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Uncapped with Jack AltmanUncapped with Jack Altman

Ben Horowitz on How a16z Built a Venture Machine | Ep. 38

Ben Horowitz is a cofounder and general partner at the venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz, a venture capital firm that manages $60 billion in assets under management. He is also the author of the New York Times bestsellers, The Hard Thing About Hard Things and What You Do Is Who You Are. Prior to a16z, Ben was cofounder and CEO of Opsware (formerly Loudcloud), which was acquired by Hewlett-Packard for $1.6 billion in 2007. Earlier, he was vice president and general manager of America Online’s E-commerce Platform division, where he oversaw development of the company’s flagship Shop@AOL service. Ben also ran several product divisions at Netscape. Ben serves on the board of Anyscale, Databricks, Mayvenn, NationBuilder, Navan, and UnitedMasters. We covered: - Marc and Ben’s relationship as co-founders - Operating a venture firm like a CEO of a company - Why scale is important and not for everyone - The evolution of media Timestamps: (0:00) Intro (0:30) Marc and Ben’s relationship (6:10) Structuring the firm to attract great talent (10:28) Difference between execs and GPs (14:51) Firm-wide guiding principles (16:43) Scaling GPs vs small teams who concentrate (20:11) Why scale is so important in venture (23:45) What platform services work and don’t work (26:58) Ben’s view on board seats (34:56) The evolution of media (44:44) Laws of physics for fund sizes (48:28) Winning is more impactful than picking (52:15) Defending why venture doesn’t scale (55:00) Hiring ex founders and CEOs More on Ben: https://a16z.com/ https://a16z.simplecast.com/ https://x.com/bhorowitz More on Jack: https://www.altcap.com/ https://x.com/jaltma https://linktr.ee/uncappedpod Email: friends@uncappedpod.com

Ben HorowitzguestJack Altmanhost
Jan 9, 202657mWatch on YouTube ↗

EVERY SPOKEN WORD

  1. 0:000:30

    Intro

    1. BH

      You know, when we started the firm, like, a big idea that we had was that venture capital was disappointing as a product for an entrepreneur. We always thought, "Wow, a much better product would be, give me, like, the network to be confident and the advice I need to run this fucking thing."

    2. JA

      [upbeat music] Ben, I'm really happy to be back here doing this. I got to be in the same room with Marc earlier in the year, and I'm, I'm really happy that you're doing this with me.

    3. BH

      I know. I'm glad to be here. This should be some fun.

  2. 0:306:10

    Marc and Ben’s relationship

    1. JA

      Can we start with your relationship with Marc? 'Cause I think it's, like, a super unique thing-

    2. BH

      Yeah

    3. JA

      ... where you guys obviously work together, you know, running companies. You've built this firm together. You have a really unique relationship.

    4. BH

      Yeah.

    5. JA

      I can't think of that many examples where I feel like I've seen it in that sort of equal way for so long. Can you talk about it a little bit?

    6. BH

      We've been working together thirty years. Uh, and, uh, I, I, I would say we're, we're both different and complement... and, and the same, and so not too complementary, so that helps. Um, he's kind of like, uh, we're a little more like relatives than, than anything else at this point, you know, working together thirty years and so forth, so-

    7. JA

      Yeah

    8. BH

      ... uh, yeah.

    9. JA

      Like, are you friends outside of the work context? Or, like, what's like on a, on, like, a non-work situation, like, what is the interaction like?

    10. BH

      Yeah, we're, we're friends, but not like drinking buddies or something like that, right? Like, uh, we both work so much, we mostly talk about work anyway, and then, like, 'cause we're working together-

    11. JA

      Yeah

    12. BH

      ... we're talking about work. But it's kind of like the, the way I would describe it, um... And I, I want to say this without sounding-- I'm not making the, like, level comparison, like, I'm, uh, so I'm just saying the relationship comparison that I think-

    13. JA

      Mm-hmm

    14. BH

      ... is most similar that I've know about is kind of the Michael Jackson, Quincy Jones relationship, if you think about that. Um, and that, yeah, Marc's more Michael Jackson, like, he's a, a star of talents that nobody else has.

    15. JA

      Yeah.

    16. BH

      Like, nobody else has maybe, like, ever had, right? Like, you've talked to Marc. Um, to the point where, like, as a firm, we can just put him out there, and it's like-

    17. JA

      Yeah

    18. BH

      ... a magic trick. Like, he's like, bang, you know? And, you know, for me to, you know, my kind of relationship with him is, you know, like a Quincy Jones. It's not like I'm, uh, you know... I, I'm certainly not Michael Jackson, but I know enough. You know, Quincy Jones knew so much about music-

    19. JA

      Mm-hmm

    20. BH

      ... and so much about how you get the most out of somebody that talented. You know, that makes it work together, so I can surround Marc with the kinds of people, with the kinds of ideas, and so forth, that maximize him. And then, you know, like, he's makes me much, much better 'cause he's Michael Jackson, and, like, you're never, [chuckles] you're never gonna make Thriller if you don't have Michael Jackson.

    21. JA

      Yeah.

    22. BH

      And all the great albums Quincy Jones made, nothing was as big as Thriller, 'cause, you know, you need that. And so that's the kind of relationship. So we're very complementary. We're like in the same field. We do the... You know, like, uh, I- I'm an investor, he's an investor. Like, you know, we built the companies together, all that kind of thing. I'm an engineer. He's an engineer by training. But he's different than me, like, very different-

    23. JA

      Yeah

    24. BH

      ... still.

    25. JA

      Yeah.

    26. BH

      Uh, and I'm different than him. Um, and that, that's kind of what makes it work. We're enough the same and enough different. But I'm not saying that like I'm Quincy Jones.

    27. JA

      No, I get it.

    28. BH

      Like, the great Quincy Jones, rest in peace. I love him. [chuckles] I don't want people mad at me.

    29. JA

      Do you think about the firm similarly? Are you on different sides of certain ideas about the firm, and that's what has led to it working the way it has? Or is it like you believe the same things about what it's gonna take to win, and then you just have a different sort of daily skill set and set of work?

    30. BH

      No, we've had a lot of kind of arguments, and, and we, uh, we've had a lot of arguments, both on kind of which direction it should go and, and in what kind of timeframe. He has kind of more ideas about things we should do than I do just 'cause, you know, in running it, I try and keep it a little more contained.

  3. 6:1010:28

    Structuring the firm to attract great talent

    1. JA

      When you think about, like, um, the way that you've decided to structure-... I guess the company, the firm, you've basically, you know, and I, I got to speak with Martine, who's, like, amazing and could obviously, you know-

    2. BH

      Yeah

    3. JA

      -run and lead his own firm.

    4. BH

      Yeah.

    5. JA

      You've structured this in some way where you can have a certain caliber of GP.

    6. BH

      Mm-hmm.

    7. JA

      How have you thought about, like, what's like the, the narrative in your head as you've been thinking about, "Okay, this is what needs to be true to have people like Martine and Chris Dixon and so forth at the company?"

    8. BH

      You know, it's funny, um, Mike Moritz had this great quote years ago where he said, like: "The key to running a venture capital firm is to keep the principals from killing each other," right? [chuckles] Like, and that, you know, there's a lot of truth to that because you have very, very high-powered, like, super high IQ, disagreeable people who are the best VCs. I mean, like, that's, you know, you, you, you can't find- You can find a VC who you don't like, you can find a, a great VC who, you know-

    9. JA

      Mm-hmm

    10. BH

      ... maybe is a, a dick or whatever, but it's pretty hard to find one who you go like, "That guy's not smart."

    11. JA

      Can you be in a, a good, agreeable VC?

    12. BH

      [chuckles] You know, I don't know many. Um, so-

    13. JA

      You know Andy

    14. BH

      ... I think some are more agreeable than others.

    15. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    16. BH

      Uh, so I do think there is a kind. So the, to be kind of a long-term, like, all-time great VC, I think most of those end up being disagreeable because you really have to think about everything for yourself, and you can't... You know, you know, wanting to be liked, uh, can be a problem. However, like, there's a phase of VC that's this kind of heat-seeking phase.

    17. JA

      Yeah.

    18. BH

      Um-

    19. JA

      You could be a good, agreeable heat seeker.

    20. BH

      Yeah, you could be a good-

    21. JA

      In fact, it probably helps 'cause you just wanna be liked by all your peers in venture.

    22. BH

      I think the best heat seekers probably are agreeable.

    23. JA

      You're right.

    24. BH

      Um, so that, th- that kind for sure.

    25. JA

      Friends with everybody-

    26. BH

      Yeah

    27. JA

      ... want everybody to think they're smart all the time.

    28. BH

      Yeah, yeah.

    29. JA

      Yeah.

    30. BH

      But the truffle hunters, like, they're, they're all disagreeable.

  4. 10:2814:51

    Difference between execs and GPs

    1. JA

      Going back to the type of, like, VCs that you think can be good, and you're obviously, you know, it's not the only thing you do, but one of the things you do is you're managing these really good investors. Can you talk about the difference between managing, you know, these, like, very accomplished GPs versus, you know, managing execs in, like, an operating company?

    2. BH

      Yeah, it's like, I, I, I would say it's quite different in that, you know, look, good execs understand, [chuckles] um, one, the, the importance of chain of command. The, uh, y- you know, they, they're managers, they... A lot of them may be execution people, process people, you know, that kind of thing, as opposed to people generating a lot of ideas. Whereas every good investor is a massive idea generator. They, they don't necessarily, um, like rules [chuckles] or be willing to follow them. Uh, and so I think that the burden on everything making sense every step of the way, uh, is much higher. And then also, you really have to org- from an organizational design standpoint, you've got to minimize conflict, or, uh, it's gonna be complete chaos. So in, in a company, you can get-- like, there's always gonna be some cross-functional dependency in a company, and you have to live with it. And then s- through some combination of rules, process, and telling people, whatever, "Shut the fuck up, like, we're just gonna do it this way," you get there. Um, I think in a VC firm, you can tolerate much less of that. You know, like, if the org doesn't solve the conflict issue, like the ability to solve-

    3. JA

      Mm

    4. BH

      ... major conflicts one-off, uh, will cause a lot of issues.

    5. JA

      You're saying interpersonal conflict is worse in a venture firm?

    6. BH

      Yeah, much worse in that, um, both because of the-... personality types, and then you can really, like, wreck each other's businesses, right?

    7. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    8. BH

      Or each other's, you know, work in that, let's say, I'm a great expert in-- I'm Martine, and I know everything about AI and foundation models, and so forth, and I've gone through every single video model like there is, and I understand all the nuances and the strengths and the weaknesses, and so forth. And then, like, you know, me over here, um, who hasn't done any of that work but, like, found an entrepreneur that they like, who's doing something, and I go invest in that model, that conflicts Martine out.

    9. JA

      Yep.

    10. BH

      Like, he, he's gonna be beyond mad. [chuckles] Like, he's gonna, he's gonna wanna, like, murder the person.

    11. JA

      Yeah.

    12. BH

      I mean, like that-- it, it's such a bad problem, uh, to have conflict like that in a, in a venture capital firm. And you just have to have respect for the work that people are doing and design the firm in a way that all that hard work gets them to the end that they expected, and, like, that their own people don't undermine them and these kinds of things. So, like, the conflicts are extremely intense in that way.

    13. JA

      When you see, like, a real one, are you like, "I'm gonna let them figure it out," or are you like, "I'm gonna mediate this-

    14. BH

      No, no, no

    15. JA

      ... get to a resolution?"

    16. BH

      They're gonna figure it. [chuckles] My biggest thing is, like, sometimes they're too respectful of, uh, of me on that, but like, like, uh, I, like, I'll just resolve it. I need to resolve the conflict.

    17. JA

      What do you mean they're too respectful? They're like, if Ben's gonna stop fighting, it'll stop that.

    18. BH

      Like the, like, the worst conflicts we've had are ones that nobody brings to me. Like, and it'll be... like, it could be something very stupid and trivial, but they get so hot, uh, in, in VC.

    19. JA

      Is this between GC- GPs that you worry about it, or are you going inside team lead s- sort of org and working out their conflicts for them, or are you like, you need to run your own division or whatever?

    20. BH

      Like, sometimes there's something inside the, uh, uh, like a fund, but tho- those are pretty cohesive. 'Cause so, so we design them, um, like, every fund we have runs like, you know, what somebody might consider a little VC.

    21. JA

      Yep.

    22. BH

      Like, there's not more than five GPs.

    23. JA

      Yep.

    24. BH

      It's, it's pretty cohesive, so there's not that much contention. You get the contention when things scale-

    25. JA

      Mm-hmm

    26. BH

      ... um, and everybody's not talking to each other every day. Like, then, then that becomes a problem. So mostly, it's cross funds or cross-functionally or something like that, but, uh, it's very important to squash 'em in the... They're all kimchi problems. They're all the deeper you bury them, the hotter they get, right? Like, so there, there is no [chuckles] problem that gets better over time in terms of conflict in a VC.

    27. JA

      Yeah.

    28. BH

      It always gets worse.

  5. 14:5116:43

    Firm-wide guiding principles

    1. JA

      What are the things that, like, you then need to, like, give sort of guidance on, like, you and Marc, let's say, at a firm-wide level? Is it about overall, like, you know, deployment pace? Is it about s- like, structure? Is it about approach to the market? Like, what is the sort of broad intersection point across all the different funds?

    2. BH

      Yeah, I mean, some of it is just kinda general principles, things we believe in. So, you know, one, like, w- we have to t- make sure we're taking enough risk, make y- you know, like... A- and that usually comes of the form is, evaluate the entrepreneur and the company on the magnitude of their strength. Like, how good are they at what they're good at? Are they super world-class, or are they, you know, is this, like, the, the literally the best person in the world at doing this thing? Not on, oh, like, the monetization model doesn't make sense, or, like, they don't know anything about go-to-market, or they don't actually understand accounting. [chuckles] Um, you know, like, that's not ARR. Like, what the fuck are they talking about? Those things, like, you can always rule out a deal-

    3. JA

      Mm-hmm

    4. BH

      ... on weaknesses, and I think it's, it's always a mistake to rule out somebody who's truly world-class on a weakness, and then it's always a mistake to invest in somebody who's not truly world-class on a lack of weakness. And so a lot of the guidance is around ideas like that, you know, things that we believe where, you know, we're always like, "Okay, like, what can they do?"

    5. JA

      Mm.

    6. BH

      Like, let's focus on what they can do, not what they can't do, and see if that's in, worth investing in. And, and it's a, it's an important psychological thing 'cause, you know, we have so many, like, brilliantly analytical people who can find what's wrong with anybody. Um, and you know, I always remind [chuckles] them there's something wrong with everybody.

    7. JA

      Yeah.

    8. BH

      You just may not have been able to find

  6. 16:4320:11

    Scaling GPs vs small teams who concentrate

    1. BH

      it yet.

    2. JA

      When you think about, like, how you're deploying capital, it seems to me like, you know, you and... I would put, like, you and Sequoia in one shape, which is, like, there are many deals, and you've scaled up the number of great-- like, it's basically a game of how many GPs can you scale? 'Cause, you know, a GP can only do so many deals, and, like, how big can you make the teams? And your answer to that has kinda been, like, many funds, and then you can sort of, like, keep it together, and that's, like, one way-

    3. BH

      Mm

    4. JA

      ... to scale broadly. I'm sure you can kind of, like, adjust what I said. And then let's say there's another version, which is way fewer people with way more concentration, and let's call that, like, Thrive and Founders Fund and maybe Green Oaks or something like that.

    5. BH

      Mm-hmm.

    6. JA

      Maybe you would say that's not quite right, but directionally you kinda know what I'm getting at.

    7. BH

      Yeah. I mean, I think, um, they do some of both, and we do some of both-

    8. JA

      Of course

    9. BH

      ... but yeah, sort of directionally. I think that, like, a- again, for us, um, and what we want to accomplish as a firm, which is, again, like, making America the strongest country in the world technologically, the, the concept of traded approach just doesn't quite work with that mission. Um, and then-

    10. JA

      Why is that? 'Cause we just need more shots to build these companies?

    11. BH

      Well, I mean, you know, if you look at, like, you know, uh, a Founders Fund or Thrive, are both great firms. Um, you know, there, there are whole, like, sectors that they're not really in. There are entrepreneurs who could build something great that they're happy to miss 'cause, like, as long as they get, you know, the very biggest ones and so forth, and that's not really what we're about. Like, w- if, like, crypto is gonna be important to the, like, financial success of the United States or, like, the, uh, uh-... way AI, AI interacts with the economy and so forth, like, then we gotta-- we're in. Like, what are you talking about? We're gonna ignore that. We need to help that succeed. And like, and it turns out, in a sector like that, it's not just like funding entrepreneurs, it's like helping change the law and get the right policies in the country and these kinds of things. And so our model wouldn't let us ignore something that important. But if what you're trying to do is say, okay, of the like, five best companies of the decade, do I have big positions and enough of them?

    12. JA

      Yeah.

    13. BH

      That's-- Look, I think that's a good financial strategy. There's nothing wrong with that. Like, go get 'em.

    14. JA

      Yeah.

    15. BH

      I mean, like, it's good. Like, it's good that they're doing what they do. Um, we work with them on a lot of deals together, but it's just not who we are. Like, you have to be who you are.

    16. JA

      Is it the kind of thing where like, over time, there's no reason for somebody who's doing the sort of broad base of lots of Series A's and B's and, you know, that, that work? Is it just rational to, if you can raise the money, do billion-dollar checks into those companies when they're really running very far?

    17. BH

      If you look at it historically, like depending on the vintage, um, sometimes, [chuckles] that strategy of waiting for the things to get to the billion-dollar valuation is definitely the best strategy. But in other eras, like, that set of companies just all suck.

    18. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    19. BH

      And the actual-- all the good investments are in the A, in the seed round because new, something new is happening.

    20. JA

      Yeah.

    21. BH

      You know, like, uh, the world is changing, and, you know, the big SaaS companies, if you piled all your money in, like Tiger Global, and it did in twenty twenty-one-

    22. JA

      Yeah

    23. BH

      ... it didn't work out that well. Um, you know, you were kind of at the end of a cycle. Uh, that may work better now, um, we'll see.

    24. JA

      Yeah.

    25. BH

      TBD.

  7. 20:1123:45

    Why scale is so important in venture

    1. JA

      Um, obviously, you were raising, you know, big funds, and you've also like, it's worked. You know, it's like on some level, like if I think about, like when you start any company-

    2. BH

      Mm-hmm

    3. JA

      ... or maybe any venture firm, too.

    4. BH

      Yeah.

    5. JA

      It's like you sort of need to have something that you believe that not everybody believes, and that needs to be right. And I would say, like, there's probably multiple, but like, clearly, one of yours that you got to early was like, venture's gonna scale.

    6. BH

      Yeah.

    7. JA

      And, you know, it looks like that's worked really well so far. Can you talk about, like, the thinking behind why scale is so important and like, why you and Marc have believed that it's like the dominant strategy?

    8. BH

      Yeah. So there-- I, I think there's a couple of different dimensions to it. One is like, what is the market of technology companies? Um, and I think that's really important. And Marc wrote a piece in, I think, two thousand and eleven, called Software is Eating the World. The conventional wisdom in VC at the time was, look, there's fifteen companies in any given year that ever get to a hundred million in revenue, and the whole game is getting into as many of those fifteen as you can. And so why have a big firm if there's only fifteen companies to invest in, [chuckles] right? Like that, that doesn't make any sense. You're just gonna chase a lot of bad stuff. But what he thought then and, and kind of the bet that we made was, well, if software eats the world, it's not gonna be fifteen, it's gonna be a hundred and fifty or two hundred, and that's what it's become. Uh, and so to get into that many great companies every year, you clearly need to be of a bigger size. Like, there's just no way to address the market-

    9. JA

      Mm-hmm

    10. BH

      ... if you're five guys. That's not possible. I think the more important part of it, which is like a big rationale for starting the firm, was if you're an entrepreneur, um, what do you need? And you need, like, you need to be important in the world, uh, which means, okay, how do I, you know, how, how do I talk to big-time CEOs? How do I get in front of big customers? How do I go international? How do I deal with the US government if I'm in AI or crypto, which is like everybody now?

    11. JA

      Yeah.

    12. BH

      Like, how do I do all that?

    13. JA

      How do you have employees take you seriously?

    14. BH

      Yeah, how do I have employees take me seriously? Like, how do I find all these employees? All these kinds of things. There's a lot of capability that you need, and if we can just bring that, you know, that's a much better product than, "I'm a smart guy." [chuckles]

    15. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    16. BH

      "I'll take you to coffee. I can give you some ideas about your product for two months until, like, I'm irrelevant on that-

    17. JA

      Yeah

    18. BH

      ... 'cause you've heard all my ideas." And so I think that, like, the, the product of a VC that has a platform and capabilities-

    19. JA

      Mm

    20. BH

      ... and so forth is so mu-- You know, speaking as a, as a former entrepreneur, I needed all that, you know? And, uh, and to, to me, that's a more important part, and we kinda see that every day. So-

    21. JA

      Yeah

    22. BH

      ... so that, that part of the idea was really good. Now, the, there is a challenge on, like, mechanically, how do you do that? How do you build a big VC that's still, like, very, very good at every part of it?

    23. JA

      I want to pull open a couple of those. Um, so one, obviously, that seems like a no-brainer is, like, the big brand and, like, this idea that you, like-

    24. BH

      Yeah

    25. JA

      ... give the company your brand or you lend it to them until they're big enough, and then, you know, they get bigger-

    26. BH

      Yeah

    27. JA

      ... and that improves back to the firm, and it's like this positive flywheel. That seems like a big one. These relationships, I think, like you're talking about, are very hard to get if you're, like, a first-time founder. You don't have the relationships with the government, whatever.

    28. BH

      Just really hard to get. Yeah, yeah.

    29. JA

      Yeah.

    30. BH

      Like, "Hey, I just started a company."

  8. 23:4526:58

    What platform services work and don’t work

    1. JA

      bit.

    2. BH

      Sure.

    3. JA

      What are the platform services that you're most confident work, and then what are the ones that you're least confident work?

    4. BH

      I actually think they all work 'cause we've kinda moved away from the ones that didn't work.

    5. JA

      Can you talk about some of the ones that, you know, that's fine?

    6. BH

      Yeah, I mean, like, so we did some things early, um, where we were publishing sort of... Y- you know, we had this thing where we were gonna, um, have sort of general research ideas or whatever, you know, for the entire, like, start-up community. But, like, it, it turns out that that works really well if you do it for crypto or if you do it for AI. You know, like, we try out all the models-

    7. JA

      Mm

    8. BH

      ... and so forth, you know, like, and we talk to the companies all the time about, okay, like, which model is best at which, and then we, you know, host models, and we try stuff out on them, and so forth. So, like-... from a tool evaluation standpoint, like we can just accelerate you and-

    9. JA

      Yeah

    10. BH

      -tell you exactly what's what. Doing that in general, well, like, uh, a lot of things I think that we tried to do across domains, uh, ended up being not as interesting.

    11. JA

      Yep.

    12. BH

      And that's, you know, that's getting true for talent as well. So like, yeah, a CFO is a CFO for the most part, like a hardware CFO is different than a software CFO, that kind of thing. But that's easy. But like a, an AI researcher-

    13. JA

      Yeah

    14. BH

      -is pretty different than a full stack engineer. [chuckles]

    15. JA

      Totally.

    16. BH

      Like that's a different talent pool. They run in different circles. Their comp structures are totally different, and so you have to specialize.

    17. JA

      I mean, the recruiting stuff is probably-

    18. BH

      Yeah

    19. JA

      ... at this point for me, just talking to, you know, mostly Series A companies, I think recruiting is, like, the number one thing, they'll just, like: "Help me recruit."

    20. BH

      Yeah. Yeah, yeah.

    21. JA

      Have you found that, like, you can effectively aim, you know, recruiting teams at companies for specific periods of time, and-

    22. BH

      Yeah, I think it helps to get the seed corn, right? Like, so a lot of what you're trying to do is, can you get the first three to five people in who are stellar and then have networks where you want to draw from? Who your VC is actually matters a lot on that, right? To an engineer, like-

    23. JA

      It does

    24. BH

      ... cares about like, okay, is this person going away? Is there... Are the-- Is there more money behind this? Have I heard of them?

    25. JA

      Yeah.

    26. BH

      That kind of thing. So that's a, that's, that's an important feature. I think every company has to ultimately get hyper-proficient at, like, recruiting, closing, interviewing, onboarding, training, or they're never gonna be a good company, so-

    27. JA

      You're saying to some degree, we're like, you can't do it all for them, or they'll never build the muscle?

    28. BH

      Yeah, at some point, uh, like, you'll end up retarding their growth if you put in, like, their entire team. Now, we've put in-- like, we've probably helped through our network, like Databricks hire, like over a hundred people for sure, over time.

    29. JA

      But it's like they clearly have their own muscle.

    30. BH

      But not in the beginning, but they're really good at recruiting-

  9. 26:5834:56

    Ben’s view on board seats

    1. BH

      thing.

    2. JA

      How about your view on, like, um, board seats and board membership and, like, how important that is, and maybe to, like, put, like, bookends on what people out there will believe?

    3. BH

      Yeah.

    4. JA

      You've got, you've got some that are like, "Our selling point is we don't take a board seat, we'll leave you alone, we don't-

    5. BH

      Yeah

    6. JA

      ... we're not gonna do anything." You've got some that are sort of like, you know, breathlessly talking about this, you know, spiritual connection between the board member and the founder, and there's a lot there. Like, where do you fall in this? How do you think about what, like, the board member-

    7. BH

      [chuckles]

    8. JA

      -should be?

    9. BH

      I probably don't believe in the spiritual connection. Um...

    10. JA

      [chuckles] I was sort of maybe embellishing a little bit, but you know what I'm talking about.

    11. BH

      So first of all, boards are important for founders. So, like, the idea that you're gonna run without a board, um, after you've, like, given equity to employees and sold equity to people who are not you, is the most dangerous fucking idea in the world. Because if you know anything about securities laws, the only protection you have as CEO from going to jail or getting personally sued is that you run material ideas through the board. That's a massive protection. Like, if I go: "Well, I want to give a, you know, two percent grant to this person in the company," you have to realize your fiduciary to, like, the rest of the company that you're diluting is in question right there, just that. Um, if you run that by the board, it's all good.

    12. JA

      Yeah.

    13. BH

      You're completely protected, no problem. If you just make that on your own, somebody wants to sue you, they're gonna win.

    14. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    15. BH

      Like, you, you really have very little defense at that point. So the idea that, like, you're not gonna have a board is a bad idea. Like, I, I, I think any-- once you start [chuckles] um, not owning the company a hundred percent, you've got to have a board. Like, that's just how it goes. You know, we went back and forth on this, like, okay, how much does, like, the board actually help the company? And I would say, so there's a couple of interesting things. So the Y Combinator people actually said, pr- it, it must have been around like twenty fifteen, twenty sixteen, they came to us, and they were like: "We did, like, an analysis of all our companies who had boards and didn't, and the ones that didn't have boards all failed. Like, they didn't do well. Like, as a cohort, the ones with boards did much better." Now, like that, those- there's confounding factors, right? Like, but, you know, in their view, the other thing was, like, just in observing the companies, the rhythm of having to tell somebody outside of the company what you're doing every three months or every two months-

    16. JA

      Creates internal pressure

    17. BH

      ... is very valuable. It's just like a good organizing-

    18. JA

      Mm-hmm

    19. BH

      ... principle to keep yourself on track. So I, I, I believe in that. Uh, and then I do think certain kinds of board members can be very, very impactful at different points in the company. Ju- just with myself, like, right now, if Ali kicked me off the board at Databricks, I'm not sure that, like, they would do much worse. Like, I, I, I honestly don't. However, um, there were times, [chuckles] um, for example, the Series C, I led the Series A, NEA led the Series B. Nobody would do the Series C of that company.

    20. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    21. BH

      Pete Sunsimie and I led that one, too. NEA and us led the C in addition to the B and the A. If I'm not on the board, like, I don't think there's any way that's happening. Uh, so that's, like, a, an existential issue. Second thing, you know, they had an offer to buy the company for, like, uh, I think it would have netted out to about four billion dollars in twenty eighteen, twenty nineteen, something like that. And had I not been on the board, they-

    22. JA

      They would have sold

    23. BH

      ... I think they would have sold.

    24. JA

      That's a big deal.

    25. BH

      Um, and I think Ali would say they would have sold. And so, like, they're worth, um, you know-

    26. JA

      Hundred billion

    27. BH

      ... they're raising now over a hundred billion dollars. Um, so that's, like, a real value. And so to say that, like-... Oh, all right, we're gonna do you a favor and not be on your board?

    28. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    29. BH

      Like, 'cause look, when you're in a company, all you think about all day is the company.

    30. JA

      Yeah.

  10. 34:5644:44

    The evolution of media

    1. JA

      The last question on this, um, I just wanna sort of hear how your thinking has evolved. You guys came out early, like, I guess two thousand and nine, with this idea that, like, media and brand are a big deal, and I think in many ways, I don't know exactly 'cause I didn't graduate till twenty eleven, but it seems to me like in those years, this was, like, not what was happening versus, like, now, obviously-

    2. BH

      Yeah

    3. JA

      ... everybody kind of knows it.

    4. BH

      Yeah.

    5. JA

      Have you evolved your thinking, like, from two thousand and nine to now? Like, are you... Do you b- think it basically played out just like you thought? Do you think it's even more important? Has it... Have you changed your idea of, like, what type of brand and media and so on matters?

    6. BH

      Yeah. Yeah, yeah. So look, I think, um, the original idea was very simple, which is VCs didn't market themselves. Um, it was some kind of, like, code in VC land, and we're like, "Well, since we're new and nobody knows who we are, like, and that's what we know how to do, we're people who build companies, we're gonna market it." And we did, and we did a good job of it, and that kind of got us ahead. The world has changed. The, the world of media is completely different than when we started. When we started, everything... Uh, I mean, there were blogs and stuff, and we had blogs and that kind of thing, but the primary way people got information was through the press, um, for sure. And the rules of the press [chuckles] are, and the laws of physics of the, of the indirect channel going through the press, are completely different than the laws of physics of going direct. The very fixed number of channels that matter-

    7. JA

      Yeah

    8. BH

      ... um, very fixed format that you, you know, you can have a quote or a short five-minute interview-

    9. JA

      Yeah

    10. BH

      ... segment where they're, like, hitting you with questions that you don't want to answer and all that kind of thing. And then the brands were all-... companies, you know, Ford, GM, this, that. The indirect world is completely upside down from that. There's unlimited channels. [chuckles] Um, there's unlimited formats.

    11. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    12. BH

      You can tell the longest or the shortest story you want to, it's no problem. Uh, and then the brands are mostly people, right? Like, is it Palantir? Is it Alex Karp? Is it Elon, or is it X? Is it, you know, like these, you know... Is it Jensen, or is it NVIDIA?

    13. JA

      Yeah.

    14. BH

      So you can't really have a brand that's completely independent of the people behind the brand. And so I think the way that we're approaching the market now is com- this is why we brought on, uh, Eric Torenburg, and what he's building is a completely new marketing model for us, um, we're not- everything is different because the laws of physics are different, so you have to build a whole new system. And look, I, I think that what's happened [chuckles] with the other VCs is, because they were late to copy us, they're still in the old world, by and large. Um, and they have some, like, you know, light shots at the new world-

    15. JA

      Mm-hmm

    16. BH

      ... but they're gonna have to do a lot of changing to, to kind of catch up.

    17. JA

      It's also the kind of thing, I think, where if you don't internally get what it's all about, you can't just replicate people's activities. I feel like this is one of those things where you have to understand, like, the underlying physics of how it's working.

    18. BH

      No, that, that's exactly right. You know, there, the, the ethos of it, it- it's, like, very culturally different.

    19. JA

      Yeah.

    20. BH

      Like, y- you're no longer thinking about what you shouldn't say. Right, like, so much of the old world was, "What can I not say?"

    21. JA

      Yeah.

    22. BH

      "How do I avoid answering that question? How do I give the talking point?"

    23. JA

      Totally.

    24. BH

      Like, there are no talking points in this world.

    25. JA

      Totally.

    26. BH

      You know, like, I'm just talking shit-

    27. JA

      Yeah

    28. BH

      ... and that's better.

    29. JA

      And if you, like, offend somebody a little bit-

    30. BH

      Yeah

  11. 44:4448:28

    Laws of physics for fund sizes

    1. BH

      be-

    2. JA

      Thinking about your sort of firm's growth, um, I wanna ask you sort of a question both on, like, um, the strongest version of, let's call it big venture. I know that's not quite the right thing 'cause I think it's a very negative-sounding word, but whatever. Um-

    3. BH

      [chuckles] Good venture.

    4. JA

      Good-

    5. BH

      I call it good venture.

    6. JA

      Yeah, instead of big, good venture.

    7. BH

      Yeah.

    8. JA

      So actually, let's start there. Obviously, you're, you've raised, like, you know, a big new fund. Um, I think, you know, I'm guessing your view is, over time, this could grow much more. What are the laws of physics on the size of how big venture firms can get and still be productive?

    9. BH

      The biggest limit is the market. So how many great new technology entrepreneurs are there, um, to fund? Look, there, there's already more money in the venture capital market than there are kind of great entrepreneurs with great ideas. But if you're number one, then that's fine, like, 'cause, like, we'll just get the deals anyway, and it's no problem. If you ask me, "Well, why don't we raise a hundred billion dollars?" Like, that's the main limit, um, because it would be hard to generate a return on a hundred billion in venture capital, probably, uh, given the size of the market, like, in twenty twenty-

    10. JA

      Basically, you're saying the companies won't be big enough.

    11. BH

      Well, I, I think there just won't be enough of them. I think that's the most likely, it would be the most likely scale challenge for us.

    12. JA

      Yeah.

    13. BH

      That, like, you know, at least with the team that we've built, when we look at the markets that we're in, it's hard to see our way to, like, an order of magnitude more money. But, you know, that could change, but that's the current-- I'd say that's the current kind of number one limiter.

    14. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    15. BH

      I think the limiter on most funds or most firms is not the limiter that we have. Uh, so for most firms, the limiter is they can't kind of have that many effective partners.

    16. JA

      Cooperating.

    17. BH

      Yeah, cooperating. There's two fundamental reasons for that. One is structure. So most venture capital firms are, uh, shared economics, shared control structures.

    18. JA

      Mm.

    19. BH

      And if you have shared control, you very likely can't reorganize effectively. So, uh, in order to scale, you have to be able to change the org structure. Like, it's just kind of fundamental to scale.

    20. JA

      You're saying you need to periodically update. Like, every few years, you might need to do a reorg.

    21. BH

      Yeah, yeah. Um, just, you know, like, if you double in size, anybody who runs a company, you double in size, like, you have to look at the org structure and see if it still works, if the communication paths are still right, if there's too much conflict, all that kind of thing. The side effect of reorganizing is you redistribute power, and so people who had power lose power, and people who didn't have power get power. Like, it's just that, that's what it is. And if you're voting on that, the chance of you getting that right is zero because having done many reorgs in my career, when a reorganization happens, people always do-- everybody does a local optimization other than the CEO.

    22. JA

      Mm.

    23. BH

      And so if the CEO gives in to the needs of the people [chuckles] um, and makes it democratic, uh, then you're done. Like, that's never gonna work. So I think it's very hard. I don't know how I'd-- you could ever get to, like, our size with, you know, shared control. It'd be very tough. The other thing you need, uh, is you do need a leader who's, can deal with that kind of scale-

    24. JA

      Mm-hmm

    25. BH

      ... um, in terms of making those decisions and, and running the firm. And most VCs don't have people of that kind of operational caliber, like some do, but, like, it's pretty rare, and if they do, they're often not in charge.

    26. JA

      Yeah.

    27. BH

      Um, so, so we have, like, those are the two advantages that have led us... I mean, we're only now sixteen years old. Like, most of the firms we compete with are much older than that. But that, those, those issues have enabled us to get bigger-

    28. JA

      Yeah

    29. BH

      ... is basically the, the

  12. 48:2852:15

    Winning is more impactful than picking

    1. BH

      situation.

    2. JA

      And basically, your view is being big in venture makes everything better because you can scale people like Martine and Chris, you can have more access to more power, you have a bigger brand, you can lend to founders, and basically, your view, I am assuming from everything you've shared and just how you're running the firm, is the bigger you get, actually, it's possible the better per dollar that you might be able to do.

    3. BH

      I think so. I mean, I think that it's kind of-- I mean, like, you know, we've got a sixteen-year track record. We just raised fifteen billion dollars. Like, I, I think the product to investors is, kind of speaks for itself. But look, I think in venture capital, just generally, the way you... There's kind of two-... parts to getting good returns, like picking the right deal and winning it.

    4. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    5. BH

      I think it turns out that winning it, [chuckles] uh, is a much bigger percentage of that equation than people, like in VC world, like to give credit for, 'cause they like to think of themselves as such super genius. "Oh, I saw F- I saw Facebook early," da, da, da.

    6. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    7. BH

      That, that's a real thing. Um, but, you know, if you can't win it-

    8. JA

      Yeah

    9. BH

      ... then you're still never gonna have good returns. And so being able to win kind of automatically, I would say, gets you to the top tier of returns, and then, you know, picking kind of moves you up that list.

    10. JA

      You're saying you could be-

    11. BH

      Yeah

    12. JA

      ... a roughly random picker or an average picker, let's say, and a great winner, and that's gonna get better returns than the inverse?

    13. BH

      Yes. For sure.

    14. JA

      At all stages?

    15. BH

      Yeah, I, I, I think at all stages. And, and it also kind of- th- they kind of- it's a little self-fulfilling in that, um, if you can win-

    16. JA

      Mm-hmm

    17. BH

      ... then the best pickers wanna join you.

    18. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    19. BH

      It's like, as an investor, like, why does Martine work here? You know, why does Chris Dixon work here?

    20. JA

      'Cause it makes it easier to win.

    21. BH

      Yeah, 'cause, like, they want their best ideas. They wanna actually be in the deals they wanna be in.

    22. JA

      Yeah.

    23. BH

      [chuckles] Right? Like, if you're an investor, and you go, "Hey, I think that's the future. I think that's the greatest entrepreneur I've met," and you can't invest in it, like, that's very frustrating.

    24. JA

      Yeah.

    25. BH

      Uh, so then you end up... the, the be- the winners get the best investors over time, I think.

    26. JA

      It's an interesting thing because, um, I was talking to somebody recently that it's actually really rare for a venture firm to have two, what you would consider, like, generationally good investors. Like, almost never happens.

    27. BH

      Yeah.

    28. JA

      And then it's, like, ridiculously rare to have three. And, like, if you have three, then you're like, you know, Sequoia Andreessen, basically.

    29. BH

      Yeah.

    30. JA

      Why is it so hard to get many at one place? Like, it just seems so uncommon, and it seems like... I don't know, is that a function of winning ability, or is that a function of picking ability? Like, what is it that makes it so hard? Like, why don't-

  13. 52:1555:00

    Defending why venture doesn’t scale

    1. BH

      yeah.

    2. JA

      Could you give your best articulation or best steel man of, like, the counter to this idea of venture scaling? Like, if you had to defend the view of, like, a, you know, I've had, um, Peter at Benchmark or Josh at First Round, to some extent, you know, um, Sequoia, you know, have said there's limitations. What is sort of, in your mind, if you had to give the best version of the argument for, like, why a venture doesn't scale or why small is better in any way? Like, could you give that narration?

    3. BH

      Yeah, I, I mean, I think that there, there are kind of configurations where that is true, right? Like, so, you know, as I said, look, if you have shared control, you, you just can't get past a certain size before it becomes some chaotic, crazy democracy, which, like, democracies are great for, like, if you've got three hundred and fifty million people, but, like, they- they're not good if you're a [chuckles] venture capital firm. It's, it's just not good. Uh, at least in terms of scale, it's, it's not gonna work. It's, it's fine if you don't scale. The second thing is, if you have, like, twenty people on an investing team, I, I, I don't think that works, 'cause I, I don't think that's a conversation anymore.

    4. JA

      Mm-hmm.

    5. BH

      And so, so much of investing is about, like, you're trying to find the truth, right? Like, you're, you're working every day, you have these conversations, and you're talking to entrepreneurs, and you're talking to all the references, and you're talking to customers, and you're understanding the technology, and this and that, and you're having this long, long running conversation about like, okay, what is true? Like, is there gonna be a God model, or does like... Can I, like, take a little model and post-train it with my own data and beat the piss out of OpenAI? Like, I- w- what's the answer to that question long term?

    6. JA

      Mm.

    7. BH

      What's the answer to that question today? Like, we've got to get it to that. How do you have that conversation with twenty people? Like, it's, it's very hard. So I think that if you're configured, um, in that kind of way-

    8. JA

      Yeah

    9. BH

      ... then, then being large is dangerous, I think, very dangerous. So, you, you know, there are reasons [chuckles] um-

    10. JA

      Yeah

    11. BH

      ... if you don't, if you don't have the ability to scale in a way that makes you... L- like, our investing teams all look like small VCs. I mean, like, so Martine's team or Chris's team-

    12. JA

      Yeah

    13. BH

      ... or Alex's team, they, they, they all look like a little VC.

    14. JA

      Right.

    15. BH

      So, so in some ways, I'm all for that model. Um, I'm just doing it in a context-

    16. JA

      Yeah

    17. BH

      ... where you have a platform and a brand that can be helpful to entrepreneurs-

    18. JA

      Yes

    19. BH

      ... more so than, you know, just, you know, having a person.

    20. JA

      Yeah, makes sense. I guess maybe to wrap, I think one of the other tenants, at least when you got started, which I think is still roughly a tenant today, that I think is, like, core, was you really believed in hiring ex-founders, CEOs. I'm sure you've hired some people who are not, but for the most part-

    21. BH

      [chuckles]

    22. JA

      ... it seems like you're very-

    23. BH

      In the beginning, yeah.

    24. JA

      Yeah, very concentrated. At least, you know, it seems like a lot of the DNA is rooted in that, at least.

    25. BH

      Yeah.

    26. JA

      Why has that been, like, important

  14. 55:0057:32

    Hiring ex founders and CEOs

    1. JA

      to you?

    2. BH

      Yeah, so, you know, when we started the firm, like, a big idea that we had, um, and, and I, I'd say this idea mostly came from me, was that venture capital was disappointing.... as a product for an entrepreneur. The reason, like, I know we had a very hard time building, like, Loudcloud Opsware, um, although it ended reasonably well. It's just, like, a very, very difficult to build a company, like, excruciatingly difficult, and there's all these components to it, and all these things you have to learn, and then things go wrong that are completely out of your control, like the dot-com crash or, you know, that kind of thing. Venture capital firms kind of give you the money and then put a very smart person on your board, um, and give you some advice, and that was, like, it. And so we always thought, "Wow, a much better product would be, give me, like, the network to be confident and the advice I need to run this fucking thing." Really early on, the way we thought about that was, okay, some experience required to be on your board. You have to have, like, done this thing before to advise me. Don't just, like, send me, you know, somebody who doesn't know how to do that. So that was the original idea. That idea turned out to be somewhat right, but not entirely right. So the problem with the way we did it is some founder CEOs are good at being founder CEOs, but not good at explaining what the hell it was they did, and then they may also not be that interested in investing like they were at running something, right? Like, it's a little bit of... If you've, [chuckles] there's a feeling you have if you have a thousand people working for you or whatever, that you're never gonna achieve as an investor. Like, that's just, like, that, that's not that.

    3. JA

      Yeah.

    4. BH

      Um, it's a different thing. You know, we made kind of the adjustment, we're like, "Okay, like, yes, advice on how to run a company is important," but like, you know, and that's when I was like: Okay, so I'll write some books that explain it, and then you can talk to me, [chuckles] who knows how to explain that.

    5. JA

      Yeah.

    6. BH

      But we're not gonna... Everybody in the firm is not gonna have to be that. That was, I think, a very important adjustment for us.

    7. JA

      Would you write another book?

    8. BH

      Uh, well, if I have another thing that I think I understand that people don't understand, like, I won't do it, [chuckles] uh, to be, like-

    9. JA

      Yeah

    10. BH

      ... popular or make money.

    11. JA

      You don't want to write a book to make some more money?

    12. BH

      No. [chuckles]

    13. JA

      That wouldn't be the driver?

    14. BH

      No. Although that book does well, you know.

    15. JA

      I'm sure.

    16. BH

      The Hard Thing About Hard Things is a very, uh-

    17. JA

      Yeah

    18. BH

      ... good seller. I gave away all the money for it, but it's, um, it, it does well, yeah.

    19. JA

      Yeah. Cool. All right, Ben, I'm gonna let you go. Thanks a bunch for doing this. This was great.

    20. BH

      Yeah. All right.

    21. JA

      Thanks.

    22. BH

      Awesome. [upbeat music]

Episode duration: 57:32

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