Why Venture Capital is a Probabilistic Game

Why Venture Capital is a Probabilistic Game

AcquiredJan 15, 20237m

Andrew Marks (guest)

Public vs. private market information and liquidityCompetition and access in top-tier venture dealsQualitative judgment about the futureExpected value and power-law outcomesPortfolio construction and follow-on capitalApplying Buffett/value lenses to venture underwritingTemperament/skill-set fit across investing styles (bonds, distressed, venture)

In this episode of Acquired, featuring Andrew Marks, Why Venture Capital is a Probabilistic Game explores venture capital rewards optimistic forecasting through diversified, high-variance bets over time Ben Gilbert and Andrew Marks contrast public-market investing—rich with widely available information—with early-stage venture, where access and competition are intense but outcomes are far more skewed.

Venture capital rewards optimistic forecasting through diversified, high-variance bets over time

Ben Gilbert and Andrew Marks contrast public-market investing—rich with widely available information—with early-stage venture, where access and competition are intense but outcomes are far more skewed.

Marks explains he moved toward venture not because it’s “inefficient,” but because it matches his strengths: long-horizon qualitative judgment, imagining what a company could become, and underwriting wide gaps between today’s price and a successful future value.

They emphasize venture as a probabilistic game: most individual bets can lose money, but a portfolio of high expected-value opportunities can produce strong overall returns, especially with selective follow-on investing.

Howard Marks (via quoted remarks) reinforces the broader lesson: choose an investing game aligned with your temperament and edge—conservative quantitative skill may fit bonds or distressed debt, while optimism and futurism fit venture.

Key Takeaways

Venture isn’t “easy inefficiency”; it’s competitive and access-constrained.

Marks pushes back on the idea that private markets are broadly inefficient—getting into the best rounds is difficult, and competition to invest in great companies is fierce.

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The core venture skill is imagining a credible 10-year future state.

Rather than optimizing around today’s abundant data, venture underwriting requires visualizing what the business, moats, and financials could look like at IPO-scale and working backward.

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Venture returns are driven by expected value, not batting average.

Marks frames venture as probabilistic: you often lose money on individual deals, but the few winners can dominate outcomes if the bets have sufficiently high upside.

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Portfolio sizing and follow-on strategy are part of the edge.

Because outcomes are uncertain, investors aim to place many shots on goal and then concentrate additional capital in companies that are proving out, improving overall portfolio EV.

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Applying “traditional” investing lenses in venture means pricing probability and magnitude.

Using Buffett-like thinking in venture is less about current multiples and more about estimating what it can be worth if it works, the probability it gets there, capital needs, and competitive dynamics.

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Your temperament should determine your investing arena.

Howard Marks’ anecdote underscores that conservative, quantitative personalities may excel in bonds or distressed debt, while optimistic futurists may be better suited to venture’s uncertainty and long duration.

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Public-market advantage is harder when information is ubiquitous.

When everyone has the same present-day data, differentiation comes either from superior interpretation or from better insight into the future—venture leans heavily on the latter.

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Notable Quotes

It’s a much more probabilistic endeavor… the average occurrence is that you’re gonna lose your money, but make enough of those bets, and so it works out to be a great return.

Andrew Marks

If the company IPOs in ten years, what’s that person gonna be looking at…? You have to sort of visualize… what could the financials… moats… capital… competition look like.

Andrew Marks

Readily available quantitative information about the present is not gonna give you the key to the castle.

Howard Marks (quoted in conversation)

I’ll do anything except spend the rest of my life choosing between Merck and Lilly.

Howard Marks (anecdote, quoted in conversation)

So far, Andrew and I have gravitated [to] things that are right for us… that’s a hell of a lot easier than… trying to put a square peg in a round hole.

Howard Marks (quoted in conversation)

Questions Answered in This Episode

When you say venture is “probabilistic,” what does a realistic loss-rate and winner-contribution look like in a well-performing early-stage portfolio?

Ben Gilbert and Andrew Marks contrast public-market investing—rich with widely available information—with early-stage venture, where access and competition are intense but outcomes are far more skewed.

Get the full analysis with uListen AI

How do you practically estimate the probability a nascent company reaches the 10-year “IPO buyer” picture you described (what signals matter most early)?

Marks explains he moved toward venture not because it’s “inefficient,” but because it matches his strengths: long-horizon qualitative judgment, imagining what a company could become, and underwriting wide gaps between today’s price and a successful future value.

Get the full analysis with uListen AI

What’s the most useful part of a Buffett/value framework to import into venture—and what parts are actively misleading at seed/Series A?

They emphasize venture as a probabilistic game: most individual bets can lose money, but a portfolio of high expected-value opportunities can produce strong overall returns, especially with selective follow-on investing.

Get the full analysis with uListen AI

If access is a major constraint in venture, what are the repeatable ways an investor can earn allocation in the “seemingly great companies”?

Howard Marks (via quoted remarks) reinforces the broader lesson: choose an investing game aligned with your temperament and edge—conservative quantitative skill may fit bonds or distressed debt, while optimism and futurism fit venture.

Get the full analysis with uListen AI

How do you decide follow-on allocation: what milestones or metrics justify doubling down versus letting a position dilute?

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Transcript Preview

Speaker

If you're talking about public equities or any public market, there's so much information out there. Yes, maybe you can have some advantage, but it's very hard. If you're instead operating in a private market that is at least relatively to the public markets, much more illiquid, you can have more advantages. So you've shifted your career to doing mostly early-stage private market investing. Is that a big reason for that?

Andrew Marks

Well, so what I'd say is, first of all, I think you'd be hard-pressed to say that venture is super inefficient. It's not a market where everyone can transact, and it's actually hard to get in the place where you can, um, in- invest in, in, you know, seemingly great companies, but the competition to invest in those things is very fierce. So I wouldn't say that I came to the realization that venture was this super inefficient market. I wanted to capitalize on that insight or whatever. And by the way, and leaving aside the fact that I love hunting for founders, I love working with founders. I love so much that goes into the whole business of venture investing. But if you'd wanna just talk about the proposition, the reason why I went into it is, um, nu- number one, you know, it sort of suits my skill set more to, um, make kinda long-term qualitative judgments about the future. And I think venture, you know, so much of, um, what you're doing is you're finding huge gaps between what you're paying today and what this could be worth if it's right. So you have to really imagine in ten years, if this is successful, well, what could that business look like? And much more so than the sort of analysis that goes into being a public markets investor, you know, that really suits my skill set much more. And then the other thing is, it's a much more probabilistic endeavor. I mean, what you're doing is you're trying to find extremely high expected value investments, where the average occurrence is that you're gonna lose your money, but make enough of those bets, and so it works out to be a great return. And then, by the way, you know, try to help the companies in whatever way you can and, and, you know, follow them closely so you can, you know, add more capital to the ones that are doing well and whatever. And so that whole endeavor really suited my makeup much more.

Speaker

Oh, man. We, we were chatting before we started recording. I, I, I went back through my notes from business school, from Howard, your book, uh, The Most Important Thing Illuminated, and every other page on there is like, risk equals permanent capital loss. Do everything you can to avoid permanent capital loss. And venture is not that.

Andrew Marks

It's not that, and I also don't think that I would be particularly great at that. I mean, if you told me I had to have an, you know, a portfolio of, of ten companies where, uh, not only would they... the portfolio return be twenty percent, but they'd all be roughly twenty percent, or they'd go somewhere between ten and thirty or something like that. I mean, I just don't know if that would be as suited with my skill set.

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