Stephen Kotkin: Stalin, Putin, and the Nature of Power | Lex Fridman Podcast #63

Without checks and balances, leaders are not challenged, information is distorted, and decisions can escalate into catastrophe, as seen under Stalin, Mao, and various authoritarian regimes and corporations.

In both Russia and the United States, a nontrivial minority is attracted to an authoritarian “strong hand” when frustrated by gridlock or perceived disorder, which can legitimize leaders who promise to “get things done” quickly.

He benefited from liberalizing reforms, the 1998 devaluation, and China-driven demand, while skillfully appealing to both economic “losers” and urban “winners”—and from tightly restricting real political competitors and independent media.

Putin stabilized the post‑1990s state, but reliance on repression, expropriation, and a narrow corrupt elite undermines diversification, human capital, and future growth, leaving Russia “stuck” and bleeding its most dynamic citizens.

His appeal came from genuine dedication to communism and Russian state power, combined with extreme diligence, memory, and organizational skill—but he used lies, purges, and terror to build a personal dictatorship within a party dictatorship.