Peter Attia MD174-The 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks: reflections on how they happened & lessons learned
CHAPTERS
- 0:02 – 7:21
Personal Memories of 9/11 and The Siege
Peter Attia and Lawrence Wright recount where they were on the morning of September 11th. Wright explains how his film The Siege and the 1998 embassy bombings had already put terrorism on his mind.
- •Wright heard about the attacks on NPR and suspected terrorism right away
- •His film The Siege, about terrorism in New York, flopped in 1998 but became the most rented movie after 9/11
- •A Cape Town bombing claimed by a group protesting the film's trailers left a scar on Wright
- •Attia was a surgical resident at Hopkins and stayed in the hospital for 48 hours
- •Attia had years of dreams about United 93 despite knowing no victims
- 7:21 – 12:49
How 9/11 Created a Security State and a Generational Divide
Wright reflects on the lost sense of invulnerability and the freedom Americans once had, such as wandering airports as a teen. He argues the security state is an abridgment of freedom Americans impose on themselves.
- •Young people have never known pre-9/11 America
- •Wright recalls touring a plane and an FAA tower as a teenager at Love Field
- •Attia shares his father bringing airline crews home for dinner
- •Wright says the security state means Americans are holding their own handcuffs
- 12:49 – 19:37
Wright Starts Reporting and Writing The Looming Tower
Wright explains how he knew immediately that this was the story of his lifetime and asked his New Yorker editor to put him to work. He describes reporting Kurt Ehelsen's escape from the World Trade Center, which led to his book contract.
- •Wright emailed David Remnick asking to be put to work
- •He was assigned to find human stories for The New Yorker's black issue
- •Kurt Ehelsen overslept his subway stop and survived the Trade Center
- •The book was due in a year but took five years
- •Attia and Wright discuss near-miss survival stories
- 19:37 – 21:33
Framing the Book: Al-Qaeda's History and the Intelligence Failure
Attia describes The Looming Tower as two parallel stories: the history of Al-Qaeda and the failure of intelligence. He disputes the claim that 9/11 was only a failure of imagination, and Wright agrees it was a failure of intelligence.
- •The book traces Al-Qaeda's roots back to Egypt
- •Attia cites Thomas Friedman's 'failure of imagination' framing
- •Attia and Wright both see a catastrophic intelligence failure
- •The discussion begins with Sayyid Qutb
- 21:33 – 34:54
Sayyid Qutb, Nasser, and Sadat's Egypt
Wright explains Sayyid Qutb's time in Greeley, Colorado, his clash with Nasser, and his execution as a martyr. He also describes living in Cairo during Nasser's death and funeral and the rise of the unlikely Sadat.
- •Qutb was repelled by America and wrote a critical article after returning
- •Nasser tried to co-opt the Muslim Brothers, and Qutb refused
- •Qutb's execution made him a symbol that inspired Zawahiri
- •Wright witnessed Nasser's funeral in Cairo in 1970
- •Sadat was underestimated but expelled the Soviets and made peace with Israel
- 34:54 – 53:34
Sadat's Prisoners, Takfir, and the Road to His Assassination
Wright explains why Sadat freed Nasser's prisoners and how radicalization in prison produced the idea of takfir. They cover the 1973 war, the pivotal year 1979, the Mecca attack, and the Al-Jihad assassination of Sadat.
- •Sadat saw himself as the first man of Islam and underestimated prison-bred fanaticism
- •Takfir, declaring others non-Muslims, became the permission for terrorism
- •The 1967 defeat pushed many Arabs toward radicalism
- •1979 brought the Soviet invasion, the Shah's fall, Camp David, and the Mecca attack
- •Zawahiri played a small role in the assassination while Attia recounts his uncle being present
- 53:34 – 1:00:30
Torture, Zawahiri's Rise, and the Turn to Afghanistan
The conversation turns to how torture and humiliation after Sadat's death produced Zawahiri's organization. Because Egypt's geography ruled out guerrilla warfare, the movement moved to Afghanistan, where the Soviet invasion galvanized the Muslim world.
- •Humiliation in prison either broke men or filled them with rage
- •Al-Jihad killed a schoolgirl named Shaima in a failed assassination attempt
- •Egypt's Nile geography prevented a guerrilla resistance
- •The US armed the mujahideen with Stingers to give the Soviets their own Vietnam
- 1:00:30 – 1:24:14
Osama bin Laden's Upbringing and Afghan Legend
Wright describes Mohammed bin Laden's rise from laborer to builder of the road unifying Saudi Arabia, and Osama's pious childhood as the son of a fourth wife. He covers Osama's role as fundraiser in Afghanistan and the legend he built around himself.
- •Mohammed bin Laden built the road across the Sarawat Mountains and became Saudi Arabia's most famous non-royal
- •Osama grew up pious, fasting twice a week, and was drawn toward the Muslim Brothers
- •Abdullah Azzam saw him as a cash machine
- •The Arab fighters accomplished little militarily but built a legend
- •CIA money flowed through Pakistani channels to radical warlords, and the Taliban emerged from madrassas
- 1:24:14 – 1:29:59
The Gulf War, American Troops, and Turning on America
Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and bin Laden's rejected offer to defend Saudi Arabia are discussed. The lingering presence of American forces humiliated bin Laden and redirected him from the near enemy to America, while Zawahiri focused on Egypt.
- •Bin Laden offered his Al-Qaeda men and his family's equipment to repel Iraq and was not taken seriously
- •He read a saying of the Prophet to mean only Sunnis of his stripe should live in the kingdom
- •American troops stayed after the war, which Wright says humiliated bin Laden
- •Bin Laden built a coalition and redirected nationalist groups toward international terror
- 1:29:59 – 1:43:28
Egypt, Democracy, Islam, and Conspiracy Theories
Attia asks about his parents' view that Egypt needs a strongman, and Wright admits he was wrong about Egypt being ready for democracy. They discuss why Egypt fell behind, the role of Islam and tyranny, and post-9/11 conspiracy thinking.
- •Wright was optimistic about Egyptian democracy and the 2011 uprising
- •A student asked him 'What happened to us?' and he answered that development takes a generational commitment
- •Wright says tyrants and literalist religious texts both push people toward submission
- •Indonesia, Turkey, and Tunisia are cited as different Muslim societies
- •An Egyptian woman explained her 9/11 conspiracy belief as asking who benefits
- 1:43:28 – 1:52:05
Bin Laden in Sudan and the Birth of Alec Station
Wright recounts Al-Qaeda's agricultural years in Sudan and his interview with a founding member. The US pressed Sudan to expel bin Laden with little evidence, and the CIA's Alec Station, led by Michael Scheuer, took shape.
- •Bin Laden was a large landowner in Sudan from 1992 to 1996
- •Wright's first Al-Qaeda interview was with Loay Bayazid, who took notes at the 1988 founding
- •The Sudan years were relatively peaceful for Al-Qaeda
- •Alec Station was an ignored 'Island of Lost Toys'
- •Wright credits Scheuer with correctly understanding Al-Qaeda's intentions
- 1:52:05 – 2:10:04
CIA vs. FBI: John O'Neill, Ali Soufan, and the Embassy and Cole Bombings
The discussion contrasts the FBI's law-enforcement mission with the CIA's intelligence role, introducing John O'Neill and Ali Soufan. It then covers the 1998 embassy bombings and the USS Cole attack, and why Americans paid little attention.
- •O'Neill was a flamboyant FBI agent heading counterterrorism in New York
- •Only six FBI agents spoke Arabic, and Soufan was one
- •The Cole attack showed the asymmetry between a powerful warship and a skiff
- •America's isolation made the bombings seem remote
- •Clinton's missile strikes on camps and a Sudanese factory were what bin Laden wanted
- 2:10:04 – 2:31:08
Hijackers in San Diego and the CIA's Concealment
Wright details how Mihdhar and Hazmi arrived in the US in January 2000 and were helped by Omar Bayoumi. The CIA knew they were in America yet withheld information from the FBI, which Wright calls obstruction of justice and the primary cause of the failure.
- •The two Saudis spoke little English and received help and money from Bayoumi's circle
- •The CIA knew by March 2000 that Al-Qaeda members were in the US
- •Soufan's requests for information about the Kuala Lumpur meeting were denied
- •The 'wall' kept FBI agents inside Alec Station from sharing what they saw
- •Wright says the CIA lost the hijackers, perhaps while pursuing a deal with the Saudis
- 2:31:08 – 2:47:36
Warnings, Personality Clashes, and O'Neill's Death
The conversation covers Atta, the hijackers' open lives in the US, Clarke's demotion, and the August 6th briefing. It also examines how personal feuds, including Bodine and O'Neill, derailed efforts, ending with O'Neill's death in the World Trade Center.
- •The hijackers lived openly using real names
- •Richard Clarke was demoted, and Condoleezza Rice appeared not to take Al-Qaeda seriously
- •The August 6, 2001 briefing warned of an attack
- •Ambassador Bodine's clash with O'Neill led to his removal from Yemen
- •O'Neill left the FBI to head security at the World Trade Center and died there
- 2:47:36 – 3:08:18
Accountability, Saudi Questions, and Soufan's Aftermath
Wright and Attia discuss the missed chances before 9/11, George Tenet's role, and the lack of accountability. They also cover the suppressed 28 pages, theories about the Saudi role, and Ali Soufan's work after the attacks.
- •Wright says that had the CIA worked with the FBI, 9/11 would not have happened
- •No one at the CIA was charged, and Tenet received the Medal of Freedom
- •Wright speculates about a Saudi effort to run the hijackers
- •Richard Clarke alone took public responsibility
- •Soufan solved the case from Yemen after finally receiving the Kuala Lumpur photographs
- 3:08:18 – 3:25:24
Lessons from 9/11 and the Future of Terrorism
Attia asks about the future of asymmetric warfare, and Wright warns of growing Al-Qaeda affiliates, drones, and biological threats. They close on whether America squandered the opportunity of 9/11.
- •Al-Qaeda grew from a few hundred to an estimated 30 to 40,000 members with affiliates
- •Wright worries about drones, bioweapons, and other terror groups
- •He calls the pandemic an intelligence failure
- •Wright says the consequences of America's response exceeded the attacks
- •He hopes for a return to the country America once was
