very little influence over what happens that summer.
- LFLex Fridman
How does it go from a skirmish between a few nations to a global war? Is there a place where there's a phase transition?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. I think the phase transition is in, over the course of the fall of 1914. Um, when the Germans make a, an initial sort of bold move into France, in many ways, they're fighting the last war, the Franco-Prussian War, um, of eight- of 1870. Um, and they really do sort of, um, you know, kind of want to have a quick sort of, uh, lightning strike in some ways against France, um, to kind of bring the war to a speedy conclusion. Uh, France turns out, uh, to be able to fight back, uh, more effectively than the Germans expected, um, and then, uh, the battle lines sort of harden. And then behind that, uh, the, the, the, the French and the Germans as well as the British on, on the, uh, side of the French start digging in literally, right? Um, and digging trenches, trenches that at first are, you know, three feet deep to, you know, to avoid shelling from artillery, then become six feet, 10 feet deep, you know, two miles wide, um, that include telegraph wires, that include whole hospitals in the back. And then at that point, um, you know, the, the front is, is locked in place, and the only way to break that is sort of basically dialing the war up to 11, right? Sort of massive numbers of troops, massive efforts, um, no- uh, none of which work, right? And so the war is stuck in this. But that's the, that's the phase transition right there.
- LFLex Fridman
What were the machines of war in that case? You mentioned trenches. What were the guns used? What was the size of guns? What are we talking about? What, what, what did Germany start accumulating that led up to this war?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
One of the things that we see immediately is the industrial revolution of the previous 30 or 40 years brought, uh, to bear on warfare, right? And so you see sort of machine guns, you see artillery, uh, you know, these are the kind of the, the key weapons of war on both sides, right? The vast majority of battlefield casualties are from artillery shelling, um, from one side to another. Um, not, you know, sort of rifle or, or even sort of, you know, machine gun kind of, uh, attacks. In some ways, the, the weapons of war are, uh, are human beings, right? Um, you know, tens of thousands of them poured over the top, um, in these sort of waves, uh, to kind of try to break through the enemy lines. And it would work for a little while, um, you know, but, but holding the territory that had been gained often proved to be even more demanding than, than gaining it. And so often, um, you know, each side would retreat ba- back into the trenches and, and wait for another day.
- LFLex Fridman
And how did Russia, how did Britain, how did France get pulled into the war? I suppose the France one is the easy one, but what, what is the order of events here?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Right.
- LFLex Fridman
How it becomes a global war.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. So Britain, France, and, and Russia, uh, are at this time, um, in, they're in alliance. Um, and so the, th- the conflicts, you know, in the f- summer of 1914 that lead, uh, sort of to the declarations of war happened sort of one after another, right, um, at the, in August of, in late August of 1914. Um, and all three powers essentially come in at the same time, um, because they have promised to do so, um, through a series of alliances, um, conducted secretly in the years before 1914 that committed them to defend one another. Uh, Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire, um, have their own sort of set of secret al- uh, agreements that also commit them to defend one another. Um, and what this does is it, it sort of brings them all into, into conflict at, at the exact same moment. They're also, for many of these countries, bringing not just their, their national armies, um, but also their empires into the conflict, right? So Britain and France, of course, have, you know, enormous, uh, sort of global empires. They, they're begin mobilizing soldiers as well as raw materials. Germany, uh, has, you know, less of an overseas empire. Russia and the Ottoman Empire, of course, have their own sort of hinterland, um, you know, within the empire. And very soon, you know, sort of all of the warring powers are, are bringing the entire world in, into con- into the conflict.
- LFLex Fridman
Did they have a sense of how deadly the war is? I mean, this is another-... scale of death and destruction?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
At the beginning, no, but very quickly, um, the scale of the devastation of these sort of massive over the top, uh, attacks on the trenches is apparent to the military officers and it very quickly becomes apparent even at home. Uh, you know, there is, of course, censorship of the battlefield and- and, you know, specific details don't reach people, but, you know, for civilians in- in any of the- the warring powers, they know fairly soon how destructive the war is. Uh, and to me, that's always been a real sort of, um, puzzle, right? So that by the time the United States comes to decide whether to join the war in 1917, they know what- exactly what they're getting into, right? They're not backing into the war in the ways that the- the European powers did. Uh, you know, they've seen the devastation, they've seen photographs, they've seen injured soldiers, um, and they make that choice anyway.
- LFLex Fridman
When you say "they," do you mean the leaders or the people? Did, uh, m- ma- the- the death and destruction reach the minds of the American people by that time?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Uh, yes, absolutely. You know, the- the- we don't, in 1917, have the mass media that we have now but, um, but, you know, there are images in newspapers, there are newsreels, um, that play at the movie theaters, um, and, of course, some of it is sanitized, but, um, but that combined with press accounts, often really quite descriptive press accounts, um, gory accounts, reached, you know, anyone who cared to read them. You know, certainly plenty of people didn't follow the- the news, felt it was far away, but- but most Americans who cared about the news knew how devastating this war was.
- LFLex Fridman
Yeah, there's something that happens that I recently visited Ukraine for a few weeks, there's something that happens with the human mind as you get away from the actual front where the bullets are flying. Like, literally one kilometer away, you start to not feel the war. The- you'll hear an explosion, you'll see an explosion and you start to, like, get assimilated to it, or you start to get used to it, and then when you get as far away from, like, currently what is Kiev, you start to, you know the war's going on, everybody around you is fighting in that war, but it's still somehow distant. And I think with the United States, with the ocean between, even if you have the stories everywhere, it still is somehow distant like the way a movie is. Maybe... Yeah, like a- a movie or a video game. It's somewhere else, even if your loved ones are going or you are going to fight.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. That is absolutely the case. And in some ways that's true even for the home fronts in- in Europe, you know, except for the areas where, you know, in Belgium and France, where the- the war is, you know, right there in your backyard, um, for other people, yeah, there's a- there's a distance and soldiers, of course, feel this very strongly when they, uh, European soldiers, when they're able to go home on leave, um, often, you know, deeply resent the, you know, the- what they see as the- the luxury that- that civilians are living entering the war.
- 15:49 – 32:46
US and World War I
- CCChristopher Capozzola
- LFLex Fridman
So how did US enter the war? Who was the president? What was the dynamics involved? And, um, could it have stayed out?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
To answer your last question first, yes, right? Um, that the United States could have, uh, could have stayed out of the First World War. Uh, as a military power, um, the United States could not have ignored the war completely, right? It shaped everything, right? It shaped, uh, it shaped trade, it shaped goods and services, agriculture, you know, whether, you know, there was a crop coming, whether there were immigrants coming, um, across the Atlantic to work in American factories, right? So the US can't ignore the war. Uh, but the US makes a choice in 1917 to enter the war, um, by declaring war, right, uh, on- on Germany and Austria. Uh, and in that sense, um, this is a war of choice, um, but it's- it's kicked off by a series of events, right? So President Woodrow Wilson, um, has been president through the- this entire period of time. Uh, he has just run, uh, the- in the 1916 presidential election on a campaign to keep the United States out of war, um, but then in early 1917, the Germans in some ways, um, sort of twist the Americans' arms, right? The- the Germans, uh, sort of high command comes to understand that, you know, that they're stuck, right? Uh, that they, you know, they're stuck in this trench warfare, they need a big breakthrough. Their one big chance is to kind of, is to sort of break the blockade, uh, to push through, uh, that- that the British have imposed on them, to break the, uh, breakthrough against, um, against France. And so they- they do. And along with this, they start sinking ships on the Atlantic, including American ships. The Germans know full well this will draw the United States into war, but the Germans look at the United States at this moment, um, a relatively small army, a relatively small navy, a country that, at least on paper, is deeply divided about whether to join the war, and so they say, "Let's do it." Right? They're not gonna get any American soldiers there in time, right? Uh, you know, it was a gamble, but I think, uh, probably the- their best chance. They took that gamble, they- they lost, right? In part because French resistance was strong, in part because Americans mobilized much faster and in much greater numbers than the Germans thought they would.
- LFLex Fridman
So the American people were divided?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
The American people were absolutely divided about whether to enter this war, right? From 1914 to 1917, there is a searing debate, um, across the political spectrum. It doesn't break down easily on party lines, uh...... um, about whether it was in the US interest to do this, whether American troops should be sent abroad, um, whether, you know, uh, Americans would end up just being cannon fodder for the European empires. Um, eventually, as American s- ships are sunk, um, first in the Lusitania in 1915, then in much greater numbers in 1917, uh, you know, the, the tide starts to turn and Americans feel that, you know, a response is necessary. And the actual declaration of war in Congress is pretty lopsided, um, but it's not unanimous by any means.
- LFLex Fridman
Lopsided towards, towards entering the war?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah, yeah.
- LFLex Fridman
Well, that's really interesting because, um, there's echoes of that in, in later wars where Congress seems to... Nobody wants to be the guy that says no to war for some reason. Once you sense that, uh, in terms of, sorry, in terms of, uh, politicians because then you appear weak. But I w- I wonder if that was always the case. So you make the case that World War I is largely responsible for defining what it means to be an American citizen. So in which way does it define the American citizen?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
When you think about citizenship, what it means is two things. First of all, what are your rights and obligations? What is sort of the legal citizenship, um, that, that you have, um, as a citizen of the United States or any other state? Uh, and the second is a more amorphous definition of, like, what does it mean to belong, right? To be part of America, right? To feel American, to, uh, you know, to love it or hate it or be willing to die for it, right? Um, and both of those things really are crystal clear, um, in terms of their importance during the war, right? So both of those things are on the table. Um, being, uh, a citizen, who is a citizen, who isn't, um, matters. So people who had never carried passports or, or, you know, any- anything before suddenly have to. Um, but also what it means to be an American, right? Uh, to feel like a... to be part of this project is also kind of being defined and, and enforced during World War I.
- LFLex Fridman
So project, you know, is a funny way to put a global war, right? So, uh, can you tell the story, perhaps that's a good example of it, of the James Montgomery Flagg's 1916 poster that reads, "I want you."
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Right.
- LFLex Fridman
A lot of people know this poster, I think, in its original form, in its memefied form, I don't know. But we know this poster and we don't know where it came from, or m- most Americans, I think, uh, me included, didn't know where it came from, and it actually comes from 1916. Does this poster represent the birth of something new in America which is a, um, a commodification or, I don't know, that propaganda machine that says what it means to be an American is somebody that fights for their country?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. So the image, uh, it's, in fact, I think one of the most recognizable images, not only in the United States, but in the entire world, right?
- LFLex Fridman
Mm-hmm.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Um, and you could br- you can bring it almost anywhere on Earth in 2022 and people will know what it refers to, right? And so this is a, uh, an image that circulated first, um, as a magazine cover, later as a recruitment poster, um, where the figure is Uncle Sam sort of pointing at the viewer, um, with his finger sort of pointing and saying, "I want you." Right? And the "I want you" is a recruitment, uh, tool to, to join the US Army. And this image, you know, really kind of starts as a kind of, like I said, a magazine cover in 1916 by the artist James Montgomery Flagg. It initially appears under the heading, "What are you doing for preparedness?" Meaning to prepare in case war comes to the United States, right? At that point in 1916, we're still neutral. Um, in 1917, um, uh, it's turned into a US Army recruiting poster, um, and then it, it reappears in World War II, reappears generations after. You know, like you said, it's now, uh, gets remixed, memefied, um, it's a- it's all over the place. I think, for me, it's a, it's a turning point, it's a sort of window into American culture at a crucial moment in our history, um, where the federal government is now embarking on a war overseas that's going to make enormous demands, um, on its citizens, and at the same time, where sort of technologies of mass production and mass media and what, uh, we would probably call propaganda, um, are being sort of mobilized, um, for the, for the first time in, in this new kind of way.
- LFLex Fridman
Well, in some sense, is it fair to say that th- the empire is born, the expanding empire is born from the Noam Chomsky perspective kind of empire that seeks to have military influence elsewhere in the world?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yes, but I think as historians we need to be at least as interested in what happens to the people who are getting pointed to by Uncle Sam, right? Rather than just the one, you know, whether he's pointing at us. Um, and, you know, so, so yes. He's asking us to do that, but, but how do we respond?
- LFLex Fridman
And the people responded. So the people are ultimately the, the machines of history, the mechanisms of history. It's not Uncle Sam. Uncle Sam can only do so much if the people aren't willing to step up.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Absolutely. They... And, you know, the American people responded for sure, but they didn't build what Uncle Sam asked them to do, um, in that poster, right? Um, and I think that's, uh, you know, kind of a crucial aspect that, uh, you know, there never would have been sort of u- global US power without the, the response that begins in World War I.
- LFLex Fridman
What was the Selective Service Act of 1917?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
... so one of the very first things that Uncle Sam wants you to do, right, is to register for Selective Service, for the draft, right? Um, and they... The law is passed very soon after the US enters the war. Um, it's sort of dem- you know, uh, demanding that all men, uh, first between eight, uh, 21 and 30, then between 18 and 45 register for the draft. Um, and they'll be selected, uh, by a government agency, by a volunteer organization.
- LFLex Fridman
So it's a requirement to sign up?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
It, it is a legal requirement to register. Um, not, of course not everyone who registers is selected. Um, uh, uh, but over the course of the war, 24 million men register. Almost four million, uh, serve in some fashion.
- LFLex Fridman
What was the response? What was the feeling amongst American people to have to sign up to the Selective Service Act?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Well-
- LFLex Fridman
Have to register.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. This is, uh, this is a bigger turning point than, than we might think, right? In some ways, this is a tougher, uh, demand of the American public than entering the war. It's one thing to declare war on Germany, right? It's another thing to go down to your local post office, uh, and fill out the forms that, that allow your own government to send you there to fight. Um, and this is especially important at a time when the federal government doesn't really have any other way to find you unless you actually go and register yourself, right? Um, and so, you know, ordinary people are participating, um, in the building of this war machine, but at least a half a million of them don't, right? And simply never fill out the forms, move from one town to another-
- LFLex Fridman
But you said 20 million did? 20-something?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Uh, yeah, about 24 million register, at least 500,000 die.
- LFLex Fridman
Is it surprising to you that that many registered?
- 32:46 – 39:05
US Military
- LFLex Fridman
Did World War I give birth to the military-industrial complex in the United States? So, war profiteering, expanding of the war machine in order to financially benefit a lot of parties involved.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
So I guess, I, I would maybe break that into two parts, right? That, um, uh, on the one hand, yes, um, the, there is war profiteering. Um, there are investigations of it, um, in the years after the war. There's a widespread concern that the profit motive had played a, uh, you know, too much of a part, um-
- LFLex Fridman
Yeah.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
... in the war, and that's definitely the case. Um, but I think when you try to think of this term military-industrial complex, um, it's best, you know, to think of it as, you know, at what point does the one side lock in the other, right? That military choices are shaped by industry, uh, sta- you know, objectives and, and vice versa! Uh, and I don't think that that was fully locked into place during World War I. I think that's really a Cold War phenomenon when the United States is on this intense kind of footing for, for two generations in a row.
- LFLex Fridman
So industrial is really important there. There is companies. So before then, weapons of war were created, were, uh, funded directly by the government. What... Were like, um, like who was manufacturing the weapons of war?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
They were generally manufactured by private industry. Um, uh, there were, of course, ar- well, arsenals, sort of 19th century, um, iterations where the government would produce its own weapons, um, partly to make sure that they got what they wanted, um, but, but most of the weapons of war for all of the European powers, um, inclu- and the United States, are produced by private industry.
- LFLex Fridman
So why do you say that the mi- military-industrial complex didn't start then? What was the, what was the important thing that happened in the Cold War?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
I think, uh, one way to think about it is that it's the Cold War is a point at which it, uh, switches from being a dial to a ratchet, right? So during World War I, um, you know, the relationship between the military and industry dials up, um, you know, fast and high and stays, you know, stays that way, and it dials back down.
- LFLex Fridman
Mm-hmm.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Whereas during, uh, the Cold War, um, sort of the relationship between the two often looks more like a ratchet. It goes up-
- LFLex Fridman
Yes, it becomes unstoppable.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
... and goes up again, uh-
- LFLex Fridman
And, in the way that you start, I think the way the military-industrial complex is often invol- uh, um, discussed is as a system that is unstoppable.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Right, and-
- LFLex Fridman
Like it expands. It almost, I mean, if you take a very cynical view, it creates war so that it can make money. It doesn't just find places where it can help through military conflict. It creates tensions that directly or indirectly lead to military conflict that it can then fuel and make money from.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
That is certainly one of the concerns, um, bo- uh, both people, um, you know, who are critical of the First World War and then also of Dwight Eisenhower, right, when he's, um, president and, and sort of in his, uh, farewell address where he sort of introduces the term military-industrial complex. And some of it is about the profit motive, but some of it is, uh, uh, a fear that, that Eisenhower had that no one had an interest in stopping this, right? And that no one had a voice in stopping it, and that the ordinary American could, could really do nothing, um, to sort of, uh, you know, to kind of, to dial it, to dial things down.
- LFLex Fridman
Is it strange to you that we don't often hear that kind of speech today with like I- Eisenhower speaking about the military-industrial c- uh, c- complex? So for example, we'll have people criticizing the spending on the w- on war efforts, but they're not discussing the-... yeah, the machinery of the military industrial complex, like the- the basic way that human nature works, th- whe- that we get- get ourselves trapped in this thing. They're saying like, "There's better things to spend money on," versus describing a very seemingly natural process of when you build weapons of war, that's gonna lead to more war. Like, it pulls you in somehow.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. I would say throughout the Cold War, um, and even after the end of it, uh, there has not been a sustained conversation, um, in the United States, um, about- uh, about our defense establishment, right, what we, you know, what we really need, um, and, um, you know, what- what serves our interest, um, and- uh, and to what extent, um, sort of other things like market forces, profit motives, um, you know, belong in that- in that conversation. Uh, what's interesting is that in the generation after the First World War, that wa- that conversation was on the table, right, um, through a series of- of investigations in the US, the Nye Committee, um, in Britain, a royal commission, journalistic exposes. You know, this would have been just talked about constantly, um, in the years between about 1930 and 1936, uh, as people were starting to worry, right, that storm clouds were gathering in Europe again.
- LFLex Fridman
Yeah. But it always seems like those folks get pushed to the fringes. You're- you're made an activist ve-versus a intel- like a versus a thinking leader.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Those discussions are often marginalized, um, framed as conspiracy theory, um, et cetera, um, and, um, you know, I think it's- it's important to realize that, you know, uh, in the generation after World War I, this was a serious civic conversation. It led to, you know, sort of investigations of defense, uh, sort of finance. It led to experiments, um, in Britain and France, in public finance of- of war material. Um, and I think those conversations need to be reconvened, um, uh, now in the 21st century.
- 39:05 – 43:15
War in Ukraine
- CCChristopher Capozzola
- LFLex Fridman
Is there any parallels between World War I and the war in Ukraine? The reason I bring it up is because you mentioned sort of there was a hunger for war, a capacity for war that was already established, and the different parties were just boiling the, uh, the tensions. So there's a case made that America had a role to play, NATO had a role to play in the current war in Ukraine. Is there some truth to that, um, uh, y- when you think about it in the context of World War I, or is it purely about the specific parties involved, which is Russia and Ukraine?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
I think it's very easy to draw parallels between World War I, uh, and the war in Ukraine, um, but I don't think they really work, um, that, you know, the first World War, uh, in some ways is generated by a, you know, fundamental conflict, uh, in the Euro- European system of empires, right, in the global system of empires. Um, so in many ways, if there's a parallel, the war in Ukraine is the parallel to some of the conflicts in, um, you know, in the Mediterranean and the Balkans in 1911 to 1913, um, that, um, you know, that then later there was a much greater conflict, right? And so I think if there's any lessons to be learned, um, for how not to t- you know, let, uh, World War III look like World War I, um, it would be to make sure that, um, you know, that systems aren't locked into place, um, that escalate wars out of- out of people's expectations.
- LFLex Fridman
Well, that- that's I s- I suppose what I was, uh, implying, that this is the early stages of a World War III, that in the same way that several wolves are licking their chops or whatever the expression is, they're- they're creating tension, they're creating military c- uh, conflict with a kind of unstoppable imperative for a global war. That's, I mean, uh, many kind of people that are looking at this are really worried about that. Now the- the stopping, the forcing function to stop this war is that there's se- several nuclear powers involved-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
... which has, at least for now, worked to stop full-on global war. But I'm not sure that's going to be the case. In fact, what is one of the surprising things to me in Ukraine is that still in the 21st century, we can go to something that involves nuclear powers, not directly yet but awfully close to directly, go to a hot war. And so do you worry about that, that there's a kind of descent into a World War I type of scenario?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yes. I mean, that- that keeps me up at night and I think it should keep, uh, you know, the citizens of both the United States and Russia u- uh- uh- up at night. Um, and I think, uh, again it gets back to what I was saying in- that the- in the summer of 1914, um, even then, um, things that looked, um, like, uh, a march toward war could have been different, right? Um, and so I think it's important for leaders to, um, of both countries and of all of the sort of related countr- you know, of Ukraine, of the various NATO powers, um, to really, um, sort of imagine off-ramps and to imagine alternatives, um, and to make them possible, um, you know, whether it's through diplomacy, whether it's through other formats, um, you know, I think that, uh...... you know, that, that's the only way to prevent sort of greater escalation.
- 43:15 – 48:53
American Civil War
- CCChristopher Capozzola
- LFLex Fridman
What's the difference between World War I and the Civil War in terms of how they defined what it means to be an American, but also, uh, the American citize- citizen's relationship with the war, um, what, what the leaders were doing then? Is there interesting differences and similarities? Besides the fact that-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah.
- LFLex Fridman
... everybody seems to have forgot about World War I in the United States and everyone still remembers Civil War?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
I mean, it, it's true. Um, and, uh, you know, uh, the, the American Civil War defines American identity, um, uh, in some ways, along with the Revolution and the Second World War, um, more so than any other conflict. Um, and, you know, it's, it's a fundamentally different war, right? It's won, uh, because it is a civil war, right? Because, um, you know, because of secession, because of the Confederacy, um, you know, this is a, a conflict happening on the territory of the United States between Americans and so the dynamics are, are, are really quite different, right? So, you know, the d- the, the leaders, particularly Lincoln, have a different relationship to the home front, to civilians, um, than, than they, than, say, Wilson or Roosevelt had in the... in World War I and II.
- LFLex Fridman
Also, the way you would tell the story of the Civil War, perhaps similar to the way we tell the story of World War II, there's, like, a reason to actually fight the war. The way we tell the story is we're fighting for this ideal that all men are created equal, that the, the, the war is over slavery, in part. Perhaps that's a radi- drastic oversimplification of what the war was actually about in the moment, like how do you get pulled into an actual war versus a d- (laughs) a, uh, hot discussion.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
And the same with World War II, people kind of framed the narrative that it was against evil.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
Hitler being evil. I think the key part of that is probably the Holocaust-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
... is how you can formulate Hitler as being evil. If there's no Holocaust, perhaps there's a case to be made that we wouldn't see World War II as such a, quote-unquote, "good war," uh, that there's an atrocity that had to happen to make it really, uh... to be able to tell a clear narrative of why we get into this war. Perhaps such a narrative doesn't exist for World War I and so that doesn't stay in the American mind. We try to, uh, sweep it under the rug, even though, uh, overall 16 million people died. So, so to, to you, the difference is in the fact that you're fighting for s- for ideas and fighting on, on, on the homeland, but in terms of people's participation, you know, um, fighting for your country, was there similarities there?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. I mean, I think, uh, I mean, the Civil War in, in both the North and the South, uh, troops are raised overwhelmingly, um, through volunteer recruitment. Uh, there is a draft in, in both the North and the South, but, um, uh, you know, it's, uh, it's not significant. Um, only 8% of, of, uh, of Confederate soldiers came in through conscription. Um, and so, in fact, you know, the, the mobilization for volunteers often organized locally around individual communities or states, um, create sort of multiple identities and, and levels of loyalty, um, where people both in the North and the South have loyalty both to their state regiments, um, to their, their sort of community militias and, as well, to, to the country. They are fighting over the country, right? Over the United States, right? Right? And so the... And the Union and the Confederacy have conflicting and ultimately irreconcilable visions of that, um, but, but, you know, that sort of nationalism that comes out of, uh, ou- out of the Union, um, after the victory in the war is a kind of crucial force shaping America, uh, ever since.
- LFLex Fridman
So what was the neutrality period? Why did US stay out of the war for so long? Like, what was going on in that interesting, like, what made Woodrow Wilson change his mind? What, what, uh, what was the int- interesting dynamic there?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
I always say that the United States entered the war in April of 1917, but Americans entered it right away, right? Um, they entered it, um... You know, some of them actually went and volunteered and fought, um, almost exclusively on the side, um, of Britain and France. Um, uh, at least 50,000 joined the Canadian Army or the British Army, um, and serve. Um, millions volunteer. They sent humanitarian aid. I think, in many ways, modern war creates modern humanitarianism, um, and we can see that in the neutrality period. Um, and even if they wanted the, the United States to stay out of the war, a lot of Americans get involved in it by thinking about it, caring about it, you know, arguing about it, um, and, you know, at the same time, they're worried that British propaganda is shaping their news system. They are worried, um, uh, that German espionage is undermining them. Um, they're worried that both Britain and Germany are trying to interfere in American elections and American news cycles. Uh, you know, they're... And at the same time, uh, a revolution is breaking out in Mexico, right? So there are sort of, you know, concerns about, uh, what's happening in the Western hemisphere as well as what's happening in Europe.
- 48:53 – 1:08:00
World War II
- CCChristopher Capozzola
- LFLex Fridman
So World War I was supposed to be the war to end all wars, and it didn't. How did l- how did World War I pave the way to World War II? Every nation probably has their own story in this trajectory towards World War II. How did Europe...... allow World War II to happen? How did the Soviet Union, Russia allow World War II to happen, and how did America allow World War II to happen? And Japan?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah, you're right. The answer is different for each country, right? Uh, that in some ways, in Germany, um, the culture of defeat, uh, and the experience of defeat at the end of World War I leads to a culture of resentment, recrimination, uh, finger-pointing, blame that, um, makes German politics very ugly. Um, as one person puts it, brutalizes, uh, German politics. Um-
- LFLex Fridman
It places resentment at the core-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yes.
- LFLex Fridman
... of the populous and its politics.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. And, you know, so in some ways that lays the groundwork for the kind of politics of, of resentment and hate that, that comes from the, from the Nazis. Um, you know, for the United States, in some ways the failure to win the peace, um, uh, you know, uh, sets up the, the possibility for, for the next war, right? That, um, that the United States, uh, you know, through Wilson as sort of crafting a new international order in, in order that th- this will be the war to end all wars. But because the United States failed to join the League of Nations, um, you see that the United States really sort of on the hook for another generation. Uh, in Asia, the story is more complicated, right? Um, and I think it's worth bearing that in mind that, that World War II is a two-front war. Um, it's, it starts in Asia for its own reasons. Um, World War I is transformative for Japan, right? Um, it is a time of massive economic expansion. Um, a lot of that, uh, sort of economic wealth is poured into sort of greater industrialization and militarization. And so when the military wing, um, uh, in Japanese politics takes over in the 1930s, they are in some ways, uh, flexing muscles that come out of the First World War.
- LFLex Fridman
Can you talk about the end of World War I, the Treaty of Versailles? Um, how's, uh, what's interesting about that dynamics there, of the parties involved of, um, how it could've been done differently to avoid the resentment? Is there, or, again, is it inevitable? (laughs)
- CCChristopher Capozzola
So the war ends, and very soon, even before the war is over, um, the, the United States in particular is trying to shape the peace, right? And the United States is the central actor, um, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Woodrow Wilson is there. He's presiding. Um, and he knows that he calls the shots. This is like-
- LFLex Fridman
So he was respected.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
He was respected, but, uh, but resentfully in some ways by, by the, the European powers, Britain and France and, and Italy to a lesser extent, who, you know, felt that they had sacrificed more. Um, they had two goals, right? They wanted to shape, um, the, the imperial system in order to make sure that their, you know, kind of fundamental economic structures wouldn't change, and they also wanted to, um, sort of weaken Germany as much as possible, right? So that Germany couldn't rise again. What this leads to is a, a peace treaty that, um, you know, maintains some of the fundamental conflicts of the imperial system and, um, makes, uh, bankrupts Germany, uh, starves Germany, and kind of feeds this politics of, of resentment, um, that make it i- um, impossible for Germany to kind of participate in a European order.
- LFLex Fridman
So, uh, people like historian Neil Ferguson, for example, make the case that if Britain stayed out of World War I, we would've avoided this whole mess and we would potentially even avoid World War II. There's kind of counterfactual history. Do you think it's possible to make the case for that? That there was a, uh, a moment, especially in that case, staying out of the war for Britain, that the escalation to a global war could've been avoided, and one that ultimately ends i- in a deep, global resentment? So where Germany is resentful not just of France or particular nations, but is resentful of the entire, um, I don't know how you would define it, the West or something like this, the entire global world?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
I wish it were that easy. (laughs) Um, and, you know, I think, um, it's useful to think in counterfactuals, um, you know, what if. Um, and if you believe, as historians do, in causation, um, then if that one thing causes another, then you also have to believe in counterfactuals, right? That if something hadn't happened, then maybe that wouldn't, you know, that would've worked differently. Um, but, uh, I think all the things that led to World War I, um, are multi-causal and nuanced, and this is what historians do. We make things more complicated. Um, and so, you know, there was no one thing that could've, you know, uh, that, that could've turned the, the tide of history. Um, you know, and, you know, oh, if only Hitler had gotten into art school or oh, if only Fidel Castro had gotten into the major leagues, you know? Uh, uh, those are interesting thought experiments, but few, few events in history, I think, are that contingent.
- LFLex Fridman
Well, Hitler's an example of somebody who's a charismatic leader that seems to have a really disproportionate amount of influence on the tide of history. So, you know, if you look at Stalin, you could imagine that many other people could've stepped into that role. And, uh, the same goes for many of the, the other presidents through... or even Mao.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
It seems that there's a singular nature to Hitler, that you could play the counterfactual-... that if there was no Hitler, you may have not had World War II. He, better than many, uh, leaders in history, was able to channel the resentment of the populous into a very aggressive expansion of the military. And, um, I would say, skillful deceit of the entire world, in terms of his plans, and was able to effectively start the war. So, is it, is it possible that, um... I mean, could Hitler have been stopped? Could we have avoided if he just got into art school?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Right. Uh-
- LFLex Fridman
Or again-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah.
- LFLex Fridman
... do you feel like there's a current of events that was unstoppable?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
I mean, part of what you're talking about is, uh, is Hitler the individual, as a sort of charismatic leader who's able to mobilize, um, you know, the, the nation. Um, and part of it is Hitlerism, right? Um, his own sort of individual ability to play, for example, play off his subordinates against one another-
- LFLex Fridman
Yeah.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
... to set up a system and, you know, of that, of that nature that, that in some ways escalates violence, including, uh, you know, the violence that leads to the Holocaust. Um, and some of it is also Hitlerism, um, as a, as a, a leader cult. And we see this in many other sort of, uh, ind- you know, things where, where a political movement, um, surrounds one particular individual who may or may not be replaceable. Um, so, so yes, um, the World War II we got, um, would have been completely different, um, if a different, um, sort of, uh, faction had risen to power in Germany. Um, but, uh, but Europe, you know, Depression-era Europe was so unstable, um, and democracies collapsed throughout Western Europe over the course of the 1930s, uh, you know, whether they had charismatic, uh, uh, totalitarian leaders or not.
- LFLex Fridman
Have you actually read, uh, one, one book I just recently, um, finished? I'd love to get your opinion from a historian perspective. There's a book called Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich by Norman Ohler. It makes a case that drugs played a very large r- um, meth essentially, played a very large role in World War II. There's a lot of criticism of this book, saying that it's, it's, it's, um, kind of to what you're saying, it takes this one little variable and makes it like, this explains everything. So everything about Hitler, everything about the, uh, blitzkrieg, everything about the military, the, the way, the strategy, the decisions could be explained through drugs, or at least implies that kind of thing. Um, and the interesting thing about this book, because Hitler and Nazi Germany is one of the most sort of written about periods of human history, and this was not... Drugs were almost entirely not written about-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
... in, in this context. So here, here come, uh, along this semi-historian, 'cause I don't think he's even a historian. He's a f- um, a lot of his work is fiction. Um, uh, hopefully I'm saying that correctly. So he tells a really c- that's one of the criticisms, is he tells a very compelling story that drugs were at the center of, um, of this period, and also of the man of Hitler. What are your sort of feelings and thoughts about, um, if you've g- gotten a chance to read this book, but I'm sure there's books like it-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
... that tell a interesting perspective, singular perspective on a war?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. I mean, I, I have read it, and I, I also had this sort of eye-opening experience that a lot of, uh, uh, historians did, and they're like, "Why didn't, why didn't we think about this?"
- LFLex Fridman
Yeah.
- 1:08:00 – 1:18:49
Nationalism
- LFLex Fridman
Let me ask you about nationalism, which I think is at the core of I Want You poster. Is nationalism destructive or empowering to a nation? And we can use different words like patriotism-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
... which is, in many ways, synonymous to nationalism. But, uh, in recent history, perhaps because of the Nazis, has, has, um, slowly parted ways, that somehow nationalism is when patriotism- patriotism gone bad or something like this.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. They're, they're different, right? Um, patriotism, um, you know, patriotism is in some ways best thought of as an emotion, right? Uh, and a feeling of, of love of country, right? Um, you know, uh, literally. Um, uh, and in some ways, that's a necessary condition to participate in nationalism. Um, you know, whether... To me, I think nationalism is crucial, um, in a world organized around nation states, um, and you have to sort of believe that you are engaged in a common project together, right? Um, and so, you know, in the contemporary United States, um, you know, uh, in some ways that, that question is actually on the table in ways that it hasn't been in the past. But, you know, you have to believe that you're engaged in a common project, that you have something in common with the person with whom you share this nation, um, and, um, and that you would sacrifice for them, whether it's by paying taxes for them or, um, you know, or going to war to defend them. Um, that's a vision of, you know, what we might call civic nationalism, um, uh, that's, that's the good version. The question is whether you could have that, um, without having, um, exclusionary nationalism, you know, hating the other, right? Fearing the other. Saying, uh, "Yeah. Be, you're part of this nation, uh, against all others." Um, and I think there's a long tradition in America of a very inclusive, uh, nationalism, um, that is open, uh, inclusive, welcoming, um, and, you know, new people to this shared project. Um, that's something to be defended. Exclusionary nationalisms based on, you know, um, uh, uh, ethnic hatreds and, and others that we see throughout the world, um, those are things to be afraid of.
- LFLex Fridman
But there is a kind of narrative in the United States that a nationalism that includes the big umbrella of democratic nations, nations that strive for freedom, and everybody else is against, is against freedom and against human nature, and it just so happens that it's a half and half split across the world. So that's imperialism, that feels like it beats the drum of war.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yeah. And I, I mean, I don't want to paint too rosy a picture, and certainly, you know, the United States, um, as a nation has often found it easier to define ourselves against something, um, than to clarify exactly what we're for.
- LFLex Fridman
Yeah. Yeah. The Cold War, China today. Not- that's not only United States, I suppose, as, as human nature. It's we need a competitor. It's almost like maybe the success of human civilization requires figuring out how to construct competitors that don't result in global war.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yes. Or figuring out, um, how to turn enemies into rivals and competitors.
- LFLex Fridman
Sure. Right.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
There's a real difference. (laughs)
- LFLex Fridman
Right.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Uh, you know, you can, you, you know, you compete with competitors, you, you fight with enemies.
- LFLex Fridman
Yeah. With competitors, there's a respect, may- maybe even a love, uh, underlying the competition. What lessons, what are the biggest lessons you take away from World War I? Maybe, we, we talked about several, but, you know, you look back at the 20th century, what... As a historian, what do you learn about human nature, about human civilization, about history from looking at this war?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Hmm. I think the, the lesson I would want everyone to take from the story of the First World War, uh, is that human life is not cheap, um, that all of the warring powers thought that just by throwing more men and more material at the front, they would solve their political problems with military force. And, at the end of the day in 1918, one side did win that, um, but it didn't actually solve any of those political problems. Uh-
- LFLex Fridman
And in the end, the regular people paid the price with their lives.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
They did, and people who, people who had been told that their lives were cheap, uh, remembered that, right? Um, and it sort of, you know, reshapes mass politics for the rest of the 20th century, both in Europe and around the world.
- LFLex Fridman
Yeah, the, yeah, the cost of a death of a single soldier is not just, or a single civilian, is not just the cost of that single life, it's the resentment that... The anger, the hate that r- reverberates throughout. One of the things I, I saw in Ukraine-... is the birth of, at scale, of generational hate.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
Not towards administrations or leaders, but towards entire peoples. And that hate, I mean, overnight that hate is created and it takes perhaps decades for that hate to dissipate.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
It takes decades and it takes, uh, it takes collective effort to build institutions that divert that, that hate into, into other places.
- LFLex Fridman
One of the biggest things I thought was not part of the calculus in when, uh, the United States invaded A- Afghanistan and Iraq is the creation of hate. When you, when you drop a bomb, um, even if it hits military targets, even if it kills soldiers, which in that case it didn't, there's a very large amount of civilians, what does that do to the... yeah, like, what, um, how many years, minutes, hours, months, and years of hate do you create with a single bomb you, you drop?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
And, like, calculate that. Like, literally can the Pentagon have a chart, how many people wi- will hate us? Uh, how many people does it take... do some science here. How many people does it take, uh, when you have a million people that hate you, how many of them will become terrorists? Uh, how many of them, uh, will do something to the nation you love and care about, which is the United States, will do something that will be very costly? I feel like there was not a pl- plot in the chart. It was more about short term effects.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Uh, yes. It's, again, it's the idea of using, uh, military force to solve political problems. Um, and I think there's a, a squandering of, of good will that people have around the world towards the United States. Um, you know, that's respect for, uh, you know, for its economy, for its consumer products and so forth, and I think that's, um, uh, that's been lost, a lot of that.
- LFLex Fridman
Do you think leaders can stop war? I have a, perhaps a romantic notion, perhaps 'cause I do these podcasts in person and so on, that leaders that get in a room together and can talk, they can stop war. I mean, that's the power of a leader, especially one with a, uh, in an authoritarian regime, that they can through comradery alleviate some of the, uh, emotions associated with the ego.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yes. Leaders can stop war if they get into the room when they understand, um, from the masses in their countries that war is something that they want stopped.
- LFLex Fridman
So the people-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
So-
- LFLex Fridman
... ultimately have a really big say.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
They do. You know, that it was the, it was mass movements by, um, people in the United States for the nuclear freeze, um, in Russia pushing for, for openness that brought, for example, um, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev to Reykjavik to sort of debate, uh, you know, uh, and eventually sort of put caps on, on nuclear weapons. Um, you know, those two people did, you know, made choices in the room that made that possible. Um, but they were both being pushed, um, uh, and knew they were being pushed by, by their people.
- 1:18:49 – 1:44:56
US elections
- LFLex Fridman
let me ask you about our presidents. You a- are taking on the, um, impossibly difficult task of teaching a course in, in, uh, in a couple of years here, or in one year, called the History of American Presidential Elections. So if the people are in part responsible for leaders, how can we explain, um, what is going on in America that we have the leaders that we do today? So the, if we think about the elections of the past several cycles, m- I guess I, let me ask, are we a divided nation? Are we more of a divided nation than we were in the past? What do you understand about the American citizen at the beginning of this century, uh, from the leaders we have elected?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Yes. Obviously, we are a divided country. In our rhetoric, um, in our day-to-day politics, um, uh, but we are nowhere near as divided as we have been in other periods in our history, right? The most obvious, of course, being in the American Civil War, right, 150 years ago. Um, and the distinction is not just that, you know, we haven't come to blows, um, but that we are fundamentally one society, one economy, um, and sort of, you know, deeply integrated, um, as a nation, um, both, um, domestically, and on the world stage in ways that, um, you know, look nothing like the United States, uh, in 1861. Um, you know, will there be, um, you know, will political rhetoric, um, continue to be extreme? Of course. Um, but, uh, but, but we're, we're not as divided as people think we are.
- LFLex Fridman
(sighs) Well, um, then if you actually look throughout human history, does it, does it always get so outside of the people that do the elections get as contentious as they've recently been? Um, so there's a kind of perception has been very close and there's a lot of accusations and a lot of tensions. It's very heated. It's almost fueling the machine of division.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
Has that often been the case?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
It has. We are, um, it has and it hasn't. I mean, I do think right now is, is different. Um, and there it's worth distinguishing, you know, are there deep social or economic divisions, which I don't actually think that there are, versus partisanship in particular, sort of the rivalry between the two parties. And it's very clear, um, that we are in an era of what we, what political scientists call hyper-partisanship, right? And that the two parties have taken, um, sort of, um, fundamentally different positions, um, and moved further, um, you know, apart from one another. Um, and, um, you know, and, and that is, um, what I think people talk about when they say our country is divided. So the country may not be divided even if our politics are highly partisan. That is, uh, you know, a divergence from, from other time periods in, in our history.
- LFLex Fridman
So I wonder if this kind of political partisanship is actually, uh, an illusion of division. I, I sometimes feel like we mostly all agree on some basic fundamentals (laughs) and, and the things that people allegedly disagree on are really blown outta proportion, and there's like a media machine and the politicians really want you to pick a, a blue side and a red side, and because of that, somehow, I mean, families break up over Thanksgiving dinner about who they voted for. There's a really strong pressure to be either red or blue, and I wonder if that's a feature or a bug, whether this is just part of the mechanism of democracy that we want to, even if there's not a real thing to be divided over, we need to construct it such that you can always have a tension of ide- a tension of ideas in order to make progress-
- CCChristopher Capozzola
Mm-hmm.
- LFLex Fridman
... to figure out how to progress as a nation.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
I think we're figuring that out in real time, right? On the one hand, it's, uh, it's easy to say that it's a feature of, uh, of a political system that has two parties, right? Um, and the United States is in some ways unique, right? In, um, in not being a parliamentary democracy, and so in some ways it, you would think that would be the feature that is causing, uh, partisanship and to reach these heights. That said, um, you know, we can even see in parliamentary systems and, you know, all around the world, uh, that the same kinds of, um, rhetorics of, of irreconcilable division, uh, kind of politics of emotion, um, are proliferating around the world. Um, some of that, um, as you say, I think is, is not as real as, as it appears on, on television, on social media and other formats. Uh, so, you know, I don't, I don't know that other countries are, um, you know, that are experiencing sort of political conflict, uh, I'm not sure that they're deeply divided either.
- LFLex Fridman
So I've, uh, had the fortune of being intellectually active through the George Bush versus Al Gore election, then the Obama, and it's just every election since, right? And it seems like a large percentage of those elections, there's been a claim that the elections were rigged, that there is some conspiracy, corruption, malevolence on the oth- on the other side. I distinctly remember when Donald Trump won in 2016, a lot of people I know said that election was rigged, and there's different explanations including Russian, um, influence. And then in 2020, I was just running in, in Austin along the river and somebody said like, "Oh, huge fan o- of the podcast." And they said like, "What do you think of it? This is just not right what's happening in this country." That, um, the 2020 election was obviously rigged, uh, from their perspective, uh, in e- uh, electing Joe Biden versus, uh, Donald Trump. Do you think there's a case to be made for and against each claim in the full context of history of our elections being rigged?
- CCChristopher Capozzola
I think the American election system is fundamentally sound, um, and reliable.And I think that the evidence, um, you know, is, is clear for that, um, you know, regardless of which, uh, election you're looking at. In some ways whether even, you know, you look at a presidential election or even a local, you know, county election for dogcatcher or something, right? That the, um, you know, the amount of sort of time, and resources, and precision that go into, uh, voter registration, vote counting, um, certification processes are crucial to democratic institutions. I think when someone says rigged, regardless of which side of the political spectrum they're coming from, um, they're looking for an answer, um, that i- you know, they're looking for that one answer for what is in fact a complex system, right? So, you know, on the left, um, when they say rigged, they may be pointing to a wide range of, um, of ways in which they think that the system, um, is, is tilted, um, through, you know, gerrymandering, um, uh, you know sort of misrepresentation, uh-
- LFLex Fridman
Yes.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
... through the electoral college. Um, on the right when people say rigged, they may be concerned, uh, you know, about, about, um, you know sort of voter security. About ways in which the media pre- may, you know, mainstream media may control, um, messages, um, and in which, you know, in both cases the feeling is, um, my, it's articulated as, "My vote didn't get counted right." Um, but th- the deeper concern is, "My, my vote doesn't count." You know? "My voice isn't being heard." Um, so, so no, I don't think, I don't think the elections are rigged.
- LFLex Fridman
So let me sort of push back, right? There's a comfort to the story that they're not rigged and a lot of us like to live in comfort. So people who articulate conspiracy theories say, "Sure, it's nice to be comfortable," but here's the reality. And the thing they articulate is there's incentives in close elections, wh- which we seem to have non-stop close elections. There's so many financial interests, there's so many powerful people, surely you can construct, not just with the media, uh, in all the ways you described both on the left and the right that elections could be rigged. But literally actually in a fully illegal way, uh, manipulate the results of w- votes. Surely there's incentive to do that, and I don't think that's, uh, that's a totally ridiculous argument. 'Cause it's like, all right well, um, I mean it actually lands to the question, uh, which is a hard question for me to ask as a ultimate- as an optimist, of how many malevolent people are out there and how many malevolent people are required to rig an election? So h- how many, what is the phase transition for a system to become from like, uh, corruption-lite to corruption, uh, to high level of corruption such that you could do things like rig elections? Which is what happens quite a lot in many nations in, um, in the world even today.
- CCChristopher Capozzola
So yes, there is interference in elections and there has been in American history, right? And we can go all the way back into the, the, you know, into the 18th century. Um, you don't have to go back to, you know, uh, Texas in the 1960s, uh, or LBJ to, to find examples of, of direct interference in the outcome of elections. And there are incentives to do that. Those incentives will only feel more, um, existential as hyper-partisanship, uh, makes people think that the outcome of the elections are, um, you know, are, aren't, are a matter of black and white or life and death. Um, and, um, you will see people sort of organizing sort of, um, uh, every way they can to shape elections, right? We saw this in the 1850s, right? When settlers, you know, pro- and anti-slavery sort of flooded into Kansas, um, to try to sort of, uh, you know, uh, determine the outcome of an election. Um, we see this in the reconstruction period, right? When the Ku Klux Klan shows up to kind of, um, you know, to block the doors for, for black voters in the south. Um, you know that th- this history is not new, it's, it's there. Um, I think what, um, what the reason why I think that the system is sound is, um, is not, or the reason... When I say I believe that the election system is fundamentally sound, um, it's not, um, I'm not trying to be reassuring (laughs) um, or encourage complacency, right? I'm saying like, you know, this is something that we need to, to do and to, and to work on.
- LFLex Fridman
So the, the current electoral mechanisms are, are sufficiently robust even if there is corruption, even if there is rigging, they're robu- like, uh, the force that corrects its- self-corrects and ensures that nobody gets out of line is much stronger than the other incentives which are like, the corrupting incentives. And that's the thing I, um, talked about corrup- you know, visiting Ukraine, talking about corruption. Where a lot of people talk about corruption as being a symptom, not if the system allows, creates the incentives for there to be corruption, humans will always go for corruption. That's just, you have to assume that. The power of the United States is that it constructed systems that prevent you from being corrupt at scale. At least, I mean it depends what you believe, but most of us, if you believe in this country you have to (laughs) you believe in the, in the self-correcting mechanisms of corruption. That, uh, even if that desire is in the human heart, the system resists it, prevents it.So that's, that's your, that's your current belief?
Episode duration: 2:15:35
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