Dwarkesh PodcastEdward Glaeser - Cities, Terrorism, Housing, & Remote Work
CHAPTERS
- 0:00 – 2:38
Building cities on Mars: transportation costs, flexibility, and organic growth
Glaeser answers what advice he’d give Elon Musk about founding Martian cities, arguing that urban form is largely a function of transportation constraints. He suggests a flexible, grid-like plan that can evolve over time rather than heavy-handed central planning.
- •City shape is determined by dominant transportation costs and technology of the era
- •Mars cities face prohibitive interplanetary travel costs and likely car-oriented mobility
- •Recommend flexible land-use planning (e.g., NYC’s 1811 grid) over micromanagement
- •Entrepreneurial adaptation beats centralized planning in allocating uses over time
- 2:38 – 4:33
Terrorism and urban resilience: cities as targets and defensible spaces
Discussing post-9/11 terrorism, Glaeser notes that terrorists’ goals often aren’t simply mass urban casualties, and that cities have improved defenses. He frames cities as simultaneously attractive targets and uniquely capable of collective protection.
- •Terrorist objectives may be political change rather than maximizing city deaths
- •Density creates symbolic targets (e.g., Twin Towers) but also concentrated security capacity
- •Historic origin of cities: collective defense (walled settlements)
- •Post-2001 ramp-up in urban security and surveillance (NYC, London camera infrastructure)
- 4:33 – 7:10
Why modern nations aren’t synonymous with their capitals anymore
They explore why ancient empires were identified with capital cities, while modern countries like the U.S. are not. Glaeser emphasizes institutional choices—especially in English offshoot countries—to locate capitals away from dominant commercial centers to limit rent extraction and political imbalance.
- •English offshoots often placed capitals in remote locations (DC, Ottawa, Canberra)
- •Motivation: reduce capital-city rent-seeking and over-concentration of “goodies”
- •Contrast with countries where leaders centralized wealth into capitals (Paris example)
- •Capital-city dominance still stronger in places like Beijing/Moscow than in the U.S.
- 7:10 – 9:22
City decline vs recovery: housing stickiness and persistent population loss
Glaeser differentiates how housing prices, population, and incomes behave after shocks. He argues population decline is extremely persistent because housing stock is durable, keeping people “stuck” even when economic productivity falls (Detroit as the key example).
- •Housing prices show short-run momentum but mean reversion over longer horizons
- •Population declines are highly persistent because housing stock doesn’t quickly disappear
- •Negative shocks reduce prices, stop new building, but existing housing keeps residents in place
- •GDP per capita behaves more like a random walk compared to population persistence
- 9:22 – 13:12
Why Americans move less: housing constraints and the informal safety net
Addressing reduced mobility, Glaeser reframes the issue as non-employment rather than unemployment—especially among prime-age men. He attributes stalled “directed mobility” (poor moving to rich areas) to high housing costs in opportunity hubs and reliance on place-bound family support.
- •Shift from “unemployment” to “non-employment,” especially prime-age men out of labor force
- •Rising non-employment correlates with misery, not leisure or productive alternatives
- •Mobility fell as high-opportunity regions became unaffordable due to building constraints
- •Informal safety net (e.g., living with parents) ties people to place and discourages moving
- 13:12 – 15:23
Aging, fertility decline, and the city ‘demographic barbell’
They consider how population aging and low fertility might reshape cities. Glaeser argues many cities attract a ‘barbell’ of young adults and older residents, while upper-middle-class parents often leave due to school concerns; COVID may further skew cities younger by changing older residents’ preferences.
- •Cities often lose upper-middle-class families due to space needs and school concerns
- •Urban advantages: dating market, amenities, museums, concerts, dense consumption options
- •Older residents still value amenities but COVID increased risk aversion and suburban appeal
- •Barbell persists until urban school quality improves
- 15:23 – 19:12
Why urban K–12 lags while urban universities excel: competition and governance
Glaeser argues colleges thrive in cities because higher education is fiercely competitive, while K–12 often operates as a local monopoly. He adds that suburban systems have more inter-district competition and parent power, whereas big-city politics can empower unions and diffuse parental influence.
- •Higher education is competitive (students, faculty, reputation), driving performance pressure
- •K–12 is often a monopoly; monopoly provision can reduce innovation and accountability
- •Suburbs feature competition across many districts and highly empowered parents
- •In large cities, teacher unions can be more politically influential and parents less organized
- 19:12 – 21:09
Georgism and land value taxes: good tool, not a panacea
They discuss Henry George’s proposal to tax land value rather than improvements. Glaeser supports land value taxation for reducing disincentives to build, but rejects the idea that it can replace all other taxes or solve broad social problems, especially in modern economies where value isn’t land-intensive.
- •Economists broadly like land value taxes because they don’t punish building improvements
- •Property taxes can incentivize underuse (e.g., keeping lots as parking)
- •Implement via assessing real estate and netting out structure/construction value
- •Land value tax isn’t sufficiently progressive or comprehensive as a sole national revenue base
- 21:09 – 26:07
Robert Moses, building capacity, and whether local democracy over-vetoes projects
Glaeser gives a nuanced take on Robert Moses: acknowledging harms while emphasizing that he built infrastructure at scale. He argues today’s challenge is to build again without ‘running roughshod’—and to reform governance so neighborhoods have voice but not universal veto power, especially for housing.
- •Moses was high-handed and sometimes destructive, but delivered parks, pools, roads, projects
- •Need a middle ground: build infrastructure while respecting communities and rights
- •Local opposition overweighting visible costs vs broader benefits and newcomers’ interests
- •Advocates limiting local regulatory vetoes (especially zoning) and shifting decisions upward (state level)
- 26:07 – 30:35
Opioids, supply-side dynamics, and skepticism of UBI in rich countries
Glaeser describes opioids as recurring ‘new, safe opioid’ cycles (laudanum, morphine, heroin, OxyContin), emphasizing supply-side narratives alongside economic distress. He worries that UBI could increase joblessness and misery by weakening the role of work as purpose and social connection, while distinguishing this from cash transfers in very poor countries.
- •Opioid crises recur via claims of non-addictive innovations; OxyContin fits the pattern
- •Geography of addiction linked to prior pain prescribing intensity
- •Joblessness is more damaging to well-being than income inequality; work provides purpose and ties
- •UBI may raise non-employment (negative income tax evidence); cash transfers can still work in very poor settings
- 30:35 – 36:35
Remote work and face-to-face contact: substitutes short-run, complements long-run
They revisit Glaeser’s long-standing argument that information tech can increase demand for in-person interaction over time. He notes historical parallels (books, telephones) and predicts Zoom threatens office markets in the short run but is likely neutral to pro-city in the long run by making the world more interconnected and knowledge-intensive.
- •No universal rule: remote tools substitute in the short term, complement in the long term
- •Complexity and knowledge work benefit from in-person cues (comprehension/confusion)
- •Historical evidence: books and telephones didn’t reduce urbanization; business travel rose
- •Zoom may reshape office demand now, but cities’ face-to-face advantages persist
- 36:35 – 40:23
Metaverse skepticism and the coming tax competition for mobile high earners
Glaeser doubts VR/metaverse will replace real-world social life, citing revealed preferences when people regain in-person options. He then argues remote work increases high-skill mobility, colliding with progressive local agendas and potentially forcing painful political learning about tax limits and flight risk.
- •Metaverse likely increases gaming time but won’t replace real social interaction
- •Pandemic-era virtualization didn’t eliminate desire for in-person hangouts, especially for youth
- •Remote/hybrid makes relocation to lower-tax or higher-amenity places easier
- •Local governments face tension between redistributive goals and mobile tax bases; policy errors likely before equilibrium
- 40:23 – 43:07
Will remote work get ‘Ford-optimized’? Evolutionary constraints and hybrid equilibrium
They consider whether remote work could become dramatically more productive as practices mature. Glaeser concedes it’s possible but argues human evolution and enjoyment favor in-person settings; he expects a hybrid norm for many white-collar roles and warns remote work can reduce learning and promotion opportunities.
- •Human ingenuity may improve remote workflows, but social species constraints are strong
- •Workplaces are also social/pleasure institutions (pre-2020 big-campus investments)
- •Hybrid (20–40%) plausible; fully remote likely niche for high-skill creative work
- •Evidence: remote call-center productivity can be high, but promotion probability drops sharply
- 43:07 – 48:58
Origins and future of Silicon Valley: Stanford roots, Fairchild diaspora, and ‘Detroit risk’
Glaeser traces Silicon Valley’s emergence to Stanford-linked early radio firms, wartime contracts, and Fred Terman’s institution-building, culminating in Fairchild’s talent network and spinout culture. He worries the Valley now resembles a one-industry town dominated by behemoths, risking a Detroit-like trajectory rather than a startup-rich ecosystem.
- •Early roots: Federal Telegraph, Stanford proximity, Navy contracts, talent clustering
- •Fred Terman’s role: Stanford engineering leadership and industrial park strategy
- •Fairchild/Shockley dynamic: attracting and repelling talent created spinouts and ecosystem
- •Current concern: concentration into big incumbents and one-industry dependence
- 48:58 – 57:11
Housing, migration capacity, Europe vs U.S. urban change, slum safety, and climate risk
In a wide-ranging closing segment, they touch on why Houston’s minimal zoning doesn’t automatically create ‘interesting’ urbanism, and what it would take to absorb massive immigration (infrastructure and housing reform). They compare Europe’s preservation and low-growth constraints to America’s dynamism, discuss why some slums (e.g., Dharavi) are safe via strong community norms, and end with Glaeser’s biggest open question: protecting developing-world coastal megacities from climate threats.
- •Houston’s tourism appeal tied to ‘newness’ and homogeneity more than zoning alone
- •Absorbing huge immigration is feasible long-run but requires major housing and infrastructure reform
- •European cities change less due to lower population growth, stricter zoning, and preservation priorities
- •Slum safety can come from stable communities and ‘eyes on the street’; guns/drug trades undermine it
- •Largest unsolved problem: climate adaptation for low-lying developing-world cities (e.g., Manila, Mumbai)
