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The ERP for the AI Revolution is here

John Glasgow is the CEO and founder of Campfire (S23), an AI-native ERP platform built for high-growth tech companies that automates accounting and financial reporting workflows using a custom foundation model and agent platform — the company recently raised a Series B led by Accel and Ribbit Capital, has more than doubled ARR each quarter since Q4 2024, and now exceeds 100 employees after closing a $35 million Series A in June 2025 with just 12 people. In this fireside, John sat down with Andrew Tan to talk about how he went from a Google Sheets prototype to pulling customers off NetSuite, why staying in founder-led sales until $1M ARR was critical, how narrowly targeting the needs of tech companies gave Campfire a wedge into a decades-old market, and why the shift to AI-native infrastructure flipped the narrative on what "safe" software buying actually means. https://www.meetcampfire.com Apply to Y Combinator: https://www.ycombinator.com/apply Work at a startup: https://www.ycombinator.com/jobs

Andrew TanhostJohn Glasgowguest
May 20, 202627mWatch on YouTube ↗

EVERY SPOKEN WORD

  1. 0:00 – 0:05

    Intro

    1. AT

      [upbeat music]

  2. 0:05 – 0:39

    Campfire’s mission: an AI-native ERP for finance teams

    1. AT

      I'm joined today by John Glasgow, CEO and founder of Campfire. Uh, Campfire recently raised their Series B, led by Accel and Ribbit. John, tell me about Campfire.

    2. JG

      Well first, Andrew, thanks for having me on today. Campfire is the AI-native ERP for high-growth companies, and we help finance and accounting teams automate manual work for their accounting and their financial reportings, whether it's taxes or investors. Um, and when we automate it, of course, uh, a lot of it's with AI, then we're able to allow them to focus on more strategic work.

  3. 0:39 – 1:54

    ERP 101 and why the market is enormous (and hard)

    1. AT

      So I guess tell us first, ERP, I, I don't know if everyone's familiar with that. What is that?

    2. JG

      Yeah. Enterprise resource planning, essentially all of the accounting and financial reporting for a company. So the good thing for us is literally everybody has taxes. They have... P- particularly in, in tech, a lot of folks have financial reporting requirements to investors. And so the market's wide because everybody essentially has one. Now it's just a matter of which one are you on. And so for us, it was not in education. We just had to go out and build something that people wanted.

    3. AT

      Yeah. I mean, this is to me the, the classic established market, but then the question is how do you break in? I mean, I mean, you're going up against NetSuite. Like, how, how did you decide to do that?

    4. JG

      Yeah. And I vividly remember during my YC interview, uh, of course famously it was eight minutes, it went short.

    5. AT

      [laughs]

    6. JG

      And, um, I was saying I wanna build a modern ERP. And they, uh... It was, it was Dalton, and Dalton was like, um, "Literally we've yet to see somebody that's excited about this category because it's so old and ancient and ready for something new," but also credible because I was in corporate finance for over 10 years. And so, um, yeah, it's a category I've gotten to know well in my career. But to your point, I think it was, it was definitely ripe for disruption.

  4. 1:54 – 2:54

    Founder–market fit: a decade inside legacy finance stacks

    1. AT

      Let's talk about that. That's the, that's the, um, you know, founder market fit piece there. How did you... W- what about your prior experiences led you to the space of ERPs and, and coming to the belief that now is the time to, uh, to do a new one?

    2. JG

      Yeah. And, and actually, like, meeting after we got into YC, that was the biggest question investors had, which was like, "Why now?"

    3. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    4. JG

      And so I, I think a lot of it did come down to, uh, about a 10-year corporate finance career and really spending a lot of time in the legacy systems. And then, uh, our company got acquired, so I was no longer doing finance, I was doing partnerships. Our largest partners were the legacy ERPs-

    5. AT

      Mm-hmm

    6. JG

      ... at the company that bought us. So we spent a lot of time with the customers as a partner, and initially it was like, well, maybe I'm the only person that thinks this is a, an opportunity. And then partnering with them, all of our customers were saying like, "Hey, actually this is a huge opportunity. All of us have the same pain you did." That it gave me the conviction to, to come to you guys and say, you know, "I'm gonna leave it all behind in the corporate world-

    7. AT

      [laughs]

    8. JG

      ... and build something new."

    9. AT

      Mm-hmm.

  5. 2:54 – 3:24

    The ‘why now’ question and finding a wedge into an incumbent market

    1. JG

      But, and investors were very much g- at demo day, I vividly remember very much like, "Why now? This is like a very established market, mission-critical software for the customers. Um, and so how do you... Like, what's the catalyst?" And so I spent a lot of time on, on, on that mentally before I went and made the leap.

    2. AT

      What, what were some of the, what were some of the things that you, you decided, like how, how you were gonna, you know, sometimes we say wedge into the space?

    3. JG

      Sure.

    4. AT

      Yeah.

  6. 3:24 – 5:09

    Shipping fast in YC: the first paid product was a Google Sheet

    1. JG

      Yeah. It, it's a great question because as you know in YC you've got a couple months to build-

    2. AT

      Yeah

    3. JG

      ... you know, a working prototype and show revenue and success. And there were some other folks that had been in, uh, trying to tackle this problem that did very long stealth periods.

    4. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    5. JG

      But, uh, you know, YC was very much like, "You got three months to ship something, get revenue, get paying customers."

    6. AT

      Yes.

    7. JG

      So we very quickly... Actually, um, some other YC companies from prior batches saw this as a pain that we had reached out to. And given my finance background, just built, uh, the full version of, uh, the verse, first version in Google Sheets. And we put it into, uh, a login and had Brax and Mercury feeds-

    8. AT

      Okay

    9. JG

      ... kinda in one tab. And then I just did a bunch of, uh, formulas and spreadsheets, and the very first paying version was, uh, less than a month, uh, after we started YC. So it was a very, it was very much-

    10. AT

      Hmm

    11. JG

      ... like the YC mantra of just like getting things out and then rapidly get customer feedback. And I think that allowed us to very quickly, um, build something people want. You know?

    12. AT

      Sure.

    13. JG

      I think I still have my shirt, uh, that says-

    14. AT

      [laughs]

    15. JG

      ... "Build something people want," and-

    16. AT

      Yeah

    17. JG

      ... um, yeah, it's still a mantra we very much have today at Campfire.

    18. AT

      So that, that's interesting. I didn't know that. So your, your prototype, the first version of the product that you got into people's hands was in fact almost a, a, I'm gonna say mock-up, although I get that it was usable-

    19. JG

      Yes

    20. AT

      ... in Google Sheets.

    21. JG

      Yes.

    22. AT

      It wasn't even like software software.

    23. JG

      Yeah. I mean-

    24. AT

      Sure

    25. JG

      ... it was still on the internet in the browser-

    26. AT

      Right

    27. JG

      ... but we had like iframed the Google sheet into the browser.

    28. AT

      Oh, I see. I see. Yeah.

    29. JG

      So it's very, very rudimentary-

    30. AT

      Yeah

  7. 5:09 – 6:52

    You don’t need NetSuite’s entire feature set—focus on what tech companies actually use

    1. AT

      Yeah. Interesting. You know, I, I r- remember, um, you know, one, one thing that, that people struggle with is like, okay, in these like classic enterprise categories like, you know, ERP, CRM, um, HRIS, like you need to be pretty... or what they'll say is that, hey, you need to be pretty feature complete before you can actually disrupt anything. But I look at you guys and, you know, I, number one, I think you cranked out a lot of software very quickly, but number two, you know, you were able to displace, uh, those, those products. Um, did you, did you have to be feature complete before you were or, or how, how were you able to do that?

    2. JG

      Yeah. I think there's a mis- Like, yes, the incumbents are incredibly deep and broad in the-

    3. AT

      Mm-hmm

    4. JG

      ... feature and functionality. But within our initial market-Um, of tech companies, they're actually not using a lot of NetSuite.

    5. AT

      Yeah.

    6. JG

      There is act- most of the, of NetSuite they're actually not using.

    7. AT

      Interesting.

    8. JG

      So we very narrowly focus on a certain segment, which was, like, tech companies that had outgrown QuickBooks-

    9. AT

      Yep

    10. JG

      ... that needed something more powerful or more mature for certain specific features that cause them to move to NetSuite, and we just solve for those specific things. So, like, approval workflows, doesn't sound sexy at all.

    11. AT

      Mm.

    12. JG

      But it's a key reason that folks need it for audit, and QuickBooks doesn't have that.

    13. AT

      Right.

    14. JG

      Multi-entity accounting, where you have a subsidiary. Particularly in the AI-native world, folks are going multi-entity very quickly.

    15. AT

      Yes.

    16. JG

      You know, you look at, like, the Lagores of the world-

    17. AT

      Multi-country. Yeah

    18. JG

      ... and they have, you know, global operations. Um, and so there's a lot of forcing functions. And so, like, we narrowly focus on those few features, and then folks are saying they actually don't have a lot. But within nine months, we were moving people off of NetSuite because we actually narrowly focused on being the best for a very specific profile of the customer base.

  8. 6:52 – 8:51

    Pulling customers off NetSuite: winning on APIs, UX, and trust

    1. AT

      Yeah. And I remember that, too. I remember your initial go-to-market strategy. If, and you can tell me if this is correct, was, was really to catch people at that moment where they were too big for QuickBooks, but maybe not quite big enough for NetSuite.

    2. JG

      Yes.

    3. AT

      But I remember checking in with you at one point, and you were saying you were actually pulling customers off of NetSuite-

    4. JG

      Yeah

    5. AT

      ... which kind of blew my mind.

    6. JG

      I know you were shocked. Yeah.

    7. AT

      How, how did that work? 'Cause that's... I mean, those are... They, they must have signed a, a, a, at least an annual contract with them, and you were able to pull them onto your product. Like, how did you win?

    8. JG

      Yeah. I think a lot of it was, um, you assume that people are very happy on these large incumbents 'cause there's so much features and functionality.

    9. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    10. JG

      But they quickly pointed out that, like, the APIs were challenging for them. The team was struggling with the interface. It was a very outdated interface. And so they were saying, like, if you did a couple things really well, well, we are willing to make a move.

    11. AT

      Hmm.

    12. JG

      And so it wasn't necessarily like, "Oh, we'll move over 'cause it's free," 'cause, like, this is really, like, mission critical software.

    13. AT

      Yeah.

    14. JG

      And so that was the challenging part, was like, how do you convince someone, to your point, to trust us? But we were just a seed stage business, and people with 300 million annual revenue, we only had I think four employees at the time, were moving from NetSuite to Campfire. And it was just this... And I remember this one CFO told me, he's like, "Literally, we are making a venture investment in you-

    15. AT

      Yes

    16. JG

      ... by going with you because you can only be on one ERP really at a time." And so he was like, "I'm literally getting fired if you shut down, and we are so large and you've, you're... This contract is longer than your runway." It was a two-year deal-

    17. AT

      Mm-hmm

    18. JG

      ... for us that, uh, really had to, you know... Particularly in the early days, they're really buying you as much as they are as the product.

    19. AT

      Yeah.

    20. JG

      And so there was a lot of just selling, like, I've come from the category. We're gonna figure it out. Look at how much we've built in a short amount of time. We're gonna continue to ship. Um, and you know, they, uh, they're obviously still a customer today, but I think those early folks that really believed, we had to find some wedge, and for, it was specific features that we were better at.

  9. 8:51 – 10:47

    Demand generation: events, daily LinkedIn, demos, and customer advocacy

    1. AT

      Now, how did you find these guys, and how did you... I mean, to your point, like, how did you convince them? W- was it just the function set? Uh, was, were there other things? Because, you know, I, I, I don't know. I guess a lot of founders would say, like, "Hey, I, you, you have to be further along before you can go after customers like that," but it, in your ca- you're the counterexample.

    2. JG

      Yeah. It- I'd say, like, going to as many events as possible, uh, writing a lot on LinkedIn.

    3. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    4. JG

      I think we're probably 80% inbound demand today.

    5. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    6. JG

      I do a LinkedIn post a day.

    7. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    8. JG

      And it's a lot of content, but I think a lot of these folks just... I remember one CFO said, "Hey, we were gonna check you guys out, uh, and just go to one of your product demos." I was doing, like, weekly product demos or something.

    9. AT

      Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

    10. JG

      And, uh, he's like, "I was gonna think about buying you in a couple years, and I attended, and literally you had everything we actually needed."

    11. AT

      Hmm.

    12. JG

      And so we immediately went into a cycle. But they found us online, they opted into some sort of, uh, group demo experience, and they were blown away what we'd built. They just... And they were a customer less than a month after that. So really sh- like, just going to as many events as possible, building advocates, and then of course customers kind of sharing the good word-

    13. AT

      Right

    14. JG

      ... as they go to events and go to their communities as well.

    15. AT

      And it sounds like almost like the speed at which you were building out your product, which I, I remember, um, the, the pace. I was like, "Oh, this is crazy." That, that pace itself gave your customers comfort-

    16. JG

      Yes

    17. AT

      ... that like, hey, they're not very, you know, feature complete yet, but they, it's not gonna be long before they, they are.

    18. JG

      Yeah.

    19. AT

      Yeah.

    20. JG

      Like some of, uh, a lot of YC companies, obviously Replit-

    21. AT

      Mm-hmm

    22. JG

      ... PostHog.

    23. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    24. JG

      And a lot of what they tell us is, "You guys are building so fast. As we add new global subsidiaries, as we need new features, as we, our usage-based revenue gets more complex, you know, you guys, we feel confident you're gonna be able to stay ahead of us."

    25. AT

      Yeah.

    26. JG

      And so I think that's our commitment to our customers, and we've, to this day, I've never had anybody outgrow Campfire. And so that's-

    27. AT

      Oh, wow

    28. JG

      ... um, really just because we're just shipping every day.

  10. 10:47 – 12:39

    Go-to-market and product packaging: rev-rec wedge vs ‘sell the core ERP’

    1. AT

      Yeah. Let's talk about your, your go-to-market strategy at first too. I mean, I, I remember one of the things that you sort of debated was like, "Hey, maybe we should go in with a, a, you know, a, a more, um, like a product that does a specific thing." I think it was rev-

    2. JG

      Yeah

    3. AT

      ... rev rec, right?

    4. JG

      Yeah. There was a-

    5. AT

      And-

    6. JG

      ... specific wedge on revenue, yeah

    7. AT

      ... and then did, did you keep that, did you keep that strategy or... 'Cause I, in my mind, I remember you at some point realizing like, "Eh, whatever. We're just gonna go full throttle and, and just do [chuckles] the whole thing."

    8. JG

      Yeah.

    9. AT

      What, what, what prompted that? Or, or, or first of all, am I, am I remembering correctly? And secondly, what prompted that?

    10. JG

      Yeah. We, we applied to YC as like a full general ledger, like ERP.

    11. AT

      Yep, yep.

    12. JG

      But we knew that, like, to get a couple customers, uh, live, we were like, "Hey, while we build the general ledger and kind of take the spreadsheet and make it more mature, we can also solve this, something that's almost always in spreadsheets for tech companies, which was like the revenue accounting and SaaS reporting for, like, the investors."

    13. AT

      Yep, yep.

    14. JG

      And so we're like, "Hey, why don't we, like, tackle that? And they'll buy that on top of, like, their ERP. We'll build some trust."

    15. AT

      Right.

    16. JG

      And we quickly found that that cohort ended up not being the cohort that was great at converting to the core product that we actually, that we're trying to get them to move over to.

    17. AT

      Hmm.

    18. JG

      So to your point, we flipped it and, you know, probably right after the batch, we'll call it month three in existence, we essentially flipped where you can only buy kind of the core product that was more rudimentary, and then the revenue one was like an add-on to that, as opposed to the other way around where-

    19. AT

      Yeah

    20. JG

      ... you would drive one to flip the other.

    21. AT

      Yeah, it's so interesting 'cause I g- I guess it's, it's so counterintuitive. Like, from a product perspective, it was like start with this wedge, and maybe be really cute with it.But in the end, you decided, "You know what? We're just gonna like punch it and do the whole, do the whole thing." And same thing on the, on the go-to-market side. It was like, "Well, we could target startups that are just trying to go from like this size to this size." And in the end, you're like, "Nah, whatever, we can target those people and also just pull people off of NetSuite."

  11. 12:39 – 13:16

    Choosing the customer and sales motion: in-house accounting teams, sales-led (not PLG)

    1. JG

      Yeah. 'Cause to your point, I think the other big challenge was like we could go after more folks that were on QuickBooks with like-

    2. AT

      Right

    3. JG

      ... called the SMB solution, but I saw a very different like product to build. Like that's PLG. We're product-led. We end up going pure sales-led.

    4. AT

      Yeah.

    5. JG

      And so I think the features and functionality for the in-house accounting team was very different than the bookkeeping community.

    6. AT

      Yes.

    7. JG

      So we decided to kind of over-index on the in-house team, and so again, narrowly focus on that entry point is when they bring accounting in-house. That was kind of the initial focus. And just really, really own that one moment in time for tech companies is how we're able to build the initial customers.

  12. 13:16 – 15:19

    Seed to Series A: founder-led sales, customer proximity, and micro-pivots

    1. AT

      Got it. Let's talk about your journey from Seed to A. Um, like what, you know, sort of what, what did you do to get those initial customers and, and to build out the proof points that you needed to, to hit to raise your Series A?

    2. JG

      Yeah. Well, I vividly remember the last day of YC-

    3. AT

      Mm-hmm

    4. JG

      ... they said there was really three pieces of advice, and I still remember... I tell the- still tell the team this every day. Uh, build in the Bay, build in person, and get to Series A. Those were [laughs] the three pieces of advice.

    5. AT

      Yep.

    6. JG

      So I religiously took all three.

    7. AT

      Yeah.

    8. JG

      Uh, we're- we do all three. We're five days a week in office in SF for HQ. We now have a New York office. Um, and, and yeah, the, the team's in the Bay. But ultimately S- Series A is kind of the, the one that you have less control over.

    9. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    10. JG

      Um, and for us it was really, I ended up doing founder-led sales. I think even in the AI era, I do really recommend founders to stay in the founder-led sales mode. I think it's like offloading it to AI or offloading it to some AE-

    11. AT

      Mm-hmm

    12. JG

      ... I think like feels like, you know, like, "Oh, let's just like bring in a professional," whether it's an agent or whether it's a human. [laughs]

    13. AT

      Yeah.

    14. JG

      But I, I still recommend like being as close to the customer and the prospective customer as possible, um, until you have product market fit, and I still do that today. Like how can I be as close to everyone? I'm in every Slack channel with every customer. I've always had been, even as we've scaled. I'm trying to join, listen to as many sales meetings as I can to really hear, because then you can... You're the best person in the company to actually like impact change-

    15. AT

      Mm-hmm

    16. JG

      ... on what is happening. You know, the sales team driving engineering, I think you're the best person. So I ended up getting to Series AI, the kind of classic million in ARR for us, um, on my own as the one AE, as the one doing all the demos, all the sales, and I think that allowed us... We didn't pivot at all. It was always the same idea.

    17. AT

      Yeah.

    18. JG

      But there was always like micro pivoting on like what features and functionality.

    19. AT

      Right.

    20. JG

      And so I think that continues to be my advice for folks is like really own it as much as you can.

  13. 15:19 – 16:20

    When it started working: referenceable migrations and the Q4 ’24 inflection

    1. AT

      How did you know, and at what point did you know it was working?

    2. JG

      I would say we didn't pivot at all, but I think if I didn't come from the category, definitely would've pivoted.

    3. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    4. JG

      Because it took over a year. Like it, you know, started in June of '23. It took until Q4 of '24 until we really started to see traction.

    5. AT

      Right.

    6. JG

      And yes, we had paying customers super quickly, and then like kind of the first couple of NetSuite to Campfires was transformative for us. That was the summer of '24. But we had a l- we quickly realized we had a lot of building to do as soon as these kind of larger businesses came online. So once we solved the build for them, and they became referenceable going into the fall of '24, people started to hear like, "Whoa, there's like a new kind of ERP. Customers are very happy moving off of these big incumbents, very complex, mature incumbents." Um, and Q4 of '24, you know, we've more than doubled ARR each of, each quarter since then.

    7. AT

      Right.

    8. JG

      And so, but the, but up until that point, uh, the business looked very different.

    9. AT

      Yeah, yeah.

  14. 16:20 – 16:44

    Scaling mindset shift after the Series A: from scrappy to structured

    1. JG

      Um, and I still remember when we raised our, our A, went from 3.5 million in funding to 35 million in funding.

    2. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    3. JG

      Investors sat me down, and they were like, "You need to start to think differently now."

    4. AT

      Right.

    5. JG

      "How do we hire differently? How do we..." Everything had to transform overnight. And so for me as a founder, it was very much like, "How do we just continue to scrap and claw, to how do we scale?" And, and that was a, that was a big change for us.

  15. 16:44 – 18:06

    Competition and differentiation: product velocity, public-company readiness, and AI moat

    1. AT

      Yeah. T- tell me about how you think about competition, 'cause you know, there's, there's a few other players in this, in this space now. I think s- um, different people came to this realization that the world needs a new ERP, and-

    2. JG

      Mm-hmm

    3. AT

      ... how, how have you been thinking about that?

    4. JG

      Yeah. Well, we're not the, the oldest of, um, of the newer kind of cohort-

    5. AT

      Mm-hmm

    6. JG

      ... but, um, we're being told we're now the largest.

    7. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    8. JG

      And I think it's purely on product velocity. Uh, we, we quickly hear that folks say like, "Your product velocity is so high," again to the point earlier, that, you know, "We f- we feel you're gonna be able to scale with us," and that's, that has been the case so far. Um, we've done great with public companies on Campfire. We're very referenceable in the public markets now.

    9. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    10. JG

      And so all tech companies, most tech companies aspire to be public someday. And so if we can kind of solve for the end state, that's why you buy an ERP in many ways is like the, the rigor, um, and level of reporting required to go public.

    11. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    12. JG

      That if we could kind of solve that, and so we've been told we're very good at solving that in terms of audit and controls and approval workflows. And then the other one, um, we are consistently hearing we have the best AI. And so I think maybe it's 'cause we're the only one with our own foundation model-

    13. AT

      Right

    14. JG

      ... with our custom agent platform. But, um, those are the three areas where consistently we hear like, you know, "You're, you're now, uh, you're, you're why w- we went with you, uh, because of these reasons."

  16. 18:06 – 27:37

    Long-term ambitions and founder lessons: go public, enjoy the journey, and persist through the plateau

    1. AT

      Fascinating.Tell me about your ambitions for Campfire. Like, where w- where, where to next with it, like in terms of product roadmap, in terms of customers? Like, where, where do you wanna take it? What's... And, and what, what do you see as like the, the ultimate goal for the company?

    2. JG

      Yeah. Well, the last company was B2B invoicing software. I was, I was not the founder, but I was an exec there, and we sold for 600 million with the, with the reali- realization that the category wasn't big enough-

    3. AT

      Mm-hmm

    4. JG

      ... for us to build something massive. So actually intentionally went after this category as I think you can build like a massive public company in this category. And so really, the, the plans for Campfire is, you know, we're going public, we're building something very l- long-term and durable. Um, you know, I t- I tell my wife this is the last job I'm ever gonna have. You know-

    5. AT

      Mm-hmm

    6. JG

      ... the, uh, the next 30 years of my career will be Campfire. And so I think it's like I do think, and I, you know, chose investors, including you all, of like very long time horizons bec- and that's 'cause that's how I think about the business.

    7. AT

      What is something that you wish you knew at the start of your founder journey that perhaps only became clearer, uh, you know, some distance into it? So like, basically you are the Series B founder now.

    8. JG

      Yeah.

    9. AT

      Tell me what you wish you had told the, the, the seed, the seed found- or the, you know-

    10. JG

      Yeah

    11. AT

      ... seed stage.

    12. JG

      Yeah. I, I would say, um, enjoy the journey.

    13. AT

      Okay.

    14. JG

      I think every moment is so stressful that as a seed stage business, when you're wandering the wilderness, and a lot of my peers in the batch like hadn't found, like they didn't even know what idea to work on. It's all very stressful. Um, it was very stressful for us. But I, I will say like people ask me now, like, "Are you more stressed now or then?" It is more stressful now. I think there's large... There, there's, you know, we're over 100 employees now. There's, there's a lot, there's, um, I would say the bags get heavier-

    15. AT

      Yeah

    16. JG

      ... uh, in terms of, um, the, the mental, um, piece that you carry. In the early days, it's just very pure. It's, you know, there's just you and, and an engineer or two, maybe you're a solo, just coding solo. Um, so I would just say enjoy the early days. I look back on the... Even a- as ment- as men- much m- me- mental anguish as there was in the early days-

    17. AT

      Mm-hmm

    18. JG

      ... I would say, uh, I look back with, uh, a lot of fond memories of my YC days. So enjoy, enjoy every moment.

    19. AT

      Excellent.

    20. JG

      It goes fast.

    21. AT

      I mean, it sounds like this has been like pretty much a almost a rocket ship. Like just, just everything's worked great and of course that I'm, I'm sure there were difficult moments. Like what was the, what was the hardest part so far that, uh, the hardest problem that you had to solve?

    22. JG

      Yeah. I would say about nine months in, this was call it spring of '24, there was like, "Hey, you know, we're not..." A lot of the folks in the back batch had either taken off as a co-

    23. AT

      Mm-hmm.

    24. JG

      Like I remember the, even before that, the, um, the YC kind of alumni retreat, or not, not retreat, YC alumni day, um, that everyone, I was catching up with everybody after the batch, and they either had taken off or they were still pivoting, and we were neither.

    25. AT

      Right.

    26. JG

      And so I think then it was like spring of '24, and I remember talking to you and it's like, well, you know, do we like, do we like do a micro pivot or do we do a specific industry or like beyond tech? Um, and I think it was just th- having the conviction to keep going, and it was another six months that we had to g- keep grinding until things really started to inflect.

    27. AT

      And what was it? Was that, was that building product? Was it doing sales? Like what was it that you just had to keep turning the crank on?

    28. JG

      I would say it's a good question. It was a bit of product, um, yes, 'cause it's a long build. Even if we had paying customers quickly, I think then getting to the next kind of the not super early adopter, but call it the early adopter, we had more work to do.

    29. AT

      Right.

    30. JG

      Um, and then I, I think just getting the, some reference, early referenceable customers that were real businesses. Um, but I mean, these customers weren't people I knew. It was cold outbound. They were just people cold that were signing up. And when they started to really go to bat for us on reference calls in, in their community, then things really started to, to take off.

Episode duration: 27:38

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