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“This Will Be The Most Violent Election Of Our Lifetime” - Robert Pape

Robert Pape is a political scientist, professor at the University of Chicago, and author.

Chris WilliamsonhostRobert Papeguest

Sep 24, 20261h 43mWatch on YouTube ↗

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CHAPTERS

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Chapter summaries

America’s biggest threat: mass mainstream support for political violence
Pape argues the top threat to the U.S. is not foreign enemies or fringe militias, but tens of millions of Americans who now see political violence as justified. He frames this as a historically unusual period where support for violence is embedded in everyday politics.
- •Threat is mainstream normalization of political violence, not isolated extremist cells
- •Support for violence changes the scale and likelihood of real-world attacks
- •This period is distinct from routine historical episodes of sporadic violence
- •Sets up the concept of a new paradigm he calls “violent populism”
Why this moment is historically different: assassination attempts and violent protest waves
The conversation contrasts past unrest (Civil War, 1960s) with today’s intensity and frequency. Pape lists recent assassinations/attempts and ties them to broader spikes in protest-related violence (George Floyd, Jan 6, campus unrest).
- •Today resembles rare peak eras (1920s, 1960s) but is new for most living Americans
- •Multiple high-profile assassination attempts and political killings cited
- •2020 George Floyd protests were mostly peaceful but included a significant violent minority
- •Jan 6 and other events illustrate escalation from sentiment to action
Populism vs violent populism: the key difference is mass approval of force
Pape separates ordinary populism—anger at “the establishment” expressed through politics or peaceful protest—from violent populism, where significant portions of the public condone force. That approval becomes a catalyst for real attacks by motivated individuals or mobs.
- •Ordinary populism can be peaceful and electorally productive
- •Violent populism = mainstream support for political violence
- •Support for violence encourages and legitimizes real-world violence
- •The shift marks a structural change in American politics
New survey numbers: political-violence support spikes heading into the midterms
Pape reveals fresh survey findings from the University of Chicago Project on Security and Threats. He reports a sharp jump in anti-Trump violence support and substantial support for pro-Trump coercive violence, warning the data ‘screams’ about risk around the midterms and certification.
- •21st national survey shows unprecedented increases vs prior waves
- •25% of adults support force to prevent Trump from being president (44% of Democrats)
- •Survey experiments suggest many respondents mean assassination or riot-level violence
- •16% support Trump using the military to suppress Democratic protesters
- •Combined, he estimates ~100 million Americans support some form of political violence
Right vs left: why ‘who is more violent’ depends on timeframe and what you count
Chris raises claims that domestic threats skew right-wing; Pape argues headline conclusions hinge on start dates and narrow definitions (e.g., lone-wolf cases excluding crowd violence). He contends violence has become more symmetrical in the last decade and is now largely pro-Trump vs anti-Trump/anti-anti dynamics.
- •Many studies count lone-wolf incidents and omit crowd events like Jan 6 or George Floyd unrest
- •Long windows (e.g., since 1990) skew right; post-2015 looks more balanced
- •Nature of political violence changed markedly over the past 10 years
- •Current conflict pattern is often pro-Trump vs anti-Trump escalation cycles
How peaceful protests turn violent: ‘splinter groups’ and the wildfire pattern
Pape explains how large protests frequently remain peaceful for most participants while smaller subsets escalate into property destruction and clashes. He describes a repeatable pattern across cities and events—especially after dark in 2020—creating conflicting narratives about what ‘really happened.’
- •2020 protests: peaceful daytime events often shifted to violence after most left
- •Small percentages become large absolute numbers when participation is massive
- •Violence often driven by splinter groups rather than the main body of marchers
- •Peaceful protesters feel their message is hijacked by nighttime escalation
January 6 in detail: crowd dynamics, triggering moments, and why a minority drove the breach
Pape walks through the timeline from Trump’s call-to-rally to the Ellipse speech and the movement toward the Capitol. He emphasizes how a relatively small fraction became the violent spearhead, while leadership signals and key moments (like the Pence post) acted as accelerants.
- •~120,000 attended; ~10,000 surrounded the Capitol; ~1,600 actively breached and fought police
- •Crowd momentum built during the speech and intensified with focus on Congress/Pence
- •Breaching tactics included improvised weapons (flagpoles, bike racks) against police
- •Delay in calling people off allowed violence to persist; later glorification/pardons radicalized parts of the movement
A third arena of collective violence: post–Oct 7 campus protests
Beyond 2020 and Jan 6, Pape highlights campus unrest following Oct 7 through spring 2024 as another instance of violent populism on the left. He notes it was generally less destructive than 2020 but still created fear and uncertainty among students and staff.
- •Campus protest wave adds a third example of collective political violence
- •Pape references large surveys of undergrads and adults to profile participants
- •Violence was less severe than 2020 property destruction but still threatening
- •Reinforces that the current era features violence on both right and left
The new archetype: political-violence supporters are often educated, middle-class, and employed
Pape argues the classic stereotype (young, rural, unemployed militia member) is outdated. Using Jan 6 case files and profiles of would-be assassins, he claims many participants are professionals with families, assets, and reputations—people with ‘something to lose.’
- •Old stereotype fit 1990–2014; shifted significantly after Trump era and Jan 6
- •Jan 6 dataset shows many business owners and professionals; only ~10% militia-affiliated
- •Examples include affluent or highly educated perpetrators and would-be assassins
- •Geography often suburban rather than impoverished rural areas
Why ordinary people radicalize: fear of losing everything and the ‘silent majority’ problem
Pape attributes radicalization to perceived existential threats: both sides believe the other will ‘zero out’ their rights, status, or future. While most Americans oppose violence, he argues they lack leaders and institutions that consistently channel anti-violence norms into politics.
- •Radicalization driven by belief the other party will permanently harm one’s way of life
- •Both sides feel existential stakes rather than routine policy disagreements
- •Surveys show ~65–70% abhor political violence but feel politically homeless
- •Lack of strong elite pushback allows normalization to cascade; podcasts sometimes fill the void
From sentiment to action: the spark, focal points, and evidence of overlap
Chris probes whether supporting violence predicts committing it; Pape uses the wildfire analogy—dry tinder needs a spark. He points to focal points (elections, certification days) and to perpetrator statements/manifestos showing they expect social approval from a broader community.
- •Normalization alone may sit dormant until a trigger event activates it
- •Elections and certification moments are predictable focal points for escalation
- •Examples: Pelosi attacker apologizing for failing to kill Pelosi; manifestos seeking community validation
- •Supportive audiences provide perceived legitimacy and encouragement for volatile individuals
Extremists vs sympathizers: why mass approval is more dangerous than small violent fringes
Pape argues sympathizers and casual endorsers matter more than the few who commit violence. He uses international and historical parallels (IRA, Weather Underground) to show that militant campaigns grow out of perceived community support—and collapse when support evaporates.
- •Sympathizers create the permissive environment that fuels recruitment and action
- •Northern Ireland example: public support preceded IRA growth
- •Weather Underground example: violence escalated based on expected support, then faded when support failed to materialize
- •Everyday ‘jokes’ endorsing violence contribute to normalization
Is violent populism uniquely American? Early signs in other democracies (Germany, Canada, UK)
Pape says the U.S. is ahead of a trend appearing in other mature democracies, not just unstable states. He recounts advising German leaders after a Reichstag storming episode and notes allied governments’ concern about similar underlying social pressures.
- •Trend shows up in mature democracies (Germany, Britain, France, Canada) at lower intensity
- •Germany saw Reichstag storming and an alleged assassination plot later rolled up
- •Pape describes direct briefings to foreign leaders and cross-national parallels
- •Underlying drivers are broader Western social changes, though U.S. dynamics are acute
Core drivers: demographic ‘tipping point’ and wealth shift to the top 1%
Pape identifies two primary structural forces: America’s transition toward a white-minority democracy and a decades-long concentration of wealth among the top 1%. He links these to ‘existential politics’—fear that the other side will permanently change the country and take away one’s future.
- •Demographic shift: non-Hispanic white share falling (1990 ~76% → today ~57% → projected <50%)
- •Belief in ‘replacement’ strongly correlates with pro-Trump violence support; mirror beliefs correlate with anti-Trump violence support
- •Wealth concentration: top 1% share rises (late 1980s ~17% → recent ~26%), creating a ‘negative-sum’ perception
- •Two drivers interact to intensify zero-sum, identity-based conflict
The domestic escalation trap: why the midterms and certification could be the next flashpoint
Pape lays out a three-stage cycle: razor-thin results create a legitimacy shock, certification becomes the focal-point confrontation, and violence can evolve into prolonged opposition. He warns conditions resemble a ‘loaded’ scenario regardless of which party loses—especially with limited elite restraint and discussion of military suppression.
- •Stage 1: close elections generate legitimacy crises and accusations of cheating
- •Stage 2: certification/seating winners (e.g., Jan 6) becomes the confrontation point
- •Stage 3: aftermath can produce prolonged violent opposition rather than one-day events
- •Pape expresses high concern (>50%) and cites past warnings that later materialized
- •He argues outcomes wouldn’t change much if the other party had won—drivers are structural
Foreign manipulation and who benefits: modest amplification, major beneficiaries (Russia/China)
The discussion evaluates whether unrest is self-generated or manufactured by adversaries. Pape argues foreign actors can amplify existing divides but can’t easily invent them; he uses Iranian propaganda videos and survey patterns to claim polarization is domestically rooted, while Russia and China benefit strategically from U.S. distraction.
- •Cambridge studies suggest foreign influence is modest—amplifies issues rather than creating them
- •Iran ‘Lego videos’ illustrate propaganda attempts with limited evidence of major attitude shifts
- •Iran war opinion splits track preexisting domestic cleavages rather than rallying around the flag
- •Russia and China benefit most from U.S. internal division and reduced strategic focus
Trump’s role vs deeper forces—and where to follow Pape’s work
Pape estimates relative contributions: structural social changes as the majority cause, with Trump and social media as major but secondary accelerants. The episode closes with Pape sharing where to find his ongoing analysis and resources.
- •Pape’s weighting: ~50% social changes, ~25% Trump, ~25% social media/other factors
- •Deplatforming individuals doesn’t remove underlying drivers
- •New leaders on both sides rise by channeling these social-change conflicts
- •Directs listeners to his YouTube channel and Substack for continued coverage

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