Bustamante and Jacobsen: A non-kinetic World War III is here

Andrew argues we are in the early phases of World War III, just not in the World War II sense. The main battlefields are proxy wars (Ukraine, Gaza, Yemen, Syria, Libya), cyber operations, trade wars, and algorithm‑driven information warfare. States now degrade adversaries indirectly—by funding and arming others, attacking infrastructure, and polarizing societies—while avoiding direct great‑power clashes that could trigger nuclear escalation.

Proxy war is defined as a rich state funding, training, and arming conflict in a poorer or already unstable state to weaken a primary adversary without risking its own troops. Andrew controversially frames Israel as a U.S. proxy against Iran, and Ukraine as a Western proxy against Russia. This is attractive because it externalizes costs and casualties—but history (e.g., Vietnam, Iraq) shows proxies can spiral, backfire, or drag patrons into larger wars.

Annie and Andrew both stress that classic, strategic U.S.–Russia nuclear war remains deterred by mutual assured destruction and highly practiced launch protocols. The real growth in risk is: (1) miscalculation or misreading ambiguous launches under tight timelines; (2) dirty bombs or small tactical devices used by states with plausible deniability or by terror groups; and (3) a growing number of nuclear‑threshold states. Andrew places the chance of seeing a nuclear detonation in our lifetimes at roughly 30%, likely by a non‑state or unattributed actor.

Benjamin explains the Islamic Republic rests on three pillars—independence from the West, hostility to Israel, and exporting the Islamic revolution. Nuclear “threshold” status (enrichment beyond civilian levels but short of a weapon) gives Iran bargaining power and deters invasion without inviting instant annihilation. He believes the regime is ruthless but not suicidal: it wants longevity, not a glorious last strike. The real fear is transfer of nuclear or radiological materials to proxies like Hezbollah or the Houthis.

All three describe an “age of the algorithm” in which social media, deepfakes, and AI‑generated content erode any monopoly on truth. Benjamin points to TikTok’s role in shaping youth views on conflicts like Israel–Gaza; Andrew describes CIA doctrine around ‘volume and speed’ in influence ops; Annie gives concrete examples of narrative hijacking (e.g., headlines reframing a limited strike as “America Enters the War”). Deepfake scams involving the host himself illustrate how easily real identities can be weaponized; at scale, a convincing AI video during a crisis could push leaders toward catastrophic misjudgment.