Modern WisdomChina's Secret Playbook For War - General Robert Spalding
CHAPTERS
- 0:00 – 1:37
Shanghai lockdowns as a “checklist” system of control
Spalding describes what he’s seeing (largely through public videos and reporting) about Shanghai’s lockdowns and how China appears to have refined lockdown enforcement since Wuhan. The conversation highlights how rigid, standardized procedures can be scaled quickly across a huge city—often with harsh outcomes.
- •Lockdown tactics in Shanghai compared to early Wuhan measures
- •Authorities’ increasing “efficiency” and standard operating procedures
- •Reports of pets being removed/disposed of as part of quarantine rules
- •China’s culture of checklists and compliance-by-procedure
- 1:37 – 2:37
Why pets are being seized (and what it signals about the state’s priorities)
Chris and Spalding focus on disturbing footage of pets being collected or killed and explore potential motives. The discussion frames it as both a public-health rationale (vector control) and a compliance measure (reducing reasons to leave quarantine).
- •Possible justification: pets as vectors of transmission
- •Possible enforcement logic: pets create incentives to break quarantine
- •Contrast with China’s broader record of harsh internal repression
- •How coercive measures normalize extreme state interventions
- 2:37 – 7:03
Drones, CBDCs, and the “digital panopticon”
They zoom out from Shanghai specifics to a systems-level view: surveillance technology enables real-time behavioral enforcement at scale. Spalding argues China is combining Silicon Valley-style data tools with governance to create automated compliance—rewards for good behavior and immediate punishment for violations.
- •Reports of drone policing, facial recognition, and automated fines
- •Society engineered like a manufacturing system (Six Sigma metaphor)
- •Performance-based social control: rewards vs. cancellation/punishment
- •Panopticon concept upgraded by AI: always-on monitoring
- 7:03 – 12:54
Technocratic control vs innovation: eliminating “anomalies”
Spalding argues that heavy-handed systems designed to remove deviance can also suppress the positive outliers that drive innovation. He suggests China has compensated by extracting innovations from the West while keeping tight internal control—then notes COVID-era policies nudged Western countries toward similar state-individual dynamics.
- •Over-optimizing compliance can kill beneficial experimentation
- •China ‘imports’ innovation from freer systems while restricting dissent
- •COVID policy as a catalyst for Western adoption of restrictive tools
- •Concern about shifting norms in state power over individuals
- 12:54 – 22:15
Western double standards and corporate accommodation of China
Chris raises examples of Western moral posturing that appears to soften when Chinese market access is at stake (e.g., film edits). Spalding connects this to a broader power shift: as economic gravity moves toward China, Western institutions and corporations increasingly align messaging and behavior to maintain access.
- •Hollywood edits and selective activism as a case study
- •Economic dependence changes what companies will say and do
- •Post–Cold War power shift: supply chains and influence moving to China
- •‘Who drafts the narrative’ follows economic power
- 22:15 – 30:22
Unrestricted Warfare (1999): war without rules via internet + globalization
Spalding explains the origins of the PLA text ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ and why it mattered: it proposed bypassing direct military confrontation and attacking societies through non-military means. The doctrine focuses on exploiting globalization and information networks to erode sovereignty gradually and invisibly.
- •Written by two PLA Air Force lieutenant colonels as competitive doctrine
- •Core insight: avoid direct military contest with a superior foe
- •Use internet/globalization to target society rather than military forces
- •Win incrementally: sovereignty and cohesion erode ‘day by day’
- 30:22 – 34:16
Politics is war: how the CCP conceptualizes enemies and alliances
Spalding contrasts Western Clausewitz-style thinking with what he describes as a CCP tradition where politics itself is warfare. He argues China treats most outsiders as adversaries, prefers interest-based relationships over true alliances, and benefits when rivals and democracies are divided.
- •CCP/PLA framing: political warfare as the primary arena
- •‘No permanent allies’—relationships of interest and leverage
- •Using Russia/Iran/North Korea and regional partners to complicate coalitions
- •Strategy of splitting alliances (e.g., US–EU divergence on China)
- 34:16 – 42:35
Why dictatorships look ‘efficient’—and why that’s seductive in the West
The discussion turns to how authoritarian systems can move quickly with less political friction, making them appealing to some leaders. Spalding argues constitutional limits exist precisely to prevent power consolidation, and warns that China’s rise undermines the global “luster” of liberty while accelerating internal Western cynicism.
- •Dictatorship’s operational speed vs democracy’s accountability friction
- •Western leaders tempted by ‘getting things done’ authoritarian style
- •Erosion of constitutional instincts: trading liberty for convenience
- •China framed as an ‘existential’ challenge to democratic self-belief
- 42:35 – 47:45
China’s disinformation advantage: scale, ownership, and influence pathways
Spalding claims China’s information operations dwarf Russian efforts due to scale and economic entanglement. He emphasizes structural influence: media consolidation, shareholder incentives, and globalized financial ties that indirectly shape narratives and mute criticism.
- •China vs Russia disinfo: ‘convenience store vs Getty’ scale metaphor
- •Media influence via globalization: shareholders, incentives, relationships
- •Consolidation reduces viewpoint diversity and increases narrative control
- •Fourth-estate erosion: media less able/willing to challenge power
- 47:45 – 51:17
Military buildup and the Taiwan scenario: preparing for conventional war
Spalding argues China is now accelerating military power after first capturing supply-chain dominance. He predicts an invasion of Taiwan, describing China’s capacity as overwhelming and suggesting Beijing’s internal narrative rewards territorial ‘restoration’ regardless of human cost.
- •Earlier restraint to avoid Soviet-style military overspend
- •Supply-chain dominance first, military expansion second
- •Prediction: Taiwan invasion is ‘coming’ and would be massive
- •Belief that CCP prioritizes land/narrative over people
- 51:17 – 56:51
South China Sea bases, Belt & Road, and learning from Ukraine (the ‘dry run’)
Spalding explains how artificial islands function like stationary aircraft carriers that enable sustained control in the South China Sea. He connects Belt & Road to resource-security planning (avoiding chokepoints like Malacca) and argues Beijing is studying Western sanctions and responses to Russia’s invasion to pre-plan a Taiwan campaign.
- •South China Sea militarization as long-planned control strategy
- •Artificial islands as fixed platforms enabling logistics and power projection
- •Belt & Road as redundancy for energy/raw materials under blockade risk
- •Ukraine as a test case to observe Western reactions and refine plans
- 56:51 – 1:04:07
Fentanyl as systemic warfare: factories, triads/cartels, and asymmetric pain
Spalding presents fentanyl as an example of how systemic, state-tolerated activities can harm adversaries while remaining insulated domestically. He argues Western law enforcement often treats it as isolated criminality rather than a strategic pipeline, making it hard to impose the kind of elite-level costs that would change behavior.
- •Claim: fentanyl production originates in Chinese factories
- •Distribution path: triads and cartels moving product to North America
- •Why China avoids a domestic fentanyl crisis: harsh internal deterrence
- •‘Anthill’ analogy: arresting individuals doesn’t stop a systemic flow
- •Leverage problem: punishing China’s elites also hits Western elites via supply chains
- 1:04:07 – 1:06:35
Deception as strategy: Sun Tzu, stealth war, and the Imperial College example
Chris reads a Sun Tzu passage to frame the idea that open conflict comes only after the outcome is already decided through demoralization and manipulation. Spalding reinforces that political outcomes can be achieved without declared war and offers a controversial example of institutional influence shaping public policy and fear.
- •Sun Tzu: deception, spies, demoralization, and ‘attack a defeated enemy’
- •Claim: by the time war is declared, capitulation may already be forced
- •Information operations aimed at perceptions, intentions, and behavior
- •Example raised: influential modeling institutions shaping policy narratives
- 1:06:35 – 1:07:22
Where to find Spalding + closing remarks
Chris wraps up the conversation and Spalding shares where people can follow his work and find his book. The episode ends with standard show outro and prompts to watch more clips and subscribe.
- •Spalding’s social profiles and website
- •Pointers to his book and online presence
- •Show sign-off and viewer call-to-action
