Alexander Mikaberidze - Napoleon, War, Progress, and Global Order

1. 0:00 – 0:48

   Preview

   1. AMAlexander Mikaberidze0:00

      Napoleon is not necessarily the child of revolution. Now, he's a product of the revolutionary circumstances, but he does not necessarily represent revolution as such. To me, he's the last of the enlightened despots. Napoleon did not support the radicalism of revolution, and we, we see that throughout his life. The sheer nature of the war is that, that it makes things possible that in peacetime would be unthinkable. Without the war, the revolution would not have radicalized as rapidly or to the extent that it did.

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel0:28

      I wonder what you think of this. If Napoleon was alive today, he'd be-

   3. AMAlexander Mikaberidze0:31

      (laughs)

   4. DPDwarkesh Patel0:31

      ... a startup founder, you know, as you mentioned. Uh, wh- wh- what do you think about this? Would Napoleon, uh, I don't know, become the CEO of a company like Tesla today?

2. 0:48 – 14:32

   The allure of Napoleon

   1. DPDwarkesh Patel0:48

      All right. Today, I have the pleasure of interviewing Professor Alexander Mikaberidze, who is a professor of history and the Ruth Herring Noel Endowed Chair at Louisiana State University, and he's the author of the mo- Napoleonic Wars: A Global History. Um, this is, this is an absolutely fascinating book. Uh, it was unlike any other history book I've read in the sense that it was just, uh, global in its scope, and you're covering such an interesting period in history. Um, so first of all, can you give, uh, my audience a little bit of background on yourself and on the Napoleonic Wars?

   2. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:21

      Yes. Um, thank you so much for having me. It, it's, it's a delight to be here. Um, I'm originally from, uh, the country of Georgia, and I usually tell, um, people that, no, it's not the state of Georgia, right. It's the country of Georgia in Eastern Europe, a small, uh, state sandwiched between, uh, Russia and Turkey with a rather complex and, uh, diverse and turbulent history. Uh, but it is, mm, most small nations, it is oftentimes kinda lost in, in, on the pages of history. And of course, uh, when I embarked on, on this career to become a professional historian, uh, I've always wanted to see, you know, where my, my people kind of fit in the larger scheme of things. Uh, and I was oftentimes frustrated, uh, especially y- working on the revolutionary Napoleonic era, that the huge transformations that this period witnessed in caucuses were not properly addressed. And so the immediate cause and kind of spark to write this book was desire to kind of wrong, to correct the wrong. But it also kinda, uh, then grew from there, um, to, to get a better understanding of the field because Napoleonic era is one of the most written historical periods. Um, there are thousands and thousands of volumes. In fact, um, Napoleon is probably the most written about historical figure, period. Um, the last estimate was that at least 300,000, maybe 400,000 volumes ha- have been written just about him. Uh, so there has to be a really good reason to (laughs) write another book about, (laughs) uh, this topic. And my, um, gradually my realization was that almost everything that has been written about this period is written from the French and British points of view and focused on the great transformations taking place inside Europe. And that is perfectly worthwhile enterprise, but I thought that it offers a very s- narrow snapshot of the period because Napoleonic, revolutionary and Napoleonic mom- uh, uh, uh, uh, period is the moment when we see the modernity setting in not just in Europe, but gradually extending to various parts of the world. It, it changes the trajectory, uh, uh, that many of these r- world regions followed, um, and, and I thought a- a fresher study ne- was needed to, to flesh that out.

   3. DPDwarkesh Patel3:58

      And, you know, what I appreciated, uh, you know, as like a American of Indian origin is that y- y- like I, you had almost a chapter in the book that was just dedicated to how the Napoleonic Wars, um, impacted, you know, the expansion of British rule in India and also about y- obviously, um, the impact on the Americas from the Louisiana Purchase onwards. I'm c- I'm curious, by the way, how, uh, how it's possible that so many volumes about Napoleon have been written. I think Andrew Roberts said that there's been one, on average, one new book about Napoleon a day since he died.

   4. AMAlexander Mikaberidze4:27

      Right. Yeah. (laughs) Oh, yeah.

   5. DPDwarkesh Patel4:29

      How is it even... How hard, how are there, how are there possibly that many Napoleonic sch- scholars?

   6. AMAlexander Mikaberidze4:34

      Um, well, uh, it's, it's a, it's a very enticing field. Um, I, I compare Napoleon, and, uh, you told me that video will be recorded, right? So you see the, uh, the wall behind me, which has, uh, parts of the British, uh, propaganda, part of the French propaganda, and of course, the gift from my students, Napoleon's cutout, but oftentimes compare Napoleon to a siren. And because for those who first approach the shores of Napoleonic history, they are drawn by the lure of that sweet song of Napoleonic legend, right, the vision of a romantic kind of titan, the Prometheus who's thought to bring about change and was ultimately, uh, defeated and exiled to a rock in the middle of nowhere. Um, and, and I think Napoleonic legend exercise, uh, uh, such a lure that there is n- always, uh, uh, enough people interested in it to write about it. But, but it has a downfall or a kinda side effect, and that is, um, most of what is written is written, uh, uh, on, on, on Europe, uh, for, uh, for linguistic reasons. For example, to write the books of global nature, global historical narrative, you need to have diversity of, uh, uh, language skills. Uh, that includes not just the French and British, which... by now it's taken for granted. But Spanish and German and Russian, and then if you expand your narrative even further to the east, then you have to involve the Ottoman and, and Iranian historical traditions as well, right? Um, and, and of course, that is a, is a colossal challenge, and I, I think that is oftentimes pushes people away from such a, uh, narrative. Um, and also that the events in Europe itself, uh, in, in, in this period are such colossal scale, right? So we talk about the battles that involve, uh, for example, at Borodino, there are a quarter million troops. At Leipzig, there are well over half a million troops fighting for the, for the future of Europe. Uh, that by comparison, uh, you know, let's say dealing with events in, uh, in Russo-Iranian War where you have an average 10,000 to 15,000 men engaged, it kinda... Not sexy, no, right? (laughs) Not, not big enough. Uh, so I think that's also, uh, uh, plays a role, and, and the, the charisma of these great in- uh, personalities that were engaged also kinda eschews it towards Eurocentric narrative. And that's exactly the point that I, I was trying to make in the book is that, that should not be the reason to, to avoid our discussion in elsewhere for, uh, and, uh, as you pointed out, um, for, for India, this is the moment of, of tremendous importance. And not to include the developments in, in, in India under the leadership, um, of British East India Company led by W- Richard Wellesley from 1798 to 1805, right? These seven years are of crucial importance because in many respect, the foundation for what will be the Raj, right, is, is laid exactly at this time. Uh, uh, and same applies to, let's say, extending our narrative to North America or South America where, you know, the, this period saw the, the collapse of the Spanish imperial rule and the emergence of a new political reality that will continue to reverberate and kinda effect us to the present day, right? The, the, the fact that we have such a political, uh, uh, kinda, uh, political reality of, of independent nation states from Mexico down to Argentina all are, uh, the, the, you know, part of the legacy, um, o- of the Napoleonic period.

   7. DPDwarkesh Patel8:26

      Ca- ca- can you talk more about the impact of the, uh, Napoleonic wars on India? Um, wh- why, why was it so crucial for the British East India Company?

   8. AMAlexander Mikaberidze8:36

      Now, the... Of course, the English presence, um, in, in India, um, predates revolutionary period, and by the start of Revolutionary Wars, and I remind the listeners the French Revolutionary War started in April of 1792, and Britain joined the war in 1793. Uh, so by then, British East India Company had already, uh, uh, established presence in, in India, especially in the northeastern part of it, in, in Bengal. Uh, and of course, India... Uh, oftentimes people forget just how huge and how diverse and how populous this, this, uh, subcontinent is, and notice that I use the term subcontinent and not region because, (laughs) again, uh, it's, it's enormous in, in scale. In fact, we can... We, you know... The estimates, uh, usually point that India at this time has a population well over 120, uh, million people. Uh, so... And this would have been a, a huge area, uh- uh, for... Or huge area for, for the British as, as market for their goods but also as a source of the goods for their own commerce. And we know that, um, in... Before Revolutionary Wars, there was a vibrant trade going on, uh, that in, in many, in many respects sustained the industrial- the, the nascent Industrial Revolution in Britain. So from the British point of view, India is a crucial asset, or at least the presence in India is a crucial asset. But it is an asset that from the British point of view has... Is, is constantly under threat from other, uh, powers, uh, both local such as, for example, Mughal Empire, until it experienced a decline in the mid-18th century and then the Maratha Confederation, right? Uh, and, and external threats, most notably, uh, the French who've been kinda nibbling at their heels all through the 18th century. And so the... What, what... To me, the, the, the interesting aspect of this is not necessarily the actual threat that existed, but it's the perceptions of the, of threat that Britain saw, the British officials saw. Not all of them. For example, uh, when we look at 1798, 1799 period, um, you have some British officials such as Granville who was the Foreign Secretary arguing that the threat, direct threat to British presence in India is over... Uh, is, is exaggerated and kinda embellished and that Britain should focus i- its efforts on confronting France in Europe. And then you have colonial officials, uh, of course the, uh, the British East India Company officials steadfastly arguing that the threat is real, that French are coming and in fact, if you read the letters of, uh, Richard Wellesley who was appointed as the Governor-General of British East India Company in 1798, he speaks constantly of this, um, French threat as if it is real, as if, as if it is, uh, imminent. Even though we know, uh, that France was not, um, in, in a position to directly threaten the positions, uh, the British positions in India at this time, right? The French hands are tied in, in Europe. But nonetheless, the perception is important because it is on- uh, under this pretense of confronting the French threat-... that Wellesley then embarks on, on empire building. And in the book, I refer to Wellesley as probably the most Napoleonic of this British statesmen of this period because his vision is, uh, is that of an empire in India which can be built, um, within the context of confronting the f- uh, uh, this alleged French threat. And so we see the, uh, the, the wars, the com- the campaigns that Wellesley, uh, con- uh, waged against the local Native, uh, Indian states that, uh, refused to trod the British line. So I remind you of the, the war between Anglo, uh, the, uh, the British and the Mysore, right? The, the infamous, uh, storming of Seringapatam and the killing of its ruler or Tipu Sultan. Or the, uh, the subjugation of Nizam of Hyderabad, who is forced to accept this, uh, subsidiary relationship with the British. Or the confrontation ultimately between the British forces and the Maratha Confederation, during which, in 1803 for example, you have that famous Battle of Assaye, where, uh, Arthur Wellesley, right, Richard's younger brother and future greatest, uh, British, uh, military commander of the age, Duke of Wellington, uh, distinguished himself. And so these policies of, of, uh, using the French, uh, scare to impose the British, um, kind of interest on the local states, uh, are extremely successful. Uh, in that by 1805, much of southern and eastern Indian cont- subcontinent is under British, um, uh, rule. Now different shades of it, you know, direct or indirect rule, but nonetheless, it's under the British influence. And that process will only continue in the subsequent years, so that by 1819, um, you see the extension of the, uh, British authority in the north to areas like Oudh, uh, in, in, in, in northern parts of the subcontinent and, of course, the encroachment on the Maratha territory, um, which will be ultimately, right, consumed by 18, uh, 19, 18, uh, and early '20s. And hence we see the establishment of the British, um, uh, rule in India.

   9. DPDwarkesh Patel14:26

      Is having your, uh, you know, like a global empire, uh, bunch of colonies, is that

3. 14:32 – 29:24

   The advantages of multiple colonies

   1. DPDwarkesh Patel14:32

      helpful when you're engaged in a war with another power? Uh, I mean, in some sense you're, maybe you're like, I don't know, more diversified. But in another, you had to, as you just said, you had to, uh, the British had to divert resources and attention to, um, defending their stakeholder in India, um, and even in World War II, Churchill has to worry about, uh, the Singapore, uh, Singapore is taken over by the Japanese. So I- uh, when you're fighting a war, is it good to have a lot of colonies or is it bad for you?

   2. AMAlexander Mikaberidze14:56

      No, of course, um, having res- having colonies means having access to resources. Resources both in terms of manpower but also resources in terms of commodities, natural, uh, uh, um, uh, resources that sustain your economy, your war effort. I mean, to kind of deviate from maybe Napoleonic era, uh, you know, when we talk about the- that other great war because Napoleonic wars for much of the 19th century was the great war only to be superseded by World War I, but think about the British imperial involvement in World War I. When we talk about Britain at war, we really mean the empire and it's, it needs to be pointed out that more Br- Indian troops served in that war, uh, than the actual British troops. And certainly, you know, the expeditions to, for example, Iraq involved thousands of Indian forces. Uh, so that i- you know, having an empire certainly, uh, helps in, in, in conducting the war. And, and that is true in Napoleonic, uh, period because the trade that, uh, Britain, uh, conducted both with India and with China was, um, was extremely lucrative. And there are, uh, you know, excellent studies done on the extent of this trade and on the ex- on the value of the, uh, uh, and the volume and value of, of the commerce, uh, that was conducted, uh, with, with, with Asia, which is, is one of the crucial, uh, um, parts of the British economic, uh, endurance, kind of, uh, res- uh, resilience. Because think, uh, in 18... You know, once Napoleon consolidates his control of the continent, we, we know that in 1806 he embarks on the system that we refer to as continental blockade, uh, which was designed to isolate the British, uh, or cut them, uh, off from, from the, uh, continent i- in, in terms of their ability to sell goods. Uh, o- one, one of the reasons why Britain was able to survive this, uh, economic war was precisely because it could rely on its colonial presence, uh, uh, rely on markets elsewhere, and of course, um, uh, have the ability, the naval capacity to, to, to ensure that its commercial roots, its lifelines s- continue to sustain its war effort. Uh, um, and the re- the reverse is true for France. And, and that is one of the crucial, uh, stories of Napole- revolutionary Napoleon era is the collapse of the f- what we call First French Empire. France loses, loses virtually every possession it has outside Europe. That is in India, that is in, uh, broadly in Indian Ocean, certainly the Caribbean, and of course you refer to the loss of Louisiana, uh, um, in, in 1803, 1804, right? So that means that, uh, c- by comparison, France finds itself in a much weaker position in the years to come. And that, um, later on will kind of sustain this narrative of restoration of the national-... uh, uh, grander, which will justify, for example, colonial enterprise or colonial projects that France will s- will unleash in Algeria in 1830 and in Subsaharan Africa in, in, in later periods, right, as a part of that, the reconstruction of the imperial, uh, construct.

   3. DPDwarkesh Patel18:33

      Did the continental system contribute to Britain having, uh, the Industrial Revolution first? There's a book, um, by this, uh, developmental economist, uh, uh, Joseph Studwell called How Asia Works. And i- in it he makes the case that, um, th- uh, uh, these, uh, Asian tigers in the late 20th century, they, they imposed a bunch of tariffs, um, whose main purpose was to enforce export discipline so that it would, uh, help the- their nascent industries, I guess car-making in, uh, Korea, for example. Um, it would give them a leg up so that they could build the knowhow within the country to manufacture these things and then, then they could get rid of the tariffs. Did this kind of just artificially happen with the continental system? I mean, to what extent are the Napoleonic Wars and the Industrial Revolution, uh, linked?

   4. AMAlexander Mikaberidze19:15

      Mm-hmm. Um, so in, in the book, I devote, uh, uh, as an entire chapter to, uh, what I call war through other means, and that is the, the economic side of the war. In fact, I wish I had more, more space to devote to it. In fact, uh, you know, that's one of the topics I'm working on today, uh, well, nowadays, and that is to, uh, to explore the economic dimensions of the war, uh, which usually is ignored even though they- i- it's absolutely instrumental to it. Uh, uh, and the, the... There are a couple of things to kinda address right away, and one is that, uh, industrialization began in Britain before the war. Uh, we know that the, the, the elements of the industrial development are already present in Brit- in Britain in 1760s, '70s, '80s. Certainly by 1780s, uh, Britain is far more industrialized than, uh, Europe, the continental powers. Uh, the, the second point is that France had prerequisites for industrialization, right? And there's a fascinating new study on, on why the Industrial Revolution didn't play, didn't take place in France in, in 1760s, '70s, and '80s like, like it did in Britain, and, and, but that's a separate kind of topic. What... However, uh, once the Industrial Revolution took off in, in Britain, uh, it gave the British an enormous advantage, uh, uh, in, in terms of their, uh, economic parity, in terms of their economic or financial evanci- uh, uh, uh, um, you know, relations with, with the continent. And it left, therefore, the continental powers with... In, in, in this position where the only way they really can respond to, uh, to the British threat or economic, right, threat is by, as you pointed out, uh, creating barriers, uh, tariffs. Napoleon understood that, um, opening up market, that letting the British goods flow will be absolutely catastrophic to French interests, not to mention to the industrial kind of... the, the nascent in- in- i- i- industries in, in the territories that he controlled, which is why, uh, he comes up with this continental system. And I want to... And that's what kind of my pet peeve in that I o- I am very, uh, adamant about distinguishing between continental blockade, which was, uh, a po- a policy designed to deal with the British commerce, and a continental system, which was a far more encompassing, uh, policy that Napoleon pursued towards creating, uh, a s- a, a new reality, political economic reality in Europe. Uh, later on in Saint Helena Island when he's exiled, he does talk about his desire to create, uh, United States of Europe, effectively, an early version of European Union. Uh, but we, you know... We, we have to bear in mind that, that Euro- Napoleon's vision of European Union was an imperial construct where France was supreme. But within that European Union, so to speak, right, Napoleon did want to use the tariffs, the protective, uh, barriers, as a way of promoting industrial growth. And that's where Napoleonic Wars is interesting because, uh, on one hand, the fighting, the military devastation that takes place in places like Spain, like Germany, like Russia, does affect the local manufacturing, does affect local industries. But on the other hand, Napoleon, by creating this kind of vacuum or the, the bubble... Not vacuum, but bubble around cer- uh, uh, certain areas of u- uh, of Europe tried to promote industries i- within the safety so that the British couldn't compete with him directly. And we see the kind of haphazard impact of, of his policies. There are some areas where it worked and the... In the postwar period, places like Belgium, Netherlands, Southern Germany, Northern France, Northern Italy, the industrial development took off. And, but also... But on the other hand, there are al- uh, areas where the war had a far greater impact and the continental system with its restrictions actually delayed the industrial development rather than promote it.

   5. DPDwarkesh Patel23:33

      I was just looking at this paper, um, from the economist Daron Acemoglu. I, I think it's called The Consequences of Radical Reform, and in it, he was making the case that, um... Uh, i- if you look at the places that, uh, Napoleon conquered and, you know, reformed within the Napoleonic Codes, um, I- I... His claim is that after 1850, all of them... They all experienced, uh, more economic growth than the places that he didn't conquer. Um, and I, I think he says in the paper that there were no cases where there was a- a... They couldn't identify any negative effects, um, (laughs) from, uh, from, uh, from this. I, I, I, I wonder if you, um, agree or, or was this, uh, was this just a unalloyed good?

   6. AMAlexander Mikaberidze24:09

      I think, um... Uh, it, it... (sighs) I, I think it's a general... It's a... It's, it's too generalized kind of statement and, and if you dig deeper, I think you'll see a more complex reality.... one thing is that many of the, all of the areas that this ge- uh, the author was referring to as having the economic growth and all, uh, right? They had the pre- uh, pre-conditions for economic prosperity, for industrialization before Napoleon showed up. So usually, uh, the case studies for that are low countries, right? Belgium, Dutch Republic, um, the s- Rhineland, the northern Italy, areas around Turin and Milan. But those were already high, you know, urbanized, developed, uh, s- uh, regions that were on the way to, to industrialization. In fact, in those areas, you can argue to, to, and, and many of my colleagues have done it, that the Napoleonic Wars actually hampered the industrial growth because Napoleon, you know, because of the direct effect of the war, right? The fighting and the destruction, but also because of the, uh, taxes, requisitioning, occupational costs that the war brought on these regions. However, if you look beyond this kind of... And, and that's where in, in the book, I, what I am arguing is that the impact of Napoleon needs to be, uh, needs to be quant- qualified, you know, kinda, kinda, uh, uh, uh, you know, you have to approach it very carefully because i- it depends on particular region and on the duration of the French presence. So the areas that I just mentioned stayed under French control for much longer. For example, you know, in Belgium case, we talk about from 1794 until 1814, right? There's a much longer duration in time. Compare that, for example, to Calabria, in southern Italy, where the French arrive in 1806. Uh, they face vociferous resistance from the local population, uh, and they really can't overcome it until 1810, and then in 1814, they are gone. So how much can you accomplish in four years? Or think about Poland, let's say, or in Spain, right? So there is f- far shorter duration of the Napoleonic impact and there is only so much you can accomplish in that few years. Um, uh, and so that's where I would, I would argue, is that, yes, Napoleon, the introduction of Napoleonic reforms, uh, in many cases were, uh, helpful in changing the system. Now, what I mean by Napoleonic reforms, this is usually centralization of authority, this is professionalization of administration, this is enforcement of new administrative, uh, kind of, uh, uh, institutions, and of course, as you mentioned, the new legal framework. Napoleonic code was, um, you know, this transformation, this revolutionary, uh, change, uh, in, in, in, in the, through a legal code. But how long did they stay? That's the question, right? H- what's the actual impact on the ground? And that's where you see, o- once you scratch the surface, that the impact is not as uniform, um, a- a- a- and, and much, much dependent on the willingness of the local population to accept this change.

   7. DPDwarkesh Patel27:38

      And then, uh, you know, in a previous life, you were a lawyer.

   8. AMAlexander Mikaberidze27:41

      (laughs)

   9. DPDwarkesh Patel27:41

      I'm wondering how that experience, uh, or, or how, how that background has shaped your understanding of the impact of-

   10. AMAlexander Mikaberidze27:47

       (laughs)

   11. DPDwarkesh Patel27:48

       ... these reforms and these c- uh, uh, these codes. And I have a more, uh, especially to the question of, uh, there, there's a, a, like a perennial debate about whether institutions and laws that have been shaped kind of naturally through tradition and through history are better, or ones that are, um, um, ones that are more technocratic based on more rational principles, um, w- wh- wh- whether that's preferable. I, I, I wonder what kinds of lessons you draw, um, on questions like that.

   12. AMAlexander Mikaberidze28:12

       So that, that's a, it's a, a complex question and, but it's an interesting question to ponder and I, in my own courses when I teach students, I usually ask to look at what Napoleon tried to implement, right? On, on the legal side of it with Napoleonic code, look, go through the provisions of Napoleonic code, and there is a lot, uh, that can be qualified as, as progressive for this period, right? If we set aside, um, important issues th- on which Napoleon was not as, uh, as, as, uh, as progressive, for example, on the issue of the equality of the women or the issue of the proper, you know, kind of, uh, property rights of, of, of, of, of ch- certain, you know, children w- born out of wedlock and all that. But if we look at, at some of the core elements of the, um, Napoleonic regime, or Napoleonic, uh, uh, reforms, they are quite progressive. However, is progress always good thing? That's... I usually kinda pose the question to students and usually the answer is, "Oh, yeah. Of course. Progress is a good thing." But what if the progress comes in intrusive manner and it changes

4. 29:24 – 35:27

   The Continental System and the industrial revolution

   1. AMAlexander Mikaberidze29:24

      the way of life that you are used to, you're comfortable with? Uh, then the question becomes whether the progress is actually, uh, a good thing. And what I mean by this is that in places like Spain or Italy or in Poland, Napoleonic reforms, as progressives might argue, right, they were, uh, they o- they, they, they threatened to bring about more centralized, therefore more intrusive power of the state. It threatened to bring about more effective tax collection, more effective b- uh, administration. Uh, uh, it, it effectively, uh, threatened to, uh, create a system that held citizens more accountable. Right? Now, today, we all like to complain about taxes and about the government over reach, right? So why are we kinda surprised that people in early 1800s would have been complaining about this? I- in some way it might strike as quite, quite, you know, um-... you know, not unusual, but in a, in a weird way is that, for example, one of the great legacies of Napoleon is the, uh, vaccination program. I think that's especially relevant in (laughs) the last two years, right? The, uh, the government's effort to vaccinate, to boost, and all this, and even today, we know that people were resisting it, right? Now, Napoleon, uh, promoted a great vaccination program for smallpox, and he started with his own, with his own child, he, uh, he vaccinated his troops and then kind of rolled this program on, on, uh, to, to the territories that he occupied. But in many areas, the people resisted vaccination because it represented government overreach, because it represented the government kind of telling people, "You got to vaccinate." Uh, and, um, there were par- you know, parts of, uh, Europe where people suspected that vaccination was part of the government's, uh, kind of secret plan to control them, which is... (laughs) Which, uh, which will strike us as a very modern thing, right? (laughs) The conspiracy theorists, uh, today were not, you know, are not that original. (laughs)

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel31:33

      Today, there's, like, a big discrepancy between how Americans and Europeans see the role of the state. You know, E- E- Europeans are much more comfortable with it. I- I- Is the origin of that, that they did have a figure like Napoleon, um, centuries ago who instilled, um, a more centralized, uh, and, uh, I guess more, uh, more administrative form of government?

   3. AMAlexander Mikaberidze31:52

      Partly. Uh, uh, uh, of course, um, we, we have to bear in mind that unlike United States, let's say, or to, to a great degree, uh, Britain, uh, continental European history, it centers around strong authoritarian monarchical rule. You know, here we see kind of dichotomy of, example, of the French absolutism with the British, uh, uh, parliamentarian, more, you know, limited monarchical development. Or further east we go, right, in, in, in Prussia, for example, we see the development of, again, absolutist tendencies in the camera list system or further to, to the east in Russia, of course, the autocratic, uh, monarchical government that, uh, uh, predates, of course, Napoleon. So that, th- there is a long history of a, of a strong, uh, statist approach to it. Now what Napoleon tried to do is he tried to make the state efficient. And, and in that he was, I mean, that, that's actually one of the most fascinating things about him is kind of e- e- increasing the centralization, the efficiency, the enforcement of the state. Um, in France we, for example, see that after the turbulent years of revolution, Napoleonic, uh, centralization and the enforcement completely changed the relationship between the, you know, the people and the state. Eh, uh, uh, and that includes, for example, in rela- in, in areas like tax payments, right, tax collection, which, uh, increased exponentially as Napoleon actually set up the system that, uh, held people accountable for it. Um, and, and that made, uh, that made I think the continental, uh, powers or the, the continental societies, uh, far more willing to accept the role of the state. Now there is another kind of nu- you know, fold to this, in this. And that goes that often Napoleonic period rights once the war is over and now we're at the period of peace and will last several decade, you know, un- until 1850s with the Crimean War and then with the bigger conflicts of, of '60s and '70s. But nonetheless, we know we have s- you know, about four decades of peace. Well, we have to deal with this kind of gorilla, 800 pound gorilla in, in the room, and that is the British industrial might. And one of the ways we can deal with that is, is by maintaining the protective barriers of s- of tariffs and by increasing the role of the state in the economic development. And here your listeners can, uh, read up on, for example, theory, you know, the economic theories that Friedrich List, uh, was the great proponent of, which indeed championed the role of the state in promoting economic prosperity and promoting industrialization. And many European states followed exactly that model.

   4. DPDwarkesh Patel34:46

      The, another theory about how the economics here proceeded is y- maybe the public choice theory model from like Mancur Olson where, you know, he observed that, for example, um, after World War II, economic growth rates in Germany and, uh, Japan were increased by a lot. And his theory is just that you got rid of these old institutions and, um, uh, old institutions and, um, uh, these, uh, built-in incentives that the old system had. And then maybe similarly in, uh, continental Europe, w- Napoleon gets rid of these guilds, he gets rid of, um, these, uh, titles of nobility and these arcane, um, arcane systems. To, to what extent is, uh, public choice theory also a good model of, uh, what was happening

5. 35:27 – 51:44

   Napoleon’s legacy.

   1. DPDwarkesh Patel35:27

      at the time?

   2. AMAlexander Mikaberidze35:27

      Yes. And, and that's, I think yeah, I would, I would agree w- with that to, to a great deal in, in that ultimately I, you know, I, I usually end my lectures, uh, in my Napoleonic history courses by saying that ultimately Napoleon is, is a loser in that he lost the war, he lost the empire, he ended the life on that godforsaken place in, right, in, in Atlantic. But the impact that he left is, is, stays with that in that the, the, in the post-Napoleonic period, the European powers have to grapple with his legacy, right? Even though, right, his changes, for example, are, um, reversed in, in Italy where, you know, he- his United Kingdom of Italy is, is abolished and pre-Napoleonic arrangements are restored, even though we see restoration of the ruling dynasties that he overthrew-... um, "We cannot reverse the clock. We cannot simply go back to pre-Napoleonic era and the, and, and pretend that it didn't happen." Right? So you have to accept the, uh, the changes that he introduced. Now, the question is to what degree you will accept? And here, again, we can look at the kind of gradation and there's some areas like in, uh, southern and western Germany where Napoleonic and certainly Netherlands and Belgium and in Northern Italy where the impact was so pronounced that it stays, that it will be simply impossible to turn the clock back. But in other areas, it was easier to accept some changes and then reverse many others. So for example, we know that in, in, in places like in Poland or in Southern Italy or in, or in Spain, uh, the Napoleonic impact, uh, in terms that of, of, of the changes of the old regime, uh, was, was far less pronounced than, than in, in, in the core areas of, of Europe. And so, uh, but overall I think you're right in that Napoleon represented such a major blow to the old regime that it simply couldn't stay the way it was. It had to reinvent itself, and reinvent it did, right? In this post-Napoleonic era. Uh, and, and I, here I do want to point out that oftentimes we think about this post-Napoleonic reconstruction as this conservative ar- you know, reaction. As this arch conservatives and, you know, reactionaries. Um, but we have to bear in mind that majority of these conservatives were not against the change. Right? Even Metternich, who is usually perceived as this arch conservative, uh, you know, (laughs) villain, um, he is not averse to change. He's averse to revolutionary pace of the change. And so here in the post-Napoleonic era, where these great powers were willing to accept reforms and changes that came at cer- gradually, you know, in a controlled environment. And that's essentially what- what we see, uh, taking place in- in the decades after Napoleon is gone.

   3. DPDwarkesh Patel38:42

      That- that's very interesting because, you know, um, Robert Conquest has, uh, has these set of laws and his second law is that any institution that is not explicitly, um, right-wing will eventually become left-wing. And I don't know, it seems like the- the course of Europe after Napoleon's, uh, is similar. Like you have, um, you have a bloody revolution, you have this person who causes a massive amount of, uh, death and war, and then, um... A- at least if you're trying to make the monarchical case, right? You'd say, "Oh, this is a result of these revolutionary ideals. Obviously, monarchy's better. We should go back to the old ways." You, you, like, maybe intellectually you would think that that view would get vindicated, um, at least at the time. Uh, but it seems like no, the... Even given the immediate consequences of, uh, the French Revolution and Napoleon, um, eventually it kind of assisted he- he and the revolution created, um, endured and caught on through rest of Europe. Uh, uh, do you have any comments on, like, uh, this- this move in history where things... Maybe left-wing is not the right word, but... And modern is almost a tautology, but y- yeah, maybe you see what I mean.

   4. AMAlexander Mikaberidze39:42

      Yes, I think the- the way I- I look at it is, and the way I kind of, um, discuss it with my students is that I look at what revolution promised and at its simplest, right? The revolution was about quest for equality, and that quest can be then kinda, you know, interpreted in- in variety of ways. It can be political equality with the suffrage voting and all. It can be economic equality, social equality, gender equality, all this, right? And- and so to me, the revolution and Napoleon and then of course the post-Napoleonic period is not necessarily this, you know, left-wing, right-wing or liberal conservative, you know. We can use whatever terminology you would like to, but to me, it's- it's the quest for these, uh, evolving notions of equality. Uh, so for example, when we talk about the politics, right? The political side of this equality, we know that revolution, right? Produces remarkable documents in August of 1789 with Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen proclaiming in the, in the, in its very first article that "Men are born and remain free and equal in their rights." That's a very aspirational, very idealistic kind of statement. But it's also a problematic statement because it's so vague. What does it mean, "Equal in their rights?" And what does it mean to be man, right? Now in French, the- the term is homme, but homme, even though it was used in this context of men, can be interpreted as being as human beings. And so here then the story of revolution and Napoleon is the story of the struggle of various groups for the political equality, because revolution, uh, after the Declaration of Rights of Man, interpreted this provision as saying, "Well, uh, it's equality of those men who are self-reliant, who are well-off, that cannot be influenced. So therefore, we're gonna institute property qualification and let only affluent vote." Well, what about those who are below the threshold, right? And so you see then that struggle during revolution Napoleonic era leading to, for example, Napoleon proclaiming universal male suffrage. After Napoleon is the, uh, overthrown, that system is reversed to a- a much stricter property qualification, uh, and then you'll see again universal male suffrage coming back in 1848 and staying part of French political narrative. And the same, um, kind of quest for political equality can be then traced in many of these other European, uh, powers that were effected by- by Napoleon. Or even in Britain. I mean, think about the British electoral reforms of 1832, the Great Reform Bill, or 1860s and 1880s. It is also part of that quest for greater political equality.... same then, you know, if we're gonna expand our view, what about then social economic equality, right? What about the treating our, you know, fellow citizens i- in, more equitably when it comes to wages, when it comes to working conditions, when it came, comes to what we now call the, you know, welfare, kind of social welfare system? Because these are the ideas the revolutionaries were grappling with, Napoleon was grappling with, and of course, in post-Napoleonic period, they all were trying to find a way to, uh, to answer these challenges. So in 1848, for example, French socialists, um, tried to find w- a, a solution to the existing problem of the socioeconomic inequality by setting up, uh, what they referred to as national workshops. Effectively a state-subsidized system where people could register and, and, and drew sustenance from the state. And, and it is this time when we see the, kind of the, uh, the concept of right to work come to, uh, come, uh, you know, come i- into the public d- uh, um, discussion. Uh, so that's how I look at it. And then, then again, we can look at the gender equality, we can look at the issues, for example, of slavery that is at its, uh, at its, uh, simplest about equality of human beings.

   5. DPDwarkesh Patel43:53

      And how is your, um, how, how, how did growing up in the former Soviet Union, how did, how does that shape your-

   6. AMAlexander Mikaberidze43:58

      (laughs)

   7. DPDwarkesh Patel43:59

      ... um, views about, uh, a sort of idealistic, uh, uh, you know, "I have a revolution for equality," and then, um, deferring to a sort of enlightened despot?

   8. AMAlexander Mikaberidze44:09

      (laughs)

   9. DPDwarkesh Patel44:10

      Um, h- how, how, how has that shaped your views here?

   10. AMAlexander Mikaberidze44:12

       Well, um, my kids, um, I have two kids, I have two boys, and the oldest one is already reaching that age when he's studying this modern history and, and one of the other day he, uh, kinda came to realization that I was born and raised in the evil empire. (laughs) And so he was quizzing me about-

   11. DPDwarkesh Patel44:31

       (laughs)

   12. AMAlexander Mikaberidze44:31

       ... what, what it was like, s- uh, father (laughs) -

   13. DPDwarkesh Patel44:34

       (laughs)

   14. AMAlexander Mikaberidze44:34

       ... to be on the other side. I'm like, "Oh, thank you, son." Um, I think it, of course, it, it has a direct impact because I was born and raised in Soviet Union and, um, my father was a critic of the Soviet system and he, uh, I remember him as a, as, as a young man, um, uh, in like in the early '80s kinda listening to, secretly listening to the broadcasts of, of Voice of America or BBC-

   15. DPDwarkesh Patel45:00

       Mm.

   16. AMAlexander Mikaberidze45:00

       ... which were kind of muffed but, uh, he would still listen. And I, and this is some of my early kind of, uh, you know, memories as a child when my father would sneak out and kinda secretly listen to a, a, a, a rig, a radio receiver that he, he f- he fashioned. Uh, and, and I think that and kind of imperial ex- you know, that experience within imperial entity, uh, it, it does, it, it did have an impact on me. Um, uh, and, and certainly shaped me because Soviet Union collapsed when I was becoming, you know, my, my character, my, my, kind of my, my personality was being f- uh, forged in, in '90s and I lived through the, the debris of the so- post-Soviet era with its economic devastation, with its civil strife, with its economic collapse. So, uh, in that sense, I, I, in many respects, I can relate to, to those, to that generation that lived through Napoleonic era, saw the collapse of the empires, and then lived through the post-imperial, kind of post-Napoleonic era, which was a period of economic turbulence, economic, uh, uh, stagnation in many parts of Europe, um, uh, not to mention the, the civil strife that Revolution Napoleon unleashed in many parts of, of Europe. So I think, you know, for example, you know, just if nothing else, I would, uh, and I would t- oftentimes tell students that, you know, living through the '90s in, in, in Georgia was grappling with basic necessities, such as standing in line for bread for two or three days, kind of waiting for a loaf, a piece of, you know, a loaf of bread. (laughs)

   17. DPDwarkesh Patel46:41

       And, uh, you know, when I talk about the French experiencing, for example, in rev- during revolution this hardship and trying to, uh, really find sustenance and, and seek out, uh, like me, pieces of bread in, in various bakeries, um, uh, I, I could, on some level kind, could relate to their misery, right? Could relate to their frustration.

   18. AMAlexander Mikaberidze47:04

       (laughs)

   19. DPDwarkesh Patel47:05

       I, I guess an, an- another aspect of, uh, this, this conflict is, um, uh, I, I, so, you know, I, I know very, uh, little about history and which is why it was very fun to, uh, read this book and to, I, I guess, venture forth and, um, i- uh, learn more about your, your history through the podcast. But one of the things that's, um, interesting to me, um, is that, um, uh, it seems that there's, like, these, uh, punctuated equilibrium in international relations and, um, in, uh, in, you know, um, uh, you know, you have these long periods of peace and then you have these periods where there's massive wars, massive death, borders get reshuffled. I guess f- from the Seven Years' War to the Napoleonic Wars and then from there to World War I, um, y- uh, and then, you know, maybe we can draw that line to today where since World War II we've had peace in Europe and then now we have the conflict in Ukraine. What, what, is, is this a pattern you see? Or, and if you do, what is the explanation?

   20. AMAlexander Mikaberidze48:03

       Well, I mean, if we look at the conflict in Ukraine, and that's the conflict that, you know, that has a direct relevance to me in, in, because it's part and parcel of the, uh, Russian imperial project, uh, that, you know-... in many respects, this conflict doesn't start in February of 2022 or, or in 2014 when Russia took over U- uh, Crimea and in the eastern province of Ukraine, but to me it started in 2008 when we had the war in, between Russia and Georgia, uh, for that, for that very reason, right, of, of, o- o- of the countries or the group of people seeking, uh, a course of development that was, that is different from the one that the Russian, uh, l- you know, government, uh, has envisioned for them. Uh, so y- uh, to m- so that's where I see... And I mean, I- I- kind of if, if you look at the rhetoric that comes from, uh, from Moscow and its statements by President Putin or his ministers, they all have the echoes of the 19th century great power of politics which, as far as I'm concerned, should stay part of history rather than the reality. Uh, as you pointed out, in the post-World War II period, we, we went to great length to fashion, uh, an international system, uh, to prevent the very imperial... so the, the, the very, uh, kind of great power of politics that, uh, dominated European, you know, the g- global, uh, the global, uh, kind of development in the later half of the 19th century because look at... Effectively what Putin's, uh, kind of grand strategy is, is to carve out his spheres of influence which would be, uh, not unlike what Catherine the Great, for example, did in, in the late 18th century when, um, the Ru- under her leadership, Russia partitioned, uh, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Coincidentally, the very territory that, uh, involves, uh, the war today, right? Uh, Ukraine, the Baltic States. So that's where I, I see the kind of connections. Uh, and to me it is absolutely paramount to, to contain this imperial, uh, impulses a- a- and to ensure that the people have agency, that people have the ability to self-determine their fate. I mean, that's, you know, kind of to go back to your or- earlier question about my own experiences. I lived through the 90... I lived through the, uh, national liberation movement. I lived through the Civil War. I lived through this our own Georgian efforts to figure out who we are and what, and what we wanna be. Uh, uh, uh, but that's exactly the issue and, and it should be our decision, you know, as a, as a group of people, uh, to, to figure out whether we wanna be a Western nation, uh, whether our ideals are more attuned to European or whether we would like to seek closer relationship with Russia. Uh, we should not be punished, uh, by an outside power for seeking, uh, a, a course that disagrees with this, with, with its vision. And same applies for Ukraine, right? To me, that's... The war in Ukraine is, is, is about the agency of the Ukrainian people.

   21. DPDwarkesh Patel51:17

       What changed between before World War II and afterwards that didn't change after the Napoleonic Wars? Do you think that after the Napoleonic Wars that if the international norms could change, they would have changed at that time to be, like, "Okay, no more great conquests"? But, you know, maybe it took till World War II. And then what has caused, uh, wh- wh- what has caused this idea that you can have, uh, you know, these kinds of, uh... you, you can expand into what, what you perceive to be your zone of influence? Um, but... so how do you explain these two different, uh,

6. 51:44 – 1:02:03

   The impact of Napoleonic Wars

   1. DPDwarkesh Patel51:44

      changes in norms?

   2. AMAlexander Mikaberidze51:44

      Actually, the, the interesting thing is, um, the immediate post-Napoleonic era saw the, the creation of a new international security system. Ab- absolutely remarkable and they were my, my, uh, dear colleagues like, uh, Professor Beatrice De Graaff from the University of Utrecht has written fascinating studies and we talk about just last two, two years or so, uh, ex- exploring the impact of Napoleonic wars on crafting this, this new international system. And the hallmarks of this system was indeed, uh, the, the, uh, balance of power where these great powers sought to maintain certain parity. Uh, the goal of this was international cooperation to prevent political instability in Europe, so hence we see, for example, the, uh, great power of cooperation, the issues of suppression of revolutionary, um, uh, cycles in 1820s and 1830s. Uh, and, and kind of to draw parallel to World War I or World War II, one of the things that we oftentimes forget that it is Napoleonic Wars that pioneered new mechanism of, of dealing with a defeated power, and that is includes occupational regimes, that includes, uh, development schedules of reparation payments. And yes, defeated powers before, right, um, had to pay war indemnations, but Napoleonic, post-Napoleonic era saw a very different mechanism that involved occupation, that involved extraction of resources on the, uh, that is formalized and that is, uh, kind of part of the coalition, uh, uh, which is very similar to what, for example, was done in, in post-World War II period. Um, l- you know, in 1815, for example, France is divided into zones of occupation and European powers have occupational tr- you know, troops that are occupying specific regions as a way of de- uh, de-Bonapartize France. Just like in the post-World War II, right, we have Germany divided into zones of occupation with the policy of denazification, right?

   3. DPDwarkesh Patel53:48

      Why was this not implemented after World War I, the occupa- the occupational part?

   4. AMAlexander Mikaberidze53:52

      (laughs) Oh.

   5. DPDwarkesh Patel53:53

      Was that just a m- massive oversight?

   6. AMAlexander Mikaberidze53:54

      Uh, no. Well, partly because, um, um, I think we have to bear in mind that unlike, uh, World War II, um, the war didn't directly reach Germany, right? The... It was mostly fought on the... in the northern, in Northern France and in Belgium-... uh, and, and, and kind of the Rhineland area, but, um, Germany itself remained intact for much of it. Uh, and certainly, uh, by the, by the end of the war, eh, the sheer exhaustion of, of, of France and Britain and the collapse of Russia, the collapse of Austria and other powers certainly create the reality that was very different from pol- in the war in- from 1945 when you have a grand alliance, and that grand alliance is determined to, to carve out the zones of occupation, right? I mean, think about, uh, kind of, uh, United States in 1919 with its, uh, uh, self-imposed isolation is, is a very different entity from the 1945 United States that is, uh, keen on, on, uh, um, you know, keeping its presence in Europe. Same applies for Russia in 1919 is not, isn't, is imploding, while in 1945 it is, uh, it is quite strong. Uh, or at least it's, it will be on, on, you know, it's on its way to, to recovering from the war, and it certainly has the military capacity to carve out a zone of occupation in Eastern Germany.

   7. DPDwarkesh Patel55:17

      So, uh, w- another question I have about the Napoleonic Wars is, it seems that, uh, th- so, you know, in the Seven Years' War in 1756, um, you know, France loses. It, it's not that long before the Napoleonic Wars happen, um, and you know, when, when th- France is fighting Napoleonic Wars, it's, like, gone through a bloody revolution, it's a completely new regime. So i- i- in many ways, um, it should be in a weaker position it seems, just from the, what, the politics of what's happening in France, and i- uh, and obviously, um, fr- France absolutely dominates, uh, for, like, a decade, um, afterwards. So w- what, w- you know, like, I mean, m- maybe in, like, financial terms you can think of, like, in business there's, like, private equity where, um, if a firm has good potential but it has, like, uh, a lot of assets under management but, uh, I don't know, it just has bad leadership, you can have a- another one that, like, buys it out and then runs it better. Uh, so w- is that, is that the story here? Like, why did, why did the F- uh, the, uh, French military and, uh, government just get, seem to get so much, uh, more effective between these two wars?

   8. AMAlexander Mikaberidze56:15

      Um, yes. I think there, th- again, um, there are multiple threads that come together, uh, in, in, i- in this period. So one of them, for example, is the, uh, France's ability to mass mobilize, uh, and, and that is particularly, uh, is clear in 1793, '95 period when, in response to being confronted by the European coalition, France begins a system that we, you know, that we refer to as levi en masse, which involves mass mobilization of manpower, uh, that involves development of a home front to support war effort. Uh, you know, in, in the military history, we oftentimes grapple with this kinda concept of limited war, a- and I think limited in the sense that conflict before the French Revolution w- were is- you know, kinda isolated affairs that didn't affect the, the societies as a, as a whole, right? So you have s- much smaller forces, uh, p- you know, the conflicts with the f- for the kinda obvious, clear, uh, dynastic or political, uh, goals. Now the French Revolution is, is different in this bec- in that it mobilized far greater percentage of the population and, and, and you know, if you read the text of the levi en masse decree, it talks about young men registering and serving, children being partici- you know, participating in the c- in helping kind of, in econ, in, in produc, uh, in production and manufacturing, women, uh, kind of w- uh, uh, supporting the home front and the, even the elderly, uh, kind of s- uh, providing the moral, uh, boost and, and kind of inspiration and leadership for, for the population. So i- i- it's a more f- encompassing vision of nation at war, and this is very difficult to defeat, uh, an entity like this. Uh, uh, uh, and France shows that. They, you know, with this, uh, that they are, are, is a nation that can mobilize greater manpower, that can put greater government controls on eco- on economy, uh, and armed with an ideology, uh, that it w- can overrun, uh, what we will, you know, can, can call the Old Regime forces. It doesn't mean that, uh, the, uh, Old Regime armies were inherently weaker or inherently kinda in a destined to lose. Not at all. The fact that it took a decade for the revolution to prevail over the Old Regime, right, un- until 1802 when the Revolutionary Wars are formally over, all- testifies to resilience of the Old Regime. But it is a, it is also a, a conflict in which the Old Regime has to respond, has to kinda tweak itself. Uh, Napoleon then as a kind of, to move away from structural issues to more individual issues. Napoleon, whether you like him or not, you know, even his greatest critics admit that, um, he was a brilliant, brilliant individual. Very capable, workaholic, uh, a, a, an individual who could multitask like, unlike anyone you really can, can you know, see, encounter in, in pages of history books. Um, you know, his ability to control at the height of the empire, v- uh, a virtual contine- an entire continent before the time of phones and internet and mass, right, and instant communication is just staggering. And, and Napoleon does play an important role because of his sheer brilliance on the battlefield. I mean, uh, it, it's hard to imagine, uh, kinda, uh, France going on a rampage as it did in 1805 to 1809 period, uh, uh, without Napoleon, because he brings so much, uh, to the table. Wellington, I think has that famous, um-... statement that Napoleon was equal to 40,000 men on the battlefield, right? And, uh, that he brought so much to the table and through, uh... Um, and, um, the interesting thing is that Napoleon is not necessarily the only one, uh, that France had. In fact, that revolutionary decade produced a number of brilliant, uh, military commanders, in f- uh, it, it produced a number of, uh, uh, talented men in bureaucracy and finance. In fact, one of the books that I want to write, and that's part of that kind of economic side of the history is, is a f- is a brilliant financial wizard, uh, that as far as I'm concerned, essentially bankrolled Napoleon for much, much of his reign, and most crucially ensured f- uh, rapid French reconstruction in post-Napoleonic era. Eh, so it, it's, it's dealing with this individual agencies that also makes this period fascinating because you, you, you find the characters that are, are simply amazing.

   9. DPDwarkesh Patel1:01:16

      I wonder what you think of this, but it seems to me, you know, I'm in, uh, I'm in tech circles, and it seems to me that if Napoleon was alive today, he'd be-

   10. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:01:23

       (laughs)

   11. DPDwarkesh Patel1:01:24

       ... a startup founder. You know, as you mentioned, uh, um-

   12. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:01:27

       I love it. (laughs)

   13. DPDwarkesh Patel1:01:28

       ... the, the, the long hours, the, the, the ab- ability to micromanage and to, uh, multitask. The, um, obviously-

   14. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:01:35

       Yeah.

   15. DPDwarkesh Patel1:01:35

       ... the leadership and the, uh, ability to inspire. And then, uh, uh, also, uh, most importantly maybe, the, um, the, the, the sort of the risk, uh, uh-

   16. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:01:44

       Yeah.

   17. DPDwarkesh Patel1:01:44

       ... the risk-taking, uh, there, right? Where you, if you see something... Well, I mean, uh, a startup founder has to, bec- they're, they're probably gonna fail, so they're just trying to maximize the expected value-

   18. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:01:52

       Yeah.

   19. DPDwarkesh Patel1:01:52

       Um, like increase the odds that you have a trillion-dollar company.

   20. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:01:56

       Yeah. Yeah.

   21. DPDwarkesh Patel1:01:56

       Not necessarily that you have, uh, make any money, not n- necessarily increase the odds you make some money, uh, so-

   22. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:02:02

       Yeah.

   23. DPDwarkesh Patel1:02:02

       ... j- um, yeah just the risk-taking,

7. 1:02:03 – 1:14:45

   Napoleon as a startup founder

   1. DPDwarkesh Patel1:02:03

      uh, especially it seems to me that... Uh, what, what do you think about this? Would Napoleon, uh, I don't know, become-

   2. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:02:09

      (laughs)

   3. DPDwarkesh Patel1:02:09

      ... the CEO of a company like Tesla today?

   4. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:02:10

      I, I, I love this vision of Napoleon as Elon Musk, right? (laughs)

   5. DPDwarkesh Patel1:02:13

      (laughs) Yeah, yeah.

   6. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:02:15

      Um, there is a, uh, there is a fascinating, uh, movie, it's, it's a kinda light comedy, uh, called Emperor's New Clothes that envisions Napoleon escaping from Saint Helena Island in disguise, uh, leaving a, uh, a double. And then before he can return to France, his double dies, and he's buried with all the honors, and then real Napoleon finds himself caught in this kind of conundrum of trying to prove himself. And what he does, he, he starts a business in Paris of selling bread and, and using his military genius kinda-

   7. DPDwarkesh Patel1:02:46

      (laughs) Oh, wow.

   8. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:02:46

      ... strategy, he, uh, he, uh, bec- you know, comes to dominate the baking industry, baking (laughs) business in Paris. So Napoleon, yes. (laughs) Somebody already envisioned him as the startup guy. (laughs) Oh, wait. Wha- wha- what was the name again?

   9. DPDwarkesh Patel1:03:00

      Uh, Emperor's New Clothes.

   10. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:03:01

       Oh, interesting. Uh, i- uh, he, uh, wonderful Jan Holm, uh, uh, reprising the role of Napoleon, and he's quite good at it. Uh, uh, uh, so I... He does have a m- mindset for that. Um, Napoleon has ability... Well, first of all, let me put it, uh... He, by nature, he was very gifted man, uh, with the almost photographic memory, so he retained minutiae of detail. And I've spent better part of quarter century examining his documents and going through the archives, kinda gonna, dealing with the paperwork that he left behind, and it's prod- prod- prodigious. Uh, we just finished, uh, a collective effort of publishing, uh, kind of compilation of his, uh, uh, personal letters, and we, we had to stop at 44,000. And that doesn't account for the government decision and government paperwork that he pre- you know, reviewed and then signed on. And, you know, in, in, when... In my books on 1812, we kinda see him, uh, you know, deep in Russia, he's governing empire that stretches from Spain to Poland and from Denmark to, to Croatia, right? And he deals with minutiae of these details. So he would have been, in that sense, a micromanaging CEO. Uh, again, that's... I don't know if that's a good thing or a bad thing because it, it has its, its pros and cons. But he was a micromanager.

   11. DPDwarkesh Patel1:04:24

       I mean, have you seen the videos-

   12. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:04:24

       Yeah.

   13. DPDwarkesh Patel1:04:25

       Have you seen the videos of Elon Musk, uh-

   14. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:04:27

       (laughs)

   15. DPDwarkesh Patel1:04:28

       ... uh, going through the minutiae of these-

   16. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:04:29

       That's what I'm saying. (laughs)

   17. DPDwarkesh Patel1:04:30

       ... uh, his, his Tesla plant and then also, like, the R- Raptor engine or something?

   18. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:04:32

       Yeah, that's exactly what I'm saying. Napoleon would have been that. And the worst thing is that, I don't know how good Elon's memory is, Napoleon's is brilliant. And he would be kinda, "Oh, on page this, call, you know, footnote that" (laughs) "You find, you find..." Yeah. There is a fascinating moment when, uh, when he's in Moscow, uh, he actually noticed that a small battalion was sent on the wrong road in the countryside in Central Italy. Who does that kind of thing, right? (laughs) The, the main, the kinda keeping that, um, that, that, uh, level of, of, uh, of detail. Or as an emperor, he actually, uh, supervised what we can say, I think, a modern police state. Uh, the de- the extent of the police surveillance of the French population is stunning, and as part of it, what is interesting is that he would... He required weekly reports on what people, average people, kinda common people, would say in the streets, and police agents would compile these reports from all across France and he would receive digests. So on top of everything else that he would be doing, he would sit down and kinda going through and l- and learning what Alex said on Thursday and what Varcheg said on Friday, right? (laughs) And this is expression of public, uh, public sentiment. Um, so n- no, he, he had, uh, all the preconditions for it, and a kind of, the last point, he loved technology.... and, and he i- he supported technology. He'd support, for example, he was the one who, uh, set up prizes for technological improvements that benefited the French military for, you know, uh, it's a famous story of, uh, him, uh, right, pro- uh, kinda, uh, uh, uh, setting awards for developing new ways of preserving food which led to conservation. You know, the kind of jars that we are now consuming, right? It actually c- come from the Napoleonic era. Or it is Napoleon who, for example, conducted or supported experiments on developing submarine technology. In fact, in the middle of Paris on the Seine River, they tested submarines. Now it didn't work out and, uh, the submarines were leaking so he didn't adopt it, but nonetheless it, it shows his willingness to embrace it, this technological development. He tried to stay abreast of it all, so...

   19. DPDwarkesh Patel1:06:53

       Yeah, it's similar with, um, I- I think many other important leaders in history. I think Churchill was a big, um... yeah, he, he, he was a big aviator and I think he cr- uh, he crashed at- uh, uh, at- at least once and also he, he saw the importance of tanks early on I think while he was in, um, India or something. So, um, yeah, that's very interesting. Now you mentioned earlier that, uh, the- th- this era in history in France brought forth a lot of young, great young leaders and a lot of young talent. Um, was it just that the old people got killed-

   20. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:07:24

       (laughs)

   21. DPDwarkesh Patel1:07:24

       ... during the Revolution (laughs) or w- what, uh, wa- was there something else going on?

   22. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:07:28

       Um, no, not necessarily. Yeah, no, revolution was bloody but not that bloody. Um, no, th- there is a, um... The revolution was about opening careers to talent, and I think that's one of the great legacies of th- revolution and Napoleon, in that they created a system that valued merit. Yes, connection still w- you know, still played a role. I mean, it's a... You know, if there is one constant in the inconstancy of human nature and that is that, you know, the nepotism and corruption st- stays with us. Uh, but to a far greater degree, uh, merit played a role. And so that see, you see that, uh, in, in the people Napoleon, uh, promoted and surrounded himself with, uh, were, again, uh, they're... Th- his cabinet is, is quite capable, uh, and, and it stays so throughout the empire. And not just in military as I said but it's in finance, in administration, in, in science. Uh, it's the ability to, uh, for a person from a humble background to go to a school to distinguish themself through his, through his... And, uh, and at this time it's, it's largely his, right? That the women were not given the equality, uh, through his talent and, and merit and, and rise to the top. That's what matters, and that's is what is missing I think in many other areas of Europe at this time. In parts like in Spain, in, in Southern Italy, in, in Austria or in, in Russia. There is a far less opportunity for a commoner to, to rise to the top. Um, uh, uh, but, uh, Napoleon makes sure that by the time he's, uh, he's gone, that the system is already entrenched. That, yes, monarchy will be restored. Bourbons will be back, but even Bourbons will have to accept the charter, this constitutional arrangement, eh, uh, uh, one of the principles of which will be equality before the law, will be this acceptance of careers open to, to merit.

   23. DPDwarkesh Patel1:09:27

       What happened to this, um, uh, this model of the sort of enlightened despot? It seems that that's more, less common today. Maybe the most recent one would have been somebody like Lee Kuan Yew, uh, who was a similar model to Napoleon.

   24. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:09:38

       Mm-hmm.

   25. DPDwarkesh Patel1:09:39

       But what happened to figures like this in, uh, in our government?

   26. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:09:43

       Um, so in my, in- in my own research and certainly in this book, I, I'm making an argument, um, not necessarily an original argument but that's certainly, I'm, I'm a big proponent of it, that Napoleon is not necessarily the child of revolution. Now he's a product of the revolutionary circumstances but he does nece- does not necessarily represent revolution as such. To me, as I mention in the book, he's the last of the enlightened despots because much of what he tried to cre- e- establish, right? Much what he tried to in- introduce, inequality, uh, but also order and efficiency, uh, these are not necessarily the revolutionary ideals but these are ideas that other enlightened despots, including Frederick the Great, including Joseph II of Austria, right? Tried also to a various degree of success implementing in their countries. To... But Napoleon I think is the last of them and probably the most successful in, in, in that his system, uh, survived. And the reason why he's more successful than Frederick or Joseph is be- is ev- because of revolution. Okay? Now Napoleon did not support the radicalism of revolution, and we, we see that throughout his life that, you know, even as a young man when he witnessed revolutionary, uh, events in Paris, that he consistently came out against or, or, or, or expressed opinion against the radicalism of the crowd. Uh, he i- i- i- a- and that to me is the, is, is, is kind of an element in, in his mindset that tells that he's not a r- you know, revolution on horseback as such but enlightened despotism. Um, once he passed away, right? Uh, once he's, uh, you know, off the historical stage, uh, even though we are not talking about the enlightened despotism as such but the core of it still is there. It's the government trying to bring about changes, government bring about standardization, bring about efficiency. Now it is not done as overtly or as, as, as, as acutely as Napoleon did it, uh, but that's because circumstances have kind of changed and evolved. But we see, still see for example Prussian development in 1820s and '30s that are part of that.... a kind of, uh, uh, yeah, what, what I would say this part of this enlightened rational, uh, uh, reform movement. Uh, and even later on in, in post-Crimean period, uh, Alexander II, the Russian emperor's great reforms can be perceived to be as part of that steady, gradual introduction of change that, uh, will modernize the state. So, you know, you, you, I think you, you can make an argument connecting those dots.

   27. DPDwarkesh Patel1:12:34

       And then what happened to that, that, that form of government? It seems that o- other than, yeah, other than Singapore, it's kind of, uh, kind of a lost, uh-

   28. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:12:43

       No, I mean, I wouldn't say it's l-... Um, would you consider, for example, Soviet state as, as that? Because it is a status, it's a status approach that is ushering in rapid transformation of society. Um, I think it evolved. It, it, it's changed its nature. Um, Singapore is a unique case in that it was, uh, it, it was both l- kind of liberal, but author- or, or, you know, authoritarian in that sense, right? It's a c- kind of risk, you know, controlled liberal environment. Um, but Soviet system was authoritarian, but more radical in its, in its transformations. Um, so, uh, it, it's, I think it's a part of evolutionary process of, of, of, of what's happening. So not necessarily that it's withered away and, and disappeared. Um, you certainly can, for example, make a case for some of the, uh, Latin American examples, where this enlightened, you know, kind of enlightened reform movements led, spearheaded by an individual, uh, might be, um, might be still relevant.

   29. DPDwarkesh Patel1:13:49

       And then, uh, this is the question I, I meant to ask you earlier, which is when we were talking about how this, uh, was a unique time in terms of giving these talented young people, um, a- access to positions based on their merit. Is, is that possibly one of the advantages of war, which is that you have to, uh, if, if the weak perish, then, um, the, the, the n- nations are, have a very strong incentive to, um, make sure their systems and their government are as efficient as possible? I, I, if you look at, uh, let's say, uh, um, the US, it's still a meritocracy, maybe, uh, maybe in the, in, like, private markets. But, uh, there, there's, uh, the, the average age of congressmen-

   30. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:14:30

       (laughs)
8. 1:14:45 – 1:23:48

   The advantages of war

   1. DPDwarkesh Patel1:14:45

      more efficient if they need to win?

   2. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:14:46

      No, I think that's a, um, I think that's a challenging ta- uh, question to, to, to deal with in, in a sense. Because, uh, eh, that, you know, in the late 19th century, you know, social Darwinists, for example, argued that war was a, a great pur- purger of societies that rejuvenates it. So and I'm not sure that we want to kinda go back to that (laughs) , to that, to that argument. Uh, I, you know, the war, I mean, the sheer nature of the war is that, that it makes things possible that in peacetime would be unthinkable. It is a great ho- it, it has a great homogenizing effects. It suppresses some of the, uh, sharper edges, or in some areas, actually makes those sharper edges even more pronounced. And certainly when we talk about with French Revolution, for example, without the war, the revolution would not have radicalized as rapidly or to the extent that it did, right? Uh, without the conflict in, that starts in 1792, France would have, uh, it's my argument, would have continued on the path of a gradual reform movement, uh, towards the constitutional limited monarchy rather than rush towards a radical republicanism, terror, and violence, which then beget more violence, more cy- cycles of, uh, political instability and ultimately led to military dictatorship, right? That's where the war is, is crucial and certainly within that context, right, in, in, in the context of war, there's a lot of things that revolutionaries, uh, thought were justifiable. For example, suspension of habeas corpus, for example, uh, arrest and persecution of their political, uh, dis- uh, opponents. But also instituting great government controls. Think about law of maximums, for example, of the, that Jacobins introduced, uh, during the terror. Uh, all that is in the context of that fear, of that anxiety, of that emergent situation that the war cultivates. That's where I, I, I see the impact of it. And now of course, the war also creates conditions where, um, bright, talented, however you wanna, you know, whatever adjective you wanna put it at, individuals have an opportunity to distinguish. Now, for example, you know, kinda to go back to what you said, um, about the war being this kind of great purger. You know, it certainly, uh, it had a role in, in weeding out many officers in the French corps. Some, many of them immigrated, left the army. Some of them, uh, failed in the tasks that revolutions, go- the revolutionary government set for them and were, uh, punished dearly so for it. We have several cases like, uh, General Costain or, uh, General Beauharnais, oh, and others who failed to achieve the mission that the government set for them, and they were recalled, and then, uh, condemned and executed for it. And so it certainly creates, uh, this environment in which you have to, you have to deliver, you have to be at your best, uh, or y- an environment in which, uh, uh, people who are willing to take the risk are pushed f- uh, forward. And that's i- in, in many respects how Napoleon got his start, right? In 1793, he's a lowly nobody in the French, uh, um, army, and yet he's the one who is willing to take charge of artillery command in, in this town of Toulon, which is besieged by the army. He comes up with a plan that, uh, brings the city to the-... uh, the- uh, to its knees, and the rest is history, right? And, and all is done within, within this w- war environment. Um, who knows how things would have turned if there was no war, and whether Napoleon would have been able to distinguish himself or the other generals like, uh, uh, or, or that went on to make great careers.

   3. DPDwarkesh Patel1:18:37

      Uh, it seems that one of the reasons that the, uh, the, the, the revolutionary and Napoleonic ideas spread a lot was that also at the time that France was the seat of, um, uh, seat of intellectual, uh, discourse, um, a- at the time. Uh, to, why, why was that? You know, I mean, maybe today, uh, America has that sort of cultural influence that, uh, France had at the time. When you read, like, War and Peace-

   4. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:19:00

      (laughs)

   5. DPDwarkesh Patel1:19:00

      ... you know, the, all, all the elites in Russia are talking in French. Um, what, what, what gave France its cultural dominance at the time?

   6. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:19:07

      Um, that, that's a longer kind of structural, uh, historical process. Um, you know, we can go back to 17th century and see the, the rise of dominant, uh, France as a dominant, uh, both, uh, political entity in Western Europe and a cultural kind of entity in, in, in Europe as a whole. Uh, I think it's a creation of Louis XIV's era, the, the, the grandeur of the French monarchy, the opulence, the luxury of it, the, the diversity, and the richness of, of French offerings. Uh, and of course, you know, this is where I think it gets really interesting in the sense that, uh, France is oftentimes envisioned as an absolutist, uh, monarchy with its kind of tight controls and everything. But on the other hand, uh, in the 18th century, we see a diverse range of opinions, uh, expressed within France by the French writers. On one hand, you know, you can have, you, you can find an- anti-enlightenment writers, but alongside you will see Voltaire, you will see Rousseau, or the less known ones like Holbach, who was an, an atheist who was writing critical works a- against the organized religion and ve- envisioning these technocratic utopias. Um, so that is a unique circumstances that France was able to, to craft and cultivate, uh, that other countries, uh, were unable to replicate or were able to replicate to a certain- to a lesser degree. I think the other country that was successful in doing that, of course, Britain, but, uh, uh, you know, which, which had a very vibrant and, and, and rich intellectual life at this time.

   7. DPDwarkesh Patel1:20:44

      Uh, I wanna be respectful of your time. Uh, so, uh, is there, um... The book is The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History. And, um, yeah, if, if you wanna mention your Twitter handle.

   8. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:20:56

      Um, it's just A.A... Yeah, my, my, uh, first name and, uh, last name. (laughs) So it's pretty straightforward. If you can spell my last name, Mikhelevich, (laughs) you'll find me.

   9. DPDwarkesh Patel1:21:05

      You know, when, when I was doing research for the book, um, there were many times when I had to, like, look up your... I was like, maybe look, try to look up older interviews or something, and every time I had to go to Amazon and then, like, make sure I copied the name right.

   10. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:21:17

       My students call me Dr. M., which, uh-

   11. DPDwarkesh Patel1:21:19

       Yeah. And then-

   12. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:21:19

       ... (laughs) which makes me a kinda character from the James Bond movie, but (laughs) it's easier for them to recall, to remember it.

   13. DPDwarkesh Patel1:21:26

       Sure. (laughs) Um, yeah. And then, uh, yeah, any other... I don't know if there's like a, some final note or some final point that you wanna close on. Uh, something that stuck out, uh, from the conversation or from the book.

   14. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:21:38

       No, I think, uh, you know, th- this book represents kinda a humble effort to showcase what history can do in, in, in modern context, and that is to move away from traditional boundaries to, to adopt a more wider lens at looking events, more transnational, more comparative. That, uh, it, it's perfectly fine to, to do national histories and to kind of look at the historical developments of particular, uh, country. But to me, it is far more rewarding to, to see how countries developed in relationship with each other, how events in one part of the world reverberates in another. Because, um, the more... In, in our day, nowadays, we live in such an interconnected world that, that transnational and comparative approach is absolutely essential to your success in, in, really, in any field of, of, of career that you pursue, and certainly in, in politics, in business, in, in, in law. Uh, and so I encourage, um, uh, your listeners to, to pick up books, uh, like that, books written with the global history in, in mind, um, and, and broaden their horizons.

   15. DPDwarkesh Patel1:22:57

       From, from the little history I have read, usually it's like a biography or something, and you, you really do miss the global implications of the decisions that are being made and the changes that are happening. Um, so i- it was super interesting to get that, uh, that, um, total perspective.

   16. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:23:14

       Thank you.

   17. DPDwarkesh Patel1:23:14

       Um, so yeah, it's a super fascinating book, and this is a super fun conversation. Thanks so much for coming on the podcast.

   18. AMAlexander Mikaberidze1:23:19

       Thank you. I appreciate that. Uh, thank you for the opportunity.

   19. DPDwarkesh Patel1:23:22

       I hope you enjoyed this podcast. If you did and wanna help support it, the most helpful thing you can do is share it on social media and with your friends. Other than that, please like and comment on YouTube and leave good reviews on podcast platforms. Cheers, and thanks for watching. (instrumental music)

Episode duration: 1:23:48