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AcquiredVanguard: The communist capitalist who saved investors a trillion dollars (Audio)
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150 min read · 30,000 wordsStart
Ben Gilbert 0:00 I was telling my wife, you know, "I think I'll be able to do bedtime tonight, maybe, maybe even dinner," and she was like, "Whoa, whoa, whoa. Don't get ahead of yourself." [laughs]
David Rosenthal 0:07 Yeah. [laughs] "Let's not go crazy here." [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 0:10 How complicated could it be? It's index funds.
David Rosenthal 0:12 And active funds, and money market, and brokerage, and advisory, and...
Ben Gilbert 0:19 Yeah, yeah, yeah.
David Rosenthal 0:20 But really, it's mostly index funds.
Ben Gilbert 0:21 All right. [sighs]
David Rosenthal 0:22 Let's do it.
Ben Gilbert 0:23 Let's do it.
David Rosenthal 0:24 Vanguard.
Speaker 0:24 Who got the truth? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Who got the truth now? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Sit me down. Say it straight. Another story on the way. Who got the truth?
Intro
Ben Gilbert 0:41 Welcome to the Spring 2026 season of Acquired, the podcast about great companies and the stories and playbooks behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert.
David Rosenthal 0:50 I'm David Rosenthal.
Ben Gilbert 0:51 And we are your hosts. Today's episode is more relevant for you than any other company we have ever covered. For most of you, you have most of your net worth tied up in this company, or the copycats who followed. The company is Vanguard, who effectively created the first index fund for individual investors in 1975, and today is the largest provider of index funds in the United States. They manage over $10 trillion in passive index funds. That means they own an average of almost 10% of every company in the S&P 500; General Motors, Nike, Starbucks, Lockheed Martin, Visa, Apple, you name it. Vanguard is the largest shareholder of most US corporations, and together with the other big index funds like BlackRock, State Street, and Fidelity, they own 24% of the entire US stock market.
David Rosenthal 1:49 It's absolutely incredible, and none of those other firms would be in this market or doing it in the same way if it weren't for Vanguard.
Ben Gilbert 1:57 No.
David Rosenthal 1:58 I mean, the impact is just wild. I mean, millions and millions and millions of people have sent their kids to college, bought homes, retired comfortably because of Vanguard and Jack Bogle.
Ben Gilbert 2:10 So Vanguard has an incredibly unique corporate structure. If you are an investor in a Vanguard fund, you own a piece of the firm. Vanguard is owned exclusively by its customers, and it's not publicly traded. It doesn't have outside shareholders of any other kind. Even the CEO doesn't have any equity, except, of course, than what he has from investing in the funds, just like me and David and all of you. In many ways, it is a different kind of capitalism, dare we say communist capitalism.
David Rosenthal 2:40 Ooh, I like it.
Ben Gilbert 2:42 A company whose products exclusively serve the interests of its customers and no other shareholders. And David, as you've been alluding to, the man behind this idea is a visionary, an iconoclast, and a pedantic stick-in-the-mud who was as disagreeable as he was right-
David Rosenthal 3:00 [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 3:00 ... Jack Bogle. [laughs]
David Rosenthal 3:03 Oh, that's great. I couldn't have written it better myself, Ben.
Ben Gilbert 3:05 And his story is wild since he didn't start Vanguard until he was 46 years old, and you might think it was started idealistically given the structure we're talking about, and it was sort of, but the story is equal parts idealistic as it is vindictive. But what is clear, w- we all owe Jack a giant thank you. Because of Vanguard's relentless cost-cutting and low fees, Vanguard has saved investors over $500 billion in fees and trading costs since its founding in 1975, and as a recent book, The Bogle Effect, argues, Vanguard's actions also forced the hand of the rest of the industry to cut their fees, totaling another $500 billion over time. So Jack Bogle and Vanguard are responsible for a trillion dollars of wealth transfer out of the pockets of Wall Street and the finance industry and into the pockets of individual investors in the form of fees that they didn't have to pay.
David Rosenthal 4:02 Absolutely incredible.
Ben Gilbert 4:03 I was catching up with good friend of the show Morgan Housel a couple days ago-
David Rosenthal 4:06 Oh yeah, of course
Ben Gilbert 4:07 ... and his comment to me was, "I view Bogle as an undercover philanthropist," and, uh, at a trillion or even half a trillion dollars, that would make him the greatest philanthropist of all time.
David Rosenthal 4:18 Wow. Wow. I love that framing. Yeah. I mean, a large portion of that trillion dollars could easily have flowed into Jack's own wealth, and he made the choice that it didn't.
Ben Gilbert 4:28 Yeah, m- maybe.
David Rosenthal 4:29 Maybe.
Ben Gilbert 4:30 Maybe, David.
David Rosenthal 4:30 We'll see.
Ben Gilbert 4:30 We'll get into it. So listeners, you can join the email list at acquired.fm/email. That's where we're gonna send out our big takeaways from each episode, past episode corrections, exclusive behind-the-scenes photos that we find in our research, and it's where you'll get to vote on future episode topics. Plus, David writes a little hint each time about next episode's topic, so come play the guessing game with us at acquired.fm/email. Come talk about this episode with the whole community in the Slack after you listen. That's acquired.fm/slack. And before we dive in, we wanna thank our presenting partner, J.P. Morgan.
David Rosenthal 5:05 Yes, and just like how we say every company has a story, every company's story is powered by payments, and J.P. Morgan is a part of so many of their journeys from seed to IPO and beyond.
Ben Gilbert 5:16 So with that, this show is not investment advice. David and I may, and definitely do this time-
David Rosenthal 5:21 Yes
Ben Gilbert 5:21 ... have investments in the companies that we discuss, and this show is for informational and entertainment purposes only. David, where do we begin?
David Rosenthal 5:29 Ooh.
Jack Bogle's Early Life & Family Ruin (1929)
David Rosenthal 5:30 All right. Well, we start in May of 1929 on the eve of the great Wall Street crash of October 1929 that would throw America and the world into the Great Depression, wipe out millions of families' savings, ruin countless lives, forever scar an entire generation. We, we don't often talk about the Great Depression on Acquired. It was truly horrible. I mean, the financial crisis was quaint compared to this. 9,000 banks failed after the Wall Street crash of 1929. 9 million individual family savings accounts were wiped out. Almost 100,000 businesses failed. Unemployment reached 25%, and it truly did scarAn entire generation. I mean, I remember my grandparents still like into the 1990s doing absolutely insane things because of their experience during-
Ben Gilbert 6:26 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 6:26 ... the Depression. My, my dad's mom never threw out a plastic bag in her entire life. When she died and we cleaned out her condo, it was like full [laughs] of tens of thousands of plastic bags.
Ben Gilbert 6:38 My grandpa was magazines and Tums containers.
David Rosenthal 6:41 Ugh.
Ben Gilbert 6:41 We found just overflowing amounts in his basement. But the crazy thing about this, David, is back then only 1 to 2% of Americans owned stocks.
David Rosenthal 6:51 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 6:51 So all of these things were second order effects from the crash, from the banks being deeply intertwined, a lot of leverage on all these equities. It wasn't like, "Oh, I own a bunch of stocks and those stocks crashed, so my life is over." It is the giant interrelated ripples and no safeguards in the economy at that time.
David Rosenthal 7:10 Yep, exactly. It was the bank failures, it was the businesses going under, it was unemployment, it was everything. But on the eve of this great financial calamity, our hero, and a financial hero to many, is born. John Clifton Jack Bogle. And he's born here in May of 1929 as one of two twin boys, along with his twin David, and together with their older brother Bud, they form the Bogle boys, as they would be known throughout the rest of their youth and indeed the rest of their lives. Now, Jack and David here at the time of their birth are born into a prominent New Jersey family. Their great-grandfather had founded a mutual fire insurance company. Nice foreshadowing there with founding-
Ben Gilbert 8:03 Yeah, mutual
David Rosenthal 8:03 ... a mutually owned company as Vanguard would go on to be. And their grandfather had then founded a company which would go on to become part of the American Can Company, which manufactured tin cans and was one of the largest companies in America for a long time. So it's like a, a prosperous, well-to-do, well-respected family that they are born into. But during their early childhood here in the Depression, the family loses everything. Their dad becomes an alcoholic, divorces their mom, abandons the family, runs off, basically ends up dying alone on a street corner years later. Their mother, as you can imagine, is equally scarred from all this, suffers from severe depression, mental health issues, isn't able to provide for the boys. And so the Bogle boys basically from the time they're kids, like before they're teenagers, they're kind of left to fend for themselves in the world. So all three of them work several concurrent jobs while they're growing up and going through school. I mean, we're talking like paper routes, food service jobs, restaurants, manual labor, like anything-
Ben Gilbert 9:19 Mm
David Rosenthal 9:19 ... that they can do to support themselves and their mom. Jack would talk about how the best job that he ever had as a kid was a 3:00 AM paper route that he had because the world was quiet and peaceful in the middle of the night and he could escape the chaos and strife all around him. As he liked to say, it was a contrast to the rest of my life growing up.
Ben Gilbert 9:41 And you got all this from talking with Jack's kids, right?
David Rosenthal 9:43 Yeah, yeah. I spoke to several members of the Bogle family for research, and I mean, this story is just incredible.
Ben Gilbert 9:50 Yeah, it's interesting because kinda through his last name and his great-grandfather and his grandfather, they had this sort of family network where they were in high society and he knew other well-to-do kids. But personally, their family's wealth and relationships were kinda in shambles.
David Rosenthal 10:11 They're both insiders and outsiders at the same time. So as the boys get older and they enter high school, again, the family no longer has any money, but they do still have these connections and relatives and friends who have resources. And so they manage to get all of the boys scholarships to go to Blair Academy, one of the sort of prestigious East Coast boarding schools, for their junior and senior years of high school. And Jack especially just like flourishes at Blair. He becomes a fantastic student. He graduates cum laude. He gets voted both best student and most likely to succeed by his classmates-
Ben Gilbert 10:53 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 10:53 ... at graduation. Obviously he's going places.
Ben Gilbert 10:55 Yep.
David Rosenthal 10:56 Now, there's just one problem though as Jack and David are approaching graduation. The boys and the family still have no money even though they've gone to this, you know, prestigious boarding school that they're gonna graduate from, and they all need to keep working both to support themselves and, you know, their mother who's still alive. So the three of them get together and decide that, "Hey, because of our situation, only one of us should actually go to college, and the other two need to keep working and providing for the family." And because Jack has been so successful at Blair and is such a good student, he gets chosen as the one of the brothers that's gonna get to go to college. And Jack would say that like the weight of that decision just rested on him for the whole rest of his life. Like he alone was given this chance to do something bigger, and he felt like a tremendous obligation to make good to his family on this opportunity. And the other two never go to college.
Ben Gilbert 11:53 Huh.
David Rosenthal 11:53 I mean, all three of them remain close, but David and Bud never go to college.
Ben Gilbert 11:57 And it's funny, listeners, David, you're referencing the things that Jack would say. It is incredibly easy to find Jack's words everywhere.There is no shortage of commentary that Jack would give on his own life, on his philosophies.
David Rosenthal 12:11 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 12:11 The man gave thousands of speeches. He wrote memoirs. He wrote 12 books, investment advice, reflections back on Vanguard. He would go on TV and talk to journalists and speak in classes anytime anyone would have him. So there is no gaps in the historical record-
David Rosenthal 12:28 Yeah [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 12:28 ... of, uh, Jack's life.
David Rosenthal 12:30 Of Jack's memory, yeah. Jack loved nothing more than to give a speech. So
Princeton Thesis & Mutual Funds Emerge (1949-1951)
David Rosenthal 12:34 after graduation from Blair, Jack goes on to college at Princeton, once again on a work scholarship. He's working in, like, the dining halls. He ends up working in the ticketing office for athletic events and football games. And while he's at Princeton, he becomes fascinated with economics after he takes a intro econ course in the fall of his sophomore year, during which he gets a D+ on the midterm [laughs] an inauspicious beginning to his finance career.
Ben Gilbert 13:04 Yeah.
David Rosenthal 13:04 But he loves it. He works hard, and he finishes with a C- [laughs] in the class. Incredible for the, like, you know, the guy who would go on to revolutionize all of finance.
Ben Gilbert 13:14 Yep.
David Rosenthal 13:15 So the next year, during Jack's junior year at Princeton, he's decided that he's gonna major in economics or concentrate in Princeton's, you know, fancy terms. You don't have majors, you have concentrations.
Ben Gilbert 13:25 Really?
David Rosenthal 13:25 And... Yeah, yeah, really [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 13:28 Just w- every, every day I learn one more quirky little Princeton thing.
David Rosenthal 13:32 I know, I know. I'm sorry, I'm sorry [laughs] I, of course, went to Princeton, so went through all this. And specifically I also went through the rite of passage that Jack has to go through, which is he needs to write a senior thesis. So one of the hallmarks of Princeton is that every single undergraduate must write a senior thesis which must be a unique piece of scholarly research in order to graduate. Uh, it's, it's like a mini version, a very, very mini version of what you would do as a PhD. Mine of course was on the marketing history of champagne, being a French [laughs] literature major.
Ben Gilbert 14:08 Which is so funny for Acquired. Like, it's actually very useful for us in the LVMH episode.
David Rosenthal 14:13 In- incredibly useful. There you go. David Rosenthal, Jack Bogle, you know, the connections abound.
Ben Gilbert 14:17 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 14:17 [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 14:18 Okay, continue the story.
David Rosenthal 14:19 Okay. So one afternoon Jack's casting about for what would become his thesis topic. He's in Firestone, the main library on campus, and he's reading the current issue of Fortune magazine, where he comes across an article deep in the back of the magazine on page 116 entitled Big Money in Boston. And it's about the growth of a relatively new industry of open-ended public funds, what today we would call mutual funds. That term wasn't even in use yet. And the article centers on this new firm that's leading this innovation, this new sector on Wall Street even though they're based in Boston, the Massachusetts Investors Trust Company, known and marketed as MIT [laughs] No actual connection to, you know, the real MIT, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, but, uh, this gives you a sense of the marketing to the public of these, uh, open-ended public funds.
Ben Gilbert 15:25 We'll see it over and over again on this episode. Appropriating prestige is a signature of the mutual fund industry, for really the, the finance industry.
David Rosenthal 15:34 A hallmark of this industry, absolutely.
Ben Gilbert 15:38 The interesting thing about this, you might say, "Well, what do you mean mutual funds were new at this point in time?" Well, that comment that I made before the Great Depression in the '20s, only 1 or 2% of Americans owned stocks. By 1949 that was still only up to 4.2% of Americans, and what they were doing is they were working with a stockbroker to buy individual stocks. There really hadn't been any academic research around finance o- of any kind yet, let alone sorta investment and diversification and funds. So th- this notion of you are going to mutually pool your money with a bunch of other investors into a fund and buy a basket of stocks in that fund and hold it for an open-ended period of time, these public equities, that was brand new.
David Rosenthal 16:27 Yes, and this is what Jack decides to write his thesis about, this new phenomenon. Now, there are actually two important things to talk about here that you started to allude to, Ben. O- one is this concept of a open-end fund versus closed-end funds. So this is the real pioneering thing that the Massachusetts Fund, we're not gonna call it MIT here [laughs] pioneered, which is there's no set fund size. It's elastic. So it's not like they have to write a prospectus and go out and say, "We are raising a $100 million fund," and get everybody in it, and then, you know, it gets to 100 million, and then they close it, and they manage it. Nope. Could be 1 million, could be 100 million, could be 5 trillion, as we will see approaching towards the end of the episode here.
Ben Gilbert 17:17 You keep dumping more dollars in, and we'll keep buying more stuff in the basket.
David Rosenthal 17:21 Yep. And that also means that investors in the fund can come and go as they please. There's no lockups. It doesn't have to be a set number. You, you buy into the fund, you hold it for a while, hopefully it appreciates, you can sell out of the fund. It's everything we know today about mutual funds, but until this concept of an open-ended fund was pioneered, you couldn't do this. Now, y- you mentioned if Americans held stocks at all at this point in time, they held individual stocks through brokers. These funds came to be distributed exactly the same way, through stockbrokers. You would call up your Merrill Lynch broker and instead of saying, "Hey, give me five shares of General Electric," you'd say, "Hey, give me a couple units of the Massachusetts Fund," et cetera, et cetera.
Ben Gilbert 18:07 Yep. And so the marketing, the distribution, it relies on this broker-dealer network to sortasell the funds on behalf of the, the fund management company itself.
David Rosenthal 18:18 Yep. And the brokers were getting paid [laughs] by this.
Ben Gilbert 18:22 Oh, yes.
David Rosenthal 18:23 Oh, were they ever. So they would take what's called a sales load of usually, like, seven and a half to eight and a half percent of every dollar that a client was putting into the fund. The fund manager would then kick back to the broker as a spiff for putting their clients in the fund.
Ben Gilbert 18:41 And it's a kickback out of the money that was just invested. So if you're investing $100 into one of these funds, well, actually only 91 and a half dollars are going in as the investment, and the rest is going right out as this effectively distribution fee.
David Rosenthal 18:58 Yeah, to your friendly neighborhood stockbroker.
Ben Gilbert 19:01 Now, the funny thing is if, if we didn't have the context that we have today, which is I invest $100 and basically $100 goes into the thing that I'm investing in, or at least that's the way it kinda feels-
David Rosenthal 19:11 This was normal
Ben Gilbert 19:12 ... paying for distribution is a very normal thing across every business and every sector. You have to incentivize people to push your product through marketing, through advertising, through sales commissions, through hiring a giant sales force yourself. These are often very large costs. I mean, for example, retailers often double the price of something when they sell it to the public, but the revenue here is not $100. The revenue to the fund is, like, $2 per year in fees. So paying $8 to the broker-dealers is a giant, egregious amount to sell the product. I mean, it's, like, four times the amount that the fund itself actually makes.
David Rosenthal 19:50 Right. Okay. So that's number one to understand about these new open-ended mutual funds. Number two [laughs] also might be crazy or not crazy, depending on your perspective. These new funds, like the Massachusetts Fund, weren't really set up for the benefit of their customer base, the fund holders. Rather, they were created and organized by the investment managers who started and ran them with the express purpose of generating profits for themselves.
Ben Gilbert 20:22 Right. It's a business.
David Rosenthal 20:23 And the way that that happened was the people who set up the fund created a separate company called the management company that had a contractual relationship with the fund to get paid a percentage of assets that would, you know, be their revenue, and ultimately this is a very high margin business, uh, their profits.
Ben Gilbert 20:40 This is effectively the way that all finance works today. There's a management company that performs the act of advising all of the investments in each of the individual funds that the principals own and run it like a business.
David Rosenthal 20:53 Yep. And that management company would be responsible for three things regarding the fund: one, making investment decisions, allocating, you know, the capital; two, controlling marketing and distribution, which as we talked about mostly was just turning around to whatever their favorite network of stockbrokers was and kicking it over to them for additional fees; and three, managing the, like, back office and administration of the fund. So, like, the register, the fund holders, the investments, the allocations of shares, tax, et cetera, et cetera.
Ben Gilbert 21:24 Legal compliance, bookkeeping, making sure to communicate the prices of the assets with the newspapers so they can print it, all the administrative stuff.
David Rosenthal 21:34 Yep. And the way that the Massachusetts Fund worked is the management company just got paid a fixed percentage of the assets under management that year for the fund. So you can see the immediate conflicts of interest [laughs] all over the place here. If management of the fund gets paid solely based on the size of the assets in the fund with no penalties or rewards for actual investment performance-
Ben Gilbert 22:05 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 22:07 ... well, you're basically just incentivized to grow the fund as large as possible and market it as best as you can and skim a lot of fees off the top.
Ben Gilbert 22:14 There- there's a tiny bit of performance benefit built in because if the assets under management grows organically by the investments performing well, the fees grow, but it's very different than the way that a lot of funds would go on to be structured later with carried interest or a promote or some sort of performance incentive.
David Rosenthal 22:31 Right, or a hurdle rate, you know, it, it gets to benchmark, et cetera, et cetera. [laughs] None of that. Yes, investment returns are but one sort of arrow in the quiver of management companies at this point in time to grow their profits, and these profits could be very, very, very large. So let's say, for example, you have $100 million fund, which was reasonable even in that day.
Ben Gilbert 22:56 Yep.
David Rosenthal 22:56 And it would have a management fee of, like, one and a half percent of assets annually.
Ben Gilbert 23:03 For a public equities fund.
David Rosenthal 23:05 Right. Right. [laughs] So as a management company group in this hypothetical $100 million fund, you'd be taking $1.5 million a year home, rain or shine, in 1950. [laughs] That's, like, $20 million adjusted for inflation today. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 23:21 And sometimes up to 2 million, 'cause I'd, I'd seen the number 2%, too, for mutual funds in this era. And this is, again, listeners, for mutual funds, baskets of publicly traded stocks that are just listed publicly to buy on exchanges. And these funds, in exchange for picking them, putting them in a basket, and administrating it, are charging 2% to do that.
David Rosenthal 23:43 Yeah, and oftentimes they're not even doing the administration. They're not doing the distribution. They're outsourcing that to, you know, stockbrokers. They're outsourcing the administration, too. So all they're doing is picking stocks and getting a lot of money for it.
Ben Gilbert 23:56 So the things we've talked about so far are the one and a half, 2% management fee. There's the eight and a half percent sales load, so that bumps you down from whatever your current principal is to even the, on day one when you enter the fund, you know, b- being down eight and a half percent. So you have that sort of to overcome. And then there's a third thing, too, which is transaction fees at this point in time are very, very high. If the fund needs to go and trade stocks to add things to the fund or take things out of the fund, there were very, very large transaction fees relative to today to make those trades.
David Rosenthal 24:29 So yeah.Back to Jack in Firestone Library here reading Fortune magazine. Big money in Boston indeed. [laughs] And you can imagine how this might be attractive to young Jack, who comes from this destitute family. He needs to earn money to support his family. This sounds like a great new industry to get involved in. So in the spring of 1951, Jack turns in his senior thesis to the economics department entitled The Economic Role of the Investment Company. He gets an A on the thesis and graduates magna cum laude from the economics department.
Ben Gilbert 25:05 And David, what was the thrust of the piece? I mean, he wrote it, like, on this concept of big money in Boston, but what was his takeaway?
David Rosenthal 25:14 Well, it's interesting. The thrust of the piece is that this is gonna be a big, important industry within finance.
Ben Gilbert 25:21 Yep.
David Rosenthal 25:22 But Jack does also have some idealism in here, uh, as a young whippersnapper, and, you know, he recognizes everything that we were just talking about, which is that the fees charged to fund clients are gonna be a big drag on performance for these funds. And he doesn't go all the way to say, "Uh, hey, maybe we should eliminate them," but he does say that probably the best way to maximize returns to fund holders is to try and minimize the fees. And he does even in the thesis go one step further and say, "Well, it's sort of a tautological conclusion that the aggregate average of all these funds are going to perform in lockstep with the market." [laughs] So if you really wanna try and beat the market, then reducing fees is the way to do it.
Ben Gilbert 26:13 Because all of these investors who are trading against each other collectively are the market. If you take all the winners and all the losers and sum them up and don't take out any fees, you come up with zero. Every positive winner on the, uh, the side of a trade has a loser on the other side of the trade, and so in aggregate, all investors together are the market.
David Rosenthal 26:33 Now, that is true in theory, and in practice today, that is absolutely true. Back in 1951, Jack was a little ahead of his time because professional fund managers were a small, small minority of the market back then. There were a lot of other players, mostly unsophisticated players, mostly retail traders, and so it really is not inconceivable that the pitch as a professional fund manager that's gonna dedicate their life and all their working days to researching and picking stocks and betting against the market probably does have a good chance of beating the market back in these days.
Ben Gilbert 27:12 Yep, the pitch of I can outperform all this dumb money in the market, probably right and probably justifies significant fees.
David Rosenthal 27:19 Yep,
Joining Wellington Management (1951)
David Rosenthal 27:20 yep. Now, as graduation approaches, Jack has a goal. He wants to go to work in this, you know, new fund management industry, and he manages to get his A grade senior thesis in front of another prestigious Princeton alum in Philadelphia named Walter Morgan, who had founded and was running another early open-ended public investment company in Philadelphia called Wellington Management. Walter Morgan hires Jack as his assistant right out of school, really takes a shine to him. Jack becomes sort of like a surrogate son to him. You know, Jack didn't really have a dad, and Walter didn't have kids. They become really, really close. Now, Wellington and its Wellington Fund was a super conservative and very highly regarded early mutual fund that pioneered the style that came to be known as balanced investing, i.e. a balance between stocks and bonds all within a single fund. So the sort of marketing slogan that Walter Morgan had used for the firm and the fund was, quote, "A complete investment program in one security." You can see how this would be attractive.
Ben Gilbert 28:40 Sounds great.
David Rosenthal 28:41 And the Wellington Fund by this point here when Jack joins out of school has attracted $150 million in assets. So they are smaller than the Massachusetts Fund, which was the largest fund in the world at that point in time with just under 500 million in assets. But Wellington is still, like, among the top 10 funds in the industry and super well respected.
Ben Gilbert 29:03 This is what? Mid-'50s?
David Rosenthal 29:05 Early '50s, 1951.
Ben Gilbert 29:06 Okay.
David Rosenthal 29:07 So again, we talked about the economics for the management company. Like, I think Morgan and everybody at Wellington and Jack absolutely did have their customers and the fund holders in mind and wanted to do a great job for them, but they are making a lot of money. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 29:23 It's market. It's industry standard.
David Rosenthal 29:25 Yeah, based on the fees and that fund size, call it, like, $2 to $3 million a year flowing into a reasonably low headcount, high margin business here in, you know, 1951. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 29:37 Yeah.
David Rosenthal 29:37 Everybody's doing great. So Jack takes to Wellington and to Mr. Morgan like a pig in mud. He loves it. He rises through the ranks from Morgan's assistant to basically doing, like, every job in the company, and after a pretty short number of years, he emerges as the clear heir apparent to take over Wellington when Morgan retires. Morgan was 30 years older than Jack. And then ultimately in 1965, Morgan retires, steps back, and names Jack president of the firm at 35 years old. He's made it. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 30:16 Yeah.
David Rosenthal 30:17 He's Jack. He's come up in the world. He's gone from family ruin, essentially an orphan, to president of a highly profitable and respected enterprise at age 35. He's got it made.
Ben Gilbert 30:29 And importantly, a successful and pretty conservative mutual fund organization-
David Rosenthal 30:34 Yep
Ben Gilbert 30:34 ... here with Wellington at this point in time.
David Rosenthal 30:36 Yep, yep. Absolutely.
The Go-Go Years & Fidelity's Ascent (1958-1965)
David Rosenthal 30:38 But unfortunately-That conservative, uh, mindset and pedigree was exactly the wrong thing for this moment here in the mid-1960s for Wellington and its young hotshot new president because Wall Street and the investing world is undergoing a sea change from the hyper-conservative mode that emerged after the Depression to what would come to be known as the Go-Go Years.
Ben Gilbert 31:07 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 31:07 Pioneered by a small investment firm in Boston called Fidelity.
Ben Gilbert 31:14 Yes.
David Rosenthal 31:14 But before we tell that story, now is a great time to thank our presenting partner, J.P. Morgan.
Ben Gilbert 31:21 Yes. And today, listeners, we are gonna talk about something that we mentioned last season on the Trader Joe's episode, supply chain finance.
David Rosenthal 31:29 Yes. Think about when a buyer gets an invoice from their supplier. They're expected to pay quickly, but often can't or don't wanna tie up that cash. Wouldn't it be great if you could have a financing partner come in and fund that gap so the supplier isn't waiting up to 30, 60, or even 90 days to get paid? Well, that's exactly what a bank can do to bridge that time gap. The buyer gets to hold onto their cash longer, and suppliers get paid faster. True win-win.
Ben Gilbert 31:55 Yep, and J.P. Morgan specifically has been doing this kind of work for decades at the world's largest companies. So supply chain finance, receivables financing, dynamic discounting, all of this is built on top of the trillions in daily payment processing moving through the system.
David Rosenthal 32:11 But the tooling and the teams around it have historically been fragmented. You've got treasury teams trying to maximize liquidity. You've got procurement wanting everything in one place, and IT stuck integrating all of it, not to mention the different portals, static reports, and all the manual setup.
Ben Gilbert 32:27 So this is where J.P. Morgan Payment's Working Capital Accelerator platform comes in. You've got one login and one unified view across payables and receivables financing, near real-time data, and it plugs into the ERPs that your team is already running.
David Rosenthal 32:42 And when teams can see their full working capital position in real time, working capital stops being a cash management headache and starts becoming a lever that you can pull as a business. The best businesses treat it as part of their operating system, and this is the kind of platform that makes it easy.
Ben Gilbert 32:56 So listeners, if you wanna learn more about this new Working Capital Accelerator platform, go to jpmorgan.com/acquired, or contact your J.P. Morgan rep and tell them that Ben and David sent you. And if you wanna join us for some live interviews, we will be on the main stage with J.P. Morgan at the WeAreDevelopers World Congress in San Jose this September. Click the link in the show notes to learn more. All right, so David, the entrance of Fidelity into our story.
David Rosenthal 33:25 Yes, and the Go-Go Years, which really were this, like, violent reaction to all the pent-up conservatism and prudence and austerity that had dominated Wall Street and finance for America and the world through the Depression and through World War II. The journalist John Brooks would write about it later in The New Yorker that the Go-Go era was, quote, "A method of operating in the stock market, a method that was, to be sure, free, fast, and lively" [laughs] "And certainly in some cases attended by the joy, merriment, and hubbub implied by the Go-Go term. The method was characterized by rapid in-and-out trading of huge blocks of stock with an eye to large profits taken very quickly." So in other words, the exact opposite of Wellington Management-
Ben Gilbert 34:21 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 34:21 ... and Walter Morgan's approach.
Ben Gilbert 34:23 Which is tough because if you grew up as a leader in that previous era and you believed in that philosophy, but this is what all of your customers, the, the investors want, what do you do?
David Rosenthal 34:34 Yep, and Fidelity was the one that pioneered all of this. So Fidelity goes all the way back to the early Boston mutual fund scene, kinda like same era as the Massachusetts Fund. They were always, though, like, a kinda small bit player until the legendary Edward Johnson, known as Mr. Johnson, who had previously been Fidelity's legal counsel, takes over the firm right before the end of World War II. At the time, Fidelity is managing just $3 million, and the previous owners, who I think are, you know, retiring, they literally give Fidelity the firm to Edward Johnson for free. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 35:13 Wow. 'Cause they just don't think it has much value?
David Rosenthal 35:16 No. I mean, it, it was part of that, like, we're here to serve the clients, that sorta ethos.
Ben Gilbert 35:21 Hmm.
David Rosenthal 35:21 But also, it was a $3 million fund. Even with the high economics of how this fund industry works, you know, if the base that you're pulling a percentage fee off of is $3 million-
Ben Gilbert 35:33 Right
David Rosenthal 35:33 ... you're just kinda limited in how much money-
Ben Gilbert 35:35 Right
David Rosenthal 35:35 ... you're gonna make here. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 35:36 Yep.
David Rosenthal 35:36 But yeah, this is why, like, spoiler alert, obviously Fidelity is one of the largest fund complexes and financial companies in the world today. It's still owned by the Johnson family. It's estimated that their net worth is $40 or $50 billion thanks to this. [laughs] Oh, incredible.
Ben Gilbert 35:53 On a basis of zero because they got it for free.
David Rosenthal 35:55 Right, right. So when Ed Johnson takes over Fidelity, he starts trying a whole bunch of stuff to grow it. You know, he comes from the legal industry. He's not from a Wall Street background per se. He's open to different styles. He's not sorta steeped in orthodoxy, shall we say. And in 1958, he creates a new fund within the group. I mean, this in and of itself was not unprecedented but quite rare. Most of the time there was just one fund within a group or a management company. So for a long time, Wellington Management Company just managed the Wellington Fund.
Ben Gilbert 36:33 Yep.
David Rosenthal 36:33 And Fidelity had just had the Fidelity Fund. So Johnson creates this new fund called the Fidelity Capital Fund, which is gonna be a growth fund, and he hires a young portfolio manager named Jerry Sie to come in and run it. AndTsai basically ignores all the Wall Street conservative conventions and just starts shooting the lights out with this fund. He's taking big concentrated positions in blue chip companies, trading in and out of the stock, making quick profits. I mean, really, like we talked about earlier, he's kinda preying on the unsophisticated retail investors out there. Like, he could move the market by taking a big position, pop a stock, and then get out of it [laughs] and book profits.
Ben Gilbert 37:22 There was a lot less regulation at that time, and there was a lot less sophistication in your counterparties when you were trading.
David Rosenthal 37:28 Yes. So pretty quickly Tsai and Fidelity start to become, like, like a player [laughs] Like a, like a real player. All the CEOs of all the big companies wanna get to know him because, hey, he has the power to, you know, really move their stocks. He becomes kinda like a quasi-celebrity.
Ben Gilbert 37:46 And move it or not, he kinda has the power to be a giant shareholder in your company now that he's attracting all this capital because people wanna get in on his funds.
David Rosenthal 37:55 Exactly. So the Fidelity Capital Fund within just a short number of years goes from, you know, basically zero, like startup initiative within Fidelity itself already a small firm, to a $340 million fund here by 1965 when Bogle is taking over Wellington from Mr. Morgan. So this is actually the backdrop to why Morgan decided to hand the firm to Jack here in 1965 even though Jack is still so young. Morgan had a crisis of confidence. He's not sure that he's gonna be able to operate and be successful in this new go-go era. This is uncharted territory to him.
Ben Gilbert 38:37 Hmm.
David Rosenthal 38:38 So he actually gives a quote to Institutional Investor Magazine when the handover is happening to Jack. He says, quote, "I have been too conservative." [laughs] And when he hands the firm to Jack, his direction to Bogle is, "I want you to do whatever it takes to fix this firm."
Ben Gilbert 38:59 Hmm.
David Rosenthal 38:59 Like, we need to do something different.
Ben Gilbert 39:01 So he's got the mandate. He's got the clear path to do as he sees fit.
David Rosenthal 39:05 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 39:05 So this isn't just succession. This is, "Hey, you should completely change our strategy to compete in this new era."
David Rosenthal 39:11 Yes, yes. So Wellington and its kinda whole class of funds, the, the balanced funds that we had talked about, you know, it's stocks and bonds together, complete investment program in one security-
Ben Gilbert 39:23 Yep
David Rosenthal 39:23 ... before the go-go era, that balanced style was 40% of the entire fund market in 1955.
Ben Gilbert 39:32 Hmm.
David Rosenthal 39:32 That had declined by 1965 all the way down to 17% and would just keep dropping. By 1975, 10 years after that, it was down to less than 1% of the entire market. They were going the way of the dodo basically. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 39:47 So investors are looking to transition away from this blended stocks and bonds to funds that are only stocks and stocks that are trading often and trying to hit the highest number possible this year in their returns and, you know, taking some risk to do so.
David Rosenthal 40:03 Well, yeah, and specifically I think they don't even care that much about the underlying stocks. They want trades that book quick profits. You know-
Ben Gilbert 40:10 Mm-hmm
David Rosenthal 40:10 ... they want what Fidelity and Jerry Tsai are doing. Like, I don't care if you trade in and out of the stocks. I don't care if you hold GE for a day or a week or a year. If you buy it at five and you sell it at 10, like, hell yeah, let's go. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 40:23 It's funny, I associate this with the '80s. I don't think I realized that it was also happening in the kinda 1965 to 1971 era.
David Rosenthal 40:32 Yeah, the '80s were an echo of this that happens-
Ben Gilbert 40:34 Hmm
David Rosenthal 40:34 ... here in the '60s.
Jack Takes the Reins & The Ivest Merger (1965)
Ben Gilbert 40:36 Okay.
David Rosenthal 40:36 Yep. So all this is happening right at the same time here in 1965 as Jack is taking the reins at Wellington. Jerry Tsai, the, you know, celebrity fund manager here at Fidelity, he starts to think, "All right, you know, Mr. Johnson here, you're getting older. I think I should take over the firm." [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 40:59 Of course he does.
David Rosenthal 41:00 Of course he does, right? Like, he's got the star fund, all the clients. He's the man about town, et cetera.
Ben Gilbert 41:06 Tail is oldest time.
David Rosenthal 41:07 Yep. Johnson, of course, has other opinions. Uh, "No, this is my firm. This is my family business, and I'm planning to give it to my son, Ned Johnson, Edward Johnson III." So Tsai says, "Okay, fine. Buy me out of the equity that I've accumulated here in Fidelity in the management company through my performance, and, um, I'll go start my own fund." He does. He leaves. He starts a fund called The Manhattan Fund. In a absolutely wild you cannot make this stuff up, he would eventually take over the American Can Company [laughs] you know, that had been, like, co-founded by Jack's grandfather.
Ben Gilbert 41:47 Whoa.
David Rosenthal 41:48 Yes. Tsai would become the CEO of that. He would transform that into Primerica and then sell it to Sandy Weill and Jamie Dimon, and that would be part of the building block of Citigroup. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 42:02 What?
David Rosenthal 42:03 Insane. [laughs] Completely insane. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 42:06 I had no idea. It's funny, when you were giving the history of the Can Company earlier, I was like, is it really relevant for listeners h- uh, the vehicle through which Bogle's grandfather built the family business?
David Rosenthal 42:21 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 42:22 And it turns out-
David Rosenthal 42:23 That becomes Citigroup. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 42:25 That's wild.
David Rosenthal 42:26 Through Fidelity and Jamie Dimon and it... All, all of this stuff. You can't make this up.
Ben Gilbert 42:32 Wow.
David Rosenthal 42:32 So this is the stew that's happening as Jack is taking over, and pretty quickly he decides that the best course of action for him as the new leader of Wellington is to take the well, if you can't beat them, join them approach. Or more specifically, have them join you.So he goes out and he starts looking for Go-Go style fund managers to merge with and absorb into Wellington, and transform Wellington into what Fidelity has done.
Ben Gilbert 43:03 And I think first he was trying to hire people like this, but he couldn't convince anyone to just join as an employee. He, he sorta realized, "Oh, I'm gonna have to buy one of their firms."
David Rosenthal 43:12 Yeah, I mean, hey, if Jerry Tsai just left because he didn't get a big equity piece in Fidelity and take over the firm, like anybody else who thinks they're as good as him, you know, they're gonna want an equity piece in the management company.
Ben Gilbert 43:24 Yep.
David Rosenthal 43:24 So he casts about, and eventually Jack finds a small new firm in Boston founded by four young partners, Thorndike, Doran, Payne, and Lewis. And the lead partner there, Nick Thorndike, had just come out of Fidelity, where he had worked with Jerry Tsai-
Ben Gilbert 43:44 Mm
David Rosenthal 43:44 ... and Ned Johnson. And so they've raised a new fund called Ivest, investing in the Go-Go style. They're young hotshots. They have $17 million under management in their nascent Go-Go fund. Wellington at this point has $2 billion [laughs] under management.
Ben Gilbert 44:06 Which is huge. That's giant market share-
David Rosenthal 44:08 Yes
Ben Gilbert 44:09 ... even though they're-
David Rosenthal 44:10 Declining rapidly [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 44:11 ... investing in the old style of investments.
David Rosenthal 44:13 Yes. But back to the business model of the management companies where you're getting paid fees based on a percentage of assets under management, like the revenue and fee streams flowing into Wellington even though they're declining are-
Ben Gilbert 44:23 Super high
David Rosenthal 44:24 ... way higher than the startup Ivest Fund out of Boston. Nonetheless, Wellington and Jack feel like they're in such dire straits and need this merger, need to bring this Go-Go blood into the firm so much that he ends up offering 40% of the equity in the management company to the four partners coming in from Ivest.
Ben Gilbert 44:50 Oof. That's almost a merger of equals.
David Rosenthal 44:52 [laughs] Yeah. $2 billion for Wellington, $17 million from Ivest, 60/40 split on the equity. There's a quote in The New York Times in a lead story about this merger, "Some observers feel that Wellington paid too high a price for management personnel. Many persons are said to credit the Boston group with a major coup. Mr. Bogle disagrees. With generous offers, he had been unable to hire the men he wanted," to your point, Ben, "and he did not wanna wait for promising men to develop their skills." This is a big deal. I mean, Wellington is still, even though its style is on the outs, one of the, you know, top 10 mutual funds in the entire industry. Institutional Investor Magazine runs a cover story on the merger titled The Whiz Kids Take Over at Wellington.
Ben Gilbert 45:43 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 45:44 And they have an illustration on the cover, you can find this on the internet, we'll include it in the email, with Jack as a four-armed quarterback- [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 45:51 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 45:51 ... handing off footballs to each of the four Ivest partners as, you know, the running backs to take them across the line to score touchdowns here. Oof. What could go wrong? What could go wrong?
Ben Gilbert 46:02 What could go wrong?
David Rosenthal 46:03 Yeah.
The Go-Go Bust & Jack's Crisis of Conscience (1970-1973)
David Rosenthal 46:04 Well, as you can predict, after a couple more Go-Go years, the bubble bursts. In the 1970s, the oil crisis hit, stagflation hits, the stock market declines 50%. It is not quite Great Depression levels, but you and I, Ben, have also never lived through anything like the 1970s in the US. It was bad. It was a lost decade.
Ben Gilbert 46:29 Even 2008 was not this severe. Certainly the, uh, short-lived COVID crash was not this severe. Uh, software going out of favor in 2022 was not this severe. The dot-com bubble burst was not this severe. This is something that very few listeners will sorta understand the magnitude of and, and feel intrinsically how bad this was.
David Rosenthal 46:47 Yeah, I mean, interest rates went to 21% by the end of this.
Ben Gilbert 46:52 Oof.
David Rosenthal 46:52 [laughs] I mean, the world basically fell apart a couple years ago when interest rates went to what? Like five. You know-
Ben Gilbert 46:58 Yeah
David Rosenthal 46:58 ... can you imagine?
Ben Gilbert 47:00 So what was the good years of the Go-Go time, and then when did it fall apart?
David Rosenthal 47:04 Through the '60s and then probably like 1970, 1971 it starts falling apart, and then once the oil crises start hitting in '72, '73, '74, Go-Go just completely falls apart. So the Ivest Fund, they ported over the Ivest Fund itself into Wellington. It had continued to perform during the Go-Go years. It gets a drawdown of 65% in one year, and they ultimately shutter the fund, like they close it down.
Ben Gilbert 47:33 They closed down the Ivest Fund entirely?
David Rosenthal 47:34 They closed down the Ivest Fund.
Ben Gilbert 47:35 Oh, wow.
David Rosenthal 47:36 Yeah, yeah.
Ben Gilbert 47:36 But hadn't they already shifted the Wellington Fund's style-
David Rosenthal 47:41 Yes
Ben Gilbert 47:41 ... to look a lot more like Ivest's?
David Rosenthal 47:43 Oh, yes.
Ben Gilbert 47:44 So Wellington was suffering too, right? The, the fund.
David Rosenthal 47:46 Wellington was suffering too. I mean, really, like Wellington is just a, a battered ship [laughs] taking on water on all sides at this point because it had been out of favor during the Go-Go years 'cause it was too conservative and too balanced.
Ben Gilbert 47:59 It was underperforming the market because of that.
David Rosenthal 48:01 Underperforming the market. Then it transformed basically into a Go-Go fund.
Ben Gilbert 48:07 Took on a lot more risk.
David Rosenthal 48:08 A lot more risk. Then that falls off a cliff. By 1973, the assets of the Wellington Fund have fallen all the way from $2 billion at the time of the merger down to $480 million. So over three quarters of the assets in the fund, and thus three quarters of the revenue to the management company, poof, up in smoke.
Ben Gilbert 48:31 Now, all of that wasn't because of the assets decreasing in value. A lot of that was redemptions-
David Rosenthal 48:36 Yes
Ben Gilbert 48:36 ... where investors are taking their money-
David Rosenthal 48:37 Client withdrawals, yeah
Ben Gilbert 48:37 ... and going elsewhere, but doesn't matter to the management company. For, for them, AUM is AUM.
David Rosenthal 48:41 And this is... Somebody made this point to me in research. Management companies of investment firms have phenomenal operating leverage, as we talked about earlier.
Ben Gilbert 48:51 Hmm.
David Rosenthal 48:52 As you are growing-... your funds under management, you don't have to scale your headcount or your operations or your costs in the same way, and so you can get this, you know, amazing operating leverage and profits.
Ben Gilbert 49:02 Much like a software business.
David Rosenthal 49:04 Much like a software business. Unfortunately, that works in both directions. So-
Ben Gilbert 49:09 Right
David Rosenthal 49:09 ... if your assets under management ever start to shrink, that goes away very quickly. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 49:15 You still have almost all the exact same operational responsibility that you did when you had lots of assets when you have a smaller number of assets.
David Rosenthal 49:22 Yep. And thanks to the merger, there are now four new partners around the table with mouths to feed who own 40% of the management company. So then in the midst of all this, [laughs] to complicate things even further, Jack starts to develop a crisis of conscience. As all these losses are piling up at Wellington and clients are withdrawing, and they're shutting down the Ivest Fund, he starts wondering, you know, first to himself and then aloud to his partners, "Guys, what are we doing here? Like, we're still taking fees from our fund clients. Yes, our assets under management are shrinking, so our fee stream is shrinking, but for the clients who are sticking with us, we're not lowering our costs. We're still getting paid pretty well, and we're just incinerating their capital. Something feels wrong here."
Ben Gilbert 50:21 I've heard this referred to as his Jerry Maguire moment-
David Rosenthal 50:24 Yes
Ben Gilbert 50:24 ... in the book The Bogle Effect-
David Rosenthal 50:26 Yes
Ben Gilbert 50:26 ... where, uh, in that famous scene in, in Jerry Maguire where he loses confidence in the entire industry of-
David Rosenthal 50:32 Yep
Ben Gilbert 50:32 ... being a sports agent and writes a letter and says, "Guys, we're gonna do this right."
David Rosenthal 50:37 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 50:37 "We should change everything and, and blow up our whole business." And, uh, as usual, you know how that is received.
David Rosenthal 50:43 Well, so Jack's Jerry Maguire moment here is he gives a speech to the whole firm where he throws out this idea that, "Hey, maybe we should actually mutualize the firm's funds, dissolve the management company or have the fund itself acquire the management company, and eliminate all of the excess profits that we are making and just solely serve our fund holders, operate at cost, and at least reduce or get as close to eliminate as possible the fees that they are paying for this frankly not very good service that we are providing them."
Ben Gilbert 51:21 A mutually owned group of mutual funds or a mutual mutual, as Jack loved to say.
David Rosenthal 51:28 [laughs] Yes, indeed. Now, buy it out, why would they have to do that if Jack and potentially his partners out of the goodness of their hearts were, were gonna give it to the fund holders? Well, before Mr. Morgan retired, he had taken the management company public, like floated it on the stock exchange.
Ben Gilbert 51:46 That's right.
David Rosenthal 51:46 So there were public shareholders there in the management company, in Wellington Management Company, along with Jack and along with the four Ivest partners.
Ben Gilbert 51:55 So you not only have to get, you know, your camp, the Philadelphia camp, to agree, but you need the Boston guys to get on board too that are a big voting block at 40% and all these public shareholders. And why would anyone do this?
David Rosenthal 52:08 Right.
Ben Gilbert 52:09 Because it's not rational or economic. It's, uh-
David Rosenthal 52:12 Right
Ben Gilbert 52:12 ... charity. Let's take this business that generates a bunch of cash and has enterprise value, let's stop generating the cash, and let's take its enterprise value and effectively call it zero now-
David Rosenthal 52:23 Yes
Ben Gilbert 52:23 ... and give it to the funds itself.
David Rosenthal 52:24 Commit suicide with the company effectively. Yeah, and just to really highlight this again, it's kinda easy in retrospect to look at this and be like, "Oh, Jack, he was, like, so morally upstanding, and he stood up against Wall Street and, like, all of the, you know, crooks and fees out there." That's not the case. This was how the industry operated. Nobody was asking for this. [laughs] No other firm changed how they operated. No other firm reduced their fees or mutualized. No clients got mad about it. The government was fine with it.
Ben Gilbert 52:58 There were not protest groups outside of headquarters.
David Rosenthal 53:00 Yeah, there's no-
Ben Gilbert 53:01 This was-
David Rosenthal 53:01 ... Occupy Wall Street in the 1970s. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 53:03 Purely him saying, "Nobody's asking, but I think we should do this."
David Rosenthal 53:07 "I think this is the right thing to do." Like, it is really lunatic fringe. To the extent there is a moral conflict, it exists solely in Jack's kinda head and in his heart. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 53:18 Yep.
David Rosenthal 53:19 So Ben, as you said, as you can imagine, this goes over like a lead balloon within the partnership-
Ben Gilbert 53:24 Yes
David Rosenthal 53:24 ... which is already quite stressed with all of the problems going on.
Jack is Fired: The Genesis of Vanguard (1974)
David Rosenthal 53:28 So after Jack proposes this on January 23rd, 1974 at the Wellington Management Company board meeting, the four Ivest partners band together, rally enough votes from the public shareholders, and they fire Jack as CEO of Wellington Management Company.
Ben Gilbert 53:50 And this is a few years after his original proposal for mutualization, for making the, the fund self-owning. There is this multi-year drawn out sort of struggle between them where they just don't see eye to eye on anything. They have completely different philosophies, and it gets so contentious, you know, they, they ask Jack to quit. He says, "I refuse."
David Rosenthal 54:11 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 54:11 You know, he, he even writes a many, many, many page m- memo, speech, gives it to the whole board of directors, uh, espousing how much he refuses, and then they formally actually do fire him.
David Rosenthal 54:20 Yeah, yeah. This is an extreme event. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 54:23 Yes.
David Rosenthal 54:23 An extreme event.
Ben Gilbert 54:25 And from Jack's perspective, he partnered with these guys. They came in. It was a fox in the henhouse, and they forced him out of his own company.
David Rosenthal 54:31 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 54:31 And that is sort of how he is viewing it.
David Rosenthal 54:33 Yep. And from their perspective, this guy lost his marbles.
Ben Gilbert 54:36 We had public shareholders to look after.
David Rosenthal 54:38 So January 23rd, 1974, Jack is fired as CEO of Wellington Management Company.
Ben Gilbert 54:47 But-
David Rosenthal 54:48 Now, here's the thing. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 54:51 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 54:51 Wellington Management Company and the actual Wellington Fund, and at this point in time funds, they had several funds-Are technically separate legal entities. So Jack was CEO of Wellington Management Company. He was also the chairman of each of the individual funds, which collectively together had their own separate board of directors for the funds. There was one board of directors that represented all the funds, and Jack is chairman of that board of directors.
Ben Gilbert 55:18 Now, up until this point in time in the history of American financial organizations, that's a footnote.
David Rosenthal 55:26 Right.
Ben Gilbert 55:26 That doesn't matter.
David Rosenthal 55:27 That's like a legal technicality.
Ben Gilbert 55:28 It's like yeah, yeah, yeah, the funds have their own directors, but like really the management company, the funds, it's all kind of one thing run by the same group of people.
David Rosenthal 55:35 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 55:35 They were about to find out just how powerful that technicality was.
David Rosenthal 55:40 [laughs] Or Jack was about to test it, shall we say.
Ben Gilbert 55:43 Yes. Yes.
David Rosenthal 55:44 So he hatches a plan. He's like, "All right. Well, you guys gonna kick me out of the management company and think I'm just gonna go quietly into the night? You don't know Jack Bogle." [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 55:54 And for anyone who is not in finance, PE, venture, anywhere in, in the financial ecosystem, th- the funds traditionally have the right to select what investment manager they want, and the investors in the fund who elect a board of directors of the fund rely on that board of the fund or the management of the fund to pick the investor. So the funds actually do have the power to pick whether or not they wanna stay with Wellington Management or go find a new company that could advise them on how to invest this pool of capital.
David Rosenthal 56:34 Right, or do something different, et cetera. Nobody had ever tested this idea before though. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 56:39 Yes. Yes.
David Rosenthal 56:41 So the next day after Jack is fired as CEO of the management company, he calls a special meeting of the board of directors of the funds, which is his prerogative as chairman, and he proposes that they as the board of the funds vote to, one, do just what you said, Ben, sever the management company relationship with Wellington Management Company, and two, do Jack's, uh, you know, fever dream idea, mutualize all the management and operations of the funds, hire their own staff, and run it all directly within the fund with no separate external management company or fees.
Ben Gilbert 57:22 The phrase that comes to mind here, although it is used completely differently in this context than its original context, is, "Your margin is my opportunity," Jeff Bezos.
David Rosenthal 57:33 [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 57:34 And in this case it's not the Amazonian comment which is, "Hey, you're charging high margins, I'm gonna charge a lower margin so I'm gonna get your customers," it's, "Hey, I'm gonna slash margins as close to zero as possible. I'm gonna mutualize the ownership of this thing. I'm gonna make it-
David Rosenthal 57:46 Quite actually to zero, not as close to zero as possible. There are, there's not gonna no longer gonna be any profits. There will still be costs.
Ben Gilbert 57:51 Right.
David Rosenthal 57:51 We will operate at cost, but we will forgo all profits.
Ben Gilbert 57:55 Right. It's effectively like a poison pill. Like they're not gonna get rich, I'm not gonna get rich. There's these high margins, and I'm gonna use the fact that you're making high margins as my opportunity to come in and say, "Nobody's gonna make any money. We're gonna shift it all to this new organization that I'm gonna create, and nobody's making anything."
David Rosenthal 58:14 Yep. So how do the fund board of directors [laughs] react to this? Um, perhaps not quite as negatively as the management company partners and board of directors, but they're still pretty shocked. [laughs] They're like, "Wow. Okay, Jack. Um, you know, we've heard you talk about this before. Um, obviously we're in an acute situation here."
Ben Gilbert 58:38 "And you're kinda conflicted, buddy."
David Rosenthal 58:40 Yeah, yeah. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 58:41 Uh, are, are you being vindictive maybe?
David Rosenthal 58:43 Yes. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 58:44 Is there anything motivating you, uh, really pressing us to take all the profits and slash them to zero and go with your like brand new company that you're proposing here?
David Rosenthal 58:53 Yep, yep. But here's the thing. Jack does have a very good point, especially to the directors of the fund whose fiduciary duty is to do what's in the best interest of the fund holders. What he's proposing is pretty obviously in the best interest of the fund holders.
Ben Gilbert 59:10 Right. He's making the pitch to sort of a non-conflicted group. The, the board of the funds theoretically is only looking after the investors in the funds and not the shareholders of the management company.
David Rosenthal 59:23 Indeed. So the fund board says like, "Okay, we need a pause. [laughs] We need a recess. We need a little more time for the dust to settle and figure out what to do here. Let's take a month, and Jack, we will direct you since you wanna do this to go prepare a study, a feasibility study of like what are the available options to us as the fund and the board of the funds."
Ben Gilbert 59:48 'Cause you're kinda just proposing the nuclear one here.
David Rosenthal 59:50 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 59:50 Can we get the whole gradient?
David Rosenthal 59:51 Give us the full gradient.
Ben Gilbert 59:52 'Cause it is kinda nice relying on Wellington. I mean, they've built out a lot of infrastructure here on the management company for us to do what we do. I- it'd be a little bit nuts to just say, "Sorry, we're starting something new from whole cloth."
David Rosenthal 1:00:05 Yeah, from scratch. So Jack goes away, prepares a 250-page report. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:00:10 Of course.
David Rosenthal 1:00:11 It's like he's back in his Carroll at Firestone, uh, you know, uh, library writing his senior thesis again.
Ben Gilbert 1:00:17 And it's full of data. I mean, he has really, really done the research, done the math. He is making a extremely well-formed pitch here.
David Rosenthal 1:00:26 Yep. So the thesis statement of this report that he presents to the board the next month in February reads, quote, "The present structure has been the accepted norm for the mutual fund industry for 50 years. The issue we face is whether a structure so traditional, so long accepted, so satisfactory for an infant industry as it grew during a time of less stringent ethical and legal standards is really the optimum structure for these times and for the future and for the Wellington group of investment companies, or rather should the funds seek greater control over their own-"Destiny? [laughs] And obviously Jack's answer to the question is yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:01:08 I mean, fire and brimstone. He's got a preacher in him.
David Rosenthal 1:01:10 He, he's motivated. He is motivated here. A- and he actually has a telling quote in his memoir that I, I think speaks to his mindset at the time. He says, "Yes, mutualization of, of the fund and the fund's activities was totally my idea, and I realized that a mutual company would never provide me with the personal fortune that so many denizens of Wall Street would earn. But it offered, I believe, my last best chance to resume my career." Uh, obviously it's both here. Jack is idealistic, and this is his chance to save his career. This is his opportunity of last resort.
Ben Gilbert 1:01:52 Yes.
David Rosenthal 1:01:52 Ultimately, the fund board comes back and does vote with Jack, barely. [laughs] Infinitesimally barely.
Ben Gilbert 1:02:04 They, they carve out a small job for him to do.
David Rosenthal 1:02:07 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:02:07 But not the, the whole thing that he had asked for.
David Rosenthal 1:02:10 Yes. They say, "Okay, you can remain chairman of the funds, and we will endorse some very, very small degree of separation from Wellington Management Company, but not everything, and not to start. We will empower you to go form a new subsidiary company of the funds, collectively owned by the funds and thus the clients in the funds, and we will authorize that company to take over fund administration only." So not investment management, not marketing and distribution. Those will remain with Wellington Management Company, but we will run a little experiment, all the back office: tax, accounting, legal, fund holder registers, et cetera.
Ben Gilbert 1:03:00 Which is Jack's least favorite thing to do.
David Rosenthal 1:03:03 [laughs] Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 1:03:03 I mean, which is everyone's least favorite thing to do. I mean, the, the, the fun stuff is picking what to invest in and seeing if you can then go out and, you know, sell clients and bring in new money. Traditionally, it's fun to be the stock picker or it's fun to be the salesperson. It's not fun to be th- the person making sure the accounting checks out.
David Rosenthal 1:03:23 Yep. A- a- and indeed, most management companies outsource this. They don't do it themselves.
Ben Gilbert 1:03:26 Yep. And technically, he was explicitly precluded from offering investment advisory services.
David Rosenthal 1:03:34 To the funds, yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:03:35 To the funds.
David Rosenthal 1:03:36 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:03:36 Store that away, listeners.
David Rosenthal 1:03:38 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 1:03:38 Keep that in mind. And Jack logs the win. He's like, "Cool. I got something."
David Rosenthal 1:03:41 Yep. Yeah, so I mean, hey, look, it was either his career is over and he's, you know, out on the street proverbially-
Ben Gilbert 1:03:48 Although wealthy. I mean, he's-
David Rosenthal 1:03:49 Yes
Ben Gilbert 1:03:49 ... he's, like, medium wealthy by this point. He's had a 20-year career during a great era running a f- finance company when the finance company had pretty fat profits.
David Rosenthal 1:04:00 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 1:04:00 So he's made, I don't know, I'm gonna guess $5 million, and he wasn't a big spender, so doing pretty well.
David Rosenthal 1:04:06 Yeah. Depends how much salary and draw he was taking from the management company. But [laughs] of course he's gonna take this opportunity. Whatever I can get.
Ben Gilbert 1:04:14 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:04:14 So he's like, "Great, let's do it." He writes in his memoirs, "I knew a rough road lay ahead, for my goal ultimately was to build a broad-based firm." In other words, take over everything. [laughs] Fully cut Wellington out. "And I took on my new leadership role in the same way I had left my previous leadership role, fired with enthusiasm." [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:04:39 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:04:39 Boy. Fired with great fire and brimstone would be a, a better way to put it.
Ben Gilbert 1:04:45 Yes.
David Rosenthal 1:04:46 So once the fund board votes for this, other people in the industry hear about it, of course. And Wellington, even though they're much smaller now, is still a widely known, well-respected, big firm in the industry. The reaction is severe. So Forbes Magazine runs a piece about all of this infighting happening at Wellington, with the headline borrowing from the famous curse from Romeo and Juliet of, "A plague on both houses," they declare. [laughs] Like, these guys, they're ruining it for everybody. Jack tells an anecdote at the beginning of, of the book Stay the Course, which is his memoirs, that around this time he travels out to Los Angeles, when while he's there he gets an urgent message from the head of Capital Group out there, which is a big active fund manager in Los Angeles. John Lovelace Jr., the head of Capital Group, says he needs to meet with Jack privately. Jack's like, "Well, my schedule's pretty booked. I got a lot going on here right now. Um, I'm flying out of LAX tomorrow. The only time I could do would be, like, a 6:00 AM breakfast at LAX tomorrow before my flight home to Philadelphia." Lovelace is like, "Okay, fine. I'm there."
Ben Gilbert 1:05:55 Hmm.
David Rosenthal 1:05:55 Jack shows up. Lovelace is already sitting down. He's, like, stone cold, and he says, "I hear you're planning to mutualize the Wellington Fund." And Jack says, "Uh, yes, John, that's right. In fact, I got the votes. We're, we're starting the process."
Ben Gilbert 1:06:10 Eh, ish.
David Rosenthal 1:06:11 Ish. Y- [laughs] yeah, ish. And John turns to him and says, "If you do that, you will destroy this entire industry." [laughs] Now, of course, what's fascinating is that, uh, you know, Capital Group and active management today has kinda never been better. Capital Group manages 3 trillion in assets.
Ben Gilbert 1:06:29 You can see why they had the fear, which is if you provide this existence proof that you can run this business at cost and you don't need to pay huge sums of money to the people managing this, then our customers will demand the same from us, which is sort of right, because you can buy an S&P 500 index fund from basically anyone today at basically no cost, but also sort of wrong, because Capital Group, BlackRock, Fidelity, these are all giant profitable companies.
David Rosenthal 1:06:58 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:06:58 And so I think the, the interesting thing to sorta tease out across the rest of this episode is the competitors were probably right to be terrified of this sort of communist act where they took a crown jewel of capitalism and, and communized it. But at the same time-
David Rosenthal 1:07:14 Kinda like the NFL, it ended up being great for everybody.
Ben Gilbert 1:07:17 Right. Right.
David Rosenthal 1:07:18 So yes. So-Jack's starting down the path. The first thing that this new subsidiary company needs is a name. So right as this is happening, Jack gets a visit from an antiques dealer, again, you can't make this stuff up, who offers him some prints of British naval ships from the Duke of Wellington era. Uh, the Duke of Wellington was the British prime minister and military leader for whom Walter Morgan had named the Wellington firm. Jack is looking through the prints, and one of them is of a ship, the HMS Vanguard, which was the flagship in the naval Battle of the Nile where the British forces defeated Napoleon and ensured British independence and the state of Europe for centuries to come. And so on the spot he decides Vanguard is the name. [laughs] Which is hilarious because Vanguard is a great name. It is steadfast, trustworthy, everything we think of it today.
Ben Gilbert 1:08:18 Short, memorable, unique.
David Rosenthal 1:08:19 Exactly. Memorable. It also, you know, it's the vanguard, it's the leader, it's a pioneer, it's leading a revolution. But knowing all the history now, like, obviously Jack chose the name because it represented total victory [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:08:33 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:08:33 And, like, complete annihilation of the other side. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:08:36 Yes.
David Rosenthal 1:08:37 Ah. So funny. Not at all how people think of the brand today. So in September of 1974, The Vanguard Group files for incorporation, commencing operations and taking over the back office of the Wellington Fund and the other funds that Wellington managed.
Ben Gilbert 1:08:59 Exciting.
David Rosenthal 1:09:00 Nobody cared. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:09:02 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:09:03 All of the great fear that, you know, John Lovelace at Capital Group and Forbes and everybody else in the industry had about this is gonna destroy everything, this is gonna burn the industry to the ground.
Ben Gilbert 1:09:14 Well, 'cause it didn't actually get mutualized.
David Rosenthal 1:09:16 Yeah. Nobody cares.
Ben Gilbert 1:09:17 If any venture capitalists are out there listening, or private equity guys, or if you're in the investment management business, okay, you switch back offices. This happens all the time. This happens every five years. This has n- no bearing on your peers in the industry. What would have a lot of bearing is if you said, "Oh, all of my fees and all of my sort of performance compensation, that we're just gonna take down to at cost." That would be significant, but that is not what this is.
David Rosenthal 1:09:42 No, it was not. And it turned out that Jack would need to lead another second and totally separate revolution as well before anyone would pay attention to what he was doing. A revolution not in the legal structure of funds, but in the very nature of the investment product that they offered.
Ben Gilbert 1:10:05 But David, I thought he was barred from doing that.
David Rosenthal 1:10:07 [laughs] Well, if you're not offering any investment advice at all...
Ben Gilbert 1:10:14 Perhaps you still could be in the business of deciding what to invest in if you're not actually doing any deciding.
David Rosenthal 1:10:22 Yes. And that second revolution would be the index fund.
Ben Gilbert 1:10:28 Yep.
David Rosenthal 1:10:29 But before we tell that story, now is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow.
Ben Gilbert 1:10:35 Yes, it is. Listeners, if you are running a large enterprise, then AI agents are likely spread across every single team, and deploying them is actually not the hard part anymore.
David Rosenthal 1:10:47 Yep. The hard part is knowing what permissions they have, what employees are using them for, or what decisions AI is making. AI security for an enterprise at scale is not a small concern. The risks are real.
Ben Gilbert 1:11:00 Yep. So if you think about the companies like the ones we cover, at that scale you can't have a blind spot. Your systems, your employees, your permissions, they all need to be accounted for to maintain customer trust. That is the problem that many companies have with AI right now. A lot of intelligence, but n- not enough visibility.
David Rosenthal 1:11:19 Yep. And that is what ServiceNow does. Building on top of their end-to-end enterprise workflows, every device on your network, every permission across every system, your AI agents, all visible and secure in one place.
Ben Gilbert 1:11:32 They've been at this for over 20 years. Today, they run the workflows behind more than 85% of the Fortune 500, over 95 billion workflows a year. A big part of the world already works with ServiceNow.
David Rosenthal 1:11:44 And now, as the AI control tower, they're giving companies a single place to manage all of it, turning AI chaos into AI control.
Ben Gilbert 1:11:52 So listeners, if you are thinking about how to scale AI securely, go check out servicenow.com/acquired, and just tell them that Ben and David sent you. So David, the creation of the first commercially available index fund for retail investor consumers.
David Rosenthal 1:12:11 [laughs] Yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:12:14 People really care, right? They're, they're, they're lining up ar- around the block for this thing. It's the most-
David Rosenthal 1:12:18 [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:12:18 ... hotly anticipated financial product of all time. Except that it's not at all.
David Rosenthal 1:12:23 It's so funny. This would change the world, and not just, like, a little bit, like, a massive, massive impact.
Ben Gilbert 1:12:30 Most of all of your net worth is in these funds.
David Rosenthal 1:12:34 Yeah. People today are concerned that index and passive funds are too much of the market. What will happen to corporate governance when 70% of the equity ownership of America's companies are all in passive index funds? [laughs] Like, there's, you know, existential fear happening right now. That could not be farther away from the reaction in the industry to the launch of these things 50 years ago.
The Journal Article That Inspired It All (1974-1976)
Ben Gilbert 1:13:03 Okay, so David, take us to 1974 and the journal article that inspired it all.
David Rosenthal 1:13:10 Yes, the Journal of Portfolio Management, where Nobel Prize-winning American economist Paul Samuelson had written that fall in 1974 that-He had been studying market returns and active fund manager returns in this new mutual fund industry, and he had found no actual evidence that any fund managers could systematically outperform the market. And in the conclusion of the paper, he argues that, well, there's an obvious, uh, opportunity here. Somebody should come along and offer a fund that, quote, "Apes the whole market, requires no load, and keeps commissions, turnover, and management fees to the feasible minimum," AKA an index fund.
Ben Gilbert 1:14:06 And interestingly, I actually didn't realize he proposed the sort of commercial availability of it like that. The part of it that I read was, "Some large foundation should set up an in-house portfolio that tracks the S&P 500 index if only for the purposes of setting up a naive model against which their in-house gunslingers can measure their prowess."
David Rosenthal 1:14:26 Yeah, no, he was thinking about distribution to retail, like, in that paper by talking about no load. But you are touching on something. This idea of an index fund that would passively track the stock market was not totally new. A couple people in institutional circles had had the same or similar realization in the years leading up to this, that this could be an interesting idea. And in fact, the whole idea of having an index or indices in the first place really is the precursor to this idea. Like, people wanted some way to measure the entire market. I mean, that's what the Standard & Poor's 500 is. That's what the Dow Jones Industrial Average is. These things go all the way back to the 1800s. Like, newspapers wanted a way to report on the movement of the market.
Ben Gilbert 1:15:21 The delicious thing is that it took, like, 100 years from the founding of those to think, "Huh, maybe this isn't just a benchmark we should measure ourselves against, but maybe this is actually a great investment product."
David Rosenthal 1:15:33 Yes, this could be an asset class in and of itself.
Ben Gilbert 1:15:36 And it makes sense because why would anyone want to buy the average? I mean, why would you want to own the 50th percentile of the market? Isn't the whole point to work with a great investment manager who can beat the market? Why would you just want beta? You want alpha on top of beta. It's not a immediately saleable proposition to say, "Hey, don't you wanna be average?"
David Rosenthal 1:16:02 Right. Right. It's uniquely counter to the sort of whole American way of being [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:16:08 [laughs] Right
David Rosenthal 1:16:08 ... an aspiration of America.
Ben Gilbert 1:16:10 American exceptionalism.
David Rosenthal 1:16:12 It's funny, if this had all been in Europe or somewhere else, it might have emerged sooner.
Ben Gilbert 1:16:15 [laughs] That's funny.
David Rosenthal 1:16:16 [laughs] Anyway, so yeah, a couple people had tried to make this idea work on the institutional side before. Most prominently, the pension management division of Wells Fargo, uh, so, like, the division of Wells Fargo that would manage and administer pensions for large corporations, they had actually created an index fund for the pension fund of the Samsonite Luggage Corporation a few years earlier.
Ben Gilbert 1:16:47 Amazing.
David Rosenthal 1:16:48 Incredible. But it had failed. They couldn't make it work 'cause actually this was a deceptively hard problem. In order to do this, to create a fund that continuously tracked something like the S&P 500 index, you needed a lot of software. You had to have automation. Humans could not do this.
Ben Gilbert 1:17:10 Right. The point of the S&P 500 is to create a subset of the total market that has essentially the same returns but with a smaller set of companies, so you don't need the thousands of companies. You just need this 500. But even setting up the systems to track 500 companies' movements day to day, sophisticated.
David Rosenthal 1:17:30 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 1:17:31 The other thing that makes it challenging is it's kind of expensive to buy, especially in whole share-denominated amounts, a representative correctly weighted set of the entire S&P 500. Today, the minimum quantity of dollars you would need to do it on your own without buying into a fund is about $3.5 million to-
David Rosenthal 1:17:52 Right
Ben Gilbert 1:17:52 ... to sort of m- minimum efficient or, or minimum representative S&P 500.
David Rosenthal 1:17:57 So couple years after this, along come Jack and Vanguard in this unique moment where they, they need something to make their model work, and computing and software is, like, just now starting to be capable of handling this.
Ben Gilbert 1:18:14 And Jack is reading the docs very carefully. He's having tight communication with his board of directors, and he realizes he's got a little bit of daylight here.
David Rosenthal 1:18:25 He's got a loophole, yep.
Ben Gilbert 1:18:26 Where he can say, "I am not actively taking Vanguard and having it offer investment advice in any way here. But what we do wanna do is we wanna create this new fund that will require no investment advisory services, that will purely be this index of the S&P 500, and we can run it under Vanguard, and it's within our mandate."
David Rosenthal 1:18:50 Yeah, we don't need to involve Wellington.
Ben Gilbert 1:18:52 His board agrees.
David Rosenthal 1:18:53 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 1:18:54 This is sort of the acid test. He goes and he says, "What do you think? Is this what you've given me permission for?" And they come back and say, "Yes."
David Rosenthal 1:18:59 Yes. As Jack puts it in his memoir, you know, kinda like, uh, you know, uh, rendering a guilty verdict in a legal trial, he and early Vanguard there had both the opportunity to commit the crime, or in this case, you know [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:19:12 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:19:13 ... uh, create the first index fund, but also the motivation to do so because this was the way around this prohibition against active management.
Ben Gilbert 1:19:22 And the thing that Jack was starting to realize, which is the culmination of his senior thesis and the Paul Samuelson article, is that-This could actually be very successful.
David Rosenthal 1:19:32 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 1:19:32 He runs the numbers 'cause he's Jack. The S&P index without the fees beat half the active managers, and over the full decade it would beat 78% of them. So Jack realized, wait a minute, it's impossible to run an index at zero cost, but at scale actually you could approach zero cost. If you just own the S&P, then you could beat three-quarters of the other mutual funds in the market. So there really could be something here.
David Rosenthal 1:20:01 Yeah. This is a really important subtle point. If you are able to pull this off and just own the average of the market, but do it at significantly lower fees than all of the other managers in the market, you will actually have top-tier performance. Because if your fee that you are charging your clients is lower than the average fee of the other managers in the market, well, now that delta between fund returns minus fees is much lower for you. So if you say, "Great, I'll just take the average, but I'm gonna actually get the average," you will do much better than most other people in the market.
Ben Gilbert 1:20:40 So here's the math to illustrate what a giant difference it is. You might hear, "Oh, a 1% fee, that's, that's not so bad." You know? And, and at this point it was actually higher than a 1% fee. It was 1.5 to 2, but let's just say 1%. But that's 1% of the total assets. So if the stock market were to return 7% but you owe 1% in fees, that's actually one-seventh of your gains-
David Rosenthal 1:21:03 Yeah
Ben Gilbert 1:21:04 ... that you are giving up or around 15% of the returns. And so when that happens year after year after year, it really cuts out your returns at the knees. And I did a little spreadsheeting just to check the math on this. If you invested $100,000 at age 25 and you got 7% market returns for 40 years, you'd end up with $1.5 million. But if you paid a 1% management fee along the way each year, that's a 6% annual return. Instead of $1.5 million you end up with $1 million.
David Rosenthal 1:21:34 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 1:21:34 That's an extra 50% for your retirement that you could make by not paying 1% in fees each year. I mean, the, the long-term impact is that people thought Bogle was sort of this zealot for indexing, and he hated active management, but that's not true. He was a zealot for low fees.
David Rosenthal 1:21:52 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 1:21:52 He always believed that, hey, active managers might be able to outperform the market, but like Samuelson observed, the durability of that is really, really hard to do and consistently outperform for decades. But what is really obvious is e- even with just a 1% fee, that's a 15% outperformance that every year you're starting with a disadvantage, and you gotta beat the market by 15% just to break even.
David Rosenthal 1:22:21 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 1:22:22 Gosh, I'd, I'd rather not have that structural disadvantage. That's the thing that is really Bogle's legacy and what he was obsessed with.
David Rosenthal 1:22:29 Yeah. Later in life Jack would come to, uh, call this the cost-matters hypothesis. And to your example there of an extra half a million dollars in a retirement account or a college fund or even just a savings account, that's why I said at the top of the show millions and millions and millions of people completely had their lives changed by this. An extra $500,000 or, you know, whatever base you start with, that's the difference between needing to rely on your kids to support you in retirement and being self-sufficient. That's the difference in educational outcomes for your family. That's so important just because of that 1% delta in fees.
Ben Gilbert 1:23:06 That's right. Another way to put it, active managers in aggregate mathematically cannot beat the market after fees, and the in aggregate is doing a lot of lifting there, but that's the point is the market is made up of active managers. They can't all beat themselves. Some will outperform in any given year and justify fees, but the median active manager will underperform by exactly the amount of their fees.
David Rosenthal 1:23:30 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:23:30 And since you can't-
David Rosenthal 1:23:30 Every single year
Ben Gilbert 1:23:31 ... reliably identify the winners in advance, especially when your goal is to stay invested for decades, the expected value of active management with fees as a whole is a negative expected value compared to an index fund without fees.
David Rosenthal 1:23:45 Yep. So back to 1975, 1976, and Jack and his merry crew, and they do indeed call [laughs] all employees at Vanguard crew members for many, many years 'cause of the ship and the nautical theme, et cetera.
Ben Gilbert 1:24:00 It's perfect.
David Rosenthal 1:24:01 Jack assigns one of the first employees, a guy named Jan Twardowski, to go write the software to do this, to create the first retail index fund. He goes off, writes it in the APL programming language on a timesharing computer in Philadelphia. Jack, meanwhile, goes off to Standard & Poor's headquarters and negotiates a licensing fee with them for the rights to use the S&P 500 Index as the basis for this first index fund. There's a great story that Jack tells on a podcast interview about this. He was negotiating with whoever the head of the department that ran the 500 was at S&P, and, uh, the guy was like, basically like, "Ah, I don't know. Gosh, should, should you be paying us? Should we be paying you? This is gonna be great marketing for us, uh..."
Ben Gilbert 1:24:50 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:24:50 They eventually land on Vanguard paying S&P $25,000 per year that they sort of pull out of thin air as the transaction value for this, which is absolutely hilarious because now index fund licensing is basically the entire business of indices around the world [laughs] and it is extremely high margin.
Ben Gilbert 1:25:13 I've got the numbers on this. People estimate that Vanguard pays S&P Global something like 3 to $400 million per year and is their single largest licensing client, and the licensing segment of their business as a whole does $1.85 billion a year. And to your point, David, that is-... essentially all profit.
David Rosenthal 1:25:33 Right.
Ben Gilbert 1:25:34 I mean, the whole world has agreed the S&P 500 is the standard brand for the market, and so they just get to take a rent of, uh, $1.85 billion a year for anybody who wants to make an index fund.
David Rosenthal 1:25:48 Great work if you can get it. Yep. Vanguard, BlackRock, Fidelity, State Street, all paying him a lot of money.
Ben Gilbert 1:25:55 And it's charged on a basis points of assets under management, or AUM-
David Rosenthal 1:26:01 [laughs] It's a management fee. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:26:03 Or a trading volume basis, and so it scales depending on how valuable it is to you as a client.
David Rosenthal 1:26:09 I did not know that. That is so deeply ironic. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:26:12 And I started looking, too, like why doesn't Vanguard push their total market one stronger, or why doesn't someone come up with a sort of synthetic thing that looks a lot like the S&P 500 but isn't the S&P 500? Fidelity tried that. Th- there is a 500 stock Fidelity fund that is not quite the S&P 500, or at least doesn't license the name, but people just don't flock to it. People want the standard.
David Rosenthal 1:26:37 They want the brand.
Ben Gilbert 1:26:38 It's a good business if you can get it.
David Rosenthal 1:26:39 It's the Intel Inside.
Ben Gilbert 1:26:40 Yep.
David Rosenthal 1:26:40 The ingredient brand. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:26:42 Yep.
David Rosenthal 1:26:43 Well, regardless, in 1976, Vanguard launches the First Index Investment Trust Fund.
Ben Gilbert 1:26:52 Terrible name.
David Rosenthal 1:26:53 Which today has been renamed to the much better [laughs] titled Vanguard 500 Index Fund, ticker VFIAX, the first retail index fund available to the public. Today, the second largest individual fund in the entire world with $1.5 trillion in assets, and second only to its own sister fund that you mentioned, Ben, the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund, which has $2.1 trillion in assets. $3.6 trillion between these two funds today.
Ben Gilbert 1:27:34 Which are effectively the same thing.
David Rosenthal 1:27:35 Effectively the same thing.
Ben Gilbert 1:27:36 If you own the S&P 500 or you own the entire US stock market, in the long run they're gonna be nearly identical returns.
David Rosenthal 1:27:43 And they, they both have, you know, their roots in this fund that Vanguard launches in 1976 with a broken IPO that raises [laughs] $11 million.
Ben Gilbert 1:27:54 Well, to the point we were talking about earlier, why would anyone wanna buy the average?
David Rosenthal 1:27:58 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 1:27:58 It's a terrible sales pitch. I wanna outperform. Don't pitch me on this. And by the way, we talked about sort of the far future where Vanguard's fees have come down so dramatically. I own the ETF, the VOO one.
David Rosenthal 1:28:10 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 1:28:11 I looked this morning. It's a three basis point management f- fee. That is a .03% management fee. It's near zero. Uh, you know, them and all their competitors are near zero. When this thing debuts, it actually has a significant management fee.
David Rosenthal 1:28:24 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 1:28:24 It's not as bad as the rest of the industry with a percent or a percent and a half or 2%, but it's still like .6-something.
David Rosenthal 1:28:30 .65 or something like that.
Ben Gilbert 1:28:32 So the pitch as a sub-scale index fund is do you want to be average, but actually with a significant drag from fees?
David Rosenthal 1:28:41 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:28:41 It's a bad pitch.
David Rosenthal 1:28:42 Well, and, and, and worse than that, so remember we talked about the three things that a management company does, and what the Vanguard, you know, fund board, the Wellington fund board allowed Jack to do? They said, "Hey, we'll let you just do administration, but investment advice and distribution still have to live with Wellington." Well, distribution is still through the stockbroker network with-
Ben Gilbert 1:29:05 Right
David Rosenthal 1:29:06 ... sales loads. So the only way that Jack and Vanguard can get around the distribution prohibition for this new fund, they figure out, is to do an IPO of it. So I said IPO. This is why there's an IPO.
Ben Gilbert 1:29:21 Mm.
David Rosenthal 1:29:21 So they rustle up a group of Wall Street banks, and I guess technically doing a one-time event of an IPO of the fund did not count as distribution-
Ben Gilbert 1:29:29 As distribution
David Rosenthal 1:29:29 ... and marketing.
Ben Gilbert 1:29:30 Huh.
David Rosenthal 1:29:31 So Vanguard was allowed to do it, and they think that they can raise and that they're gonna need about $150 million of initial fund holder capital in this fund to make it work, and they can't get the demand. [laughs] They raise $11.3-
Ben Gilbert 1:29:51 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:29:51 ... million. It is so bad that they don't have enough-
Ben Gilbert 1:29:55 It's 1/14th-
David Rosenthal 1:29:56 ... capital
Ben Gilbert 1:29:56 ... of their target.
David Rosenthal 1:29:57 Right. Right, right. They don't have enough capital to go buy even 100 share lots of the entire S&P.
Ben Gilbert 1:30:05 [laughs] Don't they, don't they go buy, like, the S&P 220 or something?
David Rosenthal 1:30:09 Well, uh, this... I don't know how they got away with this. They buy 280 stocks, but they had to choose which 280. So they are doing active management [laughs] in the fund.
Ben Gilbert 1:30:19 I think it's something like they picked the 200 largest, and then with the remaining 80 they tried to create a representative sample that was mathematically equivalent-
David Rosenthal 1:30:28 Yes
Ben Gilbert 1:30:28 ... to owning the 500. But that was an academic hypothesis, not completely proven yet.
David Rosenthal 1:30:33 I mean, it's still requiring significant judgment in there. You might even say investment advisory. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:30:37 You might even say.
David Rosenthal 1:30:38 You might even say. There's an amazing story on this. Did you find it?
Ben Gilbert 1:30:42 No.
David Rosenthal 1:30:42 So Vanguard, A, didn't have a lot of resources, and B, didn't wanna go do anything that looked like hiring a professional investment advisor, investment manager to manage this program. So they hire a young woman part-time to work nights and weekends-
Ben Gilbert 1:31:03 Really?
David Rosenthal 1:31:03 ... and basically, like, choose these 80 extra stocks and then manage and track everything. She worked full-time during the day at her husband's furniture store in Wilmington, Delaware.
Ben Gilbert 1:31:15 Whoa.
David Rosenthal 1:31:15 And by nights and weekends she was the portfolio manager for, you know, what today is the second-largest fund [laughs] in the world, and together with its sister fund by far the largest fund in the world. How incredible is that?
Ben Gilbert 1:31:27 Okay, so they've got this completely broken IPO. They didn't raise enough capital.The pitch is bad
David Rosenthal 1:31:33 Yes. Oh, Ned Johnson at Fidelity. Remember Fidelity we talked about?
Ben Gilbert 1:31:37 Yeah
David Rosenthal 1:31:37 And Ned, he would famously comment to the press about the launch of this fund, quote, "I can't believe that the great mass of investors are going to be satisfied with just receiving average returns. The name of the game is to be the best." Deeply ironic because a giant amount of Fidelity's asset base today is composed of index funds, many of which are Vanguard index funds held within Fidelity.
Ben Gilbert 1:32:00 The funny thing about Fidelity is that I think they're primarily a brokerage. They, they do-
David Rosenthal 1:32:04 Yes
Ben Gilbert 1:32:04 ... have their own in-house funds-
David Rosenthal 1:32:05 Oh, yes
Ben Gilbert 1:32:06 ... but I think a lot of people own Vanguard funds [laughs] using Fidelity's website.
David Rosenthal 1:32:11 Yes, they do. Yes, they do. We will get to that.
Ben Gilbert 1:32:13 Okay. So the pitch is quite bad, but the machinery they've constructed as it plays out in scales is actually pretty genius. So if you think about it, if the customers own the management company, the business itself, there's really no incentive to generate any more margin than you actually need to run the business. There's no, like, point in profits for shareholders you'd wanna dividend it out to. So you could just dividend those excess profits out to customers, who are the investors in the fund, or you could just say, "Oh, we're, we're doing that in the form of lower fees."
David Rosenthal 1:32:49 Yep
Ben Gilbert 1:32:49 It's a much more tax efficient way to do it than generating profit, recognizing taxes on that profit, dividending it out, and then those people having to pay taxes on it. They're- they'll say, "Hey, look, we'll just lower the fees in the future-"
David Rosenthal 1:33:00 Yeah
Ben Gilbert 1:33:00 "... 'cause we're now confident we don't need higher fees."
David Rosenthal 1:33:02 Every time Vanguard lowers fees, you should view it as like, "Hey, we have reported higher earnings essentially." [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:33:09 Exactly. Exactly. And then as you get economies of scale and you grow, you can further cut prices. And David, as you mentioned earlier, the business of asset management really lends itself well to the economies of scale game. Th- there are just not that many variable costs in managing money. Almost everything is fixed, except things like customer service, which we'll come back to later, and is kinda where Vanguard's-
David Rosenthal 1:33:32 Achilles' heel is
Ben Gilbert 1:33:33 ... vulnerabilities are. Yeah-
David Rosenthal 1:33:33 Yeah
Ben Gilbert 1:33:33 ... is in these variable costs. So once you're managing very large amounts of money for lots of customers, fees can be super low on a percentage basis. This is the exact same thing from our Costco episode. David, do you remember the phrase?
David Rosenthal 1:33:46 Oh, yeah. Scale economies shared. I think, uh... Didn't we make Acquired T-shirts and sweatshirts with that phrase?
Ben Gilbert 1:33:52 We did. We did. Uh yeah, linked from the, the email on our website. You can share the benefit of your scale economies, Costco does this, back with customers, and Vanguard does this, too.
David Rosenthal 1:34:06 Yeah. I, I mean, at the risk, Ben, of stealing what I suspect might be your quintessence of this episode, Vanguard is Costco for finance.
Ben Gilbert 1:34:14 Exactly, but even further.
David Rosenthal 1:34:16 Yes, yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:34:16 It's, it's like Costco on steroids.
David Rosenthal 1:34:17 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:34:17 Even Costco, who lowers prices as much as they can to reward customers and encourage customer loyalty and make everything about customer experience better, even Costco has outside shareholders who want the business to generate profits. There, there, there is a reason you are investing in Costco as a business, and that's because you expect it to-
David Rosenthal 1:34:36 Yep
Ben Gilbert 1:34:36 ... generate cash flows today and in the far future.
David Rosenthal 1:34:39 Costco itself, several hundred billion dollar market cap company today.
Ben Gilbert 1:34:42 Right. Vanguard doesn't have that at all. You are investing in the beautiful machine of capitalism as a communist.
David Rosenthal 1:34:52 Yes. Yes. Even Sol Price and Jim Sinegal were not this fanatical. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:34:59 [laughs] Yes. Yes.
David Rosenthal 1:35:00 Oh.
Building the Fund & Early Struggles (1976-1981)
David Rosenthal 1:35:02 So it takes a few years for this machinery to kick in for the scale economies to get to a point where it really can and for the investing public to wake up to this idea. In the meantime, they start with $11 million of fund capital, and then they still experience customer withdrawals and cash outflows. Like, the stock market starts to rise, so that sorta keeps the fund alive, but they're not getting new cash in, and they, they can't 'cause they can't do their own distribution. It gets so bad that the next year in late 1977, they have to take the extreme drastic measure of merging another small legacy Wellington fund called the Exeter Fund into the index fund just to keep it alive and get enough capital into the fund to keep operating it.
Ben Gilbert 1:35:59 Which is crazy to me that they figured out how to sort of acquire this other fund and then just merge its assets into their index fund, and all the investors were like, "Cool, sounds good."
David Rosenthal 1:36:08 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 1:36:08 "I guess we're, we're index fund holders now."
David Rosenthal 1:36:09 Yeah. I, I, I didn't see anything in Jack's memoirs about the, uh, governance issues [laughs] associated with that. Somehow they get it done though, and that fund when they do this merger had $58 million of assets. You know, again, compared to the $11 million and bleeding out rapidly in the index fund, I mean, that's like six times the size of the index fund. So yeah, r- really the seed capital that you should think about in the Vanguard 500 Index Fund, and again, also its sister fund, the Total Stock Market Index, you know, biggest collectively fund in the world today, comes not from the IPO of clients into the index fund itself initially, but the majority of the initial capital base comes from this other [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:37:01 Exeter
David Rosenthal 1:37:01 ... former Wellington actively managed fund that just gets folded in.
Ben Gilbert 1:37:05 Yep.
David Rosenthal 1:37:06 Totally, totally wild. So after this emergency transplant to save the index fund here, finally in 1981 into 1982, Jack and Vanguard do win the right to take over distribution of the index funds, and the way they do it is through, you know, another loophole, this one kinda even more tenuous. Jack argues, "Oh, we're not taking over distribution.We're just eliminating distribution [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:37:36 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:37:36 We're gonna no longer go to stockbrokers and have them charge sales loads to go into our index funds. We're not gonna allow that at all, and thus we are eliminating distribution. Again, conveniently ignoring the fact that now they gotta employ a lot of people within Vanguard that are gonna market and sell and advertise [laughs] the funds.
Ben Gilbert 1:37:54 Right. They, they went no load. They, they refused to pay 8.5% to people outside the firm, but now they just have a fixed cost base that they picked up of people that work inside of Vanguard that have to do the work of not only convincing people to buy these funds, but then on top of that, actually handling and facilitating the purchase. The-
David Rosenthal 1:38:17 Right, right
Ben Gilbert 1:38:17 ... the way that this worked is you would communicate and send in an order via mail, and then you would mail a check to invest in this fund.
David Rosenthal 1:38:26 Right? Could you imagine? I mean, I remember my parents doing this.
Ben Gilbert 1:38:29 Yes. So, you know, uh, eliminating distribution, sure, but somehow someone has to do the marketing and distribution, and now you just do it in-house.
David Rosenthal 1:38:36 Yep. On the back of that, the 500 Index Fund does finally reach the $100 million capital milestone in 1982, six years after launch. Takes them six years to get to $100 million, which again, that was not large at this point in time. The Wellington Fund many years earlier had been $2 billion.
Ben Gilbert 1:38:58 Yep.
David Rosenthal 1:38:59 And the initial IPO target had been $150 million, so they're still below that six years in.
Ben Gilbert 1:39:05 And they've got this headwind of they just switched away from paying people to do distribution, so there's now no incentive out there in the marketplace to try to sell Vanguard funds.
David Rosenthal 1:39:14 Yep, yep. But the slow burn does start, and towards the end of the decade in the 1980s, by 1988, the fund reaches $1 billion in assets, and it would obviously grow from there.
Ben Gilbert 1:39:26 So that's six years to reach 100 million-
David Rosenthal 1:39:28 Yep, and then another six
Ben Gilbert 1:39:30 ... and then another six years to get to a billion.
David Rosenthal 1:39:31 Yep, that's right. Now, you might be wondering, that's not a lot of capital, and Vanguard's fees are super low. How is the firm staying afloat [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:39:43 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:39:44 ... during this period? Well, it turns out that Jack's first revolution of the low-cost, low-fee proposition of Vanguard, it works pretty well in equities. There are other financial markets out there where the low-cost strategy works even better, specifically money markets and fixed income, AKA bonds, the debt market. In equities, you can have real outperformance. There is uncapped upside to investing in equities. This is the dream that active management sells. Jerry Seib or Peter Lynch or Warren Buffett or, you know, the greatest investors of all time, we can generate annual returns in the 20s, 30s, even higher percentages like Rentech in our episode there. If you're investing in the debt markets or the money markets, there is a ceiling to your performance. It is the coupons of government bonds or muni bonds or, you know, treasuries in the case of money markets.
Ben Gilbert 1:40:46 Yep.
David Rosenthal 1:40:47 The only thing that matters in terms of relative investment performance by products offered in those spaces is costs.
Ben Gilbert 1:40:54 Yep. The lowest cost provider will win in those markets.
David Rosenthal 1:40:57 And Vanguard builds a juggernaut in the fixed income business during this era, and that's what keeps the firm afloat while they are waiting and waiting and waiting for Jack's indexing revolution, his second revolution, to come online.
Ben Gilbert 1:41:15 Well, there's that, and there's also the fact that John Neff, who managed the Windsor Fund, which was an actively managed fund and had th- the fees of an active managed fund, was absolutely shooting the lights out, uh [laughs] for-
David Rosenthal 1:41:31 On the equity side, yes.
Ben Gilbert 1:41:32 Yes.
David Rosenthal 1:41:32 I was wondering if you were gonna bring this up. [laughs] That is the other deep irony here. Vanguard never got out of the active business.
Ben Gilbert 1:41:40 And they sort of inherited it by virtue of having some responsibilities for the Wellington funds that they shared with the Wellington Management Company. And so, yeah, this Windsor Fund, there were many years where it basically provided all the profits to pay all the overhead and keep the lights on while Vanguard's low-cost indexing strategy was, uh-
David Rosenthal 1:42:01 On a slow burn
Ben Gilbert 1:42:02 ... not scaled enough to pay for itself.
David Rosenthal 1:42:03 Yep, absolutely. And Vanguard today still has very large fixed income businesses, money market businesses, and active equities management businesses. But today they're all dwarfed by the index fund business.
Ben Gilbert 1:42:18 Yep, which wasn't the case for a long time.
David Rosenthal 1:42:21 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 1:42:21 You know, it's funny, uh, you said something a couple minutes ago that I'm stewing on here, this whole in equities, a low-cost index fund in the long run will outperform, you know, 85% or something of other actively managed funds. Uh, listeners are probably wondering, is that really just fees? Is it just that having low fees, uh, uh, makes you better than that much-
David Rosenthal 1:42:51 Mm
Ben Gilbert 1:42:51 ... of the market? There are other components to it. A giant one is behavioral. If you are in a mindset where you are actively trying to pick the best companies-
David Rosenthal 1:43:05 Hmm, yep
Ben Gilbert 1:43:05 ... you do a lot of trading. And aside from the fact that that has a lot of transaction costs, you tend to react to external stimuli, the market being up-
David Rosenthal 1:43:16 Yeah, you don't stay in your winners long enough
Ben Gilbert 1:43:17 ... the market being down, you having conversations with other people. Exactly, David, you selling out of your winners too early, whatever it is, and you can make the errors on either side. There's a behavioral component where passive index investors tend to not act, and what you need to do is not act for long periods of time to be a great investor.
David Rosenthal 1:43:38 Yes, it's the great Warren Buffett line, "Don't just do something, stand there." [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:43:42 Y- yes, yesWhether you are trying to shoot the lights out like Warren Buffett, and you are active and trying to find the very best businesses you can, or whether you are passive and sort of throwing your hands up, either way, you need to mostly not act every day. And passive index investing just lends itself better behaviorally if, if you're in one of those funds to just saying, "I know the market's up, I know the market's down, but whatever. I own the index. I've, I've made my peace." Whereas if you are either the active manager trying to improve the outcome of the fund or an investor in an active manager, both of you have a higher predisposition to do stuff. And for most investors in the long run, you shouldn't do stuff most of the time.
David Rosenthal 1:44:30 Yep, yep, absolutely.
The Rise of Indexing & Vanguard's Growth (1988-1992)
Ben Gilbert 1:44:32 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:44:34 So as we exit the '80s here, all the pieces are in place finally for the rise of indexing. The Vanguard 500 Fund crosses a billion, as we said, in 1988, and then the model's working better and better. The scale economies are getting shared.
Ben Gilbert 1:44:54 Fees are coming down from that initial launch price of 68 basis points to, in 1979, 59 basis points, then down to 50 basis points in 1985, to 35 basis points in 1987. We are really starting to be the true low-cost index fund. They've already dropped by 50% here by the end of the '80s.
David Rosenthal 1:45:16 Yeah, yeah. I mean, the scale economies are getting shared.
Ben Gilbert 1:45:19 Yep.
David Rosenthal 1:45:19 Everybody around the table is eating good. So after assets crossed the billion-dollar threshold in 1988, around 1992-ish, they hit $10 billion. So you know, 10X in four or five years, strong acceleration. Also in 1992, Vanguard launches the sister fund, the Total Stock Market Index Fund. They now have more than enough capital base that they can own every single stock. Why stop at the S&P 500? Own everything, all US stocks.
Ben Gilbert 1:45:49 And computers are sophisticated enough by this point in time where you can track the entire stock market and own the entire stock market and handle the reporting on that, not to mention you have the benefit of not having to pay S&P Global a licensing fee-
David Rosenthal 1:46:03 Yes, yes
Ben Gilbert 1:46:03 ... to, uh, index the entire market.
David Rosenthal 1:46:05 [laughs] Quite convenient. You know, look, they're not not business people at Vanguard. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:46:12 Right. Oh, they're great business people.
David Rosenthal 1:46:13 They're great business people.
Ben Gilbert 1:46:14 It's just on your behalf-
David Rosenthal 1:46:15 Yes
Ben Gilbert 1:46:15 ... instead of on shareholders' behalf.
David Rosenthal 1:46:17 They're working for you. And so by the mid to late '90s, the two sister funds together are approaching like $100 billion. Like, the Vanguard colossus is rolling.
Ben Gilbert 1:46:31 Yep.
David Rosenthal 1:46:31 Things are going great. And then in 1999, you're not gonna believe this, Jack manages to get himself fired again. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:46:44 Unbelievably.
David Rosenthal 1:46:45 Unbelievably.
Ben Gilbert 1:46:46 Yes. But listeners, before we tell you that story, now is a great time to thank one of our favorite partners, Vercel. So for 20 years, cloud infrastructure was built around a pretty simple mental model. Humans send requests, servers respond, and then they scale according to the traffic. But what happens in the era of AI agents when the software itself is sending the requests and making decisions, not just responding to them?
David Rosenthal 1:47:15 That's the shift Vercel is building for. The cloud wasn't designed for agents, but Vercel is. They've purpose-built agentic infrastructure where agents are first-class users alongside human developers. It's not just an old deployment platform with AI features bolted on. It's a ground-up rethink, tools, frameworks, infrastructure all engineered to work together.
Ben Gilbert 1:47:36 So one particularly noteworthy element of this is their AI gateway. Just like content delivery networks accelerated and secured the web, Vercel is doing that for agents. It's a single endpoint that routes across every major AI model with automatic failovers. So when a provider goes down, and as you know, they do-
David Rosenthal 1:47:55 Oh, yes
Ben Gilbert 1:47:56 ... your product keeps humming. So since launch, it's served 60 trillion tokens across 180,000 unique teams. Vercel is a new type of delivery network for tokens.
David Rosenthal 1:48:07 A good example of what this unlocks is Poke, who are building personal super intelligence that hundreds of thousands of people use. Before switching to Vercel, they were maintaining their own AI infrastructure, everything from routing and retries to cost tracking by users. After switching, their retry rate dropped 20x, so virtually every message now succeeds on the first try.
Ben Gilbert 1:48:29 AI Gateway is just one tool in a complete AI stack built with, for, and optimized by agents, and that's what Vercel is really about, making sure that the most ambitious teams like OpenAI, Stripe, and Polymarket have the infrastructure to match. Because when code is increasingly autonomous, the question is no longer can you ship, it's what you choose to ship. Learn more at vercel.com/acquired. That's V-E-R-C-E-L.com/acquired, and just tell them that Ben and David sent you. All right, so David, there is something that you have not been telling us about Jack's life over the years.
Jack's Health & The CEO Transition (1995-1996)
David Rosenthal 1:49:06 Yes. Jack unfortunately has a bad heart. He was born with a rare genetic heart disease called arrhythmogenic right ventricular dysplasia, or ARVD. And that means that Jack suffers his first heart attack in 1960 at age 31, so before he even becomes CEO of Wellington Management. That was his first heart attack. He had like 10, 12 over his life. It was like a ticking time bomb. At any moment in time, he knew he could just drop dead.
Ben Gilbert 1:49:42 And what Jack decided to do with this was work.At the age of 36, he got a pacemaker, and he consulted a doctor, and that doctor said, "You really shouldn't count on living past 40."
David Rosenthal 1:49:57 Oof.
Ben Gilbert 1:49:59 Then he's- went and talked to a second doctor, and that doctor said, "Why don't you get a place out in Cape Cod and stop working and enjoy the last few years you have left? Don't work anymore." He, uh, wrote at one point, "If I had taken the second doctor's advice, the first doctor would've been right."
David Rosenthal 1:50:15 Yeah. Yeah. Man, this is totally Jack's unique personality. The way he approaches this part of his life is, "I'm not gonna change a thing. I'm just gonna live every day the same way I would've lived it if I didn't have this disease."
Ben Gilbert 1:50:32 Yep.
David Rosenthal 1:50:32 And the stories around this are amazing. I think one time he collapsed and had a heart attack waiting for the commuter train out of Philadelphia, and was lying there on the ground, and the ambulance and the paramedics come, and he makes a bet with them that they won't get him to the hospital in time to save his life. [laughs] He just had that kind of attitude and approach to it.
Ben Gilbert 1:50:53 He would bring defibrillators to squash matches.
David Rosenthal 1:50:57 Oh, this is the best. Yeah. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:50:58 And it, it, it happened at one point where he had a heart attack while playing and had to count on his opponent running over and reviving him.
David Rosenthal 1:51:06 Yeah, yeah. And he would use this to, like, intimidate his opponents while playing.
Ben Gilbert 1:51:10 [laughs] Yes.
David Rosenthal 1:51:10 He'd be like, "Make sure I got my defibrillator here. I could drop dead at any moment."
Ben Gilbert 1:51:15 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:51:15 "All right, let's go." You know? [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:51:16 That's amazing.
David Rosenthal 1:51:18 So as Vanguard's really taking off and indexing is taking off, Jack's heart is just getting weaker and weaker and more and more worn down from all this. In 1994, his twin brother David dies, also from heart complications, and by 1995, over half of Jack's heart has stopped working.
Ben Gilbert 1:51:40 Ugh.
David Rosenthal 1:51:40 And so in early 1995, his doctors say, "Hey, we know your approach to life, but we can't put this off any longer. Despite your relatively advanced age for this" He's 66 at the time. "You need to have a heart transplant if you wanna have any hope of actually, you know, surviving for a meaningful period of time going forward." Jack and the family are brought around. They agree to this. So this, of course, impacts Vanguard. So in May of 1995, the company holds a press conference where Jack announces that he's stepping down as CEO to prepare for his heart transplant, and the company announces that John Brennan, Jack's former assistant who had joined the company in 1982, will be taking over as the next CEO. Brennan had been Vanguard's CFO for many years leading up to this. And in late 1995, Jack Bogle enters the hospital on a waiting list for a heart transplant. His heart has continued to degenerate. He needs to be hooked up to an IV feeding him drugs to keep his heart beating constantly. He waits 128 days in the hospital-
Ben Gilbert 1:52:57 Wow
David Rosenthal 1:52:57 ... waiting for a heart transplant, and he keeps working the whole time. He hasn't officially transitioned [laughs] out of the CEO role and given it to Brennan yet. Maybe a little bit of foreshadowing here. [laughs] On January 31st, 1996, Jack officially steps down as CEO and Brennan takes over after more than three months of operating as CEO out of his hospital room.
Ben Gilbert 1:53:21 Unreal.
David Rosenthal 1:53:22 Really, Jack is one of a kind here. And then in February, finally they get the call there's a heart available for Jack, and he has the heart transplant at the end of February. So the day of the surgery arrives-
Ben Gilbert 1:53:38 And at this point Vanguard is essentially planning for this to be the end of his career. Like, uh, heart transplants today are obviously a giant deal. This is even 30 years ago, medical science is still working on this procedure. The assumption is he's, he's done at this point, even if he survives.
David Rosenthal 1:53:57 And so the company moves on. Brennan becomes CEO and starts working on a whole bunch of new initiatives, and Jack does make a miraculous full [laughs] recovery.
Ben Gilbert 1:54:08 He would live for another 23 years?
David Rosenthal 1:54:10 He would live for another 23 years on his transplanted heart, and within a couple weeks, weeks after his heart transplant, he's back on the squash court [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:54:21 Amazing
David Rosenthal 1:54:22 ... playing squash and intimidating his opponents. Like, gosh, if you thought it was scary to play against Jack when he might have a heart attack-
Ben Gilbert 1:54:28 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 1:54:28 ... how about playing against Jack with a new heart? [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 1:54:31 Seriously.
David Rosenthal 1:54:32 So of course all of this is, like, wonderful and joyous and unexpectedly great, but it is unexpected. Jack didn't think he was coming back from the heart transplant. The company didn't think he was coming back from the heart transplant.
Ben Gilbert 1:54:45 And the company's in this sort of funny place where, uh, even not thinking about leadership succession right now, but the core business, they made all these really long-term trade-offs starting back in '75, '76, where, you know, when the fund is sub-scale, the fees are kinda high, and the mutual ownership thing is, like, cute, but it doesn't mean much when it's small. Cutting the load so you go to a no load thing, that in the short term just slows your distribution down. And all these things are sacrifices for the long term, thinking, "Well, when it really starts working, it's gonna really start working."
David Rosenthal 1:55:22 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 1:55:23 In the '90s, this is that, like, harvesting phase for the company where 20 years of doing things the right way that caused really slow growth are now causing this giant inflection. I mean, David, you, you said something about the crossing a billion line in the '80s. By 1996, the AUM across all of Vanguard is up to $180 billion.
David Rosenthal 1:55:45 And the two index funds are, like-50 billion of that going pretty quickly to 100
Ben Gilbert 1:55:51 Right. So it's just gotta be fun for all the company long-timers at this point where they're sitting there thinking, "We were right. We made all these long-term trade-offs, and it really sucked for a while, and no one would distribute our product, and no one would invest in our funds, and it's really, really, really paying off."
David Rosenthal 1:56:06 Yep. And there's something else going on for the first time, too. Vanguard has competition [laughs] . Competitors have woken up and realized maybe we should jump on, too, this passive and indexing thing.
Ben Gilbert 1:56:20 Which is funny because they're not structurally incentivized to do it over at Fidelity, and BlackRock, and State Street, and, you know, all the others that are starting to roll out these very low-fee index funds. But they are doing it because they effectively have to.
David Rosenthal 1:56:36 Yep
Ben Gilbert 1:56:36 Consumers have woken up to the power of it, and they need to have an offering in this area. So even though they don't have this investor shareholder alignment the way that Vanguard does, they make money plenty of other ways-
David Rosenthal 1:56:48 Other ways
Ben Gilbert 1:56:48 ... in their business, and so they're happy to offer this as a near loss leader or, or break even in order to retain and attract those clients for their other higher margin services.
David Rosenthal 1:56:57 Indeed. So coming out of his recovery from the heart transplant, Jack is still on the board, but he's no longer CEO. The transition has happened, and the company is transitioning to this new phase. Jack, I think, gets super frustrated. He wants to be back in the saddle, and the way this manifests is he, at the board level, starts kinda becoming a curmudgeon and disagrees with all the new initiatives, all the new things that Brennan and the new management team wanna do to capture their opportunity and insulate against competitors. So these are things like launching sector-specific index funds or international funds and investing more there or investing more in marketing, you know, basically growing the firm and offering the clients what they want. In Jack's mind, this is starting to be a perversion of the mission. Meanwhile, management is like, "Hey, our customers want this, and our competitors are offering it, so we should do it."
Ben Gilbert 1:58:01 This is classically the divide between the founder of a company and the group of people that will take it not just from one to two but from one to 100. I mean, the clean simplicity and the mission and the focus and the narrowness of the product and this one cool trick that they have is the thing that got them there, and classically you need people who are willing to be much more flexible but with the same culture, the same values, the same mission, uh, than the founder was. And you see this in the numbers. 99% of Vanguard's AUM came after Jack stepped down.
David Rosenthal 1:58:40 Yep, yep. And you hit on a really, really important point to stress there. The same values, the same mission. It's not like Brennan and the new management wanna all of a sudden start generating tons of excess profits or take Vanguard public or, you know, do anything crazy like that. No, no, they, they're true believers in the mission as well. They just wanna serve clients and meet them where they're at now as the world is moving on.
Ben Gilbert 1:59:06 And there are big things here like employee retention. If, as a company, you're trying to run at cost and your competitors are in an industry where you can pay people obscene amounts of money if they are high performers-
David Rosenthal 1:59:20 Right, right
Ben Gilbert 1:59:21 ... I mean, you, you need some kind of way of dealing with this. And Jack Brennan, this sort of falls in his lap. One of the things he does early in his tenure is to create a employee partnership plan to try to incentivize the, the workforce-
David Rosenthal 1:59:35 Yeah
Ben Gilbert 1:59:35 ... and kinda deal with the structural trade-off of how do you get high performers who could get paid way more somewhere else? Or very similarly, if you aren't generating very much income, how do you make future investments in things like R&D as people's expectations for customer service and technology start becoming higher and higher and higher?
David Rosenthal 1:59:54 Right. The internet is becoming a thing now.
Ben Gilbert 1:59:56 Right. You, you, you, you need to start investing. So that's the sorta things that fall in Brennan's lap-
David Rosenthal 2:00:01 Yeah
Ben Gilbert 2:00:01 ... that he has to do to take the company forward.
David Rosenthal 2:00:03 And they end up at loggerheads with Jack on the board.
The ETF Debate & Jack's Second Firing (1999)
David Rosenthal 2:00:06 So all of this comes to an ultimate head and blowup in 1999 over exchange-traded funds.
Ben Gilbert 2:00:17 Yep.
David Rosenthal 2:00:17 The most important new thing in the industry.
Ben Gilbert 2:00:21 I am a Vanguard customer, and I think 100% of the way that I am a customer is through their ETFs, not through their mutual fund products, and the mutual funds are everything we've talked about up until this point.
David Rosenthal 2:00:33 Yep, yep. So Jack had a real point of view on ETFs, and in fact, he had the opportunity to launch ETFs. So back in 1992, a man named Nathan Most had come to see Jack at Vanguard. Nathan was the VP of new products at the American Stock Exchange, and he had had the idea to create exchange-traded funds as a new product, a new trading vehicle that would allow effectively shares, quote-unquote, of mutual funds to trade on stock markets in the same way as individual stocks, a stock exchange-traded mutual fund, an ETF. And he thinks, of course, naturally the very best fund partner to launch this idea with would be the newly, you know, kinda crowned jewel of the mutual fund industry, the Vanguard 500 Index Fund.
Ben Gilbert 2:01:34 And you might think Bogle's gonna love this. Like, w- what is an ETF? It's an even easier way to buy into something that looks basically like an index fund, and if you're trying to go direct to your customers the way that Vanguard does-
David Rosenthal 2:01:48 Yeah
Ben Gilbert 2:01:48 ... without the sales loads and everything, then great, they should be able to buy it right on an exchange.
David Rosenthal 2:01:53 Easier distribution available to more of the investing public. What's not to love? I mean, that was, that was Nathan's view. He was a real idealist about this.
Ben Gilbert 2:02:02 Yep.
David Rosenthal 2:02:02 "Hey, we're gonna vastly expand the distribution reach-"And the target audience for mutual funds and allow anybody who can place a trade on a brokerage to buy into a mutual fund, and he was absolutely right.
Ben Gilbert 2:02:16 And there's some other structural benefits too. There's the idea that you're not affected by other people in the fund. So if someone else decides to sell a bunch of their shares, I don't end up getting a, a big tax hit from it.
David Rosenthal 2:02:28 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 2:02:29 Then of course there's the you actually do know the price that you are getting because since it's traded on an exchange, when I decide to make an investment in that fund, I buy it right here, right now at the market price. I'm not waiting till the end of the day to figure out what the mutual fund is gonna be priced at. So ETFs have lots of great things about them.
David Rosenthal 2:02:47 Lots of great attributes. Jack hates this idea. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:02:51 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:02:52 Absolutely hates it, and he basically tells Nathan Most to get lost.
Ben Gilbert 2:02:57 And why does he hate it? He hates it because it's exchange traded.
David Rosenthal 2:03:01 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 2:03:01 He thinks, well, uh, uh, that for that very reason that I love it, that you know the exact price that you're buying it, it means you could trade in and out of it all day. You could do the worst possible sin of investing, which is incur a bunch of trading costs, speculate on it, not be a longterm owner, and just try to do intraday arbitrage.
David Rosenthal 2:03:21 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 2:03:21 And that particular thing that he thinks it's gonna cause all of these behavioral issues, even though the intrinsic product has all these great characteristics, he thinks the temptation for people to do that is so bad that the product shouldn't exist.
David Rosenthal 2:03:37 Well, and I think there's two other related things that he's really worried about beyond just that temptation in and of itself. One is that the brokerage platforms are gonna incentivize trading because this is how they're gonna profit from mutual funds.
Ben Gilbert 2:03:53 'Cause at this point in time, Robinhood didn't exist yet. Fees hadn't dropped to zero on-
David Rosenthal 2:03:57 Yeah
Ben Gilbert 2:03:57 ... transactions, so you actually were paying very meaningful amounts. Uh, uh, for... In recent memory it was single dollar, but it used to be like 50 plus dollars to place a trade on a exchange.
David Rosenthal 2:04:08 Yeah. So if you're a prospective competitor to Vanguard and you wanna offer competitive, you know, index funds at similarly low costs, well, all of a sudden if you can now make a bunch of profits on trading in and out of ETFs in those funds on your brokerage platform, that's a way to make money here.
Ben Gilbert 2:04:26 Yep.
David Rosenthal 2:04:27 So Jack hates that. He also hates that because these funds will now be traded on an exchange, it means that you can short sell them, and he thinks this-
Ben Gilbert 2:04:36 Mm
David Rosenthal 2:04:36 ... will just be like a absolute disaster for the financial industry. You know, and hey, look, like I would definitely not recommend going and short selling at the S&P 500. That has historically been a losing game in the long run, but look, this is a product people want, and shorting indexes like the S&P 500 is like a core part of many hedge fund strategies today. This is an idea whose time had come with all the good and all the bad, and it needed to exist. So Jack turns it down, and not just turns it down, but like he hates the concept of ETFs. Nathan goes on to launch the world's first ETF with a new asset management division of a old Boston bank named State Street. And, uh, you've probably heard the State Street name today. You might have heard of the SPDR.
Ben Gilbert 2:05:31 S-P-D-R.
David Rosenthal 2:05:32 The well-known SPDR, Standard & Poor's Depository Receipts Trust, which is the listing for State Street's S&P 500 ETF, which until recently, like a year or two ago, was the largest ETF in the world, until it was surpassed by Vanguard and BlackRock. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:05:52 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:05:53 After Jack's time. Well after Jack's time. So yeah, this was a really bad decision by Jack to pass on ETFs. Today, ETFs are a huge part of the mutual fund industry. They are still only about half the assets in aggregate of traditional mutual funds, but ETFs are growing at like 30% per year while mutual funds are flat. So if that keeps up at some point here in the next small set of years, ETF assets will pass traditional mutual funds to become the, you know, largest equity asset class in the world.
Ben Gilbert 2:06:31 Yeah. So listeners, why does this matter? Why are we explaining the difference between ETFs and mutual funds here on Acquired? I think the most interesting reason is that it was the thing where it was clear that the founder really should hand over the reins. This should not have been a sticking point. This should not have been even a decision for the company. This was clearly the right thing to do longterm, and whether or not you understand the mechanics of a mutual fund versus an ETF, and, and we dramatically oversimplified and skipped some things, it is just so perfectly illustrative of this point of-
David Rosenthal 2:07:05 Vanguard had to get into ETFs. Yeah
Ben Gilbert 2:07:07 ... and that purity of the founder is, is the thing that is required to start the company, but typically not sufficient to scale and keep them globally relevant.
David Rosenthal 2:07:17 Yep. Yep.
Ben Gilbert 2:07:18 And we see this in Ferrari with Enzo. You see this at, with Apple, the Steve Jobs, Tim Cook. You see it in the NFL, with Coca-Cola, with Trader Joe's. I mean, this phenomenon just shows up over and over again.
David Rosenthal 2:07:30 Yep. Yep. And this is how it showed up in Vanguard. Uh, so in August 1999, this finally comes to a head on the board. Brennan and the management team say, "We, we gotta launch ETFs. We're so far behind. State Street is out to this huge lead. They're building all this market share in a S&P 500 index that we started this. This is our space to own, and our, our customers, our clients are demanding it."
Ben Gilbert 2:07:58 Yep.
David Rosenthal 2:07:59 Jack is staunchly against it, and so in August of 1999, Vanguard announces that it is enforcing its mandatory board retirement age in the bylaws of 70. No board member can serve past the year in which they turn 70. Jack has turned 70 that year, and that Mr. Bogle will be stepping down from the board at the end of the year in December [laughs] . This is a big deal. This causes a huge public outcry.
Ben Gilbert 2:08:28 Also [laughs] there's someone older than him who is on the board that they don't enforce it for.
David Rosenthal 2:08:34 Right [laughs] , right.
Ben Gilbert 2:08:36 So it's not really about the age requirement, it's, it's about the overstaying your welcome. But he is the face of a movement.
David Rosenthal 2:08:44 Right [laughs] . So unlike the last time Jack got fired where his former partners were probably hoping he would go quietly into the night, that's not an option here because-
Ben Gilbert 2:08:58 He's a giant asset to Vanguard.
David Rosenthal 2:09:01 Yes. By this time, Jack has become like a saint to the investing public. People had actually started calling him Saint Jack. And when he stepped down as CEO in 1996, you know, ahead of the heart transplant, the company had commissioned a statue of him to be erected [laughs] . There is no option to just, uh, part ways with Jack Bogle.
Ben Gilbert 2:09:24 You kinda want him to keep an office at headquarters if, you know, he's alive and there's a statue of him there, and the entire investing community, and increasingly consumers-
David Rosenthal 2:09:36 Yes
Ben Gilbert 2:09:36 ... are finding religion following his teachings.
David Rosenthal 2:09:39 So the year before this in 1998, a passionate, passionate group of users on Morningstar's online discussion forums on the morningstar.com website-
Ben Gilbert 2:09:54 I love it
David Rosenthal 2:09:54 ... had founded a dedicated subforum called Vanguard-
Ben Gilbert 2:09:59 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:09:59 ... Diehards that would eventually morph into its own website and like grassroots movement called Bogleheads [laughs] .
Ben Gilbert 2:10:09 By the way, I love this subreddit. I've been on this subreddit for a long time, long before we started researching this episode. It is a beautiful thing to watch these conversations.
David Rosenthal 2:10:17 It is incredible. So the standalone Bogleheads forum, bogleheads.org, today it gets 2 million visitors per month, and then Ben, you mentioned the subreddit, that has 400,000 weekly active visitors.
Ben Gilbert 2:10:33 [laughs] And if you are listening to this episode because it was posted on there, welcome to the show.
David Rosenthal 2:10:38 Yeah, welcome to the show.
Ben Gilbert 2:10:38 Thanks for joining us [laughs] .
David Rosenthal 2:10:40 So as I said, the compromise that they reach is Jack will still be the founder of Vanguard. Jack will still be the face and the spirit of Vanguard to all of the millions of fans and diehards around America and around the world, but he will no longer be on the board. He will no longer be involved in active management of the company. They set up the Bogle Financial Markets Research Center on campus, which Jack leads, uh, with a staff helping him for the next 20 years of researching, speaking, writing books, papers, uh, and generally just evangelizing the index investing philosophy. All of which of course is like the very, very best marketing that I would say buy. You, you can't even possibly buy marketing like this. For all of the conflict and strife around this second firing, it really works out about as good as it possibly could for the company and for Jack. His legacy's preserved, his value to the company is preserved, and Vanguard gets to move on and launch ETFs, which they do in 2001 finally.
Ben Gilbert 2:11:55 Which he did soften on over time.
David Rosenthal 2:11:58 Yes. And he does eventually repair his relationships with management of the company, especially after Brennan steps down in 2008 and the next CEO, Bill McNabb, succeeds him.
Ben Gilbert 2:12:11 Yep. And there's a few things we sort of skipped over to this point that happened in the '70s, '80s, and then happened in a big way here in the '90s, and that's changes in the structure of the investment management industry.
David Rosenthal 2:12:26 Mm.
Ben Gilbert 2:12:26 The first one to know is indexing was not actually that interesting when Bogle started it. I know we gave the stats around its outperformance net of fees, but in '75 the market still had a lot of fools in it.
David Rosenthal 2:12:47 Yeah, yeah.
Ben Gilbert 2:12:48 People that were acting individually, that were not institutions or advised by financial advisors. They were clients of stockbrokers, and the stockbroker would make a commission on a trade, and so they would trade a lot.
David Rosenthal 2:13:04 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 2:13:04 And they would buy stuff that were bad decisions. And so if you were an active manager, it was just not actually that hard to beat all the fools in the market.
David Rosenthal 2:13:13 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 2:13:14 By the '80s and '90s th- that started to go away. So much of the activity in the market was real professional management that y- you could often assume, "Oh, my counterparty is smarter than I am." I, I always assume this when I'm buying individual stocks. I'm like, "Why am I buying a stock that a really smart hedge fund is selling?" And that is the thing that causes me [laughs] mostly to buy index funds.
David Rosenthal 2:13:37 [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:13:38 Or to transact in private markets where I'm buying shares directly from a company rather than in public markets where I'm the least informed person on the trade. But that was not at all the case back then. So there was this interesting trend where as more money became professionally managed, indexing's advantage increased.
David Rosenthal 2:13:58 Hmm. Uh, I bet it actually worked both ways, too, that as indexing became more popular, a lot of the, um-Unsophisticated, shall we say, participants in the market moved into indexing and stopped being easy prey available for the active managers [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:14:16 Right, right. Yeah, it's a great point. It's kinda like, um, online poker. When it first started there was a lotta fish at the tables, and then eventually the fish go away and you're just playing other poker pros, which is no fun. It's sorta the same thing in, in the stock market. And I, I didn't make the leap to realize that indexing is a much better product when it's a sophisticated market of traders versus an unsophisticated market, 'cause its relative advantage is higher.
David Rosenthal 2:14:40 Yep, yep. Absolutely.
Ben Gilbert 2:14:41 Or I'd say its relative disadvantage is lower-
David Rosenthal 2:14:44 Yep
Ben Gilbert 2:14:44 ... is the right way to put it. So that was a big tailwind for investing. The second big tailwind is in the '60s and '70s you mostly bought stocks through a stockbroker who charged you a commission, but they didn't make money simply by managing your assets the way that people-
David Rosenthal 2:14:58 Right
Ben Gilbert 2:14:58 ... do today.
David Rosenthal 2:14:59 The advisory business wasn't a thing yet.
Ben Gilbert 2:15:02 Right. You just had a stockbroker, and that guy wanted you to trade, 'cause he got paid on the trades. Over time stockbrokers went out of favor, and people started shifting, David, exactly what you're talking about, to financial advisors. And so that meant that instead of being purely incentivized for you to buy and sell stocks, they were incentivized for your net worth to grow, which is, is more aligned. Still taking typically a large fee, but aligned incentives at least. So index funds were kinda this perfect product for them.
David Rosenthal 2:15:30 Mm. Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 2:15:30 They didn't care whether you traded or not, they just wanted your assets to grow, and they wanted you to be happy with the level of service that you were getting. So it was this, like, amazing tailwind. This growth of the advisory business became this huge accelerant for index funds. You had amazing channel from it.
David Rosenthal 2:15:47 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 2:15:48 And then the last tailwind is the dot-com era.
David Rosenthal 2:15:50 Yes, yes! I love that you're-
Ben Gilbert 2:15:52 This is like-
David Rosenthal 2:15:52 ... bringing this up
Ben Gilbert 2:15:52 ... my favorite thing.
David Rosenthal 2:15:53 E-Trade, baby.
Ben Gilbert 2:15:54 Yeah. David, why do you think the dot-com era was a tailwind for index funds?
David Rosenthal 2:16:00 I've always thought that it's ETFs. It's the continuation of the story that we were just saying. Like, as people are coming online, trading more, and seeing the option to just within your online brokerage account buy the S&P 500, people are doing it.
Ben Gilbert 2:16:16 Yep, yep. That is absolutely a big one of them, the technology itself. Interest in buying stocks because the dot-com run up was happening, and people were getting more and more excited to buy stocks. So that was sort of people's introduction to it. But the third one is that they could actually see how much they were getting ripped off-
David Rosenthal 2:16:35 Mm. Yes
Ben Gilbert 2:16:35 ... by underperforming high fee active funds. Where before you work with your stockbroker, you end up in a fund, and you kinda get a statement every quarter or once a year, and you're like, "Okay." But every day you log into your, whatever your favorite brokerage dot-com is, and you see performance versus benchmark. You can dive into the research. It's sort of all at your fingertips. And that caused people to go, "Wait, there's an S&P 500 button?"
David Rosenthal 2:17:04 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 2:17:04 "Great. That's gonna be much better than whatever this thing is that I'm currently in."
David Rosenthal 2:17:08 Yep, yep. Amazing. What a revolution.
Ben Gilbert 2:17:11 So the ownership of equities in America went from that 1 to 2% pre-Great Depression to 4.2% in 1949. But even by the '80s it was still just right around 20%.
David Rosenthal 2:17:24 Mm.
Ben Gilbert 2:17:24 It wasn't until the bull market of the '80s and '90s where the stock market really took off as a thing that, that people owned. In 1989 it was at 32%.
David Rosenthal 2:17:35 Mm. So 32% of Americans owned equities?
Ben Gilbert 2:17:39 Owned any stocks at all.
David Rosenthal 2:17:40 Yeah.
Ben Gilbert 2:17:41 By 2001 it was at 54%.
David Rosenthal 2:17:46 Wow.
Ben Gilbert 2:17:47 And a huge part of that is everything we just talked about with dot-com. Probably the bigger thing is the rise of the 401 [k] where suddenly people are responsible for their own retirement.
David Rosenthal 2:17:59 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 2:17:59 And they have a, a vehicle here, which I'm sure we'll talk about in Fidelity.
David Rosenthal 2:18:02 Oh, yeah.
Ben Gilbert 2:18:03 And then thirdly, the mutual fund and the index fund just being this very s- sort of perceived as safe, good way to own equities. And today it's something around 60% of Americans have stock market exposure, which i- it's funny that it's not just one thing. You need all of these different, uh, accelerants to happen over time.
David Rosenthal 2:18:25 Yes. You say index funds being widely perceived as this good, safe thing to own. One thing we skipped over earlier in the mid-'90s was the Oracle of Omaha himself.
Ben Gilbert 2:18:36 That's right.
David Rosenthal 2:18:36 Warren Buffett implicitly endorsed Jack and Vanguard in the 1996 Berkshire annual shareholder letter where he wrote, "The best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results delivered by the great majority of investment professionals." From the horse's mouth himself.
Ben Gilbert 2:18:59 Now interestingly, if you had invested [laughs] in Berkshire, it would've been a much, much better investment-
David Rosenthal 2:19:05 [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:19:05 ... than just buy the index. I mean, we, we've been sitting here talking about how the index beats 85% of managers on a, a long-term basis, especially because you don't have to, like, leave the bad manager when they become bad, and then go find the good manager, and incur all the costs involved in that.
David Rosenthal 2:19:20 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 2:19:20 Berkshire was the exception. I was prepping for this episode with a good friend of the show from Worldly Partners, Arvind Navaratnam. He showed me this chart. From 1965 to 2025, if you had invested in the S&P 500 you would have, kinda unbelievably, a 10% compound annual growth rate.
David Rosenthal 2:19:41 Wow. Pretty good.
Ben Gilbert 2:19:43 Like, the S&P since '65 has been amazing-
David Rosenthal 2:19:46 Yep
Ben Gilbert 2:19:46 ... as a 10% annual growth rate with dividends reinvested. That's a 405x return.
David Rosenthal 2:19:53 All right. Lay Warren entirely on me here.
Ben Gilbert 2:19:56 Berkshire was a 19% compound annual growth rate for a 39,000x return.
David Rosenthal 2:20:05 Wow.
Ben Gilbert 2:20:05 405 versus 39,000.
David Rosenthal 2:20:08 And that's over 60 years
Ben Gilbert 2:20:12 That's over 60 years.
David Rosenthal 2:20:13 Wow.
Ben Gilbert 2:20:13 So when you hear us saying like, "Oh, well, it beats 80% or 85% of other managers over some timeframe," Berkshire was the extreme exception.
David Rosenthal 2:20:23 Extreme exception.
Ben Gilbert 2:20:23 And so to hear Warren saying actually what most people should do is buy low-cost index funds like Vanguard-
David Rosenthal 2:20:31 Goes, it goes a long way. Well, there's more Warren and Berkshire to come on this episode, but, uh, you know, to that point though, like I have always thought about Berkshire as the vanguard of private equity funds. Like it is essentially a no-fee private equity fund. You get to buy shares, and you don't pay fees and carry on it.
Ben Gilbert 2:20:48 Yep. It's concentrated though. That's the, that's the difference here.
David Rosenthal 2:20:51 Well, so is a private equity fund.
Ben Gilbert 2:20:53 Right. But I'm saying that's the difference versus an, uh, Vanguard S&P fund.
David Rosenthal 2:20:56 Oh, yes, yes. But like the spiritual-
Ben Gilbert 2:20:59 The spirit, yeah
David Rosenthal 2:20:59 ... and cultural resonance between Omaha and Malvern, Pennsylvania, where Vanguard is located, you know, are, are strong [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:21:07 That's true. We haven't told listeners yet, this is in the middle of freaking nowhere.
David Rosenthal 2:21:10 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 2:21:10 It's like two-hour train ride from New York City. It's the opposite of the capital of finance.
David Rosenthal 2:21:15 And also just so happens to be right up the street from where I grew up, which is amazing.
Ben Gilbert 2:21:21 Yeah. Weren't your grandparents some of the first Vanguard investors-
David Rosenthal 2:21:25 Yeah, yeah, yeah
Ben Gilbert 2:21:26 ... because they lived nearby?
David Rosenthal 2:21:26 I was gonna save this for the end of the episode, but, um, yeah, my grandparents were among the, like, very, very first fund holders in Vanguard. I, I couldn't find the exact date, but I believe my grandparents must have become Vanguard clients either in the late '70s or early '80s when, like nobody-
Ben Gilbert 2:21:47 Wow
David Rosenthal 2:21:47 ... was a Vanguard client.
Ben Gilbert 2:21:48 Before the 100 million-
David Rosenthal 2:21:50 Yep
Ben Gilbert 2:21:50 ... mark on the fund.
David Rosenthal 2:21:51 I think it was just, you know, "Hey, local company," like, "Great, we'll go with-
Ben Gilbert 2:21:54 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:21:54 ... this local company." Amazing.
Ben Gilbert 2:21:56 Southeast Pennsylvania showing up again. It was our Taylor Swift episode and this one.
David Rosenthal 2:22:00 I mean, they set up Vanguard accounts for me like the day I was born.
Ben Gilbert 2:22:03 Wow. Okay, so y- e- getting back to the story here, we haven't yet talked about the financial crisis. You mentioned there's more Berkshire to come.
David Rosenthal 2:22:12 Oh, yes.
Ben Gilbert 2:22:13 There's been like four other CEOs since, since Jack. There's a big beat of the story here.
David Rosenthal 2:22:18 Yeah. 2008 and the financial crisis really is Vanguard and all of indexing and passive's finest moment.
Ben Gilbert 2:22:29 Yeah, I think that's, uh, I think that's probably right, but should we do our last sponsor first?
David Rosenthal 2:22:33 Yep, let's do it.
Ben Gilbert 2:22:34 Well, listeners, one of the big takeaways from this whole story that we have been telling is that Jack Bogle had the data. He showed over and over again that active fund managers on average don't beat the market after fees. The data was right there. The industry ignored it for decades because conventional wisdom sort of felt, felt in quotes, correct.
David Rosenthal 2:22:56 Yep. And you know, that same dynamic plays out in product development every single day. Teams ship features based on conviction, momentum, or just the highest paid person's opinion. And most of the time nobody like goes back to check whether it actually made the product better or worse. The feature ships, everyone moves on, and you never really close the loop.
Ben Gilbert 2:23:17 So listeners, if you haven't guessed by now, Statsig is one of our sponsors this episode. This problem that we are describing gets way harder when AI is involved. LLMs are non-deterministic, meaning that the same prompt doesn't always produce the same output, and small changes to a user flow or a prompt can have surprisingly large downstream effects, and the real feedback signal that you need ends up coming from real users in production.
David Rosenthal 2:23:43 Yep. And that's exactly what Statsig does. Statsig gives product teams experimentation, feature flags, and product analytics all in a single platform, so you can ship fast, roll out changes safely, and actually see what's moving the needle in real time.
Ben Gilbert 2:23:59 Yep. Bogle bet on data over intuition and built one of the largest financial institutions in history doing it, and if you want to apply that same rigor to how you build a great product, go to statsig.com/acquired. That's S-T-A-T-S-I-G .com/acquired, and just tell them that Ben and David sent you.
The 2008 Financial Crisis: Vanguard's Moment
Ben Gilbert 2:24:18 All right, David, bring us to 2008 and the great financial crisis.
David Rosenthal 2:24:23 Yep. Indexing and Vanguard's big moment in the sun. It's kind of funny. During the financial crisis, passive index funds don't magically avoid getting whacked. Of course, they move exactly the same as the market and have huge losses in 2008, 2009, et cetera. What's more important though is what happens to everyone else. So, you know, like Michael Burry and The Big Short aside, almost the entire professional active money management ecosystem gets crushed just as bad or worse. Like mutual funds, hedge funds, private equity, alternatives, you name it. Carnage, devastation. No one is safe.
Ben Gilbert 2:25:10 Well, most money managers are not set up to have a 40% drawdown on everything in their portfolio. Their comp structures and their redemptions and their contracts all sort of break, and the business falls apart.
David Rosenthal 2:25:28 And this is what, you know, not just creates like the spiraling problems that lead to all the losses, but what permanently impairs or ruptures faith in the entire smart people on Wall Street ecosystem. The promise had always been, especially as passive and indexing had been rising over the last two decades, like, "Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's great, but like we're smart. When the bad times come, we're gonna outperform. We're gonna protect you."
Ben Gilbert 2:25:58 You're saying this is active.
David Rosenthal 2:25:59 This is the premise of active money management and all-
Ben Gilbert 2:26:02 Right
David Rosenthal 2:26:02 ... the smart people on Wall Street.
Ben Gilbert 2:26:04 Right.
David Rosenthal 2:26:04 "We know what we're doing."
Ben Gilbert 2:26:06 "We're gonna get you the high returns in the good times, and we'll figure out how to protect you in the bad times," and it's all mechanistically built in to have safeguards.
David Rosenthal 2:26:14 Yep. "We have safeguards. We won't-"Get wiped out. We won't experience the same kind of, you know, piano falling on our head losses as these naive index funds will. That turned out to be absolutely not the case.
Ben Gilbert 2:26:29 For the vast majority.
David Rosenthal 2:26:30 The vast, vast, vast majority of active management, again, of all types, not just like equity management funds, like everything out there in the financial ecosystem. So John Rekenthaler wrote on Morningstar in a retrospective on the financial crisis years later, "Active managers had long promised that when a bear market finally arrived that they would outperform Vanguard's fully invested index funds. It did, and they did not." [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:27:00 Yep.
David Rosenthal 2:27:01 Yeah. And then related to what I was saying there, even more than the underperformance, you know, some might say non-performance of the active management industry during the crisis, the crisis just completely bursts whatever halo or status or bubble had emerged around Wall Street and fund managers for most of the investing public. A lot of people's views of Wall Street during the financial crisis changes from, "Hey, these are smart people who I should probably invest my money with," to, "These people are charlatans at best and crooks at worst." You've got the bailouts, you've got the Occupy Wall Street movement, you've got Lehman Brothers, you've got all this stuff. Like public sentiment turns against Wall Street and active management in not just a major way, but arguably a permanent way. And who is there as the hero of Main Street, the little guys, but Malvern, Pennsylvania-based Jack Bogle and Vanguard [laughs] which makes no profits, has no fees above costs, has no corporate owners, and has always been the champion of the average American. I mean, you could not draw up a better marketing event for Vanguard than the financial crisis.
Ben Gilbert 2:28:29 Yeah. And I think for a lot of people, th- they just decided to hang it up on thinking too hard about their finances. They, they thought, "Look, I thought I was clever for trusting this person's cool strategy. I thought they were clever." Turns out none of us were clever enough, and the easy button where nobody's making any promises about how much better they're gonna do... I mean, Vanguard makes you no promises. It's, "Hey, you're gonna get the market." If you're interested in the market, it has historically performed well because it essentially captures the productivity growth and innovation of the world's most successful economy. In fact, since they started existing nine- in c- 1975, it's done extraordinarily well, something like 11.6% compound annual growth rate if you reinvest dividends. That's a delightful average. [laughs] If that's average, I'll take average.
David Rosenthal 2:29:20 Right, right, right.
Ben Gilbert 2:29:20 You know? Your, your life is gonna be in great shape if you just compound that for a long time. And so I think for a lot of people it was, "I'm fed up with clever, give me straightforward."
David Rosenthal 2:29:30 Yep. Well, and the one explicit promise that Vanguard does make to you is, "We will not profit from you."
Ben Gilbert 2:29:37 Right.
David Rosenthal 2:29:38 And that goes, especially in this moment during and after the financial crisis, like that goes so far with so many people.
Ben Gilbert 2:29:44 Yes. Did you see... You know what's interesting is Vanguard actually raised their fees in 2008.
David Rosenthal 2:29:49 Hmm, I didn't see that.
Ben Gilbert 2:29:51 I think structurally they, they sort of need to raise them when there's contractions in the market.
David Rosenthal 2:29:57 Mm.
Ben Gilbert 2:29:58 First of all, you should know Vanguard did not lay anyone off during the financial crisis, which is kind of unbelievable.
David Rosenthal 2:30:02 Yeah. Wow.
Ben Gilbert 2:30:03 So they have a fixed cost base that they have to cover, and now their AUM is lower, assuming they didn't get net new inflows 'cause the underlying stocks are worthless.
David Rosenthal 2:30:11 Right, right.
Ben Gilbert 2:30:11 They, they [laughs] actually have to effectively raise money from their customers in the worst times to m- meet their obligations to pay all of their head count and fixed costs.
David Rosenthal 2:30:22 Right.
Ben Gilbert 2:30:22 Now, w- when they raise it, it's from like 0.07% to like, you know, something slightly higher than that.
David Rosenthal 2:30:29 Right, right, right.
Ben Gilbert 2:30:29 So it ends up kind of being fine and it's just noise.
David Rosenthal 2:30:31 Still like very, very, very low.
Ben Gilbert 2:30:33 Right.
David Rosenthal 2:30:33 Yeah. Interesting.
Ben Gilbert 2:30:34 But it is sort of this interesting impact of the mutual ownership model.
David Rosenthal 2:30:38 Yeah, during market contractions they actually have to raise their fees, huh.
Ben Gilbert 2:30:41 Or at least have historically-
David Rosenthal 2:30:43 Yeah
Ben Gilbert 2:30:43 ... done that.
David Rosenthal 2:30:43 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 2:30:44 So what are, what, what's the impact of this?
The Warren Buffett Bet (2008-2019)
David Rosenthal 2:30:46 Well, just to put an even finer point on this, St. Warren over in Omaha comes back into the story here. In 2007, fortuitously right before the crash, he had issued a public challenge, Warren Buffett had. He said that he would bet $1 million of his own money against any and all takers from the hedge fund industry that over a 10-year period starting on January 1st, 2008, the Vanguard 500 Index Fund would outperform, after fees, the same dollar amount invested in any portfolio of at least five hedge funds. And then the winner of the bet would get to select a charity that the funds would be donated to.
Ben Gilbert 2:31:37 It's kinda crazy, right? You get to pick any five hedge funds you want.
David Rosenthal 2:31:41 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 2:31:41 And you can go pick the five best.
David Rosenthal 2:31:43 You can pick the five tiger cubs, [laughs] you know, whatever you want.
Ben Gilbert 2:31:46 And they just have to outperform the S&P over a 10-year period.
David Rosenthal 2:31:49 Not just the S&P, specifically the Vanguard 500 Index Fund.
Ben Gilbert 2:31:53 I know, it's cool he named it.
David Rosenthal 2:31:54 It's really cool [laughs] that he named it.
Ben Gilbert 2:31:55 It's g- good for Vanguard. [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:31:56 So this also just tells you kinda everything you need to know. Only one person took him up on the bet. Do you know... Uh, y- you do know who it was.
Ben Gilbert 2:32:06 Of course I know who this is.
David Rosenthal 2:32:07 Of course you know who it was, our friend-
Ben Gilbert 2:32:08 Ted, I'm sure you are listening [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:32:10 ... Friend of Acquired, Ted Seides, host today of the Capital Allocators podcast. The only hedge fund industry manager that took Warren up on his bet and accepted the challenge. And as Ted would be the first to tell you-He got whooped. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:32:27 It didn't look that way at first. The, the hedge funds were off to a good start, but in the fullness of, of the decade... I don't have the numbers in front of me, but it was something like the S&P performed, like, 130 something percent-
David Rosenthal 2:32:39 Yeah, yeah, yeah
Ben Gilbert 2:32:39 ... and the hedge funds w- in aggregate were, like, 30 to 40%.
David Rosenthal 2:32:43 I've got the numbers right here. Yeah, it is not even close. So the Vanguard 500 Index Fund over the 10-year period blows away Ted's selected hedge fund portfolio, so much so that Ted ends up conceding early to Warren. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:32:57 Wow.
David Rosenthal 2:32:57 Yeah. Like, a, a year or two before it's over, he's, Ted's like, "I, I, I... Warren, you won."
Ben Gilbert 2:33:03 What charity am I making the-
David Rosenthal 2:33:04 Yep
Ben Gilbert 2:33:04 ... the check out to?
David Rosenthal 2:33:05 The check out to. So when all is said and done, the Vanguard 500 returns a total of 126% net after fees for the 10-year period, while the hedge fund portfolio returns just 36%. So yeah, what's that, 4x plus?
Ben Gilbert 2:33:23 Over 10 years.
David Rosenthal 2:33:23 Over 10 years. Yeah. And yes, Ben, the, the charity that the check is made out to is Warren selects Girls Inc. of Omaha as the recipient of the money.
Ben Gilbert 2:33:33 I wonder... We, we gotta ask Ted if it was an option to pick the Rentech Medallion Fund.
David Rosenthal 2:33:38 [laughs] Oh, that's a good question. So Ted, it'd be fun to ask him. He actually chose five hedge fund of funds to get a total basket of about 100 different hedge funds in the portfolio.
Ben Gilbert 2:33:52 Oh.
David Rosenthal 2:33:52 And Warren said, like, "Yeah, sure. That's fine."
Ben Gilbert 2:33:53 'Cause then you're just buying the average. Like, the more-
David Rosenthal 2:33:55 And the extra fee layer on top of the fund of funds, too.
Ben Gilbert 2:33:58 Yeah. What? Ted.
David Rosenthal 2:33:58 Yeah, I'm not sure why he made that choice. [laughs] But, uh, either way-
Ben Gilbert 2:34:03 But yeah, n- but-
David Rosenthal 2:34:04 ... Warren wins
Ben Gilbert 2:34:04 ... but truly, like, the more diversification you get, the more you're just buying the market, and the more you're buying the market, the l- less interested you should be in paying fees. You should pay fees w- when it's more concentrated, and thus uncorrelated with the market.
David Rosenthal 2:34:18 Right. Right. Well, either way, Warren writes in Berkshire's 2016 annual letter related to all this, quote, "If a statue is ever erected to honor the person who has done the most for American investors, the hands-down choice should be Jack Bogle. For decades, Jack has urged investors to invest in ultra low-cost index funds. In his crusade, Jack was frequently mocked by the investment management industry. Today, however, he has the satisfaction of knowing that he helped millions of investors realize far better returns on their savings than they otherwise would have earned. He is a hero to them and to me."
Ben Gilbert 2:35:04 It is hard to get a better endorsement, I mean, as a human being, than Warren Buffett using those words about you. That is unbelievable.
David Rosenthal 2:35:11 Saying that you are a hero to him.
Ben Gilbert 2:35:14 Yep.
David Rosenthal 2:35:15 Incredible.
Ben Gilbert 2:35:16 I think the most interesting thing about 2008 is the fact that the index fund conceptually was stress-tested, and it performed with flying colors. I'm sure there were mechanical issues that didn't come up in my research, but it owned a giant percentage of American companies, and that did not further cause additional systemic issues to the already massive problems going on. We have trillions at stake in these passive funds.
David Rosenthal 2:35:43 Yep, yep. But thinking about today, now that indexing is so much bigger, if there ever were to be a problem or a failure of one of the big indexing players, Vanguard or BlackRock or Fidelity or State Street, like, the systemic fallout from that would be huge. I mean, if you think about the, you know, too big to fail concept from the financial crisis, all of the major index fund players are now much bigger than any individual player-
Ben Gilbert 2:36:09 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:36:10 ... was back during the financial crisis.
Ben Gilbert 2:36:11 Yep.
David Rosenthal 2:36:12 Interesting to think about. Hopefully, that never happens. Anyway, after 2008, as you would expect, Vanguard's share of mutual fund flows just skyrockets. It basically doubles overnight. So before the financial crisis, Vanguard received roughly 15 cents of every new dollar that came into the mutual fund industry as a whole. After the crisis, that doubles to 30 cents of every dollar, which is way, way more than any other firm. Vanguard just starts gobbling up the industry. On the back of this, in September 2010, Vanguard passes Fidelity to become the world's largest mutual fund manager, and that lead continues to expand for the next several years. So from 2014 to 2019, Vanguard takes in 1.2 trillion in cash inflows-
Ben Gilbert 2:37:07 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:37:07 ... versus 500 billion for the whole rest of the industry combined. So-
Ben Gilbert 2:37:11 Wow
David Rosenthal 2:37:12 ... over twice as much of all the dollars flowing into all of their competitors flow into Vanguard during that five-year period. This is when they also add their advisory products. So we were talking about advisory earlier. Wealthfront had emerged during this time and was getting traction as a robo-advisor. Vanguard decides under Bill McNabb, the CEO after Brennan, that, "We need to offer an advisory product to our clients, too," but they wanna actually talk to people, "And we have an advantage here. Because of our, you know, profitless strategy and approach to our business, we can offer human wealth advisors to accounts with as little as $50,000 invested." So this is a huge win for Vanguard. That pretty quickly grows from, like, zero to 150 billion in advised client assets overnight, and again, isn't a profit driver for Vanguard 'cause it doesn't need to be.
Ben Gilbert 2:38:08 And it's, to your point, the lowest... I think they charge somewhere from 5 to 30 basis points for this service. They now have over 1,000 CFPs on staff.
David Rosenthal 2:38:17 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 2:38:17 This is a completely different business line that is sort of predicated on the same model of what if we don't have any shareholders that we need to serve? What if the only stakeholder is our customer, and the customer doesn't just have to be people invested in the funds? It can also be people that are in a r- related but different business, which is they need investment advice for structuring their-
David Rosenthal 2:38:39 Yep
Ben Gilbert 2:38:39 ... personal finances.
David Rosenthal 2:38:40 And, and often it's the same customers. It's, you know, Vanguard clients who are using Vanguard funds toIn their retirement accounts or college saving funds and yeah, need advice about how best to structure that.
Ben Gilbert 2:38:50 Yep.
David Rosenthal 2:38:51 So in January 2019, Jack passes away at age 89 after just one of the most incredible lives, I think, of the 20th century into the 21st century.
Ben Gilbert 2:39:05 Uh, yeah, American hero. He enabled more Americans to participate in the fruits of capitalism in a way that sort of dips only into the best parts of capitalism and leaves all the unsavory parts behind.
David Rosenthal 2:39:20 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 2:39:20 I mean, it's this beautiful communal fair way to participate in the rising tide.
David Rosenthal 2:39:26 At the time of his death, Vanguard managed an aggregate of $5 trillion [laughs] over 20 million clients. I mean, this from a firm that started as like a cockamamie revenge plot [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:39:40 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:39:40 ... against his former partners.
Ben Gilbert 2:39:41 Using a s- a system that he believed in prior to wanting revenge.
David Rosenthal 2:39:45 Yes, yes. Absolutely.
Ben Gilbert 2:39:45 I think he, he had pitched this before.
David Rosenthal 2:39:47 Absolutely. Vanguard in 2019 is the number one mutual fund company with 25% market share of the entire mutual fund industry, the previous high water mark being Fidelity when it was the leader had 15%. The compounding advantage of Vanguard is just humming. They manage in 2019, 13 of the 15 largest individual funds in the entire world.
Ben Gilbert 2:40:15 Wow.
David Rosenthal 2:40:16 And it is widely reported in the press in Jack's obituaries at the time of his death that his estate is worth roughly $80 million, 8-0. For reference, the Johnson family, as we said from Fidelity [laughs] is worth about $40 or $50 billion through the, you know, estimated 40% that they still own of Vanguard or Larry Fink over at BlackRock. Co-founder and CEO of BlackRock is worth about $1.5 billion, much smaller 'cause he owns a much smaller percentage of the company. But yeah, Ben, to your point, whether it's savory or unsavory, it's just truly incredible like that call it, you know, $40, $50 billion, I mean, Vanguard's bigger than Fidelity at this point, so maybe $100 billion delta that Jack leaves on the table just goes right back to the American investing public.
Ben Gilbert 2:41:07 Did he leave it on the table? I mean, the only way that Vanguard would exist is by not taking profits.
David Rosenthal 2:41:14 [laughs] Good point. Good point.
Ben Gilbert 2:41:15 That is an-
David Rosenthal 2:41:15 There's a real chicken and the egg problem here.
Ben Gilbert 2:41:17 There's a path dependency thing, but, you know, over time there, there, there totally could have been ways for it to start being profit generating or have enterprise value, and he just wasn't interested in any of it.
David Rosenthal 2:41:26 Yep. Absolutely.
Fidelity & BlackRock's Resurgence (Post-2008)
David Rosenthal 2:41:28 [laughs] So our story does not end there. I used a minute ago Fidelity and BlackRock and their founders and controlling families for reference. That was not an accident. In the years kinda leading up to Jack's death and, and then especially really in the seven plus years since his death, Fidelity and BlackRock have just-
Ben Gilbert 2:41:49 They've done exceptionally well
David Rosenthal 2:41:50 ... really made a comeback.
Ben Gilbert 2:41:52 Yeah. BlackRock is the largest AUM asset manager in the world-
David Rosenthal 2:41:56 Yep
Ben Gilbert 2:41:56 ... with a more international and institutional client base than Vanguard's US individual approach.
David Rosenthal 2:42:02 Yep. And Fidelity has had an incredible comeback too, each of them in different ways, and they both come back to ETFs and really validate how important that was and frankly how wrong a decision it was of Vanguard not to get into it in the early days.
Ben Gilbert 2:42:17 So I know more about Fidelity than I do about BlackRock. In my mind, Fidelity is sort of more of a brokerage. They're like a brokerage that has funds, and Vanguard is like a set of funds that happens to have a brokerage.
David Rosenthal 2:42:32 [laughs] I think that's a fair characterization. Yeah. Yeah, yeah.
Ben Gilbert 2:42:34 They like are primarily in different places in the value chain, and I'm revealing myself here, listeners, I have a Fidelity brokerage where I own mostly Vanguard funds.
David Rosenthal 2:42:44 Yep. You and a lot of people.
Ben Gilbert 2:42:45 Which I think that's the common.
David Rosenthal 2:42:46 Yep, yep. Yeah. Well, okay, so let's take each of them in turn. And may- maybe let's start with Fidelity, and then we'll do BlackRock. So as we said throughout the story, Fidelity has always been very happy to experiment and invest in lots and lots of different things, and they have hit on two like real home run platforms in recent years, both of which are weak spots for Vanguard. So one is corporate 401 [k] plans, as you foreshadowed earlier, Ben.
Ben Gilbert 2:43:17 Which is why I am a Fidelity customer. They got me when I started my first job at Microsoft, and I got my 401 [k] there, and my employee stock plan also came through there. So then I opened my first Fidelity brokerage account, and that is how they've retained me as a customer for 15 years.
David Rosenthal 2:43:35 Well, and that's the other platform that has been a big home run for them, which is retail brokerage accounts. And as you point out, there is a natural crossover between those two things. So it all, I think, stems from a strategy that they realized a number of years ago. They don't necessarily have to compete with Vanguard anymore in the funds business. So even though Fidelity and Wellington/Vanguard all started in the same business as fund managers, Fidelity realized, hey, we can, and, and they certainly do offer their own index funds.
Ben Gilbert 2:44:11 Some of which are actually even cheaper.
David Rosenthal 2:44:12 Yep, some of which are even cheaper. They're loss leaders for them. But like we don't have to beat them there. Fidelity is very happy to have their 401 [k] and brokerage account holders do what you do of just hold the Vanguard funds through ETFs. [laughs] And I think Jack kinda foresaw this. This is, this is why he didn't like the, the, the business. Opened up the Vanguard funds to being on all the other platforms.
Ben Gilbert 2:44:39 Hmm. Yeah. I mean, this is a... I, I don't know if it's an existential risk, I wouldn't say that, but this is a vulnerability for Vanguard, which is so many of their-Customers of their AUM don't actually have a relationship with the company. They are invested in Vanguard ETFs via their direct relationship with a different brokerage-
David Rosenthal 2:45:02 Yeah
Ben Gilbert 2:45:02 ... primarily Fidelity.
David Rosenthal 2:45:04 And that different brokerage, at least in Fidelity's case, and in many other cases, is also a competitor in the funds business. So right now this is all fine, but if you play this out-
Ben Gilbert 2:45:14 Well, it's, it's fine 'cause no one makes any money on the funds, so Fidelity doesn't have a huge incentive to say, "You should come buy my two basis point fund over here instead of-"
David Rosenthal 2:45:23 Right, right
Ben Gilbert 2:45:23 "... your three basis point fund over at Vanguard."
David Rosenthal 2:45:25 Yeah. Your point is probably what will ultimately be correct, is like the cost basis for these funds is so low already it doesn't matter. But you could play this out years into the future where if this dynamic continues and Fidelity is able to make a lot of profits from all of their account holders in their other businesses, you know, 401 [k] management, profits from companies for management fees there, and then retail brokerage through all the ways that they monetize retail brokerage. They could even like really undercut Vanguard on fund costs and say like, "This is gonna be a total loss leader because we're just gonna profit in these other areas-"
Ben Gilbert 2:46:01 Right
David Rosenthal 2:46:01 "... that Vanguard won't do."
Ben Gilbert 2:46:03 This is like Vanguard is Microsoft and Fidelity is Google, and they could launch Gmail and say, "That thing that's your primary business, we're gonna make that free now, and you have no other businesses to compete with us on 'cause you don't have cash coming in from anything else, so sorry."
David Rosenthal 2:46:21 Yep. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:46:21 The pushback is I don't think there's a difference between three basis points and zero basis points. If we go back to my example earlier of you throw $100,000 in and the market compounds at 7% and your fee is 0.03%, that is a difference at the end of the day of 1.48 million and 1.497 million. So not a huge difference even 40 years later of compounding. I don't think people are gonna switch over that.
David Rosenthal 2:46:49 Yep, yep. There's another aspect to this too, though, which, uh, your Gmail versus Outlook Mail analogy is-
Ben Gilbert 2:46:57 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:46:57 ... holds even more. Fidelity's just a better product and product experience than Vanguard. So during the pandemic especially, it exposed that Vanguard's customer service and technology is like jank. [laughs] It is not good, and there were a lot of horror stories of trades not going through, fund account transfers getting lost. A- and like it makes sense, right? I mean, Vanguard, the downside of its structure is that there are no excess profits that can be invested for the long term in things like technology and things like customer service, whereas Fidelity, as they started to realize that this strategy's gonna work for them, they said, "Oh, this is gonna be a weak spot for Vanguard. We're gonna double down on technology. We're gonna double down on customer service, and we're gonna make our brokerage platform and our 401 [k] platform vastly superior to what Vanguard offers."
Ben Gilbert 2:47:51 Yep. It is an inherent trade-off in the model. You don't have as much money in the kitty to build the best-in-class technology platform or the best-in-class customer service. You could, but you probably need to raise prices a little bit, and they just need to get comfortable with that.
David Rosenthal 2:48:05 Yep, yep. So that's the Fidelity story. The BlackRock story is different, but also rooted in ETFs, and in BlackRock's case, directly rooted in ETFs. So in 2009, during the depths of the financial crisis, BlackRock made a fantastic acquisition of a business called iShares-
Ben Gilbert 2:48:30 Yeah
David Rosenthal 2:48:30 ... from Barclays, and this is all directly related to the crisis. So Barclays had acquired the pieces from a few different banks and financial firms, but really assembled iShares earlier in the decade, and iShares had become the leader in ETF issuance. When Barclays took over the failed Lehman Brothers assets, they needed to raise capital to shore up their capital base-
Ben Gilbert 2:48:59 Hmm
David Rosenthal 2:48:59 ... and they had to put iShares up for sale as part of it. BlackRock came in and acquired it, and it has been just like a slam dunk, huge, huge win for them. Coming out of the financial crisis, you know what retail investors decided they liked even more than the Vanguard story and the simplicity and the folksiness of the Vanguard index mutual funds? They liked a lot of ETFs that they could trade on their own and make all sorts of WallStreetBets style fancy bets on the market.
Ben Gilbert 2:49:38 That's right, 'cause even Vanguard only has a few hundred funds and ETFs today, whereas BlackRock has tons of-
David Rosenthal 2:49:47 A lot
Ben Gilbert 2:49:48 ... ETFs, right?
David Rosenthal 2:49:48 Yes, 1,400 total ETFs.
Ben Gilbert 2:49:51 Like, really custom-
David Rosenthal 2:49:52 In aggregate totaling 3.3 trillion in ETF assets under management, which is the largest player in the market by far.
Ben Gilbert 2:50:01 Across a bunch of different strategies and sectors and stuff that Vanguard has always been religiously against.
David Rosenthal 2:50:08 Yes, reluctant to pursue.
Ben Gilbert 2:50:10 Yeah.
David Rosenthal 2:50:10 Yep. So yeah, uh, Vanguard is today the number two player in ETFs, but smaller both number of funds and in assets under management, and BlackRock continues to kinda accelerate away from them, which again, right now the ETF market is smaller than the traditional mutual fund market that Vanguard still dominates, but the ETF market is still growing 30% every year, and BlackRock-
Ben Gilbert 2:50:35 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:50:35 ... is starting to run away with it here.
Ben Gilbert 2:50:37 And BlackRock is also very diversified. Vanguard is a competitor with a slice of their business, but they're just in so many different sectors.
David Rosenthal 2:50:45 Not to mention private assets.
Ben Gilbert 2:50:46 International. BlackRock is way more international than Vanguard is in terms of, uh, the client base that they work with.
David Rosenthal 2:50:53 Yep.Similar again, though, to the Fidelity strategy, BlackRock's profits elsewhere in the business allow them to subsidize the ETF business and just win massive amounts of clients.
Ben Gilbert 2:51:06 Yep.
David Rosenthal 2:51:07 So all of this raises an interesting question here at the end of the story. Does Vanguard's no-profit mutualized model actually hold it back today [laughs] relative to Fidelity and BlackRock?
Ben Gilbert 2:51:24 Hmm.
David Rosenthal 2:51:25 When we started the process for this episode, Ben and I originally thought that the question of the episode was gonna be, how do Fidelity and BlackRock continue to exist at all despite Vanguard's, you know, obviously superior model?
Ben Gilbert 2:51:40 Right. And to put a finer point on obviously superior, it was with Vanguard undercutting them on price and being structurally incentivized by their shareholders to do so.
David Rosenthal 2:51:52 Yep. Yep. And we kind of had to change it here as we went through the research of, oh, actually, Fidelity and BlackRock are doing so well is the question actually flipped, that Vanguard's model is holding
Salim Ramji: Vanguard's First Outside CEO
David Rosenthal 2:52:04 it back. I don't exactly know the answer, but what I will tell you to bring us to today here is that 24 months ago, in May of 2024, Vanguard made another big CEO announcement that they were bringing on the first outside CEO in the firm's entire 50-year history, Salim Ramji, from BlackRock-
Ben Gilbert 2:52:28 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:52:28 ... where he was, until that point in time, head of the iShares division.
Ben Gilbert 2:52:35 [laughs]
David Rosenthal 2:52:36 So that really says a lot right there [laughs] . And the question is, can he fix the challenges that Vanguard is facing right now?
Ben Gilbert 2:52:45 And, and to itemize those, it's what? Customer service, technology.
David Rosenthal 2:52:50 And this situation where they've found themselves that because of ETFs, their competitors, or quote-unquote competitors, can access their funds easily and in sort of a open garden on their own platforms where they will then profit from the customer relationships with those fund holders.
Ben Gilbert 2:53:11 Yeah, in, in, in, in other ways. See, I don't view that as a problem. I think, like, if you're Vanguard, you're delighted to get the business, to have people buying Vanguard funds on Fidelity, but there is a vulnerability of you actually don't have a relationship with those customers but... And they have a relationship with, with Fidelity.
David Rosenthal 2:53:28 Yep. And they can easily trade in and out of your funds whenever they want, and their advisors on those other platforms might one day advise them to.
Ben Gilbert 2:53:36 Yep. Gee, wouldn't it be smart to have a giant advisory business of your own [laughs] to build the direct relationship with those customers?
David Rosenthal 2:53:44 Right. So yeah. What does Salim do when he comes in?
Ben Gilbert 2:53:48 Well, I think it's some of these things we've been talking about. It's expand the advisory business. In addition to that, expand fixed income, which we haven't talked about in a while. Try and expand into retirement, where obviously Fidelity has really knocked it out of the park. He's talked on podcasts about making deeper technology investments and improving the client experience. There is this interesting question, which is they, they haven't really had any new innovations in a while, call it a decade, that have been really meaningful to the business and that they've continued to scale. They did buy a direct indexing platform called Just Invest, but the afterwards haven't done that much with it. Similarly, the personal advisor services grew really fast at launch and in the, in the years afterwards. But since COVID, I don't think-
David Rosenthal 2:54:33 They have been mostly flat.
Ben Gilbert 2:54:35 Yeah. Or at least they haven't been putting out any press releases talking about how big it is getting. One interesting one that I was surprised to see is an expansion into private equity.
David Rosenthal 2:54:45 Yeah. Yeah. That was surprising.
Ben Gilbert 2:54:48 So kind of before talking about why they're doing it, it is worth calling out this crazy thing, which is for public equities and for bond funds, prices have seen massive compression thanks to Vanguard, where you're seeing they used to charge 1.5, 2% 50, 60 years ago, and now you are seeing the Vanguard effect. You know, seven basis points at Vanguard and 40 basis points for the rest of the industry. Venture and private equity is two and 20, or often even higher. I've seen-
David Rosenthal 2:55:20 Right
Ben Gilbert 2:55:20 ... plenty of higher fee structures than that also.
David Rosenthal 2:55:23 Right. Not only is it 2% assets under management fee to the fund manager every year, there's also a performance fee on top of that in-
Ben Gilbert 2:55:32 Right
David Rosenthal 2:55:32 ... in the form of carry.
Ben Gilbert 2:55:34 So David, you and I are in this world. We've been venture investors in the past. We do venture investing now. Well, what is your take on structurally why the Vanguard effect has not come to venture capital and private equity?
David Rosenthal 2:55:46 Yes. [laughs] I used to think about this a lot, and now I think the answer is just quite simple. Venture capital and private equity is an access business.
Ben Gilbert 2:55:55 Yeah.
David Rosenthal 2:55:55 And it's not like you can just call up your broker and say, "Hey, I want some shares of Anthropic today," and execute an order. Like, you need to pay for access, and that's what venture capital is doing, and that's what private equity is doing.
Ben Gilbert 2:56:08 In private markets, the assets have to pick you back.
David Rosenthal 2:56:11 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 2:56:11 But in the public markets, they do not.
David Rosenthal 2:56:13 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 2:56:13 And in venture capital, there is this chance of extreme outperformance in a power law way for the very best funds, and investors actually are willing to tolerate fees for that chance at outperformance.
David Rosenthal 2:56:24 Yep.
Ben Gilbert 2:56:25 The other thing is you really do need a crazy person like Jack Bogle that is interested enough in capitalism to spend their life in the world of investing, but not capitalist enough to want to benefit from it in any way.
David Rosenthal 2:56:38 Yes.
Ben Gilbert 2:56:38 Which is, like, this incredibly rare, rare person. And Jack... didn't exist in this world at all. I mean, he only was in the world of mutual funds, and basically had no contact with the sort of venture and, and private equity worlds.
David Rosenthal 2:56:53 Yeah, there hasn't been a Jack Bogle in the private asset world of VC and private equity, and there hasn't been another Jack Bogle in the public asset world either. He is one of one. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:57:03 There hasn't been another Jack Bogle in any industry.
David Rosenthal 2:57:06 Right. [laughs]
Ben Gilbert 2:57:06 I mean, that's the interesting thing to call out here is to spoil one of my giant end notes of this episode, my quintessence. There's no reason why mutual ownership of a corporation needs to be strictly in the asset management business. I mean-
David Rosenthal 2:57:24 Yeah
Ben Gilbert 2:57:24 ... why... If this is a better form of capitalism, which I think, like, I'm excited about this model. I'm, I'm fascinated by it. It seems like this, like, really beautiful, elegant structure that provides a lot of durability. W- why aren't we seeing it in retail and grocery and technology and, like, why aren't the customers always the owners of the company? Or at least why isn't there literally any other examples other than REI-
David Rosenthal 2:57:49 REI
Ben Gilbert 2:57:50 ... like an outdoor-
David Rosenthal 2:57:50 Co-op
Ben Gilbert 2:57:51 But that's probably the biggest example, and then a handful of small grocery stores, and the other scale players are probably just insurance companies or banks.
David Rosenthal 2:58:00 Yeah, yeah.
Ben Gilbert 2:58:00 But, like, why, why isn't the economy littered with this?
David Rosenthal 2:58:03 [laughs] Let's table this question for analysis, but to keep it on Salim and Vanguard today-
Ben Gilbert 2:58:07 Yes
David Rosenthal 2:58:07 ... they're entering private assets for the first time.
Ben Gilbert 2:58:09 They are entering private assets, and the big thing is these companies are staying private longer, and so, so much more of the innovation engine of the American economy is happening in private markets. And so if you're gonna best serve investors, then you, you do wanna find some way to get exposure to it, and the question is can they do it in a Vanguard-y way, where they, they do it at, at cost or as close to at cost as possible. And we've seen an announcement of an alliance with Blackstone, the huge private equity firm, which will be really interesting, and I think the question is what's the economics there, and, uh, at what scale can they do it? Because at least historically, the private markets were a lot smaller than the public markets. Now, with multiple trillion or near trillion dollar companies in the late-stage private markets, they're pretty big now.
David Rosenthal 2:59:02 Yep, yep. Yeah, this needs to get figured out one way or another. Navigating the fee question is gonna be a big one because again, like we said, this is a fundamentally different market where the asset needs to pick the investor and access is limited and scarce. So, like, the best investors in private markets, think like, you know, Sequoia, Benchmark, et cetera, in the venture world at least, like, why would they ever give up their fees?
Ben Gilbert 2:59:27 Right. Right. The other thing that's happened is the success of the index fund has sort of created a barbell in a lot of people's portfolio where y- you kinda own Vanguard as your, like, 80%, your, your cheap beta for most of your net worth, and then you kinda, like, play with the other 20% and look for asymmetric bets to make. Does Vanguard wanna play in
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