Modern WisdomChina's Secret Playbook For War - General Robert Spalding
CHAPTERS
Shanghai lockdown as a ‘perfected’ checklist: zero-COVID enforcement escalating
Spalding describes Shanghai’s lockdown as an evolved version of Wuhan—more procedural, more automated, and harsher in day-to-day enforcement. They discuss viral videos, including pet confiscation, and what those actions signal about state control and compliance mechanisms.
- •Shanghai portrayed as Wuhan-style lockdown ‘with a checklist’
- •Pet removal/killings discussed as policy efficiency and compliance control
- •Quarantine enforcement tactics (forced removals, isolation facilities)
- •Food access issues framed as inevitable under strict confinement
Digital panopticon: social credit, AI surveillance, and automated punishment
The conversation shifts from lockdown specifics to the broader architecture of China’s tech-enabled governance. Spalding frames it as a systems-engineering approach that uses data, incentives, and penalties to shape behavior at scale—creating a real-time, AI-run panopticon.
- •Society engineered like a manufacturing process (Six Sigma logic)
- •Rewards/punishments tied to behavior; ‘cancellation’ as enforcement
- •AI surveillance scales ‘guarding’ beyond human limits
- •Panopticon effect: people self-censor and self-regulate under constant observation
The innovation tradeoff and ‘exporting’ authoritarian state–citizen norms to the West
Spalding argues that eliminating ‘anomalies’ reduces not only crime but also innovation, and that China historically relied on importing innovation from freer societies. He claims COVID-era policies helped normalize a stronger state role in democracies, pushing them toward China’s model of state primacy.
- •Suppressing anomalies also suppresses beneficial innovation
- •China historically ‘takes the good’ innovations from the West
- •COVID policies and contact tracing as gateways to expanded state control
- •Digital passports and restrictions as signs of shifting state–individual balance
Western double standards and the leverage of market access over values (Hollywood as a case study)
Chris and Spalding discuss perceived Western hypocrisy—strong moral stances at home, but accommodation abroad when China is involved. They use film censorship and shifting on-screen narratives as examples of how dependence on Chinese markets reshapes corporate behavior and messaging.
- •Selective activism vs silence on China’s human-rights issues
- •Content edited for Chinese releases; incentives drive compliance
- •Blockbusters avoid portraying China as an antagonist
- •Market access becomes soft power over speech and storytelling
Economic power becomes narrative power: from ‘we’ll change China’ to ‘China changes us’
Spalding recounts earlier Western confidence that trade would liberalize China, arguing the reverse happened as supply chains and economic influence shifted. He frames this as China inheriting the ability to set terms of discourse globally by wielding finance, investment, and industrial capacity.
- •Post–Cold War US economic dominance as the former rule-setter
- •Supply-chain shift to China alters who ‘drafts the narrative’
- •Western corporations adapt messaging to where profits are
- •Belt & Road and emerging-market investment as influence strategy
Unrestricted Warfare (1999): doctrine for bypassing militaries and targeting societies
Spalding explains the origins and intent of ‘Unrestricted Warfare’—a PLA-authored framework for defeating a militarily superior opponent by exploiting globalization and the internet. The emphasis is on indirect, continuous pressure that erodes sovereignty and decision-making without clear ‘war’ triggers.
- •Written by two PLA Air Force lieutenant colonels as competitive doctrine
- •Internet + globalization as new warfighting tools
- •Bypass military defenses; attack society and institutions directly
- •Win incrementally without being clearly identified as the aggressor
From ‘crazy’ to prescient: why the doctrine worked and why it was underestimated
Spalding reflects on reading the book in 1999 versus later, comparing it to early airpower theorists like Billy Mitchell. He argues the Chinese perspective treats politics as war—making them more attuned to tools that shape perceptions and governance outcomes without conventional conflict.
- •Personal reassessment: disbelief in 1999, recognition by 2013
- •Analogy to early airpower theorists dismissed then proven right
- •PLA as the Party’s army; political objectives drive all instruments
- •‘Politics is war’ worldview enables long-horizon strategy
Weaponizing populations: targeting perceptions, trust, and cohesion via information systems
They connect the doctrine to modern media fragmentation—declining trust in institutions, contested definitions of truth, and social division. Spalding argues that influencing individuals at scale is cheaper and lower-risk than kinetic force, and can destabilize societies from within.
- •Internet enables individualized influence operations at scale
- •Goal: alter perceptions, intentions, behaviors; fracture cohesion
- •Erode trust in government, media, and shared reality
- •Populism and polarization as exploitable pressure against elites
China’s disinformation as an ecosystem: scale, finance, and media ownership incentives
Spalding contrasts China’s capacity with Russia’s, emphasizing scale and integration with global capital. He argues that shareholder incentives and corporate ties to China can shape media narratives indirectly—turning information flow into a globalization-linked vulnerability.
- •China’s influence compared to Russia as vastly larger in scale
- •Media incentives shaped by ownership, shareholders, and China exposure
- •Globalization links narrative control to financial dependencies
- •Fourth-estate role undermined by consolidated corporate influence
Governance efficiency vs liberty: why dictatorships appeal to elites and how democracies drift
Spalding and Chris discuss the seductive ‘efficiency’ of authoritarian systems for leaders who want fewer constraints. Spalding argues Western political duopoly and performative conflict can preserve elite power, making societies more susceptible to authoritarian-style consolidation.
- •Dictatorship framed as ‘getting more done’ by removing friction
- •Constitutional safeguards designed to prevent power accumulation
- •Claim of ‘performative’ left-right conflict preserving a duopoly
- •Elite incentives and lobbying shape policy continuity across parties
China’s military build-up and Taiwan: preparing for conventional war after owning supply chains
The discussion turns to China’s long game: keep military spending sustainable while building economic dominance, then accelerate military modernization. Spalding predicts an invasion of Taiwan and argues China’s amassed capabilities and indifference to casualties make it uniquely dangerous.
- •Avoiding Soviet-style overspending while growing prosperity/social contract
- •Purchasing power, theft of R&D, and efficiency amplify real capability
- •Military expansion accelerates once supply-chain dominance is achieved
- •Taiwan invasion forecast; regional US bases seen as vulnerable
South China Sea outposts and Belt & Road as strategic logistics for wartime resilience
Spalding frames the South China Sea islands as ‘immobile carriers’ enabling control and sustainment, fulfilling long-standing PLA objectives. He connects Belt & Road to avoiding chokepoints like Malacca, building alternative routes for energy, materials, and food ahead of a Taiwan scenario.
- •South China Sea militarization as decades-in-the-making PLA tasking
- •Artificial islands as persistent power projection and logistics hubs
- •Malacca chokepoint vulnerability drives overland/alternate corridors
- •BRI as strategic redundancy for resources during conflict
Ukraine as a ‘dry run’ for Taiwan: learning Western responses and revealing allied constraints
Spalding argues China benefits from observing Western sanctions and escalation patterns against Russia, enabling counter-planning for Taiwan. He warns that ‘showing all the cards’ reduces deterrent leverage later and helps China build mechanisms to blunt future Western options.
- •China watches Western tools: sanctions, coordination, escalation limits
- •Claim: Xi granted timing/approval logic around Olympics
- •Concern that maximal response to Russia educates China’s planners
- •Fear of constrained future response when Taiwan becomes the crisis
Fentanyl as asymmetric warfare: factories, triads/cartels, and systemic enforcement gaps
They explore fentanyl’s origin and distribution, with Spalding alleging China as the primary source and arguing enforcement is structurally mismatched. He claims China tolerates harmful exports when they don’t threaten the Party, while Western agencies focus on individual arrests rather than systemic leverage.
- •Fentanyl described as manufactured industrially, not small-batch
- •Distribution via triads and cartels; Canada as an illustrative route
- •China prevents domestic spillover with harsh internal penalties
- •Western enforcement ‘kills ants, not the anthill’—arrests don’t stop flow
Deception as strategy: Sun Tzu, narrative capture, and the ‘war is already decided’ idea
Spalding and Chris end on the theme that China seeks victory before open conflict through influence, elite capture, and perception management. Spalding cites an example involving pandemic modeling to illustrate how fear and policy outcomes can be shaped through seemingly credible Western institutions.
- •Sun Tzu: deception, spies, demoralization; ‘attack a defeated enemy’
- •Goal: political capitulation and alignment without declared war
- •Example claim: institutional influence shaping pandemic responses
- •War framed as continuous political warfare rather than discrete battles
