The Barnes & Noble comeback, from the CEO who did it (James Daunt)

He argued that store quality comes from qualitative decisions about curation, space allocation, presentation, and service, and that those decisions can be taught. He described data as an occasional reference point, but said the most compelling stores often require judgment that contradicts what the numbers suggest.

He said centralized data tends to enable uniformity across stores, which he framed as harmful for bookselling. He described deliberately “driving out” data early to empower local teams, then bringing data back later once the culture can use it without turning it into control.

He described Waterstones as suffering from a misplaced loss of confidence in the face of Amazon, and said the remedy was getting booksellers to believe they could run good bookstores so customers would return. He framed bookstores as offering discovery and enjoyment that differs from efficient online purchasing.

He said Waterstones sold Kindles not primarily to chase e-book sales, but to reduce fear among staff by putting the device “in the middle” of the store. He claimed the feared behavior—people browsing in-store then ordering digitally—happened only in a “vanishingly small percentage,” and that selling Kindles helped demystify them.

He said his approach is to flatten hierarchies and build collective responsibility, even though teams sometimes prefer being told what to do when things get hard. He also described responding to mistakes by quickly acknowledging what’s wrong and moving on without blame, which he said makes it easier for junior people to speak up.