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Building Cyber Defense for the Agentic Era

a16z General Partner David George sits down with Armadin founder and CEO Kevin Mandia to discuss what happens to cybersecurity when attackers can operate at machine speed. After 30 years in security and building Mandiant, Kevin says AI convinced him to get back on the field. He explains how AI changes the economics of cyberattacks, allowing attackers to probe thousands of paths simultaneously, and why that means defense will ultimately need to become autonomous too. They also unpack Armadin’s approach: continuously attacking customers’ systems with AI to find exploitable vulnerabilities before adversaries do, then building toward autonomous defenses that can respond in real time. Kevin shares what Armadin has learned from finding more than 90 zero-days in production environments this year, why humans can’t remain in the detect-and-respond loop, and how the entire security stack could change over the next few years. Timestamps: 00:00 - Intro 01:06 - Why Kevin came back to the field 04:19 - What AI attacks look like today 07:18 - Nation state vs AI drone swarms 14:34 - Why pen testing is dead 18:36 - Autonomous defense explained 21:22 - The future of the SOC 27:04 - Lessons from the Hugging Face incident 35:44 - Building a company at AI speed Resources: Learn more about Kevin Mandia and Armadin: https://www.armadin.com/team-members/kevin-mandia Follow David George on X: https://x.com/DavidGeorge83 Learn more about Armadin: https://www.armadin.com/ Stay Updated: If you enjoyed this episode, be sure to like, subscribe, and share with your friends! Find a16z on X: https://twitter.com/a16z Find a16z on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/a16z Listen to the a16z Show on Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/5bC65RDvs3oxnLyqqvkUYX Listen to the a16z Show on Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/a16z-podcast/id842818711 Follow our host: https://x.com/eriktorenberg Please note that the content here is for informational purposes only; should NOT be taken as legal, business, tax, or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security; and is not directed at any investors or potential investors in any a16z fund. a16z and its affiliates may maintain investments in the companies discussed. For more details please see http://a16z.com/disclosures.

Kevin MandiaguestDavid Georgehost
Oct 6, 202647mWatch on YouTube ↗

EVERY SPOKEN WORD

  1. 0:00 – 1:06

    Intro

    1. KM

      You don't have a defense unless you have a great offense to go up against. You wanna be the Baltimore Ravens defense of 2000. You kind of wanna have your practice offense really push you. That's what Armadin's gonna do. We're gonna be the all-star team on offense coming at you so you can train your defense with what we're doing.

    2. DG

      You built Mandiant, a great success. Why did you decide to get back on the field?

    3. KM

      I don't wanna sit out the AI shift change when I've done 30 years in security and the whole damn thing's about to change. [laughs] What AI does in a microsecond would take 70 humans. They can't even do it. It's apples to oranges.

    4. DG

      This is a tsunami like has never been seen before in security.

    5. KM

      The whole, "Let's slow down the models. We don't want cyber risk," too late. The open models are already good enough. At Armadin since January of this year, we have found over 90 zero-days at customer sites all in production.

    6. DG

      This is not, like, rinky-dink companies. Like, these are, like, Fortune 500 companies. The differences or similarities between nation state attacks compared to AI today, and then where you think AI can be in a couple of years.

    7. KM

      On the defensive side, we're gonna say, "We're being attacked by these models, but we're not sure who's behind them. Is it a nation? Is it a human? Is it-"

  2. 1:06 – 4:19

    Why Kevin came back to the field

    1. DG

      Kevin, thanks for being here.

    2. KM

      No, thank you.

    3. DG

      Okay, so you built Mandiant.

    4. KM

      Yes.

    5. DG

      Obviously a great success. Um, many different chapters. You know-

    6. KM

      Mm-hmm

    7. DG

      ... it ended up, you know, inside of Google-

    8. KM

      Right

    9. DG

      ... ultimately. Um, why did you decide to get back on the field?

    10. KM

      It's a good question. And, you know, I don't know if I decided it, and that'll sound weird. But I met with David Slater and with Travis Lanham, the other founders, and Evan Pena I knew. Uh, you know, I, I could say they started this company. They are the founders, you know? I met them. They had the idea. They pitched me on what they wanted to do, and I saw the talent in them. Like, Travis is a generational talent. David Slater's, and I mean this in a positive way, freak of nature. [laughs]

    11. DG

      Yes. Yes.

    12. KM

      You know? Like, these guys are, are really, really good. Evan Pena is exceptional at what he does. And when you meet that team and you talk to them, the whole time I was listening to what they were doing, I was thinking, "I wanna be a part of this." You know, I don't wanna sit out the AI shift change when I've done 30 years in security and the whole damn thing's about to change. [laughs]

    13. DG

      [laughs]

    14. KM

      You know, that's great. Everything I did is dead, and then everything else is new. Uh, but meeting that team and they were starting the company, and me realizing, "I'm a, I think I'm a real good fit with these guys, um, to accelerate the need." Like, what Armadin is building, every company needs now. And I, I was like, "This team that can build it, and I think I can answer the now." Let's... You know, 30 years in security, you meet a few people. Let's go to those people and say, "We've built what you need."

    15. DG

      Yeah.

    16. KM

      You know? So I almost felt compelled to do it. I know that sounds weird, but I would not have founded a company again in my s- you know, in mid-50s

    17. DG

      Yeah

    18. KM

      ... and I was doing venture. It wasn't like, "Oh, I'm an entrepreneur and I love starting companies." That's not it. And it wasn't, "Oh, I'm not a VC. I'm just an operational guy." That's not it. I met the team and went, "We have to do this."

    19. DG

      Yeah.

    20. KM

      I mean, that's really it.

    21. DG

      Yeah.

    22. KM

      Yeah.

    23. DG

      And this whole AIC change was happening, right?

    24. KM

      Totally. Absolutely.

    25. DG

      Like, that's the catalyst, right?

    26. KM

      Yes.

    27. DG

      So-

    28. KM

      Yeah

    29. DG

      ... tell us about what Armadin does.

    30. KM

      So Armadin leverages frontier models and AI on offense to test do you have exploitable risk? And the re- and that's what we do today. We call it Armadin Red. But we s- when we started the company, Travis and, and David Slater and Evan all knew the future of cybersecurity is gonna be, A, the good guys have to build the offensive cyber cannon and shoot it at networks to make sure those networks can withstand these attacks, 'cause they're the ones that are coming. But we also knew it's gonna be AI on offense built by the good guys working and training with AI on defense built by the good guys, and you have to have both. So our act one was we gotta be the best in the world at finding exploitable risk.

  3. 4:19 – 7:18

    What AI attacks look like today

    1. DG

      Yeah. Tell us about the nature of the capabilities of AI attacks today-

    2. KM

      Yes

    3. DG

      ... and then where do you think it goes?

    4. KM

      Well, great. Th- so the nature of them is, first off, we're getting a weird window in time where we're seeing them, but not at the same level you'd expect. Like, I've seen nothing like what Armadin's already built in the wild, which is there's 25,000 agents all in concert, all working together, doing really, really smart things without going on bizarre phishing trips. Because when you respond to an AI attack, you can tell it's AI very quickly. At least I can, because I've done a, you know, I've thought about a lot of offense. I've responded to a lot of attacks in the past that were led by humans.

    5. DG

      Right.

    6. KM

      And a human goes to point A, then to point B, then to point C through their intrusion. AI does little things, like four or five differences, but one would be it'll break into point A, then laterally move to point B. Next thing you know, it's trying to break into point A again. [laughs]

    7. DG

      Yeah. [laughs]

    8. KM

      You know what I mean?

    9. DG

      Yeah, yeah, yeah.

    10. KM

      It's like, I get the drone swarm-

    11. DG

      [laughs]

    12. KM

      ... but you can probably coordinate it and think a little bit better, and that's, that's where it's at today. It'll get better and cleaner. Um, but the differences are, first and foremost, uh, w- the scale of what AI can do dwarfs humans, like in ways humans don't even get.

    13. DG

      Right.

    14. KM

      Um, so you have a scaling problem in that humans could always find only one path into a network.

    15. DG

      Yeah, they had to be selective-

    16. KM

      Yeah

    17. DG

      ... because they had to-

    18. KM

      You bet

    19. DG

      ... devote their limited resources-

    20. KM

      Yes

    21. DG

      ... to one direct path, right?

    22. KM

      Yes. And it, and then, uh, so scale, uh, is, is a challenge. Speed, ridiculous. What AI does in m- a microsecond would take s- 70 humans. They can't even do it. It's apples to oranges. And then so what was always lacking is, is AI creative-

    23. DG

      Yeah

    24. KM

      ... or effective? But when it comes to what we do Uh, we don't need the fanciest model. We're not trying to speak 400 languages, you know, with our models and all that kind of thing. What Armadin's doing on offense is we're finding vulnerabilities, exploitable risk. That is code. That's a structured language, a structured process. Because it's structured, AI's gonna be great at it.

    25. DG

      Right.

    26. KM

      Right? So I really think it's already here today, like the whole, "Let's slow down the models. We don't want cyber risk." Too late. The open models are already good enough and, and these things are coming now. It's just a matter of the minute you have anonymous availability of GPUs, you'll see far more criminal attacks. [laughs]

    27. DG

      Oh, interesting.

    28. KM

      Yeah, you know what I mean?

    29. DG

      Yeah, of course.

    30. KM

      But until you can attack anonymously and, you know, it's hard to do crime when people know your name.

  4. 7:18 – 14:34

    Nation state vs AI drone swarms

    1. DG

      Okay. So you, your experience in working in the security industry for 30 years, you, um, probably saw a fair amount of nation state attacks-

    2. KM

      Right

    3. DG

      ... right?

    4. KM

      Every day.

    5. DG

      So every day.

    6. KM

      Yeah.

    7. DG

      So talk about the differences or similarities between nation state attacks. And I use that-

    8. KM

      Yeah

    9. DG

      ... just to say the most-

    10. KM

      Totally

    11. DG

      ... sophisticated, most-

    12. KM

      Right

    13. DG

      ... you know, m- m- most w- whatever, most successful-

    14. KM

      Mm-hmm

    15. DG

      ... if you will, types of attacks compared to AI today, and then where you think AI can be in-

    16. KM

      Right

    17. DG

      ... a couple of years.

    18. KM

      So e- everything's gonna change rapidly, right? And, uh, but I can tell you, nations on offense have never, in my opinion, they've never really been... When you're hacking for espionage and for security reasons, you hack with what I would call kind of a sniper round. You're not spraying and praying. For the most part, modern nations on offense restrict their targeting, and they go deep at very specific things, like 30 defense contractors or .mil, you know, and they go hard at that. Kind of think of it as, you know, that sniper round. With AI, I think it becomes more like a drone swarm. You know? It becomes a little bit different in the cyber domain, and I think even modern nations are thinking, "What will our protocol be? If we want to attack this company, do we swarm it and just burn tokens on it?" Because AI's gonna do a lot of things humans just wouldn't.

    19. DG

      Right.

    20. KM

      You know? So it's a little sloppier, a little louder, but it's more effective.

    21. DG

      But it's more comprehensive.

    22. KM

      Yeah, that's the problem.

    23. DG

      Right? Like that's-

    24. KM

      You got it.

    25. DG

      Yeah.

    26. KM

      It's more effective probably. 'Cause if, if the... And so there's gonna be so many things a nation's gotta think through right now, and their whole doctrine will shift as, as the AI shift change comes. Like, how does AI change what our mission is? Do we m- maybe use the cyber domain differently? Do we drone swarm sometimes, sniper round other times? How do we balance the two? Does it depend on risk, target, how surreptitious we wanna be? 'Cause right now, AI is not a surreptitious action on offense-

    27. DG

      Yeah

    28. KM

      ... unless you've done a ton of post-training. You got a, maybe a human in the loop really looking at, are we doing smart things? Because if you just go, "Hey, here's a prompt. Hack," you know, "abc.com," AI's not gonna do it in a surreptitious and smart way. And I think even if you ask it to, it's still not going to-

    29. DG

      Yeah

    30. KM

      ... till it's been really trained-

  5. 14:34 – 18:36

    Why pen testing is dead

    1. KM

      on you.

    2. DG

      Yeah.

    3. KM

      Mm-hmm.

    4. DG

      It's interesting. So, um, you would kind of... Armadin, I don't know, a year ago, would probably be placed in the category of pen testing.

    5. KM

      Mm-hmm.

    6. DG

      And you and I share history and a relationship with George-

    7. KM

      Right

    8. DG

      ... at CrowdStrike.

    9. KM

      Right.

    10. DG

      And so they famously redefined the category from AV to EDR.

    11. KM

      Yeah.

    12. DG

      And of course, they did it-

    13. KM

      Right

    14. DG

      ... incredible things.

    15. KM

      Sure.

    16. DG

      But the category redefinition-

    17. KM

      Right

    18. DG

      ... um, was on the back of major infrastructure changes-

    19. KM

      Right

    20. DG

      ... and product changes.

    21. KM

      Mm-hmm.

    22. DG

      Um, you know, and allowed them to create a product category that was far greater and bigger-

    23. KM

      Right

    24. DG

      ... than AV. Um, talk about pen testing.

    25. KM

      Right.

    26. DG

      What is the historical view of pen testing, and why that's not what the future is?

    27. KM

      Yeah, couple things. I mean, you had to do it, right? It was kind of like first gen AV, you have to buy AV. And I think when you look at Armadin, we will be as ubiquitous as AV because you have to have that AI force field of AI on offense training AI on defense. You have to do it, and you can do it, so why wouldn't you? And, um, so you look at that, and, uh, it- it's... Pen testing to me is always just scanning for what's already known, and it doesn't prove whether you're really exploitable or not.

    28. DG

      Right.

    29. KM

      So it's always created a larger list of vulns that don't matter.

    30. DG

      Right.

  6. 18:36 – 21:22

    Autonomous defense explained

    1. KM

      coming at you would do.

    2. DG

      Yeah.

    3. KM

      [clears throat]

    4. DG

      So, um, you talked, you, you mentioned earlier, you know, obviously that's Armadin Red.

    5. KM

      Yeah.

    6. DG

      Um, you mentioned Armadin Blue.

    7. KM

      Mm-hmm.

    8. DG

      Talk about Armadin Blue.

    9. KM

      The Armadin Blue is like we can't, David, just show up and say, "Hey, you know, you're vulnerable. See you later."

    10. DG

      Right. [laughs] You know? Yeah, yeah.

    11. KM

      And hey, the true north for every CISO should be effective autonomous response. We gotta build that. And, and we knew all along you can't just say, "Hey." We, we wanna be the best in the world at finding exploitable risk. That's-

    12. DG

      Yep

    13. KM

      ... goal number one. But then goal number two, and be the best in the world at doing something about it. And that means Armadin Blue. And Armadin Blue will be take the information about exploitable risk and work with the defense plane, you know, whether it be endpoint EDR or firewalls, and create compensating controls at speed.

    14. DG

      Yes.

    15. KM

      So that if we find an attack five minutes before someone else using a model finds an attack, you're already safeguarded. And these safeguards are gonna be rudimentary potentially out of the gates, right?

    16. DG

      Yep.

    17. KM

      Over the next few months. A year from now, they're just gonna be there.

    18. DG

      Yep.

    19. KM

      Because the whole cyber domain is progressing at a speed where you're gonna have to defend autonomously.

    20. DG

      Yep.

    21. KM

      For better or for worse.

    22. DG

      Yep.

    23. KM

      You know? I, I'd rather have a bad patch d- stopping a bad guy from getting in than have an intrusion.

    24. DG

      Right.

    25. KM

      You know what I mean?

    26. DG

      Yeah.

    27. KM

      So you gotta take your lesser of two things, and one's much more manageable. You never want an unknown person with arbitrary access on your network.

    28. DG

      Yeah. [laughs] Yes.

    29. KM

      You know?

    30. DG

      Yeah, very-

  7. 21:22 – 27:04

    The future of the SOC

    1. KM

      You know, if I'm a CISO, I do believe my true north is effective autonomous security. You wanna keep your best people engaged. You wanna automate the processes that work for your organization. But you are absolutely saying, "What survives in the AI age and what doesn't?"

    2. DG

      Right.

    3. KM

      And I think we're still working through that process. I think there's whole processes in the SOC that'll just go away, and for whatever reason we're automating [laughs] right now.

    4. DG

      Yeah.

    5. KM

      You know, it, it, over time y- I can tell you this. If you have humans in the detect-and-respond loop, you're gonna be too slow.

    6. DG

      Yes.

    7. KM

      You know what I mean? It's just not gonna work well.

    8. DG

      Mm-hmm.

    9. KM

      So you have prevent, detect, respond. Prevent's gonna be governed by AI, and detect and respond is gonna be done by AI. And the goal in cybersecurity has always been if you have, you know, you wanna prevent [laughs] -

    10. DG

      Yeah, of course. Yeah

    11. KM

      ... you know what I mean? You don't wanna detect and respond. So I just see the constant narrowing of the window of every phase to the point where, you know, we're really not doing a lot of detection and response, 'cause the window to do it is-

    12. DG

      It all happens too fast

    13. KM

      ... is almost, you got it. It's a little bit too fast. So but you still gotta have that onion peel to some extent of systems backing up systems and assuming failure somewhere.

    14. DG

      Right.

    15. KM

      You know? Like even Armadin creating the force field, sooner or later somebody's gonna get around it. Someone's gonna create an exploit before we find it somehow-

    16. DG

      Yep

    17. KM

      ... some way, on a platform or s- or a, um, or an app that we just haven't assessed yet. It hasn't been in production at a customer site, and so we haven't looked at it. And someone else finds it. And when they do that, you will wanna have a trap behind saying, "We've got unauthorized access or unlawful access to a system." Those traps are ... They're, you just can't have a human there.

    18. DG

      Yeah.

    19. KM

      I mean, it's just gonna ... Because we've already done it at Armadin. When we break in and have agentic-aware internal command and control, it proliferates at a speed that is shocking. You know? Like I remember as a human you're, like, typing on your keyboard, "I wanna go laterally move with this passphrase from here to here."

    20. DG

      [laughs]

    21. KM

      And you're so slow, and you're doing one thing at a time. This thing just does a thousand things at once. It's just like pff everywhere, and you're like, "Whoa, okay, gone. Got the example."

    22. DG

      Yeah, so the re-

    23. KM

      Yeah

    24. DG

      ... so the, so the-

    25. KM

      [clears throat]

    26. DG

      ... each one of those steps of the process-

    27. KM

      Yeah

    28. DG

      ... has to be automated. Can't be a human in the loop.

    29. KM

      Yeah. It's as bad as this. I mean, I don't have great analogies. It's like the balloon popped, you know? [laughs]

    30. DG

      Yeah.

  8. 27:04 – 35:44

    Lessons from the Hugging Face incident

    1. DG

      Yep. What about the Hugging Face incident? I'd love for you to talk about the-

    2. KM

      Y- you know, it's-

    3. DG

      ... the learnings from that

    4. KM

      ... I've given that a lot of thought. I mean, I'm certain at OpenAI they're like, "Oh," or at a regular, they were like, "Oh, we coulda done this and this, and it wouldn't have happened." You know what I mean?

    5. DG

      Yeah.

    6. KM

      So they've already figured it out. Uh, it's been my experience, in every sh- technical modality shift, we underestimate the adversary's capability, and in this case, we underestimated the model's capability because, you know, when you really read it post-facto, ah, they could've stopped that, you know?

    7. DG

      Yeah, yeah.

    8. KM

      And, um, they could've put guardrails on it, some deterministic things, and, uh, and I think they realize that now. But I think when you're in a race, it's almost like a lunar landing race, right?

    9. DG

      Yeah, yeah, yeah.

    10. KM

      The AI race. And you have R&D people, and they're doing the work to create models in a way where even those CEOs are like, "We can't slow it. Let's get the government to help us slow it," you know? [laughs]

    11. DG

      Yeah.

    12. KM

      That means you can't even control your own innovation, right?

    13. DG

      I have views on that, but we c-

    14. KM

      Yeah, yeah

    15. DG

      ... we could take that to another time. Yeah.

    16. KM

      And so when you have... And I get that. R&D people are, like, chasing that innovation, and it's really hard to package them within, like, security, experienced security people that have the skillsets to cage that thing.

    17. DG

      Yeah.

    18. KM

      You know? And it's hard to marry those two up because the security people don't understand the AI as well, and the AI people don't realize... One of the things that we did in our model, I mean, make no mistake, Armadin has made the beast that we're all worried about.

    19. DG

      Right.

    20. KM

      We've made a model that attacks. We made mu- many of them. We have a system that attacks production networks and is highly successful breaking in. Well, is it safe? Well, our guys instinctively knew we gotta have obviously a secure, you know, we gotta have a hypervisor. We gotta secure this thing. We gotta lock it down host-based. We have to have a proxy. It knows the proxy. It's proxy aware. That's fine. But then our guys did something, and even I was like, "Nice job." They passively, surreptitiously look at every single prompt done. Do we like it? Do we not like it? And the majority of the time, if we kill an agent, it's probably nothing to do with safety. It's that the agent's wasting money.

    21. DG

      Yeah.

    22. KM

      You know what I mean?

    23. DG

      Yeah, that makes sense.

    24. KM

      So kill it. It's off on a goose chase we've already done or don't wanna do. But there were so many layers of validation that the agent was doing the right thing. And the other thing was assume every layer of your security will fail, and y- you have to have deterministic rules that eliminate certain activities. But what I did learn reading those incidents, it does take domain expertise to secure agents behaving in certain domains.

    25. DG

      Yeah.

    26. KM

      You know what I mean?

    27. DG

      Yeah, it's a great point. Yep.

    28. KM

      So I get that. So, like, it, it, like, without a cyber background-

    29. DG

      It's validating. It becomes validating. Yeah

    30. KM

      ... I get how you're gonna make... You're gonna test something and go, "Oh, didn't think of that."

  9. 35:44 – 47:34

    Building a company at AI speed

    1. KM

      finding zero-days.

    2. DG

      Yeah. I wanna shift gears now to, uh, your philosophies and mindset in building a company.

    3. KM

      You know, they're different. Yeah, so couple things there. Like, the first time I built a company was 2004, and I wouldn't have said I was an entrepreneur. I started Mandiant in '04, February, and it was self-funded and profitable. And we were successful because in hindsight... It's like you almost learn nothing at the time-

    4. DG

      Yeah

    5. KM

      ... and then you look back and go, "Oh, I did learn right then and there" because of the pain usually. But, uh, I, I me- You know, I look back on Mandiant now. We had a premise nobody actually believed in '04 because our first website said, "Security breaches are inevitable," and nobody believed it.

    6. DG

      Hmm.

    7. KM

      And I don't even know how much I believed it. And, uh-

    8. DG

      It's a pretty good tagline

    9. KM

      ... oh, by the way, [clears throat] I'm slightly off. Our first headline was, "You cannot solely rely on preventive measures." And that was so boring, but that's the same as security breaches are inevitable.

    10. DG

      Yeah.

    11. KM

      You know?

    12. DG

      S-

    13. KM

      Can't rely on defense

    14. DG

      ... better, better ring on the security breaches headline.

    15. KM

      Yeah, I got it wrong because I'm not a marketing guy. But anyway, so security breaches are inevitable. And the premise was- That let's respond to every breach that matters so we have first mover intelligence on how to prevent it happening again.

    16. DG

      Yeah.

    17. KM

      And so the first model of intel in all of cybersecurity was antivirus. You know, it was like we look for malware-

    18. DG

      Yeah

    19. KM

      ... we have signatures for it, and if we miss, David George has to find the malware and submit it to us so we get better.

    20. DG

      Yep.

    21. KM

      And that's a bad model. My mother's not finding malware on her laptop.

    22. DG

      Right. Yeah.

    23. KM

      You know what I mean? It's just gonna eat her laptop alive. So that model was bad, so we decided a better model, because I had responded to breaches, and the reason I was responding to them is AV was easily evaded. And so we were like, "Well, let's learn all the, you know, let's second layer AV, 'cause it stinks."

    24. DG

      Yeah.

    25. KM

      And that's what George now owns.

    26. DG

      Yeah, of course.

    27. KM

      You know?

    28. DG

      Yep.

    29. KM

      So let's second layer AV. You still have to have AV, though. I beat it up, but the reality is, is you still need it, um, or something that replaces it. So the second layer of defense was required. So AV was imaginal line to here, then you extend imaginal line with something that can learn and think. And, uh, so we wanted to do that. And I actually look at Armadin as just the third wave of intel. Like, why are we waiting for a victim and learn from that? That's ridiculous. You've gotta find your own problems first. Don't wait for, you know, defense contractor A to be compromised and then quickly share the information to make sure it never happens again. Now, that model still needs to exist for the things that are somehow get there, that beat you, but, um, we got that model now, and it's just not good enough. So back to your question, uh, you know, Mandiant was f- self-funded. There's not a l- I don't know of self-funded companies these days [laughs] David.

    30. DG

      Well, the speed-

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