Richard Hanania - Foreign Policy, Fertility, and Experts

1. 0:00 – 4:35

   Intro

   1. RHRichard Hanania0:00

      So, like, there's this idea on, like, the populist right, that, like, we tried libertarianism and now wokeness has taken over it. I'm like, "Okay, when did Republicans repeal the Civil Rights Act? Like, when did that happen? When did they defund public educa- education?"

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel0:11

      (laughs)

   3. RHRichard Hanania0:11

      Like, no, you actually haven't done anything close to libertarianism, and now you're making libertarianism the scapegoat, um, for all these negative trends.

   4. DPDwarkesh Patel0:19

      Right. (upbeat music) Today, I'm speaking with Richard Hanania, who is the president of the Center for the Study of Partisanship & Ideology, and the author of the new book, Public Choice Theory and the Illusion of Grand Strategy. So Richard, first, can you just summarize the book briefly before we get into questions?

   5. RHRichard Hanania0:36

      Uh, sure. So, the argument of my book is, it's, you know, it, it has two real audiences. So first, people who study international relations, political scientists, there's something in there for them. And there's also, I think, something in there for people who are just interested in American foreign policy more generally. Um, so the way that academics, uh, tend to study foreign policy, and this is, this is a, you know, a simplification, but if you're gonna have to, you know, generalize about, um, the way sort of it's understood in political science and the field of international relations. Uh, the idea is that states basically are rational actors, and rational actors doesn't mean what they do is, um, necessarily good for the world, or, um, or, you know, whether their values are consistent with other people's values. But basically that states seek certain goals, and their behavior can be understood in that context. Um, so basically, the study of grand strategy is sort of a, um, is a, uh, um, is a sort of a corollary of this. And the idea is that diplomatic, economic, and military means tend to be, um, put towards the s- -put towards the same goals. They're all basically moving in the same direction. Um, and I think this view of understanding foreign policy is, um, is sort of naive. My main argument, um, is that we don't think like this in terms of domestic policy. We don't think that there's a grand strategy of the US government with regards to immigration, uh, with regards to healthcare, with regards to, uh, tax system. It, it's sort of a, um, the, there's a fallacy of seeing a design in an international, uh, kind of a design in international relations, um, or kind of a, um, you know, a kind of a sort of goal-focused behavior, and we tend not to make that mistake in, uh, in other areas. So, that's, you know, the first two chapters are basically the, uh, uh, the theoretical, you know, th- the theoretical case for why a lot of the ways we look at international relations is wrong. Um, that, you know, if people are interested in academic, uh, works, they're interested in sort of thinking about ideas and political philosophy, I think they're, you know, people will enjoy those chapters. And then most of the rest of the book is basically looking at American foreign policy and asking, does a theory of grand strategy or a theory, uh, based on public choice, which I present as an alternative model, does that explain things like when the US, um, US, uh, mili- uh, troop pre- presence of tr- troop presences abroad? Um, when we start and, and, uh, end various wars, uh, the American sanctions regime. So, ma- major parts of American foreign policy, and I argue that the public choice, uh, model of foreign policy just works better.

   6. DPDwarkesh Patel2:55

      Mm-hmm. So, maybe s- the unitary, uh, actor model is not right right now, but wouldn't it be true in the future? So, you know, like the, uh, the countries that have a fucked up foreign policy, where the whole thing is in shambles and contradicts, uh, itself, you know, they'll lose out to the countries that actually have a cohesive national strategy? And in the long run, the countries that actually do have, um, uh, a cohesive gr- a grand strategy will win, right?

   7. RHRichard Hanania3:18

      Yeah, so this is, um, we actually... One of the arguments for how you get rationality, um, that I, uh, that I take issue with, I think this is m- most closely associated with, uh, international relations, uh, theorist, uh, Kenneth Waltz. Um, you know, there's a l- so there's a- a few things you can say about this, right? Like, so the st- you know, the n- it might just go against the nature of, of the state, right? Maybe the state is such a big and complicated thing that maybe you get closer to rationality, get closer to grand strategy, as, uh, through a sort of a selection process, but it's still an open question how close you, uh, you get. Um, you know, and the oth- you know, and the other thing is I would, I would say that there's a l- lot else going on in the world beyond how states react to one another. So, you know, there's, um, you know, the, the, the origins of economic development are a complicated thing, and a state can ha- a country like the United States can have a lot going for it, um, as far as, uh, human capital, as far as institutions, and do very well economically. And then, um, you know, just - and, and it can afford to have a sort of irrational foreign policy. There's actually the one, one, um, one possibility is that states that, um, tend to have good, uh, institutions for economic growth with, you know, things like decentralization, um, you know, individual freedom, uh, an open society, that might be bad for forming a grand strategy for international relations because

2. 4:35 – 6:05

   Did war prevent sclerosis?

   1. RHRichard Hanania4:35

      you can have interest groups influence foreign policy and people are worried about their own lives rather than, you know, what's going on abroad and the state is, uh, limited and can't really enforce its will. So, this is a possibility that, uh, you know, nobody's brought up before but perhaps, you know, there, there is some kind of tension there, where states, um, with bad foreign policies will tend to, tend to have good, um, uh, good economic growth, and therefore a lot of geopolitical strength.

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel4:57

      Mm-hmm. Interesting. So, is, is it one way to read your book that maybe the decline of war has been bad, right? Because when you had war, you know, obviously you had the casualties and everything, that's bad, but at least you had to keep countries on their toes and their political institutions couldn't become all, uh, messed up. So, is, like, is one way to read your book that, um, the political institutions in our w- world have become so, uh, sclerotic because there isn't enough war?

   3. RHRichard Hanania5:20

      Um, I mean, well, they... So, you know, there's not a, um... War is, you know, on balance bad, but are there, are there good things we can say for war sort of as far as historical development goes? Um, I think that, you know, depending on your politics, if you look at World War I and World War II, a lot happened, um, for the expansion of the American federal government, and I, I don't... I think that's mostly been bad. But if somebody thinks that's good, um, if you're a big supporter of the welfare state and sort of the centralization of, uh, uh, of power in Washington, um, you know, you have to credit World War I and World War II. I think that's clear from the, uh, historical record. Um, so unquestionably war leads to, uh, changes, um-... you know, the pote- the potential for war probably, um, uh, cre- you know, was,

3. 6:05 – 10:00

   China vs America's grand strategy

   1. RHRichard Hanania6:05

      was part of the Cold War, and eventually the Soviet Union collapsed. If there was no potential for any kind of conflict there, you know, who knows? I mean, the Soviet Union could have, uh, could have existed forever. So, unquestionably, um, war is a accelerant and a sort of catalyst for change. And if you think we need a lot of change, maybe you might, uh, (laughs) you, you might distress seeing that the, uh, the decline of war over time, but change can also go in a negative direction too.

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel6:28

      Mm-hmm. Now, to what extent are these problems unique to democracies of, you know, concentrated interest being able to pull, uh, government to, um, you know, do counterproductive things? Because if... I mean, if you look at the, uh, quote unquote "China's grand strategy," right? It's a very centralized system, there's one guy at the top. But, you know, they're doing some very stupid things, like they're fighting over some irrelevant islands with Japan. You know, they're getting into skirmishes with India over some mountain regions. Um, and, you know, but we'll see about the Belt and Road, but, you know, right now it seems like there, there's some pla- you would know more about this than me, but there seems like there's some places where there's cost overruns, and where, you know, they're building stuff in places that are irrelevant. Um, so to what extent, uh, are centralized governments able to have a better grand strategy?

   3. RHRichard Hanania7:07

      Uh, so yeah. We, we should be careful not to say, you know, um, uh, having a grand strategy is better or smarter in some ways.

   4. DPDwarkesh Patel7:13

      Uh-huh.

   5. RHRichard Hanania7:13

      Just that the, the question that, that I address in the book is whether it's coherent.

   6. DPDwarkesh Patel7:16

      Uh-huh.

   7. RHRichard Hanania7:17

      Um, whether, uh, China... So we can understand China in comparison to the US on these two axes, whether it's, you know, smart or wise, versus whether it's coherent. Um, whether it's smart or wise, which I think your question was, was getting at, I mean, uh, uh, China's, uh, you know, blunders and, um, you know, uh, you know, having, um, you know, uh, squabbles with Japan over a few islands. I mean, if you compare that to the US investment in A- Afghanistan or Iraq, I mean, there's really... (laughs) You know, we're not really ones to talk about, you know, um, foreign policy blunders. I mean, the Chinese, um, even spending on the military is pl- pretty low. I mean, there's nothing that compares to Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria. I mean, so we have blunder after blunder. Um, and whether it's the Chinese... But whether the Chinese system has more coherence in foreign policy, um, and whether that could be attributed to not, it not being a democracy, um, I think that... I think that's, I think that's right. I mean, the... I think that the, I think that the f- you know, that the fact that the Chinese basically... 'cause China's grand strategy has been not to have much of a foreign policy, I mean, relative to the US. You know, not, not to take much a... you know, not to care much about what goes on in most of the world. Um, and then, you know, there does seem to be a concerted effort to sort of, uh, push outwa- push outward and, uh, push its weight around within its region, which is natural, which is what states do as they, as they tend to grow. Um, and so, you know, d- when I look at Chinese foreign policy, do I see more coherence than American? Yes. I mean, I... you don't see... you know, you see China basically inflict a punishment on a nation and there's usually a goal, right? And then you can us- you know, so for example, uh, Lithuania, I think just, um... I don't know if they recognized Taiwan or they did something with Taiwan. China didn't like it, so China, uh, did something and got, uh, uh, against Lithuania. I don't know if Lithuania has, like, responded or whatever, but basically, I mean, you can understand how this makes sense, right? Um, when the US sanctions somebody, it basically says, "We're go- you know, we're not gonna recognize this government." It destroys the economy. It's more total than anything China does. Um, and then it never talks to them again, and, you know, that, that's basically the end of it. So, yeah. I mean, that there's, uh... there's certainly more coherence and I think more sense to what China's doing than what the US is doing.

   8. DPDwarkesh Patel9:16

      But to what extent is, is that just because, you know, China isn't powerful enough, or doesn't have enough money to waste on debacles like Afghanistan and Iraq? So, like, maybe in like 30 years when... or not even 30 years, but like, uh, once their economy's bigger than ours, right? Um, w- will they be making the same kinds of mistakes? I mean, if you look at... when was the British, uh, empire most overextended? Um, you know, the, the, the peak of colonization was when they weren't fully a democracy, right?

   9. RHRichard Hanania9:38

      Y- yeah. So, s- I mean, so countries even without a lot of resources can often put a lot of, um, efforts overseas. So Maoist China, I think was, uh, uh, one of the, um... you know, at least for its per capita level, was the biggest provider of foreign aid in the world by far. It was giving us, uh, money for like, uh, uh, subsidies in Eastern Europe for countries that were richer than itself. Um, so Maoist China was extremely poor and

4. 10:00 – 11:30

   Does the president have more power over foreign policy?

   1. RHRichard Hanania10:00

      had an extremely interventionist foreign policy that it invested a lot in. Uh, Russia today, um, overinvests in foreign policy, you know, relative to its economic size. Um, so, you know, i- i- i- it's... you know, s- the, the US certainly can afford to do more than China. And by PPP terms, I mean, China has, um, has caught up or passed the United States. So China, I mean, has the potential to do a lot more, but I just think it choose, chooses not to.

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel10:23

      Right. Now, you say in the book that p- the public doesn't really care, uh, about... that much about foreign policy, at least in comparison to domestic policy. Does that mean that if the president actually did have a coherent vision of a grand strategy, he could enact it because, like, the public is just not gonna be paying attention, and if he just like, really wants something, he could do it?

   3. RHRichard Hanania10:39

      I think it depends on the, you know, the costs of what that grand strategy are. If the grand strategy involves sending a lot of troops abroad and taking a lot of casualties, um, that's gonna be really hard. Um, if the s- you know, if, if it's more along the lines of, "We're gonna crush one nation," um, you know... and, you know, the w- w- how we define grand strategy, there's grand strategy at the macro level, and then there's sort of at the, uh... we can think about them as like, you know, approach to one country. And sometimes we do see that, like I think the, uh, the last administration had a de facto basically... not a de facto, even more than a de facto, sort of an intended, um, uh, policy of regime change, um, towards Iran. Um, and that wasn't... that they weren't open about that, but the idea was basically you just, you know, you just, uh, sanction them as much as possible and you just hope, you know, that they're, they're as less powerful, uh, as possible and potentially collapse. And there was a more official, uh,

5. 11:30 – 15:39

   How to deter bad actors?

   1. RHRichard Hanania11:30

      strategy of regime change and they even recognized a different government, uh, in Venezuela. Um, s- and, y- you know, that didn't require any American casualties. It required a lot of, uh, suffering in the countries that were, uh, that were targeted. Um, but it did seem that the American efforts were put towards, um, certain goals. So yes, you're right. Within certain limits, um, presidents do have freedom to do a lot. And people don't care about Iran and they don't care about Venezuela, um, so there was a lot of, uh... yeah, there was a lot of freedom there.

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel11:56

      Okay. Now you say sanctions don't work, intervention doesn't work, but if we look at a country like North Korea, we feel like, you know, if there was something, we really ought to be able to do e- uh, we really ought to do it, like we really don't want them to have nukes or the capacity to launch nukes, uh, to the United States. Um, so if these traditional interventions don't work, is there something you could do about a country like North Korea, or like, you know, Venezuela is like starving its own people.

   3. RHRichard Hanania12:16

      Yeah.

   4. DPDwarkesh Patel12:16

      Uh, obviously the sanctions are making it worse-

   5. RHRichard Hanania12:18

      Yeah.

   6. DPDwarkesh Patel12:18

      ... but like, if we wanted to, you know, get rid of Maduro, is there something we could do that is like, uh, feasible and is not counterproductive?

   7. RHRichard Hanania12:24

      Uh, so I mean, each of these cases is, uh-... uh, is sort of, um, unique. So I mean, in North- North Korea... I mean, interventions work. I mean if, you know, if you just overthrow a government you can get rid of them. Um, the, um, you know, but that obviously that would be very costly in the case of North Korea for nuclear weapons and even conventional weapons. They have a, uh, you know, they have a- a lot of, uh, you know, a pretty big army. Um, yeah, can we do something about, um, North Korea and, you know, nukes? Um, I think, you know, one- one school of thought is basically that, um, that North Korea, um, wants nukes because it's afraid of the US, right? It's- it's basically defensive. It- it thinks that the US, if not, if it's not going to invade it at this point it's because of the nukes and that they, you know, would like to see the regime fall, um, uh, anyway, um, and that's probably, that's probably true. Um, and, you know, and the question is do you, um, you know, and then the question is do you, uh, uh, accommodate sort of that fear if what you're worried about is nuclear weapons and learn to live with a government? Now there's another school of thought on North Korea that says basically they want the US out and they wanna, they wanna conquer the South. You know, I don't have insight into, um, you know, the thinking of the North Korean regime so it's- it's really hard to say which is the, you know, which is the correct position. Um, and then in Vene- Venezuela, like, is there something we can do, um, to, you know, counteract the, uh, uh, you know, the terrible economic policies, um, that the Maduro regime, you know, and before him the Chavez regime, um, have implemented? Um, you know, it's- it's very, very hard. I mean, the, um, I think the, uh, the move towards, um, more open markets globally, um, has been, has been the result of basically people seeing that markets work much better than central planning. I mean, the Soviet Union, the, uh, the elites in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe realized that what they were doing was not working and they basically, they moved to a, um, capitalist system. It wasn't because... Gorbachev, you know, wasn't forced into it. There were, there was nothing, uh, there was no, like, rebellion from below or civil war or anything. They just basically decided that, uh, you know, that the, um, the regime had lost legitimacy even if not from the people; at least from, you know, from those at the top, um, and for the, especially for the Soviet satellites. Um, and so that doesn't mean that, um, that movement's gonna be, you know, the movement is gonna be, um, consistent in the direction of, you know, markets all the time everywhere, so you have to understand sometimes some places are gonna go in the opposite direction. Um, I think while, you know, one thing the US, you know, the US does have, do some very harmful things to Latin America that I think they, uh, probably shouldn't do. I mean, the drug war. I mean, these countries, um, uh, so much of their politics revolves around stopping the flow of drugs, and because that's what the US demands, and like, you know, who cares about drugs? Is that worth having a civil war over? No, of course not, and you know, Mexico and these other, uh, um, countries in Latin America would probably be much better off if we didn't, uh, if we didn't do that. Um, I think that, uh, there's also a sense of a lot of US meddling, uh, as far as, like, democratization and human rights which people think these are generally good things, and all else being equal they might be good things, but we are not in a position to know. You know, like s- like if you're a country that has a serious violence problem, right? And that's like, you know, the first, uh, you know, that- that's the prerequisite to everything else; to peaceful living, to growth. If everything is getting violence under control and Latin American countries have really bad problems with it, um, and then somebody comes from abroad and says, "You know,

6. 15:39 – 16:55

   Do some countries have a coherent foreign policy?

   1. RHRichard Hanania15:39

      you have to fight crime," or "You have to fight cartels in a way consistent with our human rights norms," um, you know, that's something that sounds good, um, but might not actually, you know, might not actually be conducive to getting the best possible policy at the, at the local level. So I think, I think there's a lot of meddling and sort of a hubris about what we know and what's best for these countries, um, and I think that moving away from that would probably, uh, help them solve their problems in their own way.

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel16:03

      Mm-hmm. Now you say in the book that one of the agents that are influencing American foreign policy are foreign governments like Israel and Saudi Arabia, but if they are able to actually influence American policy in a way that is good for them as a nation, um, doesn't that make these countries rational actors then that have a cohesive grand strategy?

   3. RHRichard Hanania16:18

      Yeah. I mean, uh, so- so, uh, it's something I don't go into in the book is and w- well, me and you have just talked about it now, sort of what countries and when countries have, you know, can act like more like unitary actors and when they don't. Um, and in the case of I think s- I think that one of the determinants of whether a country acts with, you know, a strategy in a certain domain is how important the issue is to them, right? So Iran is much more important to Israel and Saudi Arabia, um, than it is to America, right? By many, many times. And so you could imagine Israel and Saudi Arabia do have something resembling a strategy when it comes to Iran and the US has- has a

7. 16:55 – 21:05

   Why does self-interest matter in foreign but not domestic policy?

   1. RHRichard Hanania16:55

      sort of open political system and is liable to be influenced, um, by those countries. Um, and often it's not even, you know, you know, it's, um, you could even, you know, question whether it's always those countries or it's a faction within those countries. But yeah, I- I do take the point that, uh, um, you know, often there's something closer to a strategy in what other countries are doing just because they're closer to the problem and it actually just matters a lot more to them.

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel17:19

      Mm-hmm. And in the book you say that, uh, when it comes to foreign policy special interests matter more than ideas and then ideas are after the fact justifications for what these special interests want. But, uh, when you talk about domestic policy you seem to be making the opposite point, that actually it's the ideology, uh, that matters more and then, uh, economic self-interest actually determines very little about, uh, people's political preferences.

   3. RHRichard Hanania17:40

      Uh-

   4. DPDwarkesh Patel17:40

      So why- why is it there's a difference between foreign policy and domestic policy?

   5. RHRichard Hanania17:43

      Uh, so that... I mean, so my view on domestic policy... I mean, it's just... so there's, uh, you know, the, uh, the level of the voter, um, there's- there's I think very little in terms of objective interest because the voter doesn't have a- a stake in the... you know, a stake in... their vote doesn't determine the outcome of the election. So one of the consistent findings of political science is basically that, um, people's economic circumstances do a very, very poor job of predicting their, uh, their political orientation. So whether you're a Republican or a Democrat or- or whatever, your- your economic situation is not very predictive f-... you know, not even close compared to demographic factors and, you know, cultural attitudes and- and things like that. Um, now when it comes to policy, you know, there's a... I think there's a... you know, there's a- a few different kinds of policy. So the, um, all, most things there is, you know, the public opinion is just not paying attention to this. Does public opinion have a really strong view on, uh, the nature of the tax code or, um, or, uh, you know, the exact details of environmental regulations or, you know, whatever. I mean, and the same thing in foreign policy with, you know, something like NATO expansion. Um, the, uh, you know... so the, the... I think this is this... basically, you know, both international and domestic poli- international relations and domestic politics, um, the, uh, the, uh, interest groups have a, have a huge role to play. Now the, um...... uh, when it comes to, um, certain issues that are particularly salient. So in the domestic context, this is something like Social Security, like people are gonna notice, like if you cut their Social Security benefits or their Medicare or- or something like that. You know, there's not a lot of taxes, you know, same thing. There's not a lot of issues that are exactly like this. Um, but here public opinion matters and here you have to- you have to tread carefully if you're a politician. And it's the same thing in foreign policy when there's a cost that when you're gonna do something that's potentially very costly to the country and it becomes a major political issue, then, um, then, uh, it me- then public opinion matters a lot more. So you needed, you know, public opinion to be on your side to go into Iraq, right? There was overwhelming support for the Iraq War at the time. Now, one of the unique things I think about foreign policy that makes- gives leaders sort of more freedom of movement compared to domestic politics, and if you're gonna say, "What's the difference in sort of my understanding of politics between domestic issues and international issues?" it's prob- this is probably one of the most important. Um, it's the- it's the- it's the fact that basically pub- uh, uh, public opinion is more easily manipulated by leaders in foreign re- in the- in foreign relations, right? I don't think there's a way to sell, um, you know, getting rid of Social Security that's gonna work with the American public. Um, there is e- you could easily sell some country as a threat to the United States because most, uh, Americans don't have experience with foreign countries, they don't have independent knowledge, you know, these places like Ukraine or, uh, Russia or Estonia or anything is basically exists as an abstraction. And why we think of one country as a friend and one country as an ally and one country as an enemy, I mean, that's basically, that's media coverage, that's signals coming from elites. Um, and so it's, you know, if you look at, like, going back to the Iraq- Iraq War, I mean, nobody was thinking about attacking Iraq, you know, right after 9/11. But basically the Bush administration, um, had, you know, high approval ratings in the aftermath of the attack. Um, there was a full-on, uh, basically PR campaign to not explicitly tie Saddam to, um, 9/11, but basically tie him to Al-Qaeda, you know, would make people, uh, be afraid of, uh, um, WMDs. I mean, um, uh, even though the Bush administration never said this, I mean there was a, I think it was a majority or plurality of the public actually believed Saddam was personally involved in 9/11,

8. 21:05 – 23:47

   Should we limit money in politics?

   1. RHRichard Hanania21:05

      you know, which there was never any evidence for. But it was easy to sort of lead people in that direction, um, just because, you know, who- who knows anything about Saddam Hussein or- or Iraq, right? People have to sort of, uh, trust their leaders on these things and maybe that's getting harder as, like, polarization, um, is more extreme and people don't trust their leaders anymore. Uh, but there's still just more room to maneuver on foreign policy than there is on a lot of domestic issues.

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel21:28

      Mm-hmm. You say in the book near the end that one of the ways to fix this should be that we, um, better regulate, uh, uh, foreign lobbyists in the government and, you know, um, uh, funding of y- you know, let's say, defense contractors on to think tanks and, uh, research institutions. Uh, do you think the same should be true of domestic policy, so we should limit the how- I mean, this is kind of a leftist agenda of limiting how much money there is in politics? Or is this unique to foreign policy?

   3. RHRichard Hanania21:53

      So, I mean, I- I sort of throw those ideas out there as sort of institutional fixes that people can think about. I am, you know, I am not, um, you know, I don't- I don't think I come back, come down and say, you know, this- this is something to fix it. I- I- I just think that people should be thinking in terms of institutional changes rather than, um, ar- you know, arguing, you know, just sort of operating in the realm of ideas. Um, I- I think that, yeah, and so they, I, but I, but, you know, I- I think I probably would support, you know, uh, some limits on, um, lobbying, um, for people who worked in the government for, uh, w- uh, like in the Pentagon. Um, does that make, does that, should we do that for, um, for all of, uh, politics? You know, because I, you know, I, there's not really a, the- I don't think I have a principled answer here. I think that I think that the foreign, you know, the foreign policy basically and the establishment has had a negative influence on American politics. And sort of on domes- on domestic politics, I think the influence of money on politics has been sort of mixed. You know, the idea of campaign finance reform for example is you get money out of politics, but if you get money out of politics, who gets the press coverage? Well, you know, it's basically the governments and the parties. So it's some other small group of people determining sort of the, uh, um, the lay of the land and what, you know, what the, uh, um, uh, the lay of the land and what the, uh, sort of what- what the parameters of the debate are. Um, I think that, you know, um, one thing we should do is, I mean, I- I- I- I'm- I'm less, um, less hesitant or less conflicted about endorsing sort of a cultural change. So for example, uh, in the areas like, for example, when, um, you inter- you know, when you're interviewing a, um, a former general on, you know, a, uh, in a newspaper or on TV, you don't just say, "This is a former general." You say, "This guy is also on the board of this corporation or that corporation." I mean, that- that I think changes the entire focus, um, of the, uh, you know, of the conversation. And, uh, that was, um, yeah, The

9. 23:47 – 28:45

   Should we credit expertise for nuclear detante and global prosperity?

   1. RHRichard Hanania23:47

      Washington Post wrote- wrote a story about this, how basically this is the norm and I- I, uh, I was interviewed for that- for that story. I- I, you know, I think there's no good reason not to do that. Um, I think part of my, what my book does is not just sort of institutional or legal fixes, it's also so just, you know, telling people, "Think about this in a different way." And having sort of this cultural change which I think takes away a lot of the credibility...... the people influencing foreign policy.

   2. DPDwarkesh Patel24:10

      Mm-hmm. Gotcha. Um, okay. So, let's talk about experts now. So, in your article in te- uh, Tatlock and Taliban, you point out many ways in which we have established, um, established fields and if you look at the track record of societal trends associated with those fields, um, you know, things like suicides, uh, eh, when you talk about psychology or crime when you talk about criminology, or obviously, you know, to, uh, era Iraq and Afghanistan, when you talk about international relations, you know, uh, things have been getting worse. But if you're, if that's the standard you're going to apply is how do the societal trends associated with the field, uh, do, then you must think that, um, uh, you know, g- global poverty research and, uh, uh, d- development economics must be amazing, right, because we've seen like a billion people lifted out of poverty, or more, since 1990. So, um, if you're applying the same standard did then ... Wouldn't, wouldn't it imply that some fields have been doing extraordinarily well?

   3. RHRichard Hanania24:58

      Well, yeah, actually I do think that. Uh, I think ac- ... I think that, um, you know, the, the reduction in poverty, um, has come from, uh, China first and then, and then India. And if you ask economists, you know, are Chinese and, uh, Indian policies better or worse than they were in the 1960s and 1970s, you could say that they're definitely moving in the direction of sort of the consensus of economics. So, I actually do think economics is a little bit, you know, more of a serious, uh, science than, than other fields. Um, and so yeah, I, I, I would agree with that, actually. I think e- economics looks good, um, uh, in context of the ri-, uh, the decline of poverty over time.

   4. DPDwarkesh Patel25:33

      So then would you credit the fact that there hasn't been a nuclear war? Is that a ... Is that something you put in the pro column for international relations?

   5. RHRichard Hanania25:39

      Um, yeah. That one, uh, you know, I think is, I think is different because we, we, you know, we ... Poverty is something we can look at and we can say it's always existed and now it's, you know, it's getting better. And so for nuclear weapons, it's not like we had an era of like a lot of nuclear wars and, and now we don't, right? We had nuclear weapons, they were invented, and that's consistent with a story where just these weapons were too horrible, um, for anybody to use. But I think if you're gonna have like a, you know, a steel man argument of say, the case for American empire, it would be something along the lines of, you know, I don't, I don't believe that, you know, American hegemony has kept ... It's what basically has given us, uh, uh, p- you know, relative peace since 1945. But I think it would be a sy- a kind of like a Burkian argument that, you know, the international system is very complex and it's working out well and just don't change anything, you know, too radical because potentially, you know, w- w- there's just so much we don't know about what the consequences of that would be.

   6. DPDwarkesh Patel26:30

      Well, how would you respond to that, by the way?

   7. RHRichard Hanania26:32

      Um, I would say that, you know, I would say that yeah, you have to take different parts of American foreign policy and I would be more sort of, uh, open to get rid of ... Uh, you know, doing away with certain of them than others. So first up, for example, regime change wars. That's ... And sanctions. I think those are the low-hanging fruit. I don't think that ... I don't think you can make the case that ... I think you can make the case that these are, you know, these have terrible effects on the world and I don't think you could make the case that they contribute to global order, um, or anything like that. You know, overthrowing governments is a huge source of, uh, international disorder. And then, you know, as far as, you know, um, whether the, you know, US, um, you know, the sort of US hegemony has been keeping peace or that ... Then you would move on to say, the commitments to NATO and the, you know, the, the presence in Japan and South Korea, and you would say, okay, you know, we've relative ... We've kept the pe- ... You know, we've re- ... Uh, kept the peace in a relative way there. I mean, it's, it's, um, you know, I, I, I think you have to sort of look. Y- I think that there's good reason to think that it's not necessarily the influence of the US that's behind the decline of violence because you look at areas even in countries which like, they don't have, um, you know, you look at diets where they don't have, um, uh, any relationship with the US on either side. Just war is just down basically across the board everywhere. And you could say, well, that's all the American system, but I think it's, it's hard to figure out exactly, um, how, you know, the US having a presence in East Asia or, um, or, uh, Eastern Europe, um, you know, that makes Africans stop fighting each other, right?

   8. DPDwarkesh Patel27:59

      Mm-hmm.

   9. RHRichard Hanania27:59

      Um, and so, the fact that everyone basically is not doing war anymore just gives you sort of a ... this, uh ... I think backs up John Mueller, uh, what John Mueller thinks or what Steven Pinker thinks, um, that it's basically, you know, we're in the realm of ideas and people just think war is stupid. And from that perspective, you know, the US is sort of an outlier in how much it uses war and then the US is potentially a source of, uh, of instability. I think I would lean towards that view. But I ... Yeah. I, I'll acknowledge that sort of the Burkian view of, you know, things have been working out relatively well, um, let's not mess with it. I mean, another thing that hasn't been working out well actually, the number of, uh, uh, uh, being killed in like civil wars and civil conflicts has not gone down the way international war has. And if you look at who's behind a lot of the civil wars that have the huge death rates, I mean, that's the United States.

   10. DPDwarkesh Patel28:42

       Right.

   11. RHRichard Hanania28:42

       So, not everything is actually working out well. I think, uh,

10. 28:45 – 31:57

    Have international alliances made us safer?

    1. RHRichard Hanania28:45

       keeping order within countries, you mentioned Latin America, a lot of these things are, are classified as high crime rates. They could pretend ... They could, um, uh, they could, um, theoretically be classified as civil wars. And if you think American foreign policy is having a negative effect in Latin America, I mean, that's another contributor to the violence abroad. Um, so yeah, that, that, you know, I think that's the response to it, but I, I, you know, again, I acknowledge there's, there potentially could be something to that argument.

    2. DPDwarkesh Patel29:08

       So, I think one, one of the other things Steven Pinker thinks is behind the decline in violence is also like international alliances like NATO.

    3. RHRichard Hanania29:14

       Mm-hmm.

    4. DPDwarkesh Patel29:14

       Um, now, and now, uh, to have as a point against that which is that it, you know, while in the short term it makes us more safe, in the long term, you know, you're ... Like if Russia invades, uh, you know, some, uh, North Macedonia or something, then we had to go to war and then this starts World War III. Um, so do you buy Pinker's argument that actually these, uh, American alliances have created a safer world?

    5. RHRichard Hanania29:31

       Uh, so I haven't ... Um, I read Pinker, um, you know, when it came out, uh, Better Angels of Our Nature, about a decade ago. I don't remember him having that argument, um, about NATO. Uh, uh, it ... that... I don't recall but you know, I'll, I'll, I'll take your word for it. Um-

    6. DPDwarkesh Patel29:43

       I could be wrong. I thought it was in, uh, Enlightenment Now, but yeah.

    7. RHRichard Hanania29:46

       Okay. So yeah, and also ... Yeah, I also read Enlightenment Now and I, I don't remember. You know, could be, it could be there or not. Um-

    8. DPDwarkesh Patel29:51

       E- it's a po- possible argument even if it's not Pinker's.

    9. RHRichard Hanania29:53

       Okay, yeah, even if it's not Pinker's argument.

    10. DPDwarkesh Patel29:55

        Yeah, yeah.

    11. RHRichard Hanania29:55

        'Cause let's, let's ... Yeah, let's just take the argument. Um, th- yeah, I th- so NATO, I mean, if the argument for NATO making the world safer ... Okay, first of all, I mean, they, they ... during, you know, the, uh, justification ... You know, I think-The justifications for NATO, right, or- originally were there was potentially a Soviet, uh, land invasion of, of Europe, right? Um, and you know, the Soviet Union i- i- is gone, right? And so the question is like, you know, is there, um, a potential for... All we're talking about is Russia. I don't know, like, what else we'd be talking about, right? Like, that North Africa is gonna invade Europe or something. It's, uh, you know, the only potentially thing I think we're talking about here is Russia. Um, and, you know, I, I, it seems not to... I mean, it's, it seems, uh, th- there doesn't seem to be sort of a, um... You know, there, there's a capability and there's a question of will, right? Russia is just not, um, that, you know, economically-positioned to try to take on Germany or France or, um, uh, Western Eur- Western Europe. It cares a lot about Ukraine and it cares a lot about Georgia. And, you know, I think it's, I think it's pretty clear that Russia, you know, the instability is due to Russian fears over, um, the expansion of NATO. So in Georgia, basically, the, uh, the government, uh, launched a, um, uh, launched a war to try to take back, um, uh, some regions that were, um, that were, um, sort of breakaway regions with alliances towards Russia. And the idea was basically they thought that the United States had their back and they were trying to settle this issue to get into, uh, to get into NATO. There was a great, uh, Adam Tooze substack on this, um, about the history of, uh, Russia and NATO. So it's, it's clear that there's this sort of, that there's been sort of a destabilizing influence. Russia's fear that these places would, um, uh, become part of NATO, I think has driven a lot of this, uh, sort of behavior abroad. I think ultimately though what... I think what it's really about actually at its root of like what, where the antagonism comes from, I think that the US sees Russia as a potential for regime change. I think it considers the current government illegitimate. And I think Russia doesn't... it probably doesn't think that, like, the US is going to, um, go into Ukraine and add them to NATO and Georgia and then, like, launch an invasion of Russia, you know, that

11. 31:57 – 36:26

    Why does academic bueracracy work in some fields?

    1. RHRichard Hanania31:57

       seems very unlikely. I think that the, the idea is basically there's an ideological war against the idea of the legitimacy of the Russian state as a non-democracy that has a different form of government, um, different ideological ideas about, you know, just different things than the US does. Um, and I think they're res- they're reacting to that. So I thi- I think this idea of sort of a, uh, this idea of regime change is sort of beneath the surface and driving a lot of tensions.

    2. DPDwarkesh Patel32:21

       Mm-hmm. Interesting. All right, going back to the topic of expertise. Um, you, you criticize the focus on peer review, uh, and, uh, specialized knowledge. It, it seems that some fields th- that seems like a valid criticism, right? Uh, it seems like there isn't so, uh, that much, um, um, specialized knowledge there to begin with. But it feels like, let's say particle physics or computational complexity, uh, that it seems like academic bureaucracy and incentives have worked, and I expect the people at the top of that field to be the, like the best in the world at that. Right? So, but it seems like the same kind of academic institution, uh, as, you know, like a field like, uh, international relations, right?

    3. RHRichard Hanania32:52

       Uh-huh.

    4. DPDwarkesh Patel32:52

       So why, why are they the two different?

    5. RHRichard Hanania32:54

       So I think, um, I, I do say in my, uh, Experts piece, I think I say this, uh, um, that, uh, I- I- it's basically, you know, I'm focusing on the social sciences, um, because that's what I know best. Uh-

    6. DPDwarkesh Patel33:05

       But, but as you said, economics works well, right? And that's (overlapping)

    7. RHRichard Hanania33:07

       Uh, yeah, e- economics works relatively well. I think, um, yeah, I mean, we could, we could talk about why. I mean, th- th- that's an interesting question too. Um, but, um, you know, uh, I think, uh, so I think Ni- uh, Nassim, uh, Nicholas Taleb would say that actually, um, the peer review process doesn't work that well. He has some data on like where the big innovations in science comes from, and he tends to think it comes more from the, uh, the private sector. So I don't know if that, if that's right or wrong. The something... um, you know, if you look at something like, it's, it's complicated, something like the mRNA vaccine, um, you know, they couldn't get the, the publications it was based on into peer, into the top peer-reviewed journals. Um, and then it took, you know, Pfizer and Moderna and, you know, it, it seems like there was, um, uh, you know, there was a New York... It seems complicated because there was, it did rely on some university research in some ways and government funding. Um, I think that, you know, one of the big differences between the social sciences and the hard sciences, I think there's a few differences. The first one is there is, um, there is some connection to reality, right? You can, you can design the mRNA vaccine, you could take it out of, you know, you can go... even if you're rejected by the, the peer-reviewed paper, you could take it to a pharmaceutical company. They have an incentive to find out whether you're right. It can go out in the real, there in the real world, it can work, and then that changes sort of the ideas in, um, economics. In, in, um, social sciences, you know, a few things is, uh, it's more complex. So sometimes, uh, in some ways it's harder to know what actually works and what doesn't. We don't, we don't do, um, like randomized experiments on, on big things. We do, like, um, like polling questions. But not on like, you know, um, you know, this state had this econ- economic reform and this state had this other economic reform. We, we don't do it, uh, any- anything like that. And I think part of the reason we don't do that, and this is another... this is the second big reason why, um, social science is, is, you know, so, so hard is because there's not as much social desirability bias. People don't have, you know, deep-seated beliefs about the best way to get a vac... I guess some people do. They say the mRNA vaccine is just scary. But in generally about... uh, in general about these physical things, right, people don't have strong beliefs about the way they want the world to work, right? And when it comes to the social sciences, people have very, very strong, um, ideas about the way the world, the way the world should work. And when you combine that, um, with a lack of accountability, with a count of, uh, with, with a lack of any real-world tests in the form of, you know, markets or, or, uh, some kind of, uh, you know, real experimentation, um, people can just, you know, believe whatever they want or believe whatever, um, you know, um, some kind of like vested interest like the, like the State Department and, you know, the Pentagon bureaucracy basically or whoever's in power, um, wants to believe. Um, and so this is why social, uh, social science is hard and this is why, um, social desirability, uh, bias is, I think, the enemy in the search for truth. Now, one thing about economics is I think it's more of a, uh, male-dominated field. It's a more, um... uh, uh, you know, they have, uh, uh, mathematical, um, sort of requirements that are more stringent. I think that weeds out a lot of people. I think it's, it's more of a sort of a... I think the... you know, there's a sort of a... you know, there's complaints from other disciplines that economics is a little bit mean and aggressive. When I was in, um, pol- uh, I got my PhD in political science, I was, you know, surprised to find there that sometimes, you know, somebody's theory would just fall apart and then everyone would... and like other people would not just say, "Okay, this is wrong. Go study something else." They would be like, "Oh, it's okay. Just, you know, adjust it this way." And then like nobody would... you know, there was always... I, I always felt like people were treating others with sort of kid gloves, right? I think there was a culture in other fields, and

12. 36:26 – 39:34

    Did academia suck even before diversity?

    1. RHRichard Hanania36:26

       this is political science and probably much worse in other fields, of not sort of this sort of a willingness to, you know, to really, um, hurt feelings and to, you know, and to, uh, you know, just willingness to be wrong. I think economics has done that better than other fields. And I think there's a movement to make, um... I've been talking to other econom- uh, people in economics who agree with this. There's been a movement to make economics like other fields, and that would potentially be, uh, that would poten-... could potentially be disastrous.

    2. DPDwarkesh Patel36:49

       Right, right. But now, um, i- it doesn't seem clear to me that even before, uh, calls for diversity dumbed down academia, that things were that much better. Um, you know, there were, like, fads like communism or, um, um, uh, d- disarmament that, uh, were popular in academia. And, you know, like, if you look at the Vietnam War, it was waged by people who had, l- you know, like Kissinger, McNamara-

    3. RHRichard Hanania37:09

       Yeah.

    4. DPDwarkesh Patel37:09

       ... people who had degrees from prestigious universities. And, you know, they were white and male, but they were still, you know, th- they still were disconnected from the outside world.

    5. RHRichard Hanania37:16

       Yeah.

    6. DPDwarkesh Patel37:17

       So, ha- have, have, like, newer developments in academia actually made it worse?

    7. RHRichard Hanania37:20

       Uh, well, no. I mean, white, white males can, can have, you know, the same pathologies as (laughs) any other group.

    8. DPDwarkesh Patel37:27

       Oh, yeah.

    9. RHRichard Hanania37:27

       Um, the, uh, yeah. I, I think the international rela- uh, you know, the, the, the, the dumbing down of academia, um, you know, I think is a problem. E- you know, were Kissinger and these, you know, these guys, um... You know, if you look at the Vietnam War, you know, it's very, it's v- it's actually very interesting because everyone y- y- sort of knew from, like, you know, Joh- uh, from the Johnson administration and the Nixon administration, that basically, you know, they were, um, you know, that, that it wasn't winnable. That what they were saying to the public, um, wasn't true. And I think that, you know, the, if you look at, like, the historical record of what politicians were saying personally, they were amazingly, um, uh, explicit in their willingness to admit to themselves and those around them that they were doing stuff for political reasons. Right. So I think they were responding to, um, uh, I think they were responding to, um, basically a, a political pressure and basically, uh, you know, public opinion, and sometimes using public opinion for their own ends. Um, I, you know, I don't think... If you took, um, professors at international relations and did, like, whatever that, the equivalent of that would've been and whether they supported the, uh, Vietnam, um, I, I, I don't think so. I think the big, the big names, like the ones who were not connected to the government, right? So Kissinger, I mean, it's hard 'cause he's like, you know, he's a guy who was in academia, but also, like, in and out of government, right? And, you know, like, it's, it's, it's... You wouldn't expect that person to have, like... You know, you wouldn't, you wouldn't, you know, become... If he had a different views, basically, he wouldn't be in government.

    10. DPDwarkesh Patel38:48

        Yeah.

    11. RHRichard Hanania38:48

        I mean, that's the issue. He, his views ha- he had to be selected, um, to, uh, to, to at least be tolerable, um, to whoever, you know, the president happened to be at, at the moment. Um, and so, yeah. I mean, the, the, these, the, I, I, um, uh, I think the dumbing down of academia, I think the move away from sort of, um, explicit, uh, sort of, uh, more, uh, hard standards, like just basically being able to meet some standard of ma- uh, mathematical ability, you know, the, the rise of, you know, cancel culture against free speech, all these things are harmful. Doesn't mean that there weren't a lot of pathologies before, and yeah, we can, we can see that, definitely. Yeah, you know, 'cause whether expertise has gotten better overall, I mean, I think that... You know, so if you look at a political scientist from the 19... You know, looking at just some other fields, from the 1960s or 1970s, and you look at political science today, if you go to Twitter, um, and (laughs) t- you know,

13. 39:34 – 42:19

    How do we get expertise in social sciences?

    1. RHRichard Hanania39:34

       there's this, there's like a, a, uh, like a, a subject called the political scientist, so it's like a good gauge of, like, what the most prominent political scientists are saying. And it's all stupid, like, graphs, like, "Democracy has gone down 16.2% since Republicans took power in this state." It's really, really stupid. I mean, you get the, you know, the mean, the median political scientist from the 1960s and 1970s, there's nothing that ridiculous. So I do think, you know, it probably has gotten worse.

    2. DPDwarkesh Patel39:58

       Um, but, okay. So, who we would, uh... The problems you're pointing out with academia seem, uh, like they're inherent to an institution that is disconnected from the market, and also to, like, ha- something that can be imperfectly measured. But we would like to have expert knowledge in fields like, uh, international relations or criminology or psychology, right? Um, so is, is there any way to set up institutions that can study these sort of, um, um, a- ambiguous topics in a way that actually adds insight, uh, to the way we legislate?

    3. RHRichard Hanania40:25

       Um, you know, do we, do we need expert- expertise, do we even need expertise in international relations or criminology or psychology? You know, I, I tend to believe that the, the co-... You know, again, I tend to believe that the costs are more, um... I tend to believe the costs are, you know, that they outweigh the benefits, actually, here. I think a lo- I think if you rely on common sense for crime, uh, for controlling crime, and some basic statistics, right, um, I think you're better than, than the field of criminology. I would definitely attest, you know. I, I would definitely, uh, uh, you know, take the idea out of it that I think there's an idea in, like, the public that, you know, if you, uh, you know, if you, uh, wanna stop crime and for, you know, come down very hard on crime, and I think that's, you know, maybe more controversial among criminologists. But I think the problem's... I, actually, I, I wouldn't say that. I, I haven't done any survey of criminology. This is part of the problem, in that you have this field called criminology, and e- even if it, like, arrives at something that's, like, you know, uh, that's true or logical, you know, or they have, like, some unambiguous finding, the people... There will always be criminologists who politicians who wanna do something else will rely on. And they will go and they will, you know, find those people. So having this category called criminologist and un- where- unless we're gonna, like, survey the field and just do... You know, who knows if that'll work. But unless you're gonna, like, survey the field and then just do whatever they consist in the field, you're gonna end up... The media and politicians that are gonna be selecting, um, the people that they want. During the COVID stuff, you know, they all say, "Experts say this, experts say that." When you look at the, um, you know, the, something like the Great Barrington declaration, and I, I... Just hearing about it in the media, I thought these people were kooks and nobodies. And then I went and looked at their credentials were, like, Harvard Medical School, Stanford Medical School, and somehow when the media cites expertise, it's never these people, right? It's always the most hysterical person possible, um, pushing for some kind of restriction. Um, so I think the ide- you know, expertise, you know, potentially can be valuable. Um, but the idea of expertise can be harmful and that basically, you know, gives, gives, uh, certain people, um, in power who wanna do things,

14. 42:19 – 43:55

    Why are things more liberal?

    1. RHRichard Hanania42:19

       you know, more sort of legitimacy to do things that are, uh, irrational. Now, I think that, like, you know, at a, at a broader level, you know, I trust...I trust, you know, things like prediction markets, like economic markets. The things that are, um, that don't rely on credentials, but rely on track records of getting things right. And I would, you know, agree with Robin Hanson and others who, who would, you know, cheer for these things to, uh, ha- potentially have more of an effect on policymaking or the way we think about issues.

    2. DPDwarkesh Patel42:43

       Okay. Now let's talk about politics. So you say that one of the reasons that liberalism has been- has been winning is because liberals just care more a- more about politics, but how does that explain why, um, why things have shifted more liberal over the last few decades? Is it just that conservatives have started- started caring less about politics and liberals have started caring more about politics? What's changed?

    3. RHRichard Hanania43:00

       Uh, actually, uh, to a certain extent, uh, yes. So in 2016, there was a huge, uh, mobilization effect on the left.

    4. DPDwarkesh Patel43:06

       Mm-hmm.

    5. RHRichard Hanania43:06

       So I- I do have, uh, uh, in our, uh, Substack called 2016: The- The Turning Point. I just use 2016 for- for convenience, but basically if you look at, like, 2010 versus, um, like, 2016-2020 and, like, your probability, for example, of having, um, attended a protest or signed a petition if you were a conservative versus liberal, uh, it was maybe you were two or three times more likely as a liberal in 2010. By 2016 to 2020, I mean, there was- it was multiples of that. It was something like, you know, 10 times more likely to have done these things. Um, so I think that, um, national politics and sort of the mood has a lot to do with it. I think Trump mobilized a lot of people on the left. He did not... He mobilized a lot of voters on- like on the right, like low propensity voters who, like, wouldn't otherwise vote came out and voted for Trump and it was j- it was pretty good for Republicans and they were concentrated in certain states. And that tended to be good for Republicans

15. 43:55 – 47:53

    Why is big tech so liberal?

    1. RHRichard Hanania43:55

       politically or at least, you know, a mixed bag. While I think Trump did a- a terrible job of, um, sort of, uh, motivating people who are, uh, you know, activists or sort of people who would be bureaucrats or lawyers or, you know, the people who actually make policy on a day-to-day basis, you know, he- he really turned those people off, um, and made them, you know, if anything made them more liberal. Um, and so yeah, I would say that, you know, the, uh, change of engagement over time is part of the story.

    2. DPDwarkesh Patel44:20

       So I'm wondering how this theory explains why certain institutions are especially more liberal. Uh, take for example, uh, Big Tech, right? Um, or compare it to like a- a company like Walmart, right? Now, I, like, I- I don't expect that if I, you know, went to Walmart headquarters, I'd see a whole bunch of like BLM posters, but if I go to like Facebook, uh, Facebook office, I- I bet I'll see a few, uh, things like that-

    3. RHRichard Hanania44:40

       Sure.

    4. DPDwarkesh Patel44:40

       ... or like Diversity Is Our Strength or something like that.

    5. RHRichard Hanania44:42

       Yeah.

    6. DPDwarkesh Patel44:42

       So, um, you know, but both of these companies, uh, ha- have faced pressure from, you know, liberal employees, both of these companies had to face civil rights lawsuits. And, um, a- a- and it- it's not like in the FAANG companies you have a bunch of people who have given up, um, high salaries in order to have a co- a position of cultural influence because they're making a lot of money there, right?

    7. RHRichard Hanania45:00

       Yeah.

    8. DPDwarkesh Patel45:00

       So it's not like journalism or something. So what explains why Big Tech especially is super woke?

    9. RHRichard Hanania45:05

       Yeah. So Big Tech is such an interesting case because, um, until 2015 and twenty s- and 2016, there was calls... uh, there was a lot of calls for censorship, um, and from the media and Twitter basically didn't censor anybody until 2015, um, and Facebook too. Um, so basically the, you know, the Big Tech was a lot less woke than the media wanted them to be. Um, I think that there was basically a lot of political pressure that came down on them from- from the top. I think Mark Zuckerberg is, um... you know, Jack Dorsey are relatively not woke people compared to a lot of elites in America. Um, when, you know, uh, uh, when tech, um, you know, and I think- I- I, you know, I think other- uh, other people have made this point, um, basically when, you know, the- the initial generation of, you know, leaders in tech, um, they were the people who were the- sort of the pioneers. They were non-conformists, right? Um, they tended to be less, um, ... you know, they- they tended to do their own thing to serve l- and they would have their own political and social views, right? Um, and then when tech sort of became established, it started to, uh, you know, it started to draw people who are more conformist and that's why, uh, you know, these people have put forth the argument, um, uh, that, uh, basically crypto now is more right wing than tech because crypto is sort of the next, you know, cutting edge non- thing that non-conformists are doing. So I think tech, I mean, it started out, I think, with a more of a libertarian ethos and it sort of became the establishment, it became the, you know, sort of the thing for high conformist people to do. Um, and, uh, you know, I think that that's probably it's... uh, explains its wokefication, um, over time. Um, and then with something like, you know, Walmart, I mean, uh, you know, and I think, you know, the- just sort of the ether right now is if you're a- if you're an idealistic person, it's easier to be idealistic on the left than the right. I don't think the right has done a good job of, uh, providing sort of an idealistic vision that a- appeals to a lot of people. When I think if you go work for Walmart, you know, your- your- your views are more maybe, you know, you- you get enough meaning from, you know, just getting the logistics right and getting people the goods and services they need. So I think that attracts a completely different kind of person.

    10. DPDwarkesh Patel47:04

        Sorry, I- I- I don't think I understood the difference between Walmart and Big Tech in that case. Like b- in Big Tech you're also doing stuff like, you know, shipping a product that, like, you can get meaning out of that as well, right?

    11. RHRichard Hanania47:12

        Yeah.

    12. DPDwarkesh Patel47:12

        And then in both those cases, uh, they're like getting older... in Big Tech they're getting- becoming older institutions that attract conformists, so why is Big Tech more, uh, more woke?

    13. RHRichard Hanania47:21

        Yeah. So Amazon you're working on like logistics, right? I mean, uh, Facebook and Google and, um-... and Twitter are sort of more in the ... You know, because they're not actually producing anything, I th- you know, you could say that they're, they have to tell themselves a story about why they're doing something good for the world, that some people, you know, believe in that story. Um, you know, they, uh, they convince themselves of it or they believe in it, uh, or they don't. So, like, this kind of like, um, you know, like the Google thing, like, don't be evil, right? I mean, th- this, this sort of idea that they were doing something social and revolutionary, I think was part of the ethos from the start.

16. 47:53 – 51:40

    Authoritarian populism vs libertarianism

    1. RHRichard Hanania47:53

       While wal- Walmart, you know, they wanna get you lower prices and, you know, make your life better. But, eh, I don't think it ever had that idea that you are gonna fundamentally revolutionize society-

    2. DPDwarkesh Patel48:00

       Mm-hmm.

    3. RHRichard Hanania48:01

       ... by having more Walmarts, right?

    4. DPDwarkesh Patel48:02

       Right, right. Yeah, it's kind of analogous to American foreign policy in a way, that, like, uh, um, you know, like, uh, Google is something like, uh, uh, uh, America in that we have, they have a gr- an explicit creed-

    5. RHRichard Hanania48:11

       Yeah.

    6. DPDwarkesh Patel48:11

       ... and then they had to do stuff, uh, in, uh, to further that creed that actually, uh, might make things worse. That's interesting. So, you write that one thing that your theory can somewhat, uh, help vindicate is, um, authoritarian populism. Not that you s- necessarily support it, but just the idea that, um-

    7. RHRichard Hanania48:26

       Yeah.

    8. DPDwarkesh Patel48:26

       ... you know, you, you can have a right-wing government that pushes back on the, the liberal elite, who just care more than conservatives, even if, i- if they're not more numerous. Um, I, I wonder if, um, compared to this, you think, uh, th- this theory also vindicates, uh, libertarianism more. Because the ... in that case, you just ... first of all, you don't have the funds for this right-seeking elite to be able to-

    9. RHRichard Hanania48:45

       Yeah.

    10. DPDwarkesh Patel48:45

        ... survive. Uh, so, you know, there's less journalism academia. And also, there's, like, less these elites can do to, like, actually coerce people without the help of government.

    11. RHRichard Hanania48:53

        Yeah. So you're, you're getting at sort of my, uh, you know, the sort of the motivation behind a lot of my writing on American politics, which I, you know, I am disturbed by wokeness. Um, and I think that the, the fight against wokeness has been confused and not very effective, which is, you know, it's almost like, you know, that has to be self-evident because wokeness has gone so far and, you know, won so much. Um, and so I'm thinking about, you know, the different ways you can go about sort of working against it. So, I, you know, I'm not saying, you know, I'm not coming down on ... You know, I, I think that, you know, like, to just have one sort of thing, it's either libertarianism or it's populist, you know, or authoritarian. Although, I think that, you know, the words like those are very, uh, uh, sort of selectively used. But whether it's like a more interventionist or non-interventionist, I d- you know, I don't think that, like, the ideal response would be a pure version, um, of either of these, right? Um, so, uh, for ... what you could say for the libertarian perspective is that... And Robbie Swoll had reason. Um, that's, that's a lesson he took from my article, um, was basically like, you know, they're gonna ... You know, whatever you try to pass, you say the government has to be like this or it has to be like that, it's gonna get around it. Um, and one, one thing they can't get around is you cut off their funding. You stop giving money to the universities, there's, there's, you know, they, they have, they're not gonna go at you. They're, they just don't have the funding anymore to do the stuff that they wanna do. You pass a law saying they have to be politically fair and give conservatives a fair hearing, well, I mean, who's, who do you think is gonna be interpreting that law and deciding what a fair hearing is and what political discrimination is and, and all that? So yeah, there, there's something to that. I mean, shrinking ... Like, saying, you know, the government that sort of is, um, institutions that are under the influence of, you know, bureaucrats and activists, just shrinking their role in society rather than remaking them, um, remaking those institutions, I mean, there, there's something to be said, uh, uh, for that. Um, but then, like, you know, it depends on, like, what you want, right? If you are really bothered by, um, you know, if you're really bothered by the direction of the culture, um, uh, you know, and the fact that, you know, um, activists, you know, are, uh, are, um, uh, you know, propagandizing or people who basically are, you know, um, just, just the market.

    12. DPDwarkesh Patel50:57

        (sighs)

    13. RHRichard Hanania50:57

        I mean, the, whoever is r- whoever ... you know, the media institutions and, you know-

    14. DPDwarkesh Patel51:01

        (sighs)

    15. RHRichard Hanania51:01

        ... popular music and culture. Um, if you're upset that they're, you know, they're selling sexual promiscuity to children, for example, um, you know, you might, you know, have a, you know, ha- come- you know, you might c- have a more, uh, forceful response to that. I mean, you can't ... there's, we are, there's probably, um, you know, there's probably not a answer within the confines of libertarianism or ... It's very hard. I mean, you could set up your own private community and go off and do something. And right, uh, there, there, you know, the, potentially there's something there. But, you know, you could potentially say, you know, "I don't, I don't like what's considered art now. I don't like what's considered pop culture." And you might just say, well, that's the, that, that's the only potential thing you can do.

    16. DPDwarkesh Patel51:37

        Uh, so s- I, I'm not sure I follow. Like, if

17. 51:40 – 54:54

    Can authoritarian governments increase fertility?

    1. DPDwarkesh Patel51:40

       you're a parent, right, like, just don't buy your kid porn. Uh, I guess you had to buy them a smartphone at some point, but-

    2. RHRichard Hanania51:44

       You have to buy them a smartphone. I mean, they have friends of all their ... If you, if you can, you know, you can only afford to send them to a public school and everyone else is watching porn in the bathroom. I mean, I don't know, like, you know, the people are influenced by that, right?

    3. DPDwarkesh Patel51:54

       Right.

    4. RHRichard Hanania51:55

       So, it, it, it's not, you know ... I don't think it's as easy as turn off the TV, I think we all exist within this culture. And, you know, there's a, uh, you know, what other people do does affect you.

    5. DPDwarkesh Patel52:03

       Right, right. But, um, I guess I'm skeptical of t- to the extent of what a right-wing government can actually influence the culture. And that brings me to the next topic I wanna talk to you about, which is, uh, fertility, right? So, you're more optimistic about what, uh, countries like China and Hungary can do about fertility.

    6. RHRichard Hanania52:17

       Yeah.

    7. DPDwarkesh Patel52:17

       Um, but, uh, it seems to me that if, like, giving people checks doesn't get them to fuck, like, I don't know-

    8. RHRichard Hanania52:22

       (laughs)

    9. DPDwarkesh Patel52:22

       Uh, I don't know if, like, you know, banning makeups on guy is, uh, is gonna actually make a difference.

    10. RHRichard Hanania52:27

        Well, I mean, so you look at, uh, you, you know, you, you step back and you look at sort of what correlates with high fertility levels, right? And it seems more clearly to be associated with culture than economic situation. As humans have become more able to afford kids, they've tended to have less of them, right? So this is a pretty strong argument, um, against it being an economic issue. Um, or largely an economic issue as the driver of differential fertility rates. Um, and then, you know, you look at things like ... So religiosity are, you know, very important. And the question is, can government, um, influence, um, culture, right? Um, I, I see no reason to think it can't. I think one thing is civil rights law. I think it ... One of my, you know, main arguments on civil rights law is it actually did influence the culture. And even that wasn't that heavy-handed compared to, say, what the Chinese government could do, uh, potentially. Um, so yeah, if you take the idea that fertility is a cultural issue and that government can have an influence on culture, then it basically follows that government, if it wanted to, if it wanted to, um, change the fertility rate or potentially a lot of other things, you know, it can do th- do so through the control of the culture.

    11. DPDwarkesh Patel53:27

        Right, right. Uh, but, um, I guess one, one reason to be optimistic is, uh, or, or depending on your perspective to be optimistic about, um, China's fertility is, you know, like, listen, look at what they did with COVID where they were able to like just bolt people down in their houses until, like, there were zero cases in the area.

    12. RHRichard Hanania53:44

        Yeah.

    13. DPDwarkesh Patel53:44

        And if they, you know ... Well, the Western countries couldn't do that, so they couldn't get the COVID under control, so-

    14. RHRichard Hanania53:48

        Right.

    15. DPDwarkesh Patel53:48

        ... what if they did something similar on fertility? But there doesn't seem to be some obvious, uh, analogous human rights violation they could do to like, um, increase fertility that, um, uh, that the West is not willing to try, right? It's just like, what are you gonna do that's analogous to-

    16. RHRichard Hanania54:01

        Sure. Uh, sure there is. You can, you know, ban all anti-natalist propaganda. You could make the education system just be nothing but, you know, about how you should have children to, you know, for the fatherland. You could, you know, tax single people and, uh-

    17. DPDwarkesh Patel54:13

        (laughs)

    18. RHRichard Hanania54:13

        ... unmarried people at 100% and, you know, give all their money to-

    19. DPDwarkesh Patel54:17

        Fair enough. (laughs)

    20. RHRichard Hanania54:17

        ... to hun- ... So they'd ... you know, there's tons of stuff you could do.

    21. DPDwarkesh Patel54:20

        Fair enough, yeah.

    22. RHRichard Hanania54:20

        You know, whether that's good, you know, whether the co- it's like something like zero COVID is where, you know, the fact that China did it is pretty impressive.

    23. DPDwarkesh Patel54:25

        Right.

    24. RHRichard Hanania54:25

        Whether it was worth it, you know, I think, you know, they've prob- they've probably gone overboard at this point, right? So you can debate whether it's worth it. But I think, you know, yeah, having a competent and authoritarian government sort of opens up different possibilities.

    25. DPDwarkesh Patel54:36

        Mm-hmm. By the way, so you think, um ... by what year is China's fertility gonna be 1.9? 2031, right?

    26. RHRichard Hanania54:41

        Uh, yes, I give it 2031. I mean, I'm the o- you know, I'm the only, um ... you know, I talk to other smart people and I'm sort of out on a limb here. And uh, you know, the other one, you know, other smart people, they, they either think it's impossible or they think the will is not gonna be there on the Chi- in the

18. 54:54 – 56:43

    Will increasing fertility be dysgenic?

    1. RHRichard Hanania54:54

       part of the Chinese government. But yeah, I take a different, uh, view and I explained it in my Substack.

    2. DPDwarkesh Patel54:58

       Mm-hmm. Uh, by the way, I'd make you a small bet on that if you're, uh, for willing. So, um-

    3. RHRichard Hanania55:02

       Okay.

    4. DPDwarkesh Patel55:02

       ... like, uh, I give you like even, uh, three to one odds that it's your favor.

    5. RHRichard Hanania55:05

       That, that it won't be 1.9?

    6. DPDwarkesh Patel55:06

       Yeah, yeah.

    7. RHRichard Hanania55:06

       Okay, well, 1., 1-

    8. DPDwarkesh Patel55:06

       It'll be less than 1.9, yeah.

    9. RHRichard Hanania55:07

       Okay. Well, 1.9 is my median, so if, uh, yeah, I'd, I'd have to take that.

    10. DPDwarkesh Patel55:11

        All right.

    11. RHRichard Hanania55:12

        (laughs)

    12. DPDwarkesh Patel55:12

        Yeah, yeah. Uh, we'll, we'll figure out the conditions later on.

    13. RHRichard Hanania55:15

        Sure.

    14. DPDwarkesh Patel55:15

        But, um-

    15. Um, oh, and then are you afraid that what these countries will do to actually increase fertility, if that'll have a dysgenic effect, right? So if it's just that, um, if it's cash transfers or it's just s- sort of economic incentive, you know, maybe it's the people on the margins who, um, like, desperately need the cash who are gonna have more babies-

    16. RHRichard Hanania55:33

        Yeah.

    17. DPDwarkesh Patel55:33

        ... and these are exactly the kind of people who, um, or, um, yeah, you know what I'm saying.

    18. RHRichard Hanania55:37

        Yeah. It's, that's an, that's an interesting, uh, question. I think that, you know, um, so if you, let's say the government, uh, used, went down the cultural path and just tried to propagandize people at, um, you know, the highest level to have as many kids as possible, right? Are smart people or stupid people more prone to propaganda? Um, I think y- the argument could be made that smart people are. I mean, you look at wokeness, I mean, smart people tend to accept it a lot more than, than stupid people. So maybe, maybe it's the opposite. Maybe the smartest people will, you know, will take the hint, you know, most clearly and change their behavior while the stupid people won't. Or maybe the stupid pe- you know, the stupider, um, you know, are just sort of more e-... It might be different kinds of propaganda appeal to different kinds of people. So something like this nationalistic might appeal disproportionately to stupid people or, you know, and something like wokeness and like more, you know, it's more idealistic and sort of divorced from reality might appeal to smart people, but I don't think, you know, the s- so that's one potential, you know, one potential issue. But I, I... Historically, um, if you look at, like, the way nationalism, uh, came about, it was the elites generally who, who c- were nationalistic first and then it sort of trickled

19. 56:43 – 59:22

    Will not having kids become cool?

    1. RHRichard Hanania56:43

       down to the masses. So there, I don't think there's necessarily a sort of a rule of human nature that anything sort of nationalist or right-wing propaganda necessarily only, uh, disproportionately appeals to the, um, to the less intelligent. Um, but it, it's a fascinating question, like what the, you know, compositional effects are, I wouldn't, I wouldn't hazard to predict that, you know. Like, just-

    2. DPDwarkesh Patel57:02

       (laughs)

    3. RHRichard Hanania57:02

       ... I think they could get the birth rate up, whether it'll be smart people or not smart people, I don't know.

    4. DPDwarkesh Patel57:05

       Right. It's pr- probably still net good in either case. Um, but it, I, I don't know about China, but if like, for example, if the government tried to actually change the culture in America to make it more pro-natalist, I could, like, very well imagine that it would have a counterproductive effect because then it would become countercultural or, um, or contrarian, um, to, like, oppose a g- right wing government and, like, not have kids, right?

    5. RHRichard Hanania57:25

       Yeah, yeah. So it depends on, it depends on, like, what, you know, what kind... So if like, yeah, if the Republican Party took power and said, "Oh, you know, we're, uh, our biggest thing is getting the fertility rate up" and it was, like, somebody like Trump who just triggered all educated people, yeah, that, that (laughs) could probably, that would probably backfire. Um, you know, i- i- so i- in so- someplace like China, I mean, I've seen some data that indicates that, like, the el- uh, elites and more educated are more nationalistic. So they could actually just, you know, they could be united in, in favor of, uh, you know, they could be very r- potentially receptive to such a message. Um, it's so complicated because like, it's like China... I think Chinese elites see themselves as part of a country that's competing with the US while US elites don't see themselves really as people competing with China. They see themselves as people, you know, competing with other Americans and... or competing with, you know, nature and trying to change the world or get s- you know, uh, social peace. So there's completely different dynamics there and this might be one reason why sort of, you know, the West has become left wing as it's become more dominant and that, like, elites don't have anybody to compete with or, you know, uh, try to feel, um, uh, try to defeat or feel, uh, feel superior to. Um, you know, the Western, uh, gap between, you know, uh, in recent dec- in, uh, the decades of the World War, World War II, you know, between the, uh, Westerners and, uh, and the rest of the world was so large that, you know, they weren't really seen as, you know, competition. Yeah.

    6. DPDwarkesh Patel58:41

       Um, and that, you know, might change with, you know, the rise of China, but I don't think it's, I don't think it's, like, really registered, um, as something that's fundamentally shaped people's outlook. Um, so yeah, it's, um, yeah, it's a, a, you know, the compositional, yeah, the compositional, um, you know, effects and sort of who's responsive to propaganda, you know, these are, these are fascinating questions. I, I, you know, I think it's hard to predict in advance. You just, you know, you just have to sort of, uh, (laughs) you, you just, you know, you watch what people do and then... You know, one thing the, um... Actually, you brought up the, uh, the economic point. So, like, there's, um, you know, there's... If you make, like, say a cr- cash transfer for each child, right? Like $10,000, for example, that matters a lot more to a poor person than a rich person. Now, if you do something like, um, you cut, um, how much

20. 59:22 – 1:02:02

    Advice for libertarians?

    1. DPDwarkesh Patel59:22

       they're paying in taxes, right? Um, and some... I think, uh, Qu- I think, uh, uh, I think they did this in Quebec and I think, um, a- the Hungarian sort of system works like this too, where if you're getting tax breaks that rich people pay more taxes, it could potentially be worth more to, um, to rich people, um, to have more kids. So it's, um, yeah, so it... The structure of how it's set up would also matter quite a bit. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. And, um, okay, final question. What should libertarians do, uh, in order to win? So, like, in the next 20, 30 years, uh, given your theory of politics, uh, what should the libertarian strategy be?

    2. RHRichard Hanania59:56

       They should hope for ridiculous polarization. They should hope for Americans to hate each other, uh, because libertarian ideas are unpopular. The only way you get them is you basically make them... uh, you take over the Republican Party and then they just win 50% of the time no matter what they do. Um, and they're gonna control certain states no matter what, and they have a lot more freedom to do unpopular things. Um, I think, I think that, I think that's... I think polarization is actually good for libertarianism and I think we might be, you know, we might actually, uh... they might have a good few decades, actually.

    3. DPDwarkesh Patel1:00:26

       Right. That also, by the way, explains very well why wokeness has been winning the last few decades, right?

    4. RHRichard Hanania1:00:29

       It's-

    5. DPDwarkesh Patel1:00:29

       Because increased polarization, they can get unpopular things passed.

    6. RHRichard Hanania1:00:32

       Yeah. Well, it's a cause and it's a consequence of polarization, right?

    7. DPDwarkesh Patel1:00:35

       Mm-hmm.

    8. RHRichard Hanania1:00:35

       So these things w- these things work together. Uh, I think what libertarians should do, and I think I- I'm doing a part of this, is they should really make clear to people... So, like, there's this idea on, like, the populist right that, like, we tried libertarianism and now wokeness has taken over it. And I'm like, "Okay, when did Republicans repeal the Civil Rights Act? Like, when did that happen? When did they defund public educa- education?"

    9. DPDwarkesh Patel1:00:53

       (laughs)

    10. RHRichard Hanania1:00:53

        Like, no. Uh, you actually haven't done-

    11. DPDwarkesh Patel1:00:55

        Right.

    12. RHRichard Hanania1:00:55

        ... anything close to libertarianism, and now you're making libertarianism the scapegoat-

    13. DPDwarkesh Patel1:00:59

        Right.

    14. RHRichard Hanania1:00:59

        ... um, for all these negative trends. So in my argument, uh, in my article, Woke Institutions as just Civil Rights Law, I try to make people, make people clear, like, the conservatives haven't been libertarian enough. They haven't even talked about this stuff or understood, um, the downstream effects of, uh, broad interpretation of civil rights law, um, on business and the wider culture. So, you know, I think people should have, you know, they, they should try... Because people really are motivated by anti-wokeness. Um, some people are motivated by the idea of small government and what it can do, but y- you can reach people who are motivated by anti-wokeness, and that's a lot of, a lot of people on the right. Um, and if you explain to them how libertarianism can help them in what they want to do anyway, I think that's a good strategy.

    15. DPDwarkesh Patel1:01:37

        Okay. All right. Well, uh, I... Those are all the questions I had. Richard, thanks so much for being on the podcast. This was fun.

    16. RHRichard Hanania1:01:43

        Pleasure. Yeah. It's been great. (instrumental music plays)

Episode duration: 1:02:02