Modern WisdomFixing The Most Violent Countries On Earth | Rachel Kleinfeld
CHAPTERS
- 0:00 – 2:53
Why study violence: the gap between what works and how to implement it
Chris introduces Rachel Kleinfeld and her work advising governments on conflict and governance. Rachel explains that while research offers many tactics to reduce violence, the missing piece is how to get corrupt or captured institutions to adopt them—prompting her to write A Savage Order.
- •Think-tank work vs. actionable change on real-world violence
- •Conference of violence experts reveals an implementation gap
- •Lots is known about tactics (policing, anti-gang strategies), less about political uptake
- •Core question: how to make corrupt/complicit systems actually reform
- 2:53 – 4:52
Choosing global case studies: comparing places that improved vs. deteriorated
Rachel outlines how she selected paired comparisons across continents to understand why some democracies reduce violence while similar ones spiral. The contrasts—Italy, Georgia/Tajikistan, Nigeria/Ghana, Mexico/Colombia, Indian states, and U.S. history—set up the book’s pattern-finding approach.
- •Initial plan: many small lessons across many types of violence
- •Paired comparisons: Sicily vs. Naples; Mexico vs. Colombia; Nigeria vs. Ghana
- •Post-Soviet contrast: Georgia’s improvement vs. Tajikistan’s authoritarian slide
- •India state comparison: Bihar vs. Jharkhand on insurgency/crime
- •U.S. South vs. Wild West as a key revealing case
- 4:52 – 6:07
A unifying insight: violent democracies aren’t always ‘weak states’
Rachel describes discovering recurring themes across countries and explains why she focused only on democracies. She introduces the conventional ‘weak state’ view—then contrasts it with evidence that some violent democracies have functioning institutions but choose not to use them against certain perpetrators.
- •Cross-country pattern recognition from extensive interviews and research
- •Scope choice: democracies only (autocracies behave differently)
- •Common assumption: violence persists because the state lacks capacity
- •Turning point: realizing capacity can exist alongside deliberate tolerance
- •Sets up the distinction between weak vs. complicit states
- 6:07 – 8:37
Wild West vs. Reconstruction South: weak capacity versus state complicity
Through a Theodore Roosevelt story, Rachel illustrates the logistical difficulty of enforcing law in genuinely weak-capacity settings, which fuels vigilante justice. She then contrasts this with the post–Civil War U.S. South, where courts and police existed but were complicit—allowing political violence to reshape power.
- •TR posse story shows why citizens resort to self-help in weak-capacity regions
- •Typical aid logic: train/security-assistance to ‘bulk up’ weak forces
- •Reconstruction South had institutions—problem was political choice
- •White supremacist violence used to suppress Black voting and opposition
- •Impunity as the key currency: perpetrators not prosecuted by design
- 8:37 – 13:57
Electoral violence and ‘implicit deals’: how impunity becomes strategy
Rachel explains how political actors leverage non-state violence through tacit arrangements: no direct funding required, just protection from prosecution. She connects U.S. historical examples to modern parallels like Colombia’s paramilitary-cartel links and Guatemala’s anti-corruption backlash.
- •Violence spikes around elections; intimidation reshapes turnout and outcomes
- •Parties incorporated violence into electoral strategy in Reconstruction era
- •Congress voided elections due to violence; Supreme Court rulings limited federal action
- •Colombia example: campaigns funded by paramilitaries tied to drug cartels
- •Guatemala example: UN-backed anti-corruption effort expelled when it neared elites
- 13:57 – 18:12
What ‘weak democracy’ looks like: polarization + inequality + denial
Asked what people mean by weak democracy, Rachel emphasizes polarization and inequality as the enabling conditions. She describes how partisan distrust blocks accountability (Italy’s mafia/political bargains) and how inequality lets the middle class rationalize violence as distant, deserved, or irrelevant.
- •Polarization undermines credible scrutiny and enables denial of wrongdoing
- •Italy: mutual delegitimization (mafia ties vs. Soviet ties) stalls action
- •Inequality separates lived realities; violence concentrated among marginalized
- •Middle-class narratives: ‘bad part of town,’ ‘criminals killing criminals’
- •Low participation among the poor increases the middle class’s political weight
- 18:12 – 23:44
The ‘nasty 2.0’ escalation: privatized security, politicized police, and alternative order
Rachel explains how the system worsens when violence continues: the middle class buys protection while the state politicizes security forces to preserve impunity. This creates corruption, death squads, and a vacuum filled by gangs/insurgents who offer protection and legitimacy—sometimes as ‘Robin Hood’ figures like Escobar.
- •Private security proliferates and can outnumber police (Central America examples)
- •Politicization of police/security drives good officers out; morale collapses
- •Extrajudicial ‘white hat’ violence leads to death squads and further criminality
- •Citizens can’t trust police; reporting crime becomes dangerous
- •Criminal groups provide governance/charity to build social support (Escobar example)
- 23:44 – 28:45
How countries recover: the three-step pathway (deals, inclusion, then targeted force)
Rachel shifts to solutions, outlining a recurring recovery pattern. Change begins when violence reaches the middle class, which can choose repression (often backfiring) or inclusion (harder, usually requiring social movements), followed by political leaders executing a difficult three-part strategy.
- •Trigger: violence spills into middle-class life, forcing political attention
- •Bad fork: ‘mano dura’/iron-fist policies and mass incarceration worsen gangs
- •Better fork: vote for a more inclusive, less unequal state—often via social movements
- •Three steps leaders must navigate: dirty deals, inclusion-building, then enforcement
- •Division of labor: presidents/mayors may split roles (e.g., Colombia)
- 28:45 – 31:09
Reformers as high-energy risk-takers—and the danger of authoritarian relapse
Rachel discusses the personality type that tackles ‘basket case’ states: hyperactive, ego-driven leaders capable of decisive action. But the same traits can drift into authoritarianism as they use gray tactics and react to resistance—requiring populations and outsiders to know when to withdraw support.
- •Successful reform leaders often operate at extreme tempo (Georgia’s ‘Energizer Bunny’)
- •High ego and confidence can be necessary to attempt large-scale turnaround
- •Moral gray zones (dirty deals, hard crackdowns) create slippery slopes
- •Pattern: reform rises, then leaders can become autocratic and must be replaced
- •External actors should support early reform but not cling past the turning point
- 31:09 – 34:22
A frontline research story: interviewing ‘Nacho’ under assassination threat in Colombia
Rachel recounts trying to meet an investigative journalist with deep cartel and paramilitary knowledge who had survived numerous assassination attempts. The interview took place on a day his state-provided bodyguard failed to show—an ominous sign in Colombia—highlighting the personal risk borne by truth-tellers.
- •Investigative journalists as critical sources on complex violence ecosystems
- •‘Nacho’ targeted repeatedly by cartels, paramilitaries, and state actors
- •State-funded bodyguards in Colombia—and the signal when one doesn’t appear
- •Conducting high-stakes fieldwork while pregnant
- •Journalists as ‘canaries in the coal mine’ for corruption and violence
- 34:22 – 38:19
Advice for the U.S.: start with political equality, not just economic fixes
In response to a question about advising Trump, Rachel argues that change is unlikely if leaders are complicit with divisive bases. She pivots to where leverage exists—state-level leadership and structural reforms—emphasizing that political equality (votes that count, reduced capture) enables durable economic inclusion.
- •If leaders benefit from the violent/captured order, persuasion has limited effect
- •Trump’s incentive structure tied to nativist identity politics and resentment
- •Federalism means states can still drive reform even when national politics can’t
- •Political equality precedes economic equality: real voting power forces responsiveness
- •Focus areas: lobbying power, campaign finance, and reducing systemic capture
- 38:19 – 39:32
Campaign finance as a system problem: how money reshapes priorities and perception
Rachel explains why expensive elections create a cycle where politicians spend disproportionate time with wealthy donors, subtly adopting their frames and priorities. She argues this isn’t mostly about cartoonish corruption, but about incentives that normalize inequality and erode public trust.
- •‘Floodgates’ of money make U.S. elections unusually expensive
- •Politicians aren’t typically personally corrupt; they’re trapped in fundraising demands
- •Time allocation: constant exposure to wealthy donors shapes worldview and policy
- •Public perception: looks like pure corruption even when driven by structure
- •Implication: reform requires changing rules/incentives, not just individual integrity
- 39:32 – 41:04
Wrap-up: where to find the book and follow Rachel’s work
Chris closes by recommending A Savage Order and inviting a future discussion comparing U.S. and U.K. political systems. Rachel shares her website and offers to provide additional resources for deeper exploration.
- •Pointers to Rachel’s work and online presence
- •Offer to share further reading/resources
- •Tease of a future episode on U.S. vs. U.K. politics
- •Conversation framed as serious but ultimately solution-oriented
