Sarah Paine - Why Putin and Xi can't escape geography

Paine’s first discriminator is defensive feasibility: maritime states can often secure themselves primarily with naval power, while continental states cannot avoid land threats and therefore must prioritize large armies and border control. This difference cascades into distinct economic priorities and political structures.

Drawing on Mahan’s prerequisites (moat, transport grid, reliable sea egress, dense coastal commerce population, stable institutions), she argues China and Russia lack key enabling conditions for a true maritime paradigm—especially secure access to the open ocean and institutional stability. Maritime ambitions without these foundations become brittle in wartime.

Continental security is depicted as a harsh logic of contiguous threats, buffer zones, sequential expansion, and frequent overreach—because neighbors are both the immediate danger and the route to strategic depth. Paine connects this to modern tactics like destabilization, misinformation, and opportunistic “jackal” behavior to weaken neighbors before absorbing influence or territory.

Maritime orders center on oceans as commons and prosperity through trade; they depend on open sea lanes, rules, and institutions rather than territorial conquest. She frames Britain’s anti-Napoleon “elephant hunting” as a template: protect home economic growth, blockade enemy trade, fund/arm a continental ally, fight in peripheral theaters, and avoid the enemy’s main army until it’s exhausted.

The Industrial Revolution shifts the “currency of power” from land to industry, commerce, and networked trade—making sea transport dramatically cheaper and more scalable than land routes. Examples like Suez closure-driven supertankers and containerization show how technology and standards bodies can reshape geopolitics by slashing transaction costs.