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Michael Mauboussin: The Single Biggest Mistake Investors Make In Decision-Making | 20VC #945

Michael Mauboussin is Head of Consilient Research at Counterpoint Global. Previously, he was Director of Research at BlueMountain Capital, Head of Global Financial Strategies at Credit Suisse, and Chief Investment Strategist at Legg Mason Capital Management. He is also the author of three incredible books, including More Than You Know: Finding Financial Wisdom in Unconventional Places, named in The 100 Best Business Books of All Time by 800-CEO-Read. Michael has taught at Columbia Business School since 1993 and received the Dean’s Award for Teaching Excellence in 2009 and 2016. Thanks to Bill Gurley for questions. ------------------------------------ Timestamps: 0:00 How Michael Spends His Time Today 1:28 Luck vs. Randomness 7:57 How to Build a Process for Investing 13:09 Thesis-driven Investing 15:29 How to Encourage Your Team to Speak their Mind 21:23 EXPLAINED: Everything is a Discounted Cash Flow 28:08 The Increased Supply of Capital in Venture 30:09 When is the right time to exit a position? 31:48 Concentrated vs. Diversified Portfolios 34:05 Advice for Young Investors Seeing their First Downturn 37:32 Comparing the Crash of 1987 to Today 39:15 Pandemic & War: Are we in unprecedented times? 41:00 The Value Reshuffling in the Public Markets 45:02 Michael's Favourite Book 45:57 What makes Bill Gurley special? 47:10 Michael's Biggest Strength/Weakness 48:00 Best Investment Advice Michael Ever Received 48:18 Where would Michael invest $100k right now? 48:36 Michael's Biggest Investing Mistake 49:56 Michael's Exercise Routine 51:00 Why do you still do what you do? ------------------------------------ In Today’s Episode with Michael Mauboussin We Discuss: 1.) Entry into Venture and Finance: What does Michael actually do as “Head of Consilient Research”? What does Michael know now that he wishes he had known when he entered finance? How did Michael and Bill Gurley meet in business school? What does Michael believe makes Bill such a special investor today? 2.) Booms and Busts: How This Compares? How does the current macro downturn compare to prior crashes Michael has worked through? What is the same? What is different? How do political and health events impact the macro? Why was 1987 the end of the world at the time? How did the recovery take place? How does Michael analyze the duration of bull markets vs the duration of recovery time? What advice does Michael give to young people today questioning if they are good investors? 3.) The Investment Decision-Making Process: How does Michael advise on the structuring of your decision-making process? What makes a good process vs a bad process? What can be done to remove politics from the decision-making process? What can be done to ensure all people, regardless of hierarchy feel safe in the process and feel they can share their thoughts without repercussions? What are the single biggest mistakes Michael sees people make in their decision-making process? How do you know when is the right time to change your process? 4.) Everything is a DCF: What does Michael mean when he says that “everything is a DCF”? How does Michael advise and apply this thinking to early-stage venture investors? How does Michael think through highly diversified portfolios vs super concentrated portfolios in venture? ------------------------------------ Subscribe to the Podcast: https://www.thetwentyminutevc.com/michael-mauboussin/ Follow Harry Stebbings on Twitter: https://twitter.com/HarryStebbings Follow Michael Mauboussin on Twitter: https://twitter.com/mjmauboussin Follow 20VC on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/20vc_reels Follow 20VC on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@20vc_tok ------------------------------------ #MichaelMaboussin #20VC #HarryStebbings

Harry StebbingshostMichael Mauboussinguest
Nov 4, 202252mWatch on YouTube ↗

CHAPTERS

  1. 0:00 – 1:19

    Mauboussin’s role at Counterpoint Global: process, research, and communicating ideas

    Michael explains what he does day-to-day as Head of Consilient Research at Counterpoint Global (Morgan Stanley IM). He frames his work as a cycle of “input and output”: learning deeply, then translating insights internally to the investing team and externally through writing and talks.

    • Three-part job: investment process support, research/writing, and external communication
    • Focus areas: markets, valuation, strategy, and decision-making
    • “Input/output” model: find interesting topics, understand them, then teach/share
    • Why the role is intellectually stimulating and rewarding
  2. 1:19 – 2:56

    Luck vs. randomness: definitions, coin-flip intuition, and why attribution fails

    Michael draws a practical distinction between luck (individual-level outcomes that could plausibly have been different) and randomness (system-level behavior). Using a coin-flip classroom exercise, he shows how random systems naturally generate “lucky” streaks that can be mistaken for skill.

    • Luck conditions: individual-level, good/bad, and could-have-been-different outcomes
    • Randomness is a system property; luck is an individual outcome within that system
    • Coin-flip streaks: predictable emergence of ‘lucky’ winners in random environments
    • Investing implication: strong track records can arise from system randomness
  3. 2:56 – 5:50

    Expected value and the ‘must risk losing to win’ trap

    Harry probes why placing yourself to benefit from good luck can also increase your chance of loss. Michael uses lotteries to clarify: participation is required to win, but whether it’s rational depends on expected value—positive in investing (ideally), negative in gambling.

    • Skill is what’s controllable; luck is outside control
    • You must participate (and risk loss) to be eligible for upside
    • Expected value is the core filter: positive EV vs negative EV games
    • Why popular ‘work hard = luck’ aphorisms don’t fit a strict luck definition
  4. 5:50 – 8:03

    Skill, persistence, and why venture capital is unusually ‘sticky’

    The conversation turns to whether venture is more skill-based than other asset classes. Michael explains persistence as a hallmark of skill and argues venture shows unusually high persistence, potentially explained by preferential attachment and the extreme dispersion of outcomes.

    • Persistence: yesterday’s winners tend to keep winning in skill-dominant domains
    • Venture shows more persistence than buyouts today and far more than public markets
    • Preferential attachment: early wins attract better deals and founders later
    • Massive dispersion: top decile/quintile drive great outcomes; median/bottom can be dismal
    • Separating ‘brand/name on the door’ from individual investor contribution
  5. 8:03 – 9:30

    Building an investing process that matches your edge (Simons vs Buffett)

    Michael lays out how to design an investing process by first identifying your true source of edge. He contrasts two extremes—Renaissance’s high-frequency, tech-driven approach and Buffett’s low-frequency, reading-heavy approach—to show there’s no universal best process.

    • Start with: what are you trying to do, and where does your edge come from?
    • Process should be congruent with edge; no one-size-fits-all
    • Illustrative extremes: Jim Simons (frequency/tech) vs Warren Buffett (patience/reading)
    • Beware ‘aspirational process’ vs what you actually do day-to-day
  6. 9:30 – 11:40

    Harry’s media + venture model: decision hygiene, bias control, and repeatability

    Harry describes his edge: combining media access with deal-specific mini investment committees of expert founders. Michael validates the approach and adds criteria for strong processes—economic soundness, evolution over time, bias mitigation, and repeatability—highlighting why three-person committees work well.

    • A process should be economically sound and staffed with real domain experience
    • Let process evolve: immutable standards + mutable adaptations to a changing world
    • Bias management is a core design requirement, not an afterthought
    • Why ‘3’ works: discussion dynamics, odd-number voting, constructive dissent
    • Repeatability: a process must scale across many decisions over time
  7. 11:40 – 15:18

    Bad process and thesis-driven pitfalls: signposts, pre-commitment, and “decision buddies”

    Michael explains how processes fail: deviating from stated rules and letting biases take over (especially overconfidence and confirmation bias). On thesis-driven investing, he proposes “signposts” written in advance with probabilities, plus explicit stop-points and accountability partners to force honest updating.

    • Two common failure modes: ad hoc deviations and creeping bias
    • Overconfidence often shows up as over-precision (false certainty)
    • Confirmation bias: seeking supportive evidence, discounting disconfirming signals
    • Thesis investing fix: define signposts upfront with probabilities and triggers
    • Use accountability: a trusted “decision buddy” to enforce course correction
  8. 15:18 – 19:03

    Getting teams to speak freely: psychological safety, HiPPO dynamics, and pre-mortems

    Harry asks how leaders can reduce politics and fear in investment committees. Michael emphasizes that team failures typically come from meeting management (not lack of cognitive diversity) and offers techniques like soliciting junior voices first, structured dissent, and pre-mortems to surface downside risks early.

    • Three team elements: size (often 3–6), composition (cognitive diversity), and management
    • Most breakdowns happen in management of discussion, not in who’s in the room
    • HiPPO problem: people defer to the highest-income person’s opinion
    • Tactics: ask junior members first; enforce mechanisms to surface alternatives
    • Pre-mortem method: assume failure in the future and write the “why it failed” story
  9. 19:03 – 21:11

    When to update your process: Bayesian thinking and the shift to intangible investment

    Michael discusses when changing a core process is justified. Beyond adopting best practices, the hard part is updating mental models as the world changes—proper Bayesian updating—illustrated by how intangible investment breaks naive heuristics like ‘profits good, losses bad.’

    • Use best practices (e.g., odd-number committees), but don’t stop there
    • Key challenge: Bayesian updating—direction and magnitude of revisions matter
    • World change example: rise of intangible assets alters accounting and interpretation
    • Simple heuristics can mislead (profit/loss signals differ under intangible-heavy models)
    • Process should track economic truth, not outdated indicators
  10. 21:11 – 23:52

    “Everything is a DCF” for venture: unit economics, exits, and real options

    Michael reframes DCF thinking for venture investors: not elaborate spreadsheets, but clarity on how the business will ultimately generate cash. He connects venture outcomes to exit mechanics (strategic sale or IPO) and explains when real options matter—high uncertainty, capable management, capital access, and leadership position.

    • DCF as a principle: value = present value of future cash flows
    • Venture application: focus on the basic unit of analysis—how the company makes money
    • Exit reality: strategics/markets ultimately price the cash-flow potential
    • Real options are important under uncertainty, with strong teams and access to capital
    • Even option value must eventually convert into cash-flow economics
  11. 23:52 – 28:09

    Seed uncertainty, ‘two people and a dog’ pricing, and the power-law payoff distribution

    Harry challenges DCF logic at pre-seed/seed where monetization is unclear. Michael argues that even “build it and they will come” implies eventual monetization, and he grounds venture pricing in the payoff distribution: most deals lose money, but a tiny number dominate returns—making frequency less important than magnitude when right.

    • Early-stage uncertainty doesn’t remove the need for a path to monetization
    • Positive expected value can justify seemingly extreme early valuations
    • Empirical data: venture deal returns are highly skewed; few winners carry the fund
    • Key mindset shift: not how often you’re right, but how much you win when right
    • Analogy to sophisticated horse betting: lower hit rate, higher payoff structures
  12. 28:09 – 30:09

    Capital flooding into venture, episodic returns, and evolving exit dynamics

    Michael agrees that increasing capital supply should pressure future returns through higher prices and competition. He notes venture’s public market equivalent (PME) performance is episodic—returns concentrate in short windows (e.g., dot-com, 2020–21)—and highlights how fewer IPOs and changing exit paths matter for the whole system.

    • More capital in a strategy generally compresses returns (a ‘basic rule’)
    • Venture PMEs can be strong long-term but arrive in short, episodic bursts
    • Recent boom (2020–21) vs normalization afterward
    • Exits: fewer IPOs than past generations; strategics dominate and change incentives
    • Contrast with buyouts: different cyclicality and benefits when public markets fall
  13. 30:09 – 34:05

    Selling winners, timing exits, and concentrated vs diversified venture portfolios

    The discussion shifts to when to exit positions and how to size portfolios in power-law environments. Michael outlines the logic of holding rare compounding winners (Bessembinder-style outcomes) while noting the practical difficulty of identifying them in real time, and he contrasts ‘index-like’ wide portfolios with craft-style concentrated firms like Benchmark.

    • Exit timing improves as companies mature and valuation ranges become more defensible
    • Argument for ‘never sell winners’: a tiny fraction of companies drive most value
    • Core challenge: knowing which holdings are true long-term winners
    • Portfolio construction trade-off: scattershot breadth vs concentrated, high-touch craft
    • Capacity constraint: concentrated strategies depend on time/attention and opportunity set
  14. 34:05 – 41:01

    Advice in downturns: ignore noisy price/macro, lean on process, and use historical perspective

    Michael counsels young investors facing their first downturn to judge themselves by process adherence, not short-term price moves. He warns against over-fixating on macro forecasts and uses the 1987 crash to illustrate how “end of the world” moments can look small in long-term hindsight, while explaining volatility clustering as a repeating pattern.

    • Measure yourself by process quality, not daily price swings
    • Macro forecasting is hard; stay aware but don’t anchor decisions on it
    • Core job: be a business analyst—understand what you can control
    • 1987 crash story: terrifying in real time, muted on long-term charts
    • Volatility clusters: quiet periods followed by turbulent bursts that eventually pass
  15. 41:01 – 44:51

    Public-market ‘value reshuffling’: COVID distortions, duration sensitivity, and pricing power

    Harry asks whether the repricing in public markets is a new normal. Michael attributes part of the confusion to COVID demand pull-forward and reversion, and he explains the mechanics of discount rates: long-duration growth assets are highly sensitive to real-rate increases, while pricing power can help offset nominal inflation effects—potentially returning markets to more historically normal rates.

    • COVID created demand pull-forward and messy normalization for even elite operators
    • Implied duration: growth firms’ distant cash flows increase rate sensitivity
    • Real rates rising hits both bonds and equities—“no place to hide” in such regimes
    • Pricing power matters: it can help offset nominal inflation effects
    • Possibility that recent conditions were abnormal and markets are reverting to normal
  16. 44:51 – 52:25

    Quickfire: favorite book, what makes Bill Gurley special, personal habits, and motivation

    In rapid-fire questions, Michael shares his favorite book (E.O. Wilson’s ‘Consilience’) and why unifying disciplines matters. He describes Bill Gurley’s intellectual curiosity and communication skill, names “This too shall pass” as top investing advice, shares a notable mistake (Sears), and closes with his commitment to sleep, daily exercise, and continued learning through teaching and research.

    • Favorite book: ‘Consilience’ and the power of cross-disciplinary thinking
    • Bill Gurley: bright, curious, early on DCF/returns and increasing-returns frameworks; excellent communicator
    • Best investing advice: maintain equilibrium—“This too shall pass”
    • Personal investing note: would put $100k into equities given higher expected returns
    • Mistake lesson: Sears—great manager can’t always overcome a hard business
    • Performance habits: eight hours sleep, daily exercise; motivation through autonomy and learning

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