The Twenty Minute VCOscar Pierre, Glovo CEO & Founder: Selling 30% for €100K |The McDonald's Deal That Saved Them |E1263
CHAPTERS
- 0:00 – 3:06
Glovo’s origin story: from Airbus to “Uber for errands” and the McDonald’s aha
Oscar explains how leaving a corporate job at Airbus and seeing Uber’s campus impact sparked the initial concept: an on-demand errands app. Early user behavior—ordering McDonald’s through Glovo—revealed food delivery as the real wedge and a much bigger market.
- •Quit corporate path after realizing it wasn’t for him
- •Initial concept: “Uber for errands,” inspired by Uber’s growth and a personal pain point
- •Early usage showed unexpected demand for food (McDonald’s)
- •Insight: Spain had marketplace food ordering (Just Eat) but lacked integrated delivery logistics
- •Shift in ambition after recognizing food delivery disruption potential
- 3:06 – 3:58
Building the first product fast (and badly): outsourcing the MVP and getting something investable
Oscar details how quickly he moved from idea to a working prototype despite not being able to code. He outsourced development cheaply, ended up with a broken MVP, but still used mockups and early orders to start investor conversations.
- •Launched quickly with ~€10K personal budget
- •Outsourced development to a low-cost Russian/Eastern Europe dev shop
- •First app didn’t work well, but it was enough to show investors
- •Early operations were scrappy (website/text messages)
- •Early signals of demand continued to appear even pre-product polish
- 3:58 – 6:05
The brutal first round: €100K on a €280K pre-money and learning what PMF really is
Oscar recounts raising €100K at an extremely low valuation, hiring the first CTO, and rebuilding the app properly. He distinguishes between users loving the service and true product-market fit, emphasizing the long journey from negative unit economics to scalable marketplace efficiencies.
- •Raised €100K at €280K pre-money; major early dilution
- •Used funds to hire first CTO and rebuild from scratch
- •Traction grew over ~1 year, leading toward a larger follow-on round
- •PMF wasn’t real until unit economics could work (not just user love)
- •Key lever: shifting monetization toward merchants to lower consumer prices
- 6:05 – 9:50
Marketplace dynamics 101: why scale, country wins, and timing decide everything
The discussion turns to marketplace mechanics—how network effects form at a country/city level and why cross-border expansion resets the game. Oscar explains why being late in Paris was fatal, why #1 matters most, and the typical 2–3 year investment window to make a market profitable.
- •Network effects operate primarily within countries, not across borders
- •National scale matters for brand and large countrywide partnerships
- •Paris failed largely because Glovo entered too late vs Deliveroo/Uber Eats
- •#2 can work, but only as a very strong and relevant second
- •Typical profitability timeline: invest heavily for ~2 years, profit in ~2–3 years; market launches can cost €5–10M (example: Tunisia)
- 9:50 – 12:52
How scale improves unit economics: logistics density, timing precision, and data advantage
Oscar breaks down the operational physics of delivery: courier density reduces cost-to-serve, and data enables second-by-second optimization. They discuss handling real-world variability (weather, restaurant delays) and the tradeoff between batching orders and customer experience via LTV impacts.
- •Courier density lowers pickup distance and delivery cost
- •Food delivery is a seconds-driven operation—too early/late both costly
- •Data models improve ETAs using factors like weather and restaurant behavior
- •Restaurant-side tooling is critical to capture real-time ‘externalities’
- •Batching/stacking orders is an optimization problem governed by retention/LTV impact
- 12:52 – 16:20
The McDonald’s deal that saved Glovo: breaking global exclusivity through relentless execution
Oscar tells the high-stakes story of winning McDonald’s in Spain despite a global directive favoring Uber Eats. Through repeated in-person persistence and ‘all hands’ execution, Glovo secured a test, then exclusivity—creating a massive customer acquisition flywheel later replicated in Italy.
- •Global McDonald’s message said Uber Eats would be the exclusive partner
- •Glovo identified the local decision-maker and pursued relentlessly (dozens of trips)
- •Life-or-death internal focus: engineering prioritized McDonald’s requests with zero hesitation
- •McDonald’s brand drove huge new-customer inflow and accelerated network effects
- •Success in Spain helped win multi-year exclusivity in Italy as well
- 16:20 – 20:41
Fundraising hell: 120 VC rejections, near-death runways, and a ‘Frankenstein’ cap table
Oscar describes repeated brushes with failure and why their cap table became highly fragmented. He shares why European VCs passed, what he thinks he did wrong in fundraising, and the role of relentless execution in surviving with less capital than better-funded rivals.
- •Most European VCs passed; Oscar tracked ~120 real meetings/calls that said no
- •Frequent near-death moments; company ‘almost died’ at least three times
- •Self-critique: too transparent/humble; not aggressive enough in fundraising narrative
- •Belief that execution and culture outperformed better-funded competitors locally
- •Perspective on early-stage European VC: many hadn’t built companies and added pressure
- 20:41 – 22:38
Saved by serendipity (and Rakuten): the round that closed because of a chance meeting
At a moment with no VCs left to pitch, a chance encounter with Rakuten founder Mikitani at an FC Barcelona event led to a major investment. Even then, closing the round was complicated by investor process demands tied to signing the McDonald’s contract under extreme cash pressure.
- •Chance meeting at an FC Barcelona/Rakuten event led to Rakuten leading with ~$15M
- •Round dynamic: lots of money ‘pending’ but needed a lead—ended with multiple leads
- •Investor governance drama: last-minute IC demands reintroduced requirements
- •Had to accelerate signing the McDonald’s contract with only weeks of cash left
- •Illustrates how financing and commercial milestones become interdependent under stress
- 22:38 – 24:45
Running out of money repeatedly: raising every 9 months, overspending to survive, and a lead investor dropping pre-Christmas
Oscar explains why Glovo raised far more frequently than the typical 18-month cadence: competitive pressure forced overspending while unit economics were still negative. He recounts a crisis where a lead investor pulled out on Dec 23, forcing an internal bridge just to keep fundraising alive.
- •Raised a new round roughly every 9 months for ~7 years
- •Tradeoff: underinvest and die to competitors vs overspend and shorten runway
- •Burn escalated with market irrationality and growth arms races
- •Dec 23 lead investor dropout created a near-impossible situation
- •Used an internal mini-round to buy time and find a new lead
- 24:45 – 28:44
International expansion playbook: why LATAM clicked and how emerging markets can be advantaged
After learning from the Paris failure, Glovo targeted less-contested markets where first-mover advantage was still available. Oscar describes early LATAM wins (Lima) and why emerging markets can work well when the labor-cost-to-basket-size ratio enables affordable convenience for customers.
- •Paris lesson drove strategy: go where disruption hasn’t happened yet
- •LATAM expansion (Peru/Chile/Argentina) validated the model far from Spain
- •Marketplace health measured across all three sides, with customer acquisition/retention most critical
- •Courier acquisition was relatively consistent; marketing mix included TV plus online
- •Key metric: labor cost relative to AOV (bigger ratio enables cheaper service and higher demand)
- 28:44 – 31:22
Failure case study: Brazil as a ‘black hole’ and the discipline to shut down fast
Oscar details Glovo’s biggest market failure—Brazil—where they lost tens of millions and discovered iFood was far stronger and stickier than expected. He highlights the destructive economics of voucher-driven switching and the ego and human cost of shutting down after selling the dream.
- •Brazil loss estimated at €30–40M
- •Misread iFood as a weaker ‘Just Eat-like’ marketplace; reality: strong service + content dominance
- •High platform stickiness forced heavy voucher spend to win customers
- •Vouchers destroy margins in thin-unit-econ delivery businesses
- •Shutting down required overcoming ego, reversing prior narratives, and laying off ~100 employees
- 31:22 – 34:25
Burn rate, exclusivity wars, and why investors still worried despite growth
Even as Glovo scaled to billions in GMV, fundraising remained hard due to frightening burn rates and exposure to far larger competitors. Oscar explains exclusivity payments, multi-year payback expectations, and why investors doubted Glovo was ‘big enough to fail’ in a winner-takes-most market.
- •Burn reached ~€1M/day (~€30M/month) during expansion battles
- •Competitive pressure in LATAM (e.g., Rappi) normalized ‘irrational’ spending and exclusivity deals
- •Restaurant exclusivity could have 3–4 year paybacks (accepted as strategic)
- •Despite €1–2B+ scale, Glovo was still dwarfed by Uber/Delivery Hero/Deliveroo
- •Investor concern: larger rivals could subsidize attacks and destroy markets quickly
- 34:25 – 42:26
Culture and values under scale: rewriting values, ‘ruining’ culture, and restoring intensity
Oscar shares a candid leadership reflection: culture drifted when growth slowed and headcount passed ~1,000, and he became more ‘political’ in messaging. He explains the signals leaders must send—hiring, firing, and standards-setting—to rebuild a high-velocity culture even amid internal backlash.
- •Values were reviewed yearly; wording and interpretation needed constant tuning
- •Culture broke around ~1,000 employees as growth slowed and alignment weakened
- •Oscar became cautious in messaging after feedback, diluting standards and intensity
- •Wake-up moment: engineers avoided a poaching firm because ‘they work really hard there’—implying Glovo no longer did
- •Fix: align/replace leadership, communicate expectations clearly, and use hiring/firing as cultural signals despite temporary toxicity
- 42:26 – 44:56
Operating realities: layoffs done humanely, M&A integration traps, and choosing focus over distractions
Oscar discusses how Glovo approached layoffs with generous support to protect both leavers and remaining morale. He also reflects on being overly optimistic about M&A integration and how even small acquisitions can create large focus and complexity costs that distract from daily marketplace excellence.
- •Layoffs: people often handle the news more maturely than expected; treatment impacts the ‘survivors’ most
- •Advocated giving more severance/support than HR proposals—seen as a worthwhile investment
- •M&A regret: underestimated complexity of integrating tech stacks, cultures, and teams
- •Acquisitions (e.g., grocery marketplace-style) weren’t huge financially but were costly in attention
- •Core lesson: delivery businesses win via relentless daily detail optimization, not constant expansion into side quests
- 44:56 – 50:51
Quick commerce future and the Delivery Hero acquisition: why selling became rational
Oscar outlines the strategic view of multi-category delivery—groceries, pharma, and retail—and argues it will dwarf restaurant delivery as online penetration rises. He then explains why Glovo sold to Delivery Hero (2.3B all-stock): fundraising fatigue, high burn, and low IPO viability made a strong partner with capital and tech the best path.
- •Depth vs breadth depends on timing: some markets were ‘now or never’ first-mover bets
- •Multi-category = groceries + pharma + broader retail that fits in a rider’s bag
- •Groceries are massive with low online penetration (example: Spain ~2% online vs potential 20–30%)
- •Prior acquisition offers existed (e.g., ~$100M early), but Oscar wasn’t tempted
- •Sold to Delivery Hero for 2.3B all-stock; rationale: couldn’t face another high-risk fundraise; IPO not viable while burning ~€1M/day
- 50:51 – 1:09:18
Post-acquisition life, profitability, ads as a margin engine, and regulatory trial risk in Spain
Oscar reflects on staying as an operator post-acquisition, dabbling in VC, and the importance of continued work after an exit. He describes turning profitable, the growing role of advertising revenue, and then addresses the most severe challenge: Spanish regulation leading to a criminal process and potential prison time tied to the freelancer courier model.
- •Post-exit mindset: happiness correlated with continuing to work and solve problems
- •Glovo turned profitable (first profitable semester after ~10 years)
- •Ads opportunity: target ~€5 ad revenue per €100 GMV; currently ~€2–3 with room via better products and penetration
- •Merchant wishlist examples: Inditex (Zara) and Mercadona, which prefer end-to-end control
- •Spain regulation: gig model scrutiny escalated into a criminal case against Oscar; claims of uneven enforcement vs competitors like Uber Eats
